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Abstract 
This thesis examines political mobilisation into secular groups within Palestinian refugee 
Cfu'1lpS in Lebanon. It focuses on context and identity in order to fmd out why and how 
Palestinians in the camps mobilise into these groups. The thesis uses a framework that 
incorporates three levels of &"'1al)'sis: structural.; orga..~isational.; and individuaL P .. n 
ethnographic methodology is deployed involving interviews and participant observation in 
refugee camps in Lebanon. L'1e thesis st~rts b)' looking at what sort of theoretical 
framework is necessary in order to understand the three key levels of analysis, including 
literature focusing on opportunities and constraints; human needs; resources; recruitment; 
social construction; and identity. The next focus IS on context, looking at both the legal 
Issues su..~ounding reft!gees - international, regional and local - as \vell as the historicai 
context. The last three chapters examine the three levels of analysis individually, using them 
in cor~unction \"'1th ethnographic research data to fmd out 'Vh)l and ho\v Palestinians in the 
camps mobilise. The conclusion shows that, contrary to what one would imagine from most 
of the mobilisation literature~ the Palestinians in the ca~ps are not mobilising as \vouid be 
expected. Tnstead the ethnographic research results found that the political groups within the 
camps are not as politically and militarily active as \vould be presumed. rVlobi!isation into 
these political groups is happening for different reasons than in previous findings - focusing 
instead on solida..rit'j and social issues. This change has happened for contextual and 
financial reasons, including the end of the Civil War and the Palestinian Revolution m 
Lebanon, as \veH as a severe lack of resources available to the political groups. The research 
results found that although there is still mobilisation into the political groups, there was also 
disillusionment among many youths at the political groups' inability to facilitate their return 
to Palestine from Lebanon, as well as dismay at what they saw as disunity between the 
Palestinian political groups. 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis could not have been written without the encouragement and support of many 
people. I would like to tha1lk the people of Shatila camp, who welcomed me to their camp 
and homes, and supported me throughout my trips to Lebanon. Shatila was the first camp I 
visited, 311d where most of t~e ethnographic research took place, and I am forever th31mlli 
and grateful for their support, encouragement and friendship. 1 would more specifically like 
to thank Abu Moujahed for arranging most of the interviews I had with the Palestinian 
political leaders. I would also very much like to thank Salah for accompanying me to many 
of these interviews. A big tha..'1k you to my 'extended family' in Shatila camp; the fa..'Ilily of 
Abu Samer. Words cannot explain how much I appreciate their kindness and generosity. To 
everyone I visited in Bourj., Bin el Helweh and Mar Elias., as well as Robin Cook., Abdullah 
Farhat, and Professor Khashan - thank you so much for welcoming me and your honesty. 
A big thank you goes to my supervisor, Oliver Richmond, for his help, encouragement and 
patience. To my mother and friends who should be family; Anna, Bj0rn, Cecilie, Elena, 
Ellen, Inger, Jean-Luc, John, Kathrine, Katy, Line, Maroula and Maya - thank you for 
encouraging me for the last four years. Specifically related to my trips to Lebanon 1 would 
like to th311k Wiebke and Yousset~ for their support and friendship. 
To my friends in St Andrews; Anthony, Costa, Fiona S, and John - thank you so much. A 
big thank you to Su for her encouragement as well as the good advice at the start of the 
thesis (without which it would not have happened). Thatik you to Caron for her friendship 
(md kindness. AnoL'ler thank you to Chandra for her friendship and looking L'lrough my 
legal chapter. Another big thank you goes to Fiona Oviatt for her ki.'1dness and help. To all 
other members of staff in the School ofInternational Relations - thank you. 
Finally, a special thank you goes to Anders Strindberg, for his support, particularly during 
the early phases of this project. It was his encouragement that led me to pursue this topic 
atid for t~at I am so grateful. 
ii 
List of Abbreviations 
ALF - Arab Liberation Front 
AlVlAL - A..fwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnanija 
At~lv1- Arab Nationalist Movement 
AOLP - Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine 
APF - Alliance ofPaiestinian Forces 
AU - African Union 
CYC - Children and Youth Centre, Shatiia Camp 
DFLP - Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
DPRA - Directorate General of Palestinian Refugee Affairs 
ESM - Economic Survey Mission 
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDF - Israeli Defence Force 
LNM - Lebanese National Movement 
NSM - New Social Movement 
OAP - OrgCLtllsation of Arab Palestine 
OAU - Organisation for African Unity 
P A _ Pa1est;n;an Authorlty 
..L.L"""\.. .I...L.L.l...LJ.. '-.l..l. .1...1.. 
PDFLP - Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PFLP-GC - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Corr...mand 
PLF - Palestine Liberation Front 
PLO - Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PNSF - Palestine National Salvation Front 
III 
POLP - Popular Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine 
PPSF - Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 
PRC - Palestinian Retu...rn Centre 
R.M - Resomce Mobilisation 
UA..~ - Upited Arab Republic 
UDF.LL~ - Universal Declaration of Hu..11lan Rights 
UNCCP - United Nations Conciliation COlTIIIlission on Palestine 
IJ"NnCR - Upited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
lJ1\TRWA - United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
\VHO - World HealLh Organisation 
IV 
Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
List of Abbreviations 
Introduction 
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and Mobilisation 
Definition of key terms 
Mobilisation 
Identit'j 
Social Movements 
Organisation of the Thesis 
PA..~TONE 
Chapter 1: Theories of Mobilisation 
Introduction 
The Breakdown of Sociai Arrangements, Emotions and Deprivations 
Smelser m,d Collective Behaviour 
Gurr and Relative Deprivation 
Human Needs Theory 
The Resource Mobilisation Approach 
The Rational Actor 
The Political Model 
The Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach 
Why We Need to h,clude Another Approach 
New Social Movement Theory 
Melucci a..'1d the Cultural 
Touraine and Sociological Intervention 
Why NSM Theory Does Not Give a Full Picture Either 
Social Construction 
Collective Action and Fra..'11e A.'lalysis 
Collective Identity 
The other and the looking-glass self 
Constructing Recruitment 
Concluding Remarks on Social Construction 
Conclusion: How are we to examine mobilisation? 
The Structural 
The Organisation 
The People 
v 
1 
11 
111 
1 
9 
9 
11 
13 
16 
18 
19 
20 
23 
26 
34 
35 
39 
41 
43 
45 
47 
49 
52 
53 
54 
57 
59 
62 
63 
65 
65 
66 
68 
Chapter 2: The Methodology 
Introduction 
The Method 
Case Study 
Ett-J1ography - L~terviev/ing 
The Post-modem Debate 
Potential Problems of Method during the Field Work 
Suspicion 
Seduction 
Conclusion: Researcher Reflexivity 
PART TWO 
Chapter 3: The Legal Context 
LTJtroduction 
International Law 
Who is a Refugee? 
Who is a Palestinian Refugee? 
Nationality and Statelessness 
Right of Retllm 
Compensation 
Regional Arrangements 
Arab League Arrangements 
Laws and Regulations Governing Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4: The Historical Context of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
70 
72 
72 
75 
79 
82 
82 
83 
85 
89 
92 
92 
97 
102 
106 
111 
116 
119 
127 
133 
Introduction 135 
al-nakba: The 1948 War 136 
The Voluntary Exodus? 139 
The Palestinian Resistance: The Importance of the 1967 and 1970 September \Alar 147 
The Palestiniat, Resistance Prior to the 1967 War 147 
The Effect of the 1967 War 150 
The Effect of Black September 159 
Arriving in Lebanon: History of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 163 
Significant Events Prior to the Lebanese Civil War 166 
The Sta.rt of the Lebanese Civil War 169 
The 1982 Israeli Invasion 171 
AWu\L and tt,e War ofthe Ounps 174 
Post-Taif 179 
Conclusion: Understanding the Palestinian Situation in Lebanon 187 
VI 
PART THREE 
Chapter 5: The Structures Surrounding the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
Lrltroduction 
Governmental Poiicies Towards Refugees and tawteen 
UNRWA's hllpact 
Human Needs? 
Themes Resulting from the Structures and their Relation to Mobilisation 
Chapter 6: The Organisations and Recruitment 
Introduction 
Incentives? The function of the political groups in the refugee camps 
Popular Committees 
p1.ctivities 
Family 
The Common Good 
No Strategy Needed? 
Themes of Recruitment 
Chapter 7: Identity of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
Introduction: The Framing of the Situation 
The Collective Self 
Who am I and Who are we? 
Povert'j, suffering and endurance: self\vithin the fiIture 
Foreigners: self through. the looking-glass 
Framing of the 'other' -why are we here? 
Incentives or Disincentives? Peop!e' s perceptions of the Political Groups 
Conclusion: Do collective action frames and identity encourage mobilisation? 
Conclusion: The Dilemmas of Mobilisation 
Introduction 
How was Mobilisation in the Camps Examined? 
Context: Legal, Historical and Overarching Societal Factors 
Dilerr.mas of IVIobilisation 
Channels of Mobilisation 
The Generational Shift 
Conceptual Problems? 
Two Indirect Issues 
Conclusion 
The Palestinians in Lebanon: From Peasants to Revolutionaries to a State of 
Paralysis? 
Selected Bibliography 
Vll 
190 
191 
208 
217 
224 
228 
234 
235 
238 
243 
249 
252 
256 
260 
262 
263 
265 
272 
275 
287 
297 
31\A VLf 
305 
306 
309 
309 
"'" 
-'1-' 
314 
320 
325 
325 
329 
Introduction 
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and Mobilisation: 
In 1993 an era came to an end when Yasir Arafat, chainnan of the Palestine 
T ., . 0 . . (PT 0)· 1 1 D 1 • ,.. n.. . 1 • h h T 1· LlOeratlOn rgamsatlOn ~ L ,slgnea tne I eClaratlOn or rnnClples wIL Le ~srae 1 
Pn·mp ]I.;I'n'ste" i.,.h.,lK Rab,n The ne"l""at'An of"P";n"1·p1pS ,..,.,,.'Kea' thp pn,1 of"-f.orly-
..... ..L .. ..LV l't..l...1 .... .J...J.. '" ..L., ..i...L....i.a..(.i...[..L .L.J...I. .. ..L.I..J.. LJ _.a.u...i. \..1........... ..l...I. ..L.A..I. v .... ..LV ......... "".1. ..... ..LV _..L.l."-II. ..L..L .... "-
five years of denial of each others' existence and the start of further discussions 
about peace agreements to come. The PLO wpich initially arose as a refugee 
organisation based in exile, has now returned to Palestinian soil. However, the 
famous handshake outside the vVhite House was reluctant on both parts. What was 
considered a breakthrough has oPJy led to more unhappiness. After several more 
agreements it has become very apparent that these so-called peace agreements are 
not securing peace for anyone: Palestinian or Israeli. 
This IS the scene where this t..hesis has its beginl1i11g. This t..hesis IS set in the 
Palestinian. refugee C~TIlpS m Lebanon and researches why ~Tld how Palestipian 
refugees \vitrin these Ca..T11pS JOIn political groups.. Much of the literature on 
Palestinian refugees in Leba.non has a different historical context: that of the 
~ 1 .... R 1" 1 h T 1 "'- ·1 l.l:T 2 ralestmlan ~ eVOlUtIon or Le Leoanese LIVll VY ar. 
1 The Palestinian Revolution refers to the time following the 1967 War when the Palestitlian 
Resistmce was particularly active. The Palestitlian Revolution in Lebanon can be understood to have 
finished in the years 1982 and 1983 when the PLO was forced to move from Beirut. 
2 The Lebfulese Civil War had two disfInct phases in an otherwise complicated history: the years 
1975 to 1976 and then again 1978, with fighting going through various stages until the Taif 
Agreement was signed in 1989. 
1 
There are two major authors dealing with the Palestinian experience during these 
years a..lld as well as the years prior to the Revolution, They are Rosemary Sayigh 
and Julie Peteet, 
Rosemary Sayigh's first, and la.l1dmark, work Palestinians: From Peasants to 
Revolutionariei is based on what she calls 'peoples pistories' and focuses on issues 
re1atpr1 to thp 11'f'p 1pa' "hy thP rpfugpes in thP -t.orrner Pa1esI'ine the exor111s the reality 
.L .I. ....... u. r.. '-.l.v ............... ..l.V U ".1...1. ...... .l. ....... ..L V .1..1..1. .L.A. ........ ..L .1..1..1..1. .1..1..1. .1..1..1.., ".1..1. .L u.u.., ... .I..L .L .l..L .... 
of their new life in the refugee Ca.111pS in Lebanon prior to the Revolution, as well as 
focusing on the effects of the creation of the PLO on the refugees Eving in the 
C3....q}PS. Prior to the Paiestipja..'l Revolution she finds that the major themes in the 
lives of the refugees include 'loss of respect', 'social isolation', 'political repression' 
and 'fmnily disruption', Her other book Too j\lany Enemies: T.he Palestinian 
Experience in Lebanon4 is based on the p,istOf'j of Shatila camp with particular 
emphasis on events following the 1982 Israeli invasion and ending with the 'Battle 
of the Ca..rnps', Again, this work is based on oral pistories and the main themes that 
an'sp from thP Palpstinian pxperipnce a'Uf1'ng t'npsp ypars is the loss Af' nolitical ana' .I........ .I. .1..1. IL..L.l.V..L .I. .......... ..L.1...I...L .I. V.L ~ .1..1._.1..1. .1..1..1. "' ... v...... V .I. r...L.l..1. V.l. ¥ .1..1. ... .1. .I. .I. 
state protection which left the Palestinians in Lebanon vulnerable in a hostile 
envirOILrnent. Following the ¥rithdrawal of the PLO they were subject to massacres 
and sieges of their ca..rnps and were left \vithout protection and ur..represented, 
Julie Peteet's Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement5 
is based on research cllil;ed out between the years 1980 and 1982, although her 
book focuses on the period from 1968 to 1982, Her work shows how changes occur 
3 Sayigh, Rosemary Palestit-lians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (Zed Books, London, 1979) 
4 Sayigh, Rosemlliy Too Mlli,V Enemies: The Palestinian Exnerience in Lebllilon (Zed Books, 
London, 1994) 
5 Peteet, Julie Gender in Crisis: Women llild tt'1e Palestit,ian Resistance Movement (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1991) 
2 
in gender relations during cnSIS. There IS a focus on political conSCIOusness and 
how, during these years, there was a process of the development of a culture of 
resistance. This development led to changes in the role of women In Palestinian 
society in Lebanon as well as changes in the relations between men and women. 
Women now had the role of not oPJy mothers and housewives but also as activists 
and fighters. Her insight into the roles of Palestipjan ,vornen during the Palestirian 
Revolution and the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War shows that there was no 
either/or relationspip regarding the two roles above. The Palestipian women were 
These works are similar to mllle III the sense that they use an anthropological 
approach - speaking with people, observing and pa..rticipating. However, the time of 
thP1T Tesparch has a hearrlng on thP1T f1nrllngs nllTlng thesp UTOTlrS thP Palest'n'an "'..L~_.LL.L "'" .L.L.L.L ...., ..L.l..l. ....... lJ..l.V..l..1. .L.L..l..l."'--'-.I..L .. .L.J ~.J......L..l. ... .l...L "'" oj", .l.i\.. ., '-.L.l._..L .I. .... .A..I..I..l..1. 
Revolution was in its hey-day, the PLO was still in Lebanon, and it was well hmded. 
'T" 11 ~T I"'t. 1 1 1- T 1 1 t' fi 1 a .. ""'1' 1 ouay ~ne Y LV nas lelL LeDanOn, a..T}U .ne re~ugees are lel( m a preca..TJ.OUs sl~uatlOn, 
,\rith no real representation or , , legal status devastating . . SOCIo-economiC 
conditions. 
Another important work regarding this period of the Palestinian expenence III 
Lebanon IS Rex Brynen's work Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO Experience in 
Lebanon.6 Tp..is work, however, focuses on the PLO's relationsp..ip to Lebanon as 
opposed to that of the rehlgees. It looks at the interpretations of Lebanon as a 
sanctuary for the Resistance Movement du..ring the years 1969-1982, where the PLO 
lnstltt,tlonal1Spa' a Res
'
staI'ce Pa1est'n'an lrlpntlhT ana' pllt the TYlO\Tempnt on the .1..1...1. ... .I. ... \"J. ...... .1..1. .L.L _ .L.l.".L .L.I. .l..l..l..I..l. ..L'-'I-"'..'-.I. .... ..'-"') .1..1. _ \A..... ....1..1. .L.L..L .I.. .I._.L'- .1..1. .... .L.l. 
6 Brynen, Rex Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) 
3 
political map. His analysis of sanctuary involves both state support and popular 
support, as weil as issues of risk for the host state regarding the target state, their 
milit~1"'lj capabilities and acceptable risk. Brynen thus focuses on the role of the PLO 
in the Lebanese Civil War - the way it perceived its' Lebanese environment and 
responded to it. 
Yezid Sayigh's Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian 
National lvfovement, 1949-19937 is a political-milita.ry history of the Palestif1ia.Tl 
movement. It focuses on state-building outside of ones o\\'n state as well as on the 
armed groups and the notion of anned struggle to the Palestinian Resista..nce. 
Although not solely based III Lebanon, tpis work contains a comprehensive 
exatnination of the 1965-1976 phase of the Leba.'1ese Civil war and the 1982 Israeli 
invasion and its effect on the Palestinian Movement. 
These books set the backgrOlmd for the Palestinjan expenence ill Lebanon as 
opposed to how tpings stand today. T:l1ere are other books too that, although not 
based on t..~e Palestir..ian experience in Lebanon, have similar methods or topics to 
this thesis. These include Laurie Bra..nd's work Palestinians in the Arab World: 
Institution Building and the Search for a State8 III respect to certain theoretical 
fra.T..eworks and Rasr..id Khalidi's work Palestinian Identity: The Construction of 
Afodern National Consciousnes/ in respect to understanding identity. 
7 Sayigh, Yezid Anned Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 
8 Brllild, Laurie Palestinians in the Arab Wodd: Institution Building and the Search for a State 
(ColliL-ubia University Press, New York, 1988) 
9 Khalidi, Rashid Palestinian Identitv: The Construction of Modem National Consciousness 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1997) 
4 
Laurie Brand's work focuses on institution building in Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan. 
She details the origins and evolution of the socio-economic institutions (students, 
women, teachers and workers) that served as a basis for the re-emergence of the 
Palestinian National Movement. Her central argument is that the greater the degree 
of economic of political marginality, the greater the likelihood that independent 
institutions may emerge. Tpjs is '\vhere her theoretical fra..TI1ework has simila..rities to 
mine as she focuses on Tilly's political model and argues that the emergence of 
social or political movements involve tp.ree elements: 1) motive, 2) opportunity and 
3) resources. 
Khalidi's work is a challenge to idea that Palestinian Identity arrived with the 
Palestinian Revolution. Indeed, during the Palestinian Revolution there was a 
'Palestirian reawa..~eI'ing', however, the creation of a distinct Palestinia..'l identity 
had staIied long before this period. Khalidi points to identity f0n11ation and 
conSCIOusness m Palestine from the Ottoman period onwards. He does point, 
however, to two critical periods of time that were very h'1lportant h'l shaping the re-
emergence of PalestiniaIl identity; the years of the British Ma.ndate and what he calls 
the 'lost years' between al-nakba and the formation of the PLO. His understanding 
Of'the cAncpnt Af 'identity' as a flexih1p concept that is sl1hiPCf fA changp ovpr1aps .L .. .1. '-'.I. ""!-' .... v .l. .L.l. .. .I..1L. ..L.l. cL .l.V.l."" .I.. ~ ....... .1. ... .1. \.A.vJ .......... "'-J .I.. ..l. V., ."".l..1. ~ , 
as well as having several competing identities, is also accepted in this thesis. 
Tlns brief review reveals the lack of literature on PalestiDiaIl refugees in LebaIl0n 
follmving the Civil War, instead recent literature has focused on the Llltifada, state-
building and refhgees witpin the (still) Occupied Territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. The literature that does exist on Palestinian refugees in LebaII0n tends to 
5 
be in the fOl1n of articles or research papers focusing on single issues. These issues 
include, for exa.'llple, legal issues including the right of return, compensation and 
T pbarpse laws fowarAs fhP rp-h'gpps 1'Y'I A st notah1y hv Salmar AbU-Sltt~ 10 Qllsar 
.L.J...... .&........&. f.. '-I. \,...l..&.'" .l.V.l..\A. ............ ., ..... L •. V .1..1. v.&. V.J .l..&..a..&. .l. """'" t....J\A. .&. 
Akram,lI Donna Arzt,12 Rex Brynen,13 Michael Fischbach,14 Don Peretz,15 Wadie 
Said/6 Salim Tal11fu-i,17 and Elia Zw-iek.18 01i~er issues include socio-economic 
conditiofl.-S and host-state relationship and perspectives on the refugee issue as 
1· d" . th ." 1· d . 1 S· 19 out~Ine , tor Instance, by e F AFO InstItute tor App~Ie SOCIal clence , Lina 
Abu-Habib,20 Simon Haddad,21 Hilal Khashfui,22 Julie Peteet23 fuid Rosemfu-Y 
Sayigh.24 
iO See for instance Abu-Sitta, Salman "Restitution and Compensation" Ottawa Workshop on 
Refugees (Workshop on Compensation as Part of a Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, 
Ottawa, 14-15 July 1999) 
11 See for instance Akram, Susan "Temporary Protection for Palestinifui Refugees: A Proposal" 
IDRC Stock'"taking II (Conference on Palestinifui Refugee Research, Ot'"tawa, 17-20 June 2003) ,md 
"Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, fuid Implications for a Just Solution" 
Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxxi, No.3, Spring 2002) 
12 See for instance Arzt, Donna "Refugees or Citizens? The Cornerstone of Middle East Peace" 
Canadian International Develonment Research Centre (Hull, 18th June 1997) (hId "The Right to 
Compensation" Ottawa Workshop on Refugees (Workshop on Compensation as Part of a 
Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, Ot+..awa, 14-15 July 1999) 
13 See for instance Brynen, Rex "Imagining a Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Paiestini(hi 
Refugees in Lebanon" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. 25, No.2, Winter 1997) ,md "The Roadmap 
(hId the Refugees" IDRC StoCktakhlg II (Conference on Palesthiian Refugee Research, Ottawa, 17-20 
June 2003). 
14 See for instance Fischbach, Michael "The Usefulness of the lJNCCP Archives for Palestinian 
Refugee Compensation/Restitution Claim" lDRC Stocktaking II (Conference on Palesthiian Refugee 
Research, Ottawa, 17-20 June 2003) and "The United Nations (hId Palestinian Refugee Property 
Compensation" Jow-nal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxxi, No.2, Winter 2002) 
15 See for instance Peretz, Don "Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Ottawa Workshop on Refugees 
(Workshop on Compensation as Part ofa Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, Ottawa, 
14-15 July, 1999) 
16 See for instance Said, Wadie "Palestinian Refugees: Host Countries, Legal Status and the Right of 
Return" Refuge (Vol. 21, No.2, 2004) 
17 See for histance Taman, Salim "Return, Resettlement, Repatriation: The Futw-e of the Refugees in 
the Peace Negotiations" Final Status Strategic Studies (Institute for Palestine Studies, April 1996) 
18 See tor instance Zuriek, Elia "Palestinian Refugees and Peace" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. 
xxiv, No.1, Autum.'1 1994 
19 FAFO Reports: See for instcmce Gilen, Signe et al Finding Ways: Palestinicm Coping Strategies in 
Changing Environments (FAFO Report 117, Oslo, Norway, 1994) and Hovdenak, Are et al 
Constructing Order: Palestinian Adaptations to Refugee Life (FA.£;'O Report 236, Oslo, Norway, 
1997) and Ugland, Ole et al Difficult Past, Uncer-..ain Future: Living Conditions A.'1long Palestinian 
Refugees in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon (FAFO Report 409, Oslo, Norway, 2003) 
20 See tor instance Abu-Habib, Lina "Education and the Palestinian Refugees of Lebanon: A Lost 
Generation'?" Refugee Pa.'iicipation Network (V 01. 21, April 1996) 
21 See for iJlstance Haddad, Simon "The Palestinian Predicament h7J Lebanon" Middle East Quarterly 
(Vol. 7, No.3, September 2000). 
6 
Indeed much of thjs is relevant to this thesis, though there are other issues that are 
important in understanding how and why people join groups and become mobilised 
into action. 
Although the situation has changed drastically for the Palestinia..n refugees in 
T 1 ".1 '"' 1 "" R 1" .. 1 ."11" 1 1" f h Leoanon sInce tne ralesilman ~ evolUtIOn, tnere stu eXIsts tne popUlar Image 0 . Le 
refl'gee C"'Tn"'S as 'notberls of'Tn,1,t",nt act'\T,t", T'ne cnncept nf't'np 'refl'gpp w"Tm"or' 
..I.. ..l.",," U..i...L..l.¥ .I. ","..l. .l..l...lJ..l...l. .... U..i....l.... .....l. .l. ... .J. ..l..1. V.I..... _ .... V...L ... ..L_ .I. .J........ vv Ui...L ..I.. 
emerged with reference to refugees being dliven from their homes by violent 
conflict and forced to reside in refugee C~Tfips" For multiple reasons these camps 
t' h "lOt ", 1"n a thre t t~ t' , t ~ --" 1"ty 25 '{Y'"t' rt" 1 
... nen vecame illl l ... a..r:lSeO, pOS.LL.l.g u.u. at., u .... fie nos" ~0111111ur..u.". Y\ l ... n paL ,..lcu ___ ar 
reference to Palestinians in Lebanon there still exists the popular image of the 
poverty stricken refugee camps as 'hotbeds' for ~'1gry and militant activity" There is 
a \videspread image of the Palestinia.'1 refhgee with "either a Kalasp..pikov or an RPG 
in the squalid refugee camps of Lebfu'10n,,"26 Without questioning this image, 
without proving ot.'ervvise, t.'e Palestiniwl refugees in Lebanon are destined to be 
and "Sectarian Attitudes as a Function of the Palestinian Presence in Lebanon" Arab Stu.dies 
Quarterlv (Vol. 22, No.3, SUI-nmer 2000) 
22 See for instance Kt'1ashan, Hilal "Palestinian Refugees in Leblli-lOn: Behind the Debate" Montreal 
Paoers in Contemoorlliv Arab Studies (Vol. 1, April 1994) 
23 See for instance Peteet, Julie "From Refugees to Mhiority Palestinians hi Post-War Leblliion" 
Middle East Reoort (200, July-September 1996) 
24 See for instance Sayigh, Rosemary "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future" 
Jow-nal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxv, No" 1, Autumn 1995) and "Greater Insecurity for Refugees in 
Lebanon" Middle East Research and Information Proiect (MERIP Press Information Note 17, March 
1 Sl, 2000) and "Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Implantation, Transfer or Return?" Middle East 
Policv (VoL viii, No_ 1, March 2001) and "No Work, No Space, No Futme: Palest'illians in Lebanon" 
Middle East International (lOth August, 2001) 
25 The term refugee Wlli-r10r was first used by Zolberg, Aristide Escape from Violence: Conflict lliid 
the Refugee Crisis iti the Develooing World (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989)_ It is also a 
term that is commonly used hi humanitlli-ian literature that focuses on 'complex emergencies' and 
how humlliiitarian aid can at times exacerbate the problems and actually be a continuing factor in the 
conflict. See for instance Terry, Fiona Condemned to Reoeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action 
(Cornen University Press, London, 2002) 
26 Schultz, Helena Lindt~olm The Reconstruction of Pales tit, ian Nationalism: Between Revolution 
and Statehood (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) p. 124 
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viewed as militruits or even potential terrorists,27 for the foreseeable future. My 
research discredits L"'lis image. The Palestini3.l1 refugees in Leb3.l1on are people who 
'ive in Lerri'o'e ~ondition<:: <>nd "lespiLe t'naL the maiority o.ct'nem are waiting· waiLing L ___ l ___ 1 (; __ ___ __u =_ U _l _ l, __ ---:J __ l ! __ '___ _ _ _ _. _L __ 
in hope to retUTIl to Palestine. 
In researching how arld why Palestilli~l1S in Lebanon mobilise, I found that the usual 
charlnels for mobilisation are to some degree still in place (although resources are at 
an all time low) and refugees are indeed joining groups. However, I did find one 
interesting diversion from tlns trend. There were some, particularly ~1110ng the 
l' 28 1 t .. t -" 1" ...... T 1" 1 l' 1" t . 'ana' you~n, wno were no. 1Il.ereS[ea 1Il JOlIllIlg groups. ~OOKlIlg a~ ~ne msonCal __ 
present contexts of the Palestinia.'1 situation and the conditions in the ca.>nps, tl>Js 
evidence of many YOUtllS not warlting to join political groups does not match what 
would be presmned to be a pigbly-charged, highly-mobilised atmosphere. Indeed all 
rp-h'gees are 'nighl)T no'liticiser1 "'na' most r1n ioi.., groups 'D'Ut thpre seemea' to he a ~ ""..L"'- .L.I..L.L.I. !-' ",,\.......L u.., u.i. .L.L.I. L. y.v J .l..L.I. ~, I.. ..l....I..""",,- .1..1..1. U 
number of youfu...s who viewed the political groups in t..he camps with disillusioned 
eyes. There have also been cha.l1ges in govefIl.mental policies regarding Palestipian 
refugees in Leba.'1on.29 Today the Cairo Agreement that allowed t.~e Palestinians to 
nm t..heir own affairs and c~rry out revolutionary activity has been abolished. Instead 
the Lebanese govefIl.ment is keen to prevent the Palestipians from having access to 
Lebanese services and employment as well as political activity. Previous studies on 
political activity in refugee carnps in Lebanon, as well as much of the mobilisation 
literature, would not correspond with the flIldings of the field work presented here: 
sometPjng that leaves many questions unanswered. 
27 I am very uncomfor..able with this word and its applicability to Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, 
I have used it here as this is a very common assun1ption and view of Palestinian refugees. 
28 By youth I am refeuing to people in their late teens to mid-twenties. 
29 Field work carried out 2001-2003 
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'Mobilisation', 'identity', and 'social movements' are temlS that are used frequently 
witj,in this thesis. I wiil use them with specific meapings; therefore the next section 
shall exa.'Iline what these concepts refer to with reference to Palestinian refhgees in 
Lebanon. 
Def"mition of Terms: 
Mobilisation 
Mobilisation can be understood in different ways. For the purposes of tj,is thesis, I 
shall use it 1,11 terms of being a process used by orga.'1isations, as well as being a 
concept which motivates people to Jom groups. Mobilisation m its general fonn 
refers to: 
The process by which a population is brought itlto the political arena by the 
formation of new pfu'1ies and other political itlstitutions. The 'mobilisation 
svstem' is the ensemble of values, institutions and grOUDS which are orgfulised 
t~ achieve societal goals.3o - - • -
Mobilisation IS looked upon as the precursor of collective action. It is seen as the 
process by which people become involved with political groups and movements. 
The mobilisation process is different depending on the angle one ta..kes. Looking at it 
from an organisation's or group's point of view, one could use Tilly's defipition of 
mobilisation as: 
The process by which a group acquires collective control over L~e resources 
needed for action. Those resources may be labour power, goods, weapons, 
votes, and any number of things, just as long as they are usable in acting on 
30 Abercrombie, Nicholas et al The Penguin Dictionarv of Sociology (Second Edition, Penguin 
Books, London, 1988) p. 157 
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shared itlterests. ... The analysis of mobilisation deals wit,1. the ways groups 
acquire resources and make them available for collective action.31 
This defInition relates mobilisation to resources and orga.nisations. More simply one 
can define mobilisation in relation to political groups as the process by 'which these 
groups manage to recruit and persuade people to join them. In a sense it is about 
how the political groups bri ..ng people together in order to achieve the collective will, 
or put SLTIlply, their goal. Tpis can be either in the form of a group or a movement. 
Or, alternatively, one could look at mobilisation at the individual or collective 
'people' level and defme it thus: 
examitles the miciOevents t,1.at operate linkhlg individual and sociocultural 
levels in the operation of identity, solida..'ity, <md consciousness processes. It is 
social psychological itl its attempt to llilderstand the social interaction and group 
processes involved in collective action 32 
The interaction by which individual and sociocultural levels are brought 
together. It draws especially on t,1.ose long-standing social psychological 
traditions that illlli"ninate the operation of face-to-face encounters and group 
dynamic. The key concept is the mobilising act: words or deeds that further the 
mobilisation process among some set of potential challengers33 
Within this defInition mobilisation is explained on a people level - individual and 
collective. Mobilisation on the individual and collective level is about what it is that 
ma.kes people want to join groups; it involves concepts of identity and solidarity. 
These concepts involve how the collective uIlderstaTld themselves aTld their 
su..rroundi..'lgs but also how they understand the political groups that they mayor may 
not be joining. It is also about the individual's relationship with the socio-cultural 
enVirOl'~TIlent. 
31 Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishitlg CompfulY, Readit"1g, 
1978) p. 7 
32 Gamson, William A "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" in Morris A fu"1d Mueller, C. M 
Frontiers in Social Movement TheoIV (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992) p. 55 
33 Ibid. p. 71-72 
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Mobilisation can be looked at from two angles then. First, within Tilly's definition, 
we see that mobiiisation depends on the resources available. Tbis is connected to 
two different levels of analysis, the structural (societal) and the organisational. The 
societal structmes explain what resomces are available. The organisational 
structures explain how these resources are used. Ganlson' s defipition is on a 
'people' level., whereby mobilisation is understood in terms of individual and 
collective identity. These identities are fomled by social interaction. Mobilisation is 
necessary for social movements in that it is the 'raw meat' of whether social 
movements rise, decline or stay at the sa..'TIe level. 
Identity 
From the above explanation of the term mobiiisation, we can already see how the 
concept is import..ant, not orJy by and in itself, but also in conjunction with identity. 
A definitive explanation of identity is hard to come by, as it has so many facets. The 
Va..TJ.OUS fOnTIS of identity will be focused upon vv'itr.in the section on social 
constrl.lctionism 1n Chapter One. However, for the time , . oelng., a sh11lple 
understanding of what the term refers to will be given. Within the context of this 
thesis, identity refers to an understanding of oneself, the collective one is a part of, 
and the va.-rious 'others'. One can have multiple identities. It is also possible that 
one's identities change over time. Identity is seen as a continual constmction that 
may remain stable or change. Identity is also oply possible by social relations. Tbis 
means that identity construction happens \\ritl-in social relations; how one 
understands oneself as pali of a collective happens within a relationship. This is also 
true of individual identity: ll.l1dersta.l1ding one's individual identity comes from 
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relationships with others. One cannot understand oneself without lll1derstanding who 
one is different from, and where one stands in society. Si.TPilarly how one is 
identified by others happens because of social relationspips. Della Porta and Diari 
explain this well when they say: 
[Identity] is the process by which social actors recognise themselves - <hid are 
recognised by other actors - as p<h-t of broader groupings. On u~e basis of such 
allegiances, they give meani,ig to their own eJl.periences and to their 
development over time. It is worth noting the complexity of the relationship 
between the individual dimension and the collective dimension in processes 
which define identity. On the one hand, through the production, maintenance 
<hid revitalisation of identities, individuals defme and redefine individual 
projects, <hid possibilities for action open and close ... On u~e other hand, the 
construction of identity cannot simply be reduced to psychological mechanisms; 
it is a social urocess. The rediscovery of oneself becomes possible as a result of 
collective pr~cesses.34 - . 
What is the connection between mobilisation and identity? TIus question will 
become more apparent as the various social movement theories are explained in the 
theoretical frCh'TIework in Chapter One, particularly witl-in the social constructionism 
section. For the moment we can see the cOll .. nection through the temrinology I have 
adopted. If we consider t.1}e deflPition of mobilisation as the process by wpich 
political groups manage to get people to join their groups, as well as how people 
become involved with political groups and movements, and t..he defnution of identity 
as the social construction of the self, the collective a.l1d the other, then it follows that 
identity and mobilisation are necessarily linked. In other words, mobilisation stems 
from how people a.l1d political groups understa.l1d a.l1d construct 'the self, and also 
t'np1r U1Pws of' 'the ot'ner(sl' l·n <>n hlstAMcal <>nd prpsent cAntpxt 
'" .... _..1...1. \i........... .L "' .... .l. ........ , J ., .... ..l. <..i..i. .... ..L-Ll. .... v.J...... .I. Ui..L _.I.""'" ..1,..1.... V .......... • 
34 Della Porta, Donatella and Di<hii, Mario Social Movements: An Introduction (Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford, 1999) p. 85 
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Social Movement(s) 
Social movements are important to this thesis in the sense that all of the political 
groups are part of a wider social movement. I 'Arill often refer~ for exa..111pie., to the 
Palestinian Resistance by which I mean all of the various Palestinian groups, no 
matter what their political preferences are. The Palestipian Resistance can be seen as 
a sOl'ial TYlA~Tpment 35 Vnrfherrnore TYlllch of the theAretical litpratllre An mOhiliSation V.I. .I. .I..I..I.V 'Y "".1..1..1. .I..... ..L \,..I...L ... ..1..1. ..L.l..l..l. .J.. ., .I..I..l.\A-.1. .1..1. 11..1..1. V.l. \..1. .I. .1..1.,,"".1. \.\,..&..L V.l..l. .1..1.1. 1U'.I..I..1. ... .1..1..1. 
is related to social movements. 
The tel111 social movement can have a variety of meanll1gs. The most 
straightforward of deflPitions could be a social movement as "a sustained, organised 
l'Ol1pctive ef't.ort that f"Al'l1ses on some aspect of" SOl'i 1 l'haPg ,,36 T'nis de-hniti n 1 A v .I..l.V ...... ..L .I. ...... .I....L t.. .I.V_\.A. .1..1. .1..1..1. _ ..L V.l.a.l. V.I..1. .I. e. ..L.I. .I. ..l...I..l.-LLt...I.0..L.I. a.l.sv 
includes various f01111s of social movements such as reform 3...nd resistance 
i 1 f' f. f. ., , 1 h 1 1 r ( ")' movemen.s, wnere .ne :.:ormer :.:ocuses on SOCIal cna.l'lge ana Le la':.er \ usuallY aoes 
not want change. \Vitl>in tl>is definition social movements are seen as a source of 
social change as well as, at times, social conilict. The te1111 'social movement' can 
also be seen another way as simply referring to: 
... the expression of the collective will37 
In this case, whether social movements are involved with change, resistance, or 
other forms of societal issues, all of these are seen as 'collective will'. Social 
movements only exist because a collective group of people have a 'will' for 
sometping within society. 
35 I use social movement to represent all groups although many of the groups belong to different 
ai1iances, for exa.'11ple pro- or anti-Oslo. 
36 jolulson, Alan. G Tne Blachvell Dictiona.ry of Sociology (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1995) 
37 Touraine, Alain The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) p. 29 
Social movements, however, need not be more complicated than the above 
definition has us believe. Various concepts exist related to social movements, as 
well as different types of movement. \Vilkinson, for exa.'llple, has dedicated a whole 
book to the concept of social movements. Wilkinson gives us a working concept of 
social movements wpich involves a number of characteristics: 
1) A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change iII 
lli'y direction lli,d by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or 
withdrawal into 'utopilli" community. 
2) A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organisation, though 
this may rlli,ge from a loose, informal or partial level of organisation to the 
higt~ly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and the corporate group. 
3) A social movement's cOImnitment to change and the raison d'etre of its 
organisation are founded upon the conscious volition, normative cOimnitment to 
the movement's aims or beliefs. and active oarticioation on the part of the 
followers or members.38 . " 
This definition IS, of course, rather vague. What is the difference, for instance, 
between a social movement and, say, a pressure group or trade ullion? Wilkinson's 
reply is that there is a difference although these terms may overlap at times. For 
example, there IS a difference between a pressure group and the definition given 
above. In the case of a pressure group, for exa.TIlple, the social movement's area of 
action allowed h'l the above defirition would be restricted. If the social movement 
were to become a pressure group they would not be able 'to promote change in any 
direction by any means', as they would be bound to be dealing with the government 
In power. Therefore a social movement is not the same as a pressure group, although 
a resistance movement, for example, may have pressure groups working for them. 
Having said tpis, however, Tilly does 1'1 llKen social movements to political 
campaIgns. Although there are important differences., the parallels can help In 
understanding the tenn: 
38 Wilkinson, Paul Social Movement (Macmillan Press, London, 1971) 
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A social movement is a kind of campaign, paranel hi many respects to an 
electoral ca..llpaign. This sort of ca..llpaign, however, demands righting of a 
wrong, most often a wrong suffered by a well-specified population. The 
population in question can range from a single individual to all human, or even 
all living creatures '" A social movement ... [transmits] the message that its 
progra..llS supporters are WlJNC - 1) worthy, 2) unified, 3) numerous and 4) 
cmnmitted.39 
W1JNC is very important to a social movement both in terms of extemal perceptions 
of the movement as well as internal members' perceptions of the movement. 
}\.ccording to Tilly all of the VTu"NC must be included in the social movement for its 
survival; however they do compensate for one another in certain circumstances. For 
instance, a low level of numbers can be compensated for by a high level of 
wort.bjness. However, "a visibly low value on any of them discredits the whole 
movement".40 
This working concept of social movements is useful 111 understa.nding what is 
needed for social movements to exist. 'Vithin social movements there also exist 
specific types of movements. Wilkinson gIVes a list of different fomls social 
movements can take: 
1. Religious movement, millena..-ism and sect 
2. Movements of nlI,il and urban discontent 
3. Nativist, nationalist and race movements 
4. Imperialism and pan-movements 
5. Class and occupational interest 
6. Moral protest and reformist movements 
7. Revolutionary, resistance and counter-revolutiona..) movements 
8. Intellectual movement 
9. Youth movement 
10. Women"s movemenf~l 
39 Tilly, Charles, Stories. Identities and Political Change (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 
2002) 0.88 
40 Ibid: p. 88 
41 Wilkinson, Paul 1971 op. cit., p. 51-52 
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It is unlikely that any social movement can be simply categorised into any single 
one of these types. However, t..1,.ey can overlap into several of them. If we consider 
the Palestinia..'1 Resistance Movement, we can already see that it does not fit into any 
one of these categories, but several. Where the Palestinian Resistance Movement 
stands in regard to these categories, one would include many of these categories 
including nationalist., imperialisIT'Jpan-movement, class., revolution~ry/resistance., 
women's movement and with l~egard to some groups, for instance Hamas and 
Palestinian Isla.TIlic Jihad, religious. Nevertheless, the Palestipian Resistance as a 
whole tends to have 'resistance' as its main aim. Although, having said tlIis, tl>,is 
thesis will show that these sorts of definitions can be rather problematic when 
dealing with the Palestipiarl groups, particularly the ones that are based outside 
Palestine. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is split Lnto three parts: 1) Lheory and meLhod; 2) legal and historical 
context; and 3) field work. The first pa.rt sets the fra.TIlework of the thesis, wpich in 
ttL.'1l aids lL.'1derstandLqg of Pa..rt Two and Pa..rt Three. The method explains ho\v the 
research was ca.rried out and the potential problems wiLh regard to methodological 
issues in general, as well as potential problems with the field research itself. The 
sef'onrl narrt exarrn'nes context M"ch ,..f"thp f'llrrpnt 1,tera+"'rp that ex'sts on th's 'ssue __ ..L.Lu.-..!::-' "" ~ ..l...L.J.. ..... " ,l .... .J... ..L ...... ..LA. V..L '" ,l,""'" VII,..I....L.L_..L.L'- .&..1. ... .L .lUi_ ....... ..L '- ,l..L" .l...I..&....L..L 
is about various legal issues concerning Palestinian refugees, a.nd tIns creates a 
context witpin wpich we can understa.'1d how the refugees live in terms of status, as 
well as what rights they are, and have been for many years, entitled to. The 
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historical context eXall1ines the history of the Palestiniall refugees since 1948. The 
content of tbis chapter has, by necessity, been very condensed and reduced despite 
the fact that the ristory of the Palestinian refugees is very complex. Nevertheless, 
this chapter tries to show the main events having an impact on the refugees as well 
as on the political groups. It also explains how previous works - anthropological, 
sociological and political - interpreted the Palestinian revolution, the civil \var and 
Palestiniall mobilisation as being widespread and part of their identity alld 
t ,42 n.art "" ., , r- ld ' ., t' 'h (' . s.nlggle. r . IP.ree IS oasea on ne. worK camea OU In t. e rerugee camps In 
Lebanon. It has been split into three chapters -examining strllcttrres., organisations, 
alld collective identity. Each of these chapters represents a different level of allalysis 
of the question of Palestinian refugee mobilisation. Each chapter stresses different 
issues: Chapter Five, relating to structures, stresses socio-economic and regional 
issues; Chapter Six, relating to orgallisations, stresses for the most pali recruitment; 
and finaIIy Chapter Seven, relating to collective identity, concentrates on identity 
formation, and the view of the 'self and of the 'other(s)'. 
By eXalnining mobilisation alld identity in the refugee camps I alTI also highlighting 
other important issues, such as the devastating socio-economic conditions, lack of 
protection, and the general preca..riousness of their situation. The situation has been 
thus for over fifty years alld is cleal'Iy not sustainable, though as tIns thesis 
iliustrates, tbis is not because these ca.TIlpS are rife with violent or even terrorist 
acti\rities, but because such conditions can never be accepted as permanent by their 
inhabitallts. 
42 These works are many and include those by for exatllple: Rosemary Sayigh, Laurie Bratid, Julie 
Peteet and Rex Brynen, Works relevant to mobilisation atid identity will be used as comparisons 
within Part Three dealing with the field work, 
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Chapter One 
Theories of Mobilisation 
Introduction 
In eXaJ.I1111111g mobilisation of refugees living in the camps into political groups, tlus 
thesis looks at three different levels of analysis: structural, organisational and 
individual. I will outline theories of mobilisation that can be used in order to ma.1ce a 
fraJ.llework that will help understand how aJ.Id why PalestiniaJ.I refugees mobilise. It 
will become apparent as the different theories are examined that each is found to be 
lacking in some sense. This problem is usuaily because they focus on one level of 
analysis at the expense of others. Therefore I suggest a fra.1l1ework that encompasses 
many of the different theories in order to understand mobilisation at all levels. The 
chapter \vill begh'l with theories that consider emotions a.'ld deprivation as 
conditions for mobilisation. Many of these theories were the first such fraJ.lleworks 
explaining mobilisation and social movements. The second part focuses on the 
importance of resources in the mobilisation process. These theories arrived 
following the student movement of the 1960s. The third part eXaJ.I1111es new social 
movement theory(ies) which looks at the changes that arose within social 
movements foHowing the student movement. The fo~rfu section deals wit..~ social 
construction and identity. The concluding pa.rt of t.h.e chapter will look at how these 
theories can be used in order to create a working framework from which we ca.Tl 
reach an understanding of mobilisation witl-in the refugee ca.'11ps. 
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The Breakdown of Social Arrangements, Emotions and Deprivation 
The following theories argue that social movements come into being and people JOL11 
them as a result of changes in society and "breakdown of social arrangements and 
bonds associated with social change". i Key concepts include "strain, stress, mass 
society, emotion, inationality, contagion, alienation, frustration and relative 
1 .. .. " 2 T .. 1 1 .. 1 1 1· .. 1 
uepnvatlOn. ill sunple terms, tillS approacn sees people as responumg to socIetal 
changes by, for exa..'llple, feeling alienated or frustrated by their society wr....ich is 
Ahangl'~g due +0 "~;S~'P+l'O~S o~ s~n;~s to +t..~ soc;ni sys+e~" 3 Tt..e~e I'S niso v~.11 L Ul 1. U l..l..l .l u. a.l.ll tlU,,1 .tal L. .1.1.1.. ..1 1.1 .1 aJ. 
discussion about contagion and irrational behaviour where social movements come 
into being, or at the point when people join social movements. These theories stress: 
The irrationality of the crowd and tt~e vulnerability of the masses to 
manipulation and authoritarian control ... [Theorists analysing the breakdown 
of society approach] emphasised the aberrational, the bizarre, and the 
potentially totalitarian and stressed what came to be called collective behavioui 
There are two theories that especially stand out a..l1d need clarification, both because 
they are complex a..'1d because they wiil give a good idea of what this 'brea..'<.down of 
society' approach entails. These are the theories of Neil Smelser, who is associated 
with the concept of collective behaviour, and Ted Robert Gu.rr, who is associated 
with the approach known as relative deprivation. Following the discussion of these 
two theorists, the 'hmmm needs approach' will be exa.mined. 
1 Klandermans, Bert Social Psychology of Protest (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997) p. 200 
~ Ibid. p. 200. 
J Ibid. p. 291 
4 Damovsky, M et al Cultural Politics and Social Movements (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1995) p. viii. 
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Smelser and Collective Behaviour 
Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behaviour details six stages which must occur 
in order for collective behaviour to arise. Tne stages are:5 
a) Structural conduciveness; referring to t...lte settiIlg and the characteristics \\rithin it 
(for example Shatila camp in Beirut). 
b) Structural strain, referring to a situation in which there is disorder or 
disorganisation. In Smelser's words "an impairment of the relations a..'1long and 
consequentiy inadequate functioning of the components of action,,6 (for eXfuliple, 
the refugees not having any rights in Lebfuion). 
c) Growth and spread of generalised beliefs, wpich shows the source of the 'strain' 
and gives 'strain' its characteristics and possible responses (for example, is there a 
bdief that armed struggle is necessary?) 
d) Precipitating factors; this refers to an event that triggers collective behaviour, for 
instance an arrest or assassination that could set off actionlik.e, for example, a riot. 
"ljk 
e) Mobilisation of participants for action, referring to the beginning of the action. 
Once all of the above stages have occu..rred, then the orJy remaining stage is 
mobilisation for action to occur. Tpis stage is "[T]he flrst begill.J1ings of actual 
11 • 1 1 • " 7 COllectIve oenavlOUf . 
f) The operation of social control. This stage sits apart from the other stages, but 
refers to processes that try to stop the collective behaviour, in other words "social 
processes at work at all stages to inr.ibit a..'1d contain collective behaviour both 
5List taken from Smelser, Neil TheOl\' of Collective Behaviour (The Free Press, New York, 1969) p. 
15-18 
6 Ibid. p. 47 
7 Rule, James. B Theories of Civil Violence (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988) p. 162 
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before and after it takes place".8 
Smelser splits these different types of collective behaviour into: 
a) 'The panic' which refers to a "coliective flight based on a hysterical beiief,.9 
') ,~, '~. D. Ine craze; relemng to "mobilisation for action based on a positive wiH-
c) 'The hostile outburst' looking at mobilisation for action under "a hostile belief" .11 
Tbjs type of collective behaviour could also involve the two forms above. Smelser 
mentions that panic and craze often happen in sequence. With this type of collective 
behaviour one could link the three for example by seeing "craze fonowed by panic, 
and pa..'1ic followed by hostility". 12 
d) 'The nonn-oriented movement' involves an attempt to "restore, protect, modify, 
. th ,.. 1'""1" 1" ('"J" 13.. 1 fi 11 or create norms m . e name or a generanseo oe leI. .'-\ ... 110 mally: 
e) 'The value-oriented movement' refers to "a collective attempt to restore, protect, 
modify, or create values in the name of a generalised belief. Such a belief 
necessarily involves all the components of action; that is, it envisions a 
reconstitution of values, a redefinition of norms, a reorganisation of the motivation 
of h'1dividuals, and a redefinition of situational facilities".14 Each of these types of 
collective behaviour is shoVVTI to us by using the six stages above. For t.~e 
Palest.i.Pjan groups, it seems that the latter two are relevant. 
8 Rule, James. Bop. cit., p. 162 
9 Smelser, Neil op. cit., p. 131 
10 Ibid. p. 171 
11 Ibid. p. 226 
12 Ibid. p. 222 
13 Ibid. p. 270 
14 Ibid. p. 313 
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There are various criticisms of Smelser's theory of collective behaviour. First, it 
does not allow for the idea that collective action could be something that happens 
for a good cause or because values cha...'1ge. In other words 
1"1 assuming a means/end distinction and in confining conflict to the realm of 
means, Smelser assumes a basic consensus underlying potential differences. He 
has ruled out by defil"1itional fiat the possibility that collective action could be 
innovative in the sense of being oriented to new values or pointing beyond the 
bOlli"1daiies of the social system. I5 
This kind of understanding of collective behaviour that arose during the 1960s made 
social movements understood as symptoms of social strain, as "symptoms of the 
brea...l(down of cOIr.u'Ilunal ties in 'mass society', 16 as a species of 'deviant behaviour', 
as phenomenon needh"1g to be treated or controlled",17 or generally as a group of 
irrational people under the int1uence of a mistaken generalised belief In a sense, one 
could li..l1derstand the norm- and value-oriented movements to ma..ke up for this 
criticism, as they are attempts to restore, protect or create values or n0n11S that may 
not be related to 'deviant behaviour' for example. Another criticism is that, for 
Smelser, collective action does not happen without strain. Tl>..is rules out any 
collective behaviour that happens without strain, which is rather difficult to accept. 
15 Scott, Alan Ideology and the New Social Movements (Unwin Hyman, London 1990) p. 40 
16 Mass society approaches derive from Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society (1959), where the 
basic argument is that people on the margins who are socially isolated become involved in collective 
action. In relation to this approach is Le Bon's psycho-pathological approach to crowd disturbances, 
where fears and fllillOurS usually articulated by leaders make crowds join movements. This approach 
sees social movements as "microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled bodies. The 
movement a civilisation begins to decay it is always the masses that bring about its downfall" (Le 
Bon, Gustav The Crowd (Ernest Be.-m, London, 1896) p. 18). This approach condemns movements as 
destructive to civilisation, but is used in various fashions today albeit with less drastic connotations. 
See for example Jerold Post "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of 
Psychological Forces" in Reich, Walter ed OrigiIiS of Terrorism: PsYchologies. Ideologies. 
Theologies. States of Mind (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) 
17 Darnovsky , M et al op. cit., viii 
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Another problem with his theory is his distinction between norm and value-oriented 
movements. It is often very difficult to designate a movement as belonging to opjy 
one classification. "[S]ocial movements are rarely one-dimensional; they tend to be 
multi-dimensional. That is to say they may be concemed simultaneously with 
values, nOTInS, fOTIns of orga.Tlisation and material conditions and resources".lS 
Furthermore, Wilkinson points out that in "practice one movement's norm may be 
another movement's value. It depends where you are standing at the th'1le".19 Values 
and norms are constantly changing, and therefore it would be better to have a more 
precisely defined meaning of these norm- and value-oriented movements. 
If we take away the deviant behaviour and the abnormality of collective behaviour, 
Smelser's six points do have something in common with recent theories. Within 
social construction literature there has been a renewed focus on the 'grievances' of 
individuals, albeit in a way t..hat does not stress and focus on in-ationality and crowd 
mentalities. 
Gurr and Relative Deprivation 
Ted Robert Gurr's theory of Relative Deprivation explains civil unrest in temlS of 
people resisting a perceived injustice. The relative deprivation approach rests upon 
t'ne psycho10mca1 concent n-t '-Frllsfration-aggression' ThiS term is re'lati~Te'lY 
.. ... ~~ ~ b.l.. . .1.-'- Y'" V.L .L.I.~ 1..1.. .1..1...1,. .I. ... .1-.1... ..I..I..Ll. L.I..I..I..1. .I. L.I.'" 
straightforward and refers to civil lU1rest occurring because people are fmstrated for 
reasons of their perceived injustice and begin to feel (and become) aggressive. In 
i8 Wilkinson, Paul Social Movements (Macmillan Press, London, 1971) p. 25 
19 Thid. p. 25 
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other words, "the manifestation of feelings of deprivation experienced in relation to 
other social subjects and of feelings of aggression resuitLllg from a wide range of 
tTI'strated exp t ti T'IS,,]O 
-'--'-............ ~ ~ ecLa ....... o.u. . 
G1LlT'S theory involves more tha..l1 the assertion of relative deprivation and 
frustration-aggression. Because of GUIT's defInition of relative deprivation as 
perceived irJustices related to changing expectations and capabilities, he 
distinguishes types of deprivations including; 
1) Decremental deprivation; where "a group's value expectations remain relatively 
constant but value capabilities are perceived to decline".21 L'1 other words people's 
and groups' expectations are constant but their capabilities are declining. 
2) Aspirational deprivation, where there is "an increase in men's value expectations 
urithollt a cOT'lt'omitarnt charngp n·T'1 valllP !,>osition or potential".]] T~n other words . .. ~~. uv un H v ~ ~~v ~ ______ _ _ _ ____ _ 11 ___ _ _,
people's and groups' expectations are increasing a..l1d the capabilities remain 
constant. 
3) Progressive deprivation, where there is "a 'prolonged period of objective 
.. 1 .. 1'" 1 t -C: 11 1 1 1 rt .. 1.. ,.,." 23 ~1 .. economIc ana SOCIal aevelOpmen· ... 10110wea oy a sno~ . penoa or reversal . 1 illS 
version is linked to a theory comrnonly known as the J-cmve. Aspiration deprivation 
is related to a 
more or less steady improvement hi people's value position [which] generates 
expectations about continued hllprOVement. If value capabilities stabilise or 
decline after such a oeriod of improvement, progressive RD (relative 
deprivation) is the result.24 
20 Della Porta, Donna and Diani, Mario Social Movements: iLl} Introduction (Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford, 1999) p.4 
21 Gurr, Ted Robert wny Men Rebel (Pri.nceton University Press, New Jersey, 1970) p. 46 
22 Ibid. p. 50 
23 Quote by Davies, Toward a T:.'1eory of Revolution p. 6 in Gurr, Ted Robert 1970 op. cit., p. 52. 
24 Gmr, Ted Robert op. cit., p. 52 
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In other words, progressive deprivation refers to capabilities that are increasing but 
not to the levei of expectations. These differences in forms of reiative deprivation 
have a bea.1•
'
.ng on different kinds of social action. However, relative deprivation and 
perceived injustice relates to people's and group's discontent and this creates, 
according to Gurr, the potential for social action and political violence. Gurr further 
distinguishes between three justifications that are used in order to understand 
potential and actual social action and political violence: 
1) Normative justifications for violence, which Gu.rr refers to as psycho-cultural 
justifications?5 In this justification Glhrr looks at individual aggressiveness (psycho-
pathological approachi6 and cultural traditions of political violence. 
2) Utilitarian justifications for violence, which GUIT refers to as 'politicisation of 
discontent' .27 This is liP~1(ed to people and groups with political motivation for their 
action. 
3) (Degree of) legitimacy of political systems. This refers to "the balance between 
. rt··· 1 f' 1 b 1 1 -, 28 coerCIve an .... mstltutlOna~ resources o~ tne re e~s vs. tne state' . 
There have been varIOUS criticisms of Gun·'s theory. Klandennans argues that 
Gurr's theory can be criticised for seeing "reiative deprivation (being] deduced from 
the presence of conditions which are asslh'TIed to being about deprivation rather than 
measured at the individual level".29 1'1 other words, relative deprivation is a 
subjective condition, i.e. it is a perceived injustice. Therefore it is hard to understatld 
how t]:1is perceived relative deprivation can be based on objective and structural 
25 Gurr, Ted Robert op. cit., p. 160 
26 See footnote 16 
27 Gurr, Ted Robert op. cit., p.l77 
28 Klatldermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 202 
29 Ibid. p. 202 
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conditions. Nevertheless, the notion of injustice seems to be a mobilising factor, 
especially in the case of the Palestinian Resistance. 
Human Needs Theory 
The human needs approach is concerned with locating what it is that is universally 
essential to human life. It is about human behaviour and relationships, looking at the 
individual as a whole within a societal context. There is some. although no full, 
general agreement on "lhe nature of these needs, and there is wide discussion of these 
needs in reiation to values, interests and identity. 
For human needs theorists there is a difference between a 'want' and a 'need'. A 
W~T}t may express a person's needs and it may not. A need is something that is 
necessa...ry to human life. 
[A want] is subjectively felt and articulated: they may express needs, but they 
also may not; and there may be needs that are not thus expressed. Thus there is 
no assUtllption that people are conscious of their needs.3o 
We should be aware that not all wants correspond to things that are necessary. But 
what is necessary? For human needs theorists, the term necessary and needs refers to 
what it is that is needed to be hu.'Ilan. These needs are u.'1iversal and stretch beyond 
bOlmdaries. A 'need' refers to something that is necessary to life. After the 
biological 'needs' such as air and food, there are further needs that are essential to 
hu.'Ilan life. These other needs include societal needs such as security and identity. 
30 Galt1l11g, JOhful "International Development in Human Perspective" in Coate, Roger and Rosati, 
Jerel A The Power ofHUll1an Needs in World Society (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1988) 
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The hmnan needs approach believes that individual hllllaI1S must be in interaction 
with other humans. In other words, human life involves relationships, 8...11d one 
car..1lot understand one's values, beliefs and needs if one is not in interaction with 
others. 
Much of the work on hlli'Ilfu"l needs is based on the work of Maslow.31 The different 
needs that he pointed to were: 
') Ph . 1 • 1 d 1 • 1 • 1 d fj d d h d d fj h· 1 ! ~ ~~yS!O!oglca~ nee s, Willcn !l1C!U e ~oo all all, w~~at IS nee e ~or p ~ys!ca~ 
living. 
2) Safety needs which refer to "security; stability, dependency, protection, freedom 
from fear, from aIL'Ciety and chaos; need for structure, law, limits; strength h'1 the 
protector". 32 
3) Belongingness and love needs are the third need. For Maslow, once the first two 
needs have been met, people will start to have a need to belong, form relations]1jps, 
love and be loved. 
4) Esteem needs refers to the need for "a stable, firmly based, usually high 
evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of 
others".33 He classifies these needs into two sets. First, is the need and desire for 
"strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, tor 
confidence in the face of the world, and for Ll1dependence and freedom".34 The 
second is about gaining esteem from others. T]1js set is about prestige, reputation, 
attention and appreciation. These needs are very important for humans, because 
without it people will feel helpless and inferior. The last of Maslow's needs is: 
31 Maslow, Abrahatll H Motivation and Personality (Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1970) 
32 Ib·d "9 
"" 1 I . p. -' 
" Ibid. p. 45 
34 Ibid. p. 45 
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5) Needs for self-actualisation. Maslow points out that even though we have all of 
the other needs "we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and 
restlessness will soon develop, urJess the individual is dOh'1g what he individually is 
fitted for ... What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his nature". 35 
Other t.heorists have expanded upon Maslow's needs. For Sites, needs, apart from 
physiological-biological needs, are about emotions. He is 
arguing that human needs are onto logically grounded in emotions and that 
negative emotions are triggered ill hUtlla..,S where L1.ere is a Ltrreat to survival of 
eiL1.er the physical orga..1ism or the developiIig self.36 
Similarly to Maslow, Sites distinguishes the following: 
1) Sec~rity Needs, referring to the emotion of fear. 
2) Meaning Needs, referring to the emotion of anger. Tl-is need refers to societal and 
individual values where people have the need for meaning. 
3) TIle tpird need is the need for self-esteem, referring to the emotion of depression . 
.1) P1nally the need -t.or latency Th1S npeA re-t.ers tA the emOtl·On o-t sat1 sf':a;f"t10n anA 
• .I..J.....L .1..1. , .1..1. ...L .I. .I. ".I..l. ..J...I..LL .I. V """ ..L.I. L-'-' \..1..1. .1..1......1..1. ..L '-.1..1. ""'"'.I..LL .&. ....... 
happiness. In relation to this need Sites explains how, in today's (western) world 
tpjs need is becoming more and more difficult to satisfy. Many people do not have 
enough time, and suffer from stress. He explains "[ w ]hen people are experiencing 
stress the latency need obviously cmmot be gratified, and this is perhaps why 
• .. 1· 1 • 1 11 1 1 • 1 1 .,,, 37 
contmuous stress may proauce pnyslOlOg1cal as well as psycnolOglcal aamage . 
35 Maslow, Abraham op. cit., p. 46 
36 Sites, Paul "Needs as Analogues of Emotions" in Burton, John ed Conflict: Human Needs Theorv 
(Macmillan, London, 1990) p. 16 
37 Ibid. p. 21 
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Furthermore, Sites explains that all of these needs are interc0I111ected and they are 
not easily separated. For example: 
people may have fears that self-esteem will be damaged or meaning systems 
destroyed. By the same token, people may become angry when self·esteem is 
threatened. Or people may become depressed if they are forced to live under 
constant tear ... pru:nfuy emotions fu'1d their need fu'1alogues are intertwined.3s 
Added to tlllS, Sites suggests tlle need for stimulation, corresponding to the emotion 
of boredom. However, he does note that if the other needs above are satisfied, this 
need and emotion may not be present. 
AltllOUgh Sites' needs are similar to Maslow's, what Sites is most famous for is 
what he cans the need forlof control. For Sites, the need for control is of the utmost 
importance and would be the first hmnan need, if one were to prioritise them. Tbis is 
because in order to satisfy the needs listed above, people need control. Control 
refers to being able to understand, predict a..'1d control one's enviroI'.u.1'fient a..'1d 
society; one can also control the satisfaction of ones needs. People who do not have 
adequate control over other people's responses are in fear and insecure. To further 
the argument of control, Sites introduces us to Goffman39 (who is discussed in more 
depth within social constructiOlllsm). What Sites essentially t~kes from Goffulan is 
his idea that "there tend to be tacit agreements among people that each win not 
expose a..'1other as each attempts to 'present a self'".4o For example in everyday life 
- - - -
we tend to 'let things pass' where a statement or action may be potentially 
emba..rrassing. This sort of behaviour is mutual and universal, most people reacting 
38 Sites, Paul ! 990 op. cit., p. 22 
39 in this case Sites is referring to Erving Goffman's work in the area of interaction a.'1d the self, 
i.'1cIuding The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Anen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1969) 
and Strategic Interaction (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970) 
40 Sites, Paul 1990 op. cit., p. 25 
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in the same way. TIlls is explained by the fact that people would want others to do 
the same to them, if they were the ones who were saying or doing sometping 
emba..rrassing. Site's concept of control spreads across all the va..rious needs. For 
instance, the need for merullng can only be met if people have control of the(ir) 
construction of reality, both .. 1· ..... 1 mmVlQUal 1 • 1 a.lla SOCIal. Regarding Palestinian 
mobilisation in Lebanon, their control mecha..'1ism with regard to the Lebanese 
govelll_111ent is that they k.now t.hat the Lebrulese government does not wrult them to 
mobilise a.lld be active. W ouid !pis sense of control, of knowing the reaction of the 
Lebanese government, prevent them from mobilising? Tlris is an import..ant question 
ruld will be examined in Chapter Five. 
Burton too, believes in universal human needs. His list similru'ly includes 1) 
consistency in response; 2) stimulation; 3) security; 4) recognition. From these four 
needs, more needs arise: 5) distributive justice (for Bu..rton not just merely coming 
out of consistency of response, but also from rul expected ruld appropriate response); 
6) appearance of rationality (again referring to consistency in response from others); 
7) meaning (again consistent response); 8) control (a defence mechanism in case all 
of the other needs are not met, which is hru'dly ever the case). However, Burton adds 
1 1· ~c: 1 1 r 9) 1 1 r ,.,..." .. r .. 1 1 .. anotner mnerent neea: tnat or rOle aerence. 1 illS rerers to protectmg ana Keepmg 
all ofthe above needs once they have been acquired.41 
The human needs approach relates to the political realm as its basic premIse 
regarding political behaviour is "that political behaviour and political beliefs have 
their basis in a set of ontological needs which are universal, and therefore shared 
41 Burton, John W. "Human Needs Vs. Societal Needs" in Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel "The Power 
of Human Needs in World Society (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1988) 
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across cultural a.."1d economic divisions".42 This hliplies that the hllilia.."1 needs 
involved in this theory are innate and universal, for instance the kind one fInds in 
Hobbes' state of nature; however, these needs are not about competition, but about 
belonging.43 The va..--iety of needs including seclli--ity, belonging, and self-esteem are 
importailt as they relate to the perception of the self and the other: one's identity. 
Because of this theory's focus on relationships and society it irnplies that these 
needs are in..herently political; man can onJy pursue his human needs in a social 
context through huma..ll interaction. The human needs approach thus aliows for an 
insight into how and why h'1dividuals act the way they do. L'1 other words "./1,. focus 
on the pursuit of individual hmnan needs and values and the network of group 
relationships between individuals allows one to study how people become mobilised 
to form social aggregations and hO\v and why such systems of action become 
.. d" 44 T 1· s·' . .. 1 .. nl h h . . dlsaggregate . J.n relatIOn to Ite s notIOn oj. contrOl, It IS 01 Y tl oug 1 mteractlOn 
with others within society aild in society itself that we can gratifY our human needs. 
The concept of identity is inJlerent within most of the human needs. For example, 
the secu..rity need implies an identity. The need for security "is not totally satisfied in 
a society which simply preserves law and order. Secu.1i.ty involves more tha..'1 the 
preservation of life; it also involves preservation of liberty and its possible 
expansion so Lltat the individual is confident that he can not only choose whatever 
42 Jabri, Vivienne Discourses on Violence: Conflict analvsis reconsidered (Manchester University 
Press, Mallchester, 1996) p. 121-122 
43 The difference between competition in a Hobbesian state of nature and belonging within the 
context ofhulnan needs is eloquently explained in Clark, Mary E Meaningful Social Bonding as a 
Universal Human Need hi Burton, John ed "Conflict: Human Needs Theory" Macmillan, London, 
1990 
44 Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel Human Needs in World Society (Lynne Rienner Publications, 
London 1988) p. 10 
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wav of life he orefers, but also maintain it".45 The imolication of tllis is that if a 
. ~ ~ 
human's security need is met, he will feel that he is in a society/place where he 
knows, ll.l1dersta.llds a.lld Ca.ll predict the responses of others a.lld that others Ca.ll do 
the same with him. He feels safe, he tmderstands his environment, and his way of 
life, the way he wants to live suits that environment. The individual can omy 
understand the concept of security if he knows what this concept means. 
Understanding what security means to the individual can only be done through the 
possession of a self-identity. 
The identity needs may be attainable Lhrough societal structure, but identity in itself 
is understood at an individual level. If structure prevents the fonnation of social 
relationships, an.d thus one's identity, there could be serious repercussions. This 
focus of needs theory is refelTed to as the 'pathological', and is often linked to 
conflicts that arise within a cOImnupity or country. When the basic need for identity 
has not been fulfilled then the result is "psychological stress for the individual, 
conflict within the con1!mmity, and ultimately intense violent conflict between 
cOIlLrnu.rrities".46 This particular strand of human needs theory is not necessarily 
bound to conflicts within one society but can also be between countries, as for 
instance, in the Israeli-Palestinian, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland conflicts where 
t 1 fl· t b· '" 1 t 1 d {' ·1 t·ty 1· 1 1 ·11 
.nese cOnIncs are seen as emg Dasea on .ne nee lOr men.I. willcn nu.rnans Wlll 
seek to satisfy irrespective of contextual circurnstances or degrees of coercion".47 
People need to have an identity, and a belonging to a coro.lllupity as pa.rt of their 
45 Roy, Ramashay "Social Conflict and Needs Theory" in BUt-ton, John ed Conflict: Human Needs 
~ (Macmillan, London, 1990) p. 134 
46 Jabri, Vivienne op. cit., p. 122 
47 Ibid. p. 123 
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basic huma.n needs. Furthennore, the implication is that if tIns basic human need of 
identity is not met, there may be conflict. 
Potential problems aliSe wiLh hllllall needs theory once one starts to question 
cultural contexts. Human needs couid perhaps be seen as culturally relative, a.lld 
understood differently by different people. Therefore the priority of needs and their 
satisfiers can differ depending on context alld place. Cultural alld contextual 
. , t' " . 1" t'{' t' ,., . , , conSlQera.LOns alSO nave Imp~lca.lOns ror .ne means ana ways m wmcn people may 
pursue these hu,'nan needs. Some of the needs and their satisfiers may need to be 
adjusted for the context of the refugee calnps. For eXalnple, the need for stimulation-
. :fr ' 48 I' fi t ' t' t b' t TT • meanmg-reeaom usua ly re.:ers 0 neeas .na are asea upon ac.ors. tlowever, m 
the refugee camps in Lebanon, many of the different facets of tr.is particular need 
are based upon structures. Despite this shortcoming, the human needs perspective 
can nevertheless be illuminating when eXarI1jping Palestinia.ll refugees wit"Pin the 
refugee camps in Leba..llon with reference to deprivations and socio-economic 
conditions that mayor may not by themselves explain mobilisation in the cmnps. 
H ' '01 .. {' 'T' , " 'fy" '? ave tne ra~estIIua.ll remgees m Leoanon oeen aOle to satls~ tnese numan neeas, 
Wl>.ich ones do t..lJ.ey have and which ones are they deprived of? These questions 
should be able to help lmdersta.nd why Palestil1ia.ns mobilise alld also, perhaps, why 
th ' t b'" F r Tn' , "f 'ty l'rh' f' ff, t ~ey ao no. mo lllse. ~ o~ exaLple, aoes laCK 0 secun w .. ~lln .ne camps a~~ec. 
mobilisation? Is the identity of the Palestir.ia..llS withi.'l t..lJ.e ca..'1lpS recognised from 
the outside? What does tins meall for them? Is this a factor in their mobilisation and 
so forth. 
48 Word is different depending on whose version of human needs one is using. 
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Resource Mobilisation Theory 
Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory developed following the student movement in 
the 1960s, shifting attention away from deprivation, collective a.Tld irrational 
behaviour theories. Ma...'lY of the f01L.'lding scholars of R..l\.1 had been pa...rt of the 
student movement in the 1960s and realised that deprivation and L1Tationality was 
not necessa.rily the case in mobilisation and action in political groups. 
There are four maLn movements that made this shift in theory occur: the student 
movement, the women's movement, the peace movement, and the environmental 
movement. However, the movements of today have already changed; as 
Klandennans reminds us "The student movement is the only one of the four that no 
longer exists as such, the women's movement and the peace movement have 
declined ah'110st everywhere in their original forms. The envirop~'11ental movement is 
'1- - 1- " 49 stl 1 very much a lve . 
RM theories tell us that "grievances are Ubiquitous in every society and that as a 
consequence, grievances alone can not be sufficient conditions for the rise of social 
movements. The availability of resources and opporturities for collective action 
were considered more important than grievances in triggering social movement 
r. .,' 50 T' , ", 1" • tl 'd ' t' r :.ormatlOn. 1n otner woras, one ca.Tl nave all ~ne gnevances 111 '1e won , ou II 
there are no means by which to express this grievance, there is nothing one ca...'l do 
about it. These means include: rational behaviour and resources; political stmcture 
49 Klandermans, Bert "New Social Mo~ements and Resource Mobilisation: The European and the 
American approach Revisited" in Rucht, ed Research on Social Movement: The State of the Art in 
Western EnTope a.l'ld the USA (Westview Press, 1991) p.19 
50 Ibid. p. 24 
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opportunity; and lastly the movement organisation itself. What all three of these 
theories have in COIILrnon is that they see collective action not so much as OeLl1g 
r..lelled by grievances but more as a means to acI-ieve a goal. 5 i 
The Rational Actor 
The rational actor approach leans heavily on the idea that the individual joinLllg and 
participating in a political group is rational. The term 'rational' refers to calculated 
self-interest. The rational actor model incorporates the following assumptions:52 1) 
what must be explained is action, that is behaviour that reflects purpose or intent; 2) 
1 •• 1 1 1 1 l' • 1 1 "') • 1 . tne actIon IS cnosen as a ca~cUlateQ sOlUtion to a strategic proOlem;.) It exp~ams 
what goal a government or movement is pursuing when it acts and how the action is 
a product of a reasonable choice, given the objective. Given these assumptions the 
basic concepts of rationaJ action is the following. First you need to know your goals 
and objectives. This h'llplies that the actor tI-in ... 1(s hard about wI-ich route he/she will 
pursue in accordance to how much 'utility' he/she can get out of that particular 
action. Second, a rational actor must choose from a r~l1ge of alternatives. Tpird, the 
rational actor ta...1(es into account the consequences of each alternative action. And 
fourth and fInally is the choice. "Rational Choice consists simply of selecting that 
alternative whose consequences raP~ highest in the decision-m~l(er's payoff 
r..lllction".53 Being rational implies that one acts and makes choices to receive the 
51 Klandermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 203 
52 Allison, Graham. T Essence of Decision: Exnlaining the Cuban Missile Crisis rdarper Collins 
Publishers, USA, 1971) p. 13 
53 Ibid. p. 30 
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best payoff available, within certain contexts. There may be costs involved so the 
actor must choose the action with the maxL.1TIUHl utility. 
According to social theorists, rational choice theory assumes that "social systems are 
orgapised in ways that structure t..1}e alternatives a.T1d consequences facing individuals 
so that they behave rationally". 54 Decision theory is linked to rational choice theory 
through the choice of altematives. It refers to "gathering i!1.£ormation about past, 
present, and likely future events and conditions; listing options and rap.king them in 
order of relative desirability of their most li..1cely consequences; and making a fmal 
decision intended to produce the best possible outcome".55 
The major problem here is the free-rider problem. In order to deal with tins problem 
no M 1 1 01' 1 . f 11 • • 56" . 1 1 1· 1". • KJ: 1 theory leans on son s OglC o· cO.lectlve actIOn pa.rtlcUlany IDS Qlstmctlon 
between collective and selective incentives .... The core argument of Olson's theory is 
that rational Llldividuals will not pa..rticipate in collective action unless selective 
.... 1 1.,., 57 T 1 1 11" .. .. 
mcentIves encourage tnem to GO so. m otner worus, COllectIve mcentIves are 
good, but do not necessa..rily always encourage people to pa..rticipate, whereas a 
selective incentive is necessa..ry to encourage participation. TIns seems to reill.£orce 
the argu .• 1TIent made above, that grievance is not enough for mobilisation a.T1d action, 
there must be more to it, and this is where selective incentives come in. Therefore 
grievances about the nakba, lack of statehood (Palestine) and lack of civil and 
hu.1TIan rights may not be enough to mobilise the Palestinians in the refugee CanlPS in 
54 Johnson, Alan. G The Biacbvell Dictionary of Sociology Biacbveli Publishers, Oxford, 1995, p. 
225 
55 Ibid. p. 225 Similar to game theory and prisoners dilemma 
56 Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, Ca.lJlbridge, 1965 and 
1968) 
57 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 24 (italics are my emphasis) 
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Lebanon. The political groups may need to encourage mobilisation and participation 
through collective and selective LT1centives. 
Although this is a good explCLl1ation and shows why people do not join when there 
1 •• • h 11 • 1 • 1 1 1 -d are no selectIve mcentIves, L e proolem remllins that sometlmes people ao aecl e to 
join even though there are no selective incentives. People joining groups and 
movements without selective incentives must have other reasons. These reasons 
include an understaT1dLT1g by the participa.Tlt that without pis or her participation the 
collective good CaI'Jlot be realised. However, "given the multiplicative relationspip 
between the value of the collective goal and its possible realisation, for some people 
the goal is so valuable that even a slight chance of success is enoug..lI to motivate 
pa..-rticipation".58 Thus the actor is rational, not necessa..rily for pis or her own direct 
benefit, but there may be a feeling that the cause is important enough and therefore 
one can rationally come to the conclusion that me more people who participate 
without being selfish, the better. 
There are further criticisms, some of which it is possible to overcome within the 
discussion of other theories below. First, the criticism that there is more to a rational 
decision thCLl1 a person or group t.11inking in tenllS of utility maximisation. 
Institutional roles, for example, have an impact upon rational decision making. In 
other words, structures of different kinds, including state, societal a..Tld so on, also 
have a bearing on decision-making. It is not enough to look solely at the individual 
rational choice, to understaTld a person's behaviour. 
58 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 25 
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Second, there may be more than self-interest involved in a decision. Rational Actor 
theory thus does not account "for the actor's goal and desires, as well as her /his 
beliefs".59 In other words, it does not explore the motivations of the decision ma.1cer. 
The theory 
leaves unexamined the origins of L'1e desires and beliefs which form the reasons 
for the actions whose rationality is being assessed. The focus of i.lvestigation is 
'how' an actor best achieves her or his gaols irrespective of the origins or merits 
of these goals. It does not attempt to uncover 'why' the actor held the goal 
preferences she or he did nor does it question the beliefs underlyi.lg her or his 
choice of action.GO 
This implies that there are factors involved in decision-making that are both intemal 
and external to the individual. 
Action can have multiple causes, alld decision-making in relation to action is not 
always consistent. Rather, decision-making is influenced by muitipie factors 
including intuitional roles, societal norms, and ideology, for instance. 
Furthermore, with collective action into movements it is difficult to determine costs 
a.TJ.d benefits appropriately, as coilective action into and within social movements, as 
well as determination over a group's or social movement's goals, develops over 
time. "On the one hand, there is the certainty of engagement and of the acceptance 
of risk in the short term; on the other, the lLTJ...1mO'V!1 territory of resuits which are not 
only difficult to calculate, from the point of view of the individual but whose 
59 Jahri, Vivienne op. cit., p. 62 
60 Ibid. p. 62-63 
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achievement also seems a distant prospect. The existence of collective identity61 
enables t.'1ese di:f:tlculties to be overcome".62 
The Political Model 
Tilly's political model lists five major components of collective action: interests, 
.... 1·,·" '" .. 111" .... l f 63T .r. organlsatIOn, mOOl1lSatIOn, opportunity ana. cOllectlve actIOn ltse!. mterests reier 
to the reasons why people decide to mobilise and pa..rticipate. Organisation (which 
will be looked at in more depth below) refers to the organisational structure of the 
group that people are mobilising and participating in. More directly this is about 
"leaderspip, COITL1nu,nity resources, structures already in place".64 Tpis also refers to 
the extent of a C01mllon identity of the members and t..he leaders, and also to what 
extent tpis is seen as a upifying structure. Mobilisation refers to "the process by 
, . , . '1· 1 rl '-t. ." 6';; Th wmcn a group acqurres cOl~ectlve contro~ over resources neeu-ea ~or actIOn . - ~ ~ese 
resources could be anything from weapons to votes.66 The resources' importance 
lies in whether they are usable or not to ftii"ther t.'1e interests of the group. 
Opportunity refers to "primarily the degree of coercion or repression that may be 
used against the contender". 67 1.'1 other words, what the l-.J.ghest institutions (in the 
community, country, region or even world) Catl do to stop you mobilising into 
groups a..lld being active. For example, what steps can the Lebanese goverll.-ment take 
61 Collective Identity will be looked at later on in this chapter. 
62 Della Porta, Donnatella llild Diani, Mario op. cit., p. 104-105 
63 Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 
1978) 
64 Brand, Laurie Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State 
(ColU111bia University Press, New York) 1988 p.18 
65 Tilly, Charles 1978 op. cit., p. 7 
66 For Tilly, collective action llild violent action stem from the same conditions. Collective violence is 
seen as another form of collective violence. 
67 Brand, Laurie 1988 op. cit., p.18 
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to prevent demonstrations by Palestinian refugees? If the refugees are aware of all 
11 1 11 L 1/ t 1 t1 t 1 1 t1 ' t" 1 . "'h' 
.ne s.eps .ne eoanese govern.l!lenL can .aKe, .ney can .nen plan nerr aClVues. 1 ~llS 
does not mean that no mobilisation occurs if the government is coercive, on the 
contrary, sometimes that is the whole point of the action to show people how 
coercive a goven:lment may actually be, if at ail. 
The Political Model looks at "political institutions and their effects on the 
opportUIlities, constraints and channelling or social movement orgaJlisation, forms 
of action and outcomes".68 Ta..rrow reminds us that looking at the effects of political 
institutions on mobilisation and action is important; when mobilisation and action 
are compared between two different places with two different sorts of political 
institutional structure and/or arrangements, t.~e differences in political institutions 
and alTangements "colTespond to differences in style, strategy or outcomes [of social 
movements] that LTldividuai or group variables within systems frequently fail to 
explai..'1".69 1.'1 ot.~er words, this approach stresses that opportunity is about the 
interaction between mobilisation and action between the movement and the 
authorities. Ibis is an attractive approach if one wants to ~Tlders~Tld how 
movements are able to do what they do. 
For Tilly, it is the last four of the five big components that are of utmost importance 
if there is to be collective action. Interests are important for collective action; 
however, without the other four components, it is not possible. The last four 
components are "the variable determinants of collective action. If a p~rticular 
68 Tarrow, Sidney Comnaring Social Movement Particination in Western Europe and the United 
States: Problems, Uses fuid a Proposal for Synthesis in Ruehl, Dieter ed Research on Social 
Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA (Westview Press, 1991) p. 401 
69 Ibid. p. 401 
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category of people is unorganised, it has no hopes of pursuing its interests; indeed it 
may be ll..TJ.aware of them, or even of its own coHective identity. If the group is 
organised, it may still be unable to mobilise resources to realise its interests".70 Thus 
Tilly's political model is about stmctures and organisation and the resources 
available. 
A point wbich is interesting in Tilly's work is that he sees no difference between 
collective violence and collective action. Hence the ease with wpich resources 
mentioned above nmge from weapons to votes. All collective action, non-violent or 
violent, requires that people feel they have a.TJ. entitlement that t.1}ey are not receiving 
or a sense of (in)justice. These senses of entitlement and justice "arise out of 
ongoing group life,,71. However, we have to remember that this is not enough to 
produce collective action or violence and the ot.~er four big components are 
necessary . 
The Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach 
The organisational approach tends to stress issues of "organisation dynamics, 
leadersPip and resource management. It uses economic and orgaPisational theories 
to study social movements". 72 TJ:-.is approach sees orgarisation as an important 
resource for social movements bot.h for mobilising and for active participation. 
"Organisation decreases the costs of participation; it is important in the recruitment 
70 Rule, James. Bop. cit., p. 178 
71 Ibid. p. 175 
72 Denton, Margaret "Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements" New Zealand Sociology (Vol. 
13, No 2 November 1998) p. 220 
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of pa.rticipa.nts; a.nd in the opinion of most students, it increases the chances of 
" 73 Z 1 ' , M C rj' •• '1 t t tl RM 'fi t' , , success. a.u a.l1U 1 IC aI~ny VIVIU.y con.ras'1e new. I approacn .Tom ne om 
traditional approach with regard to 'orgar.isation'. The traditional approach did not 
really emphasise organisation, whereas RM theory sees orga.msation in relation to 
strategy a.l1d tactics as well as in relation to society in a larger context: 
[h1 relation to strategy and tactics] social movement organisations [have] a 
number of strategic tasks. These include mobilising supporters, neutralising 
and/or transfonniIlg mass and elite publics into sympathisers, achieviilg change 
in targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one 
ahu may conflict with behaviour aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics 
are influenced by inter-organisational competition and co-operation ..... 
[In relation to larger society] Society provides the infrastructure which social 
movement industries and other industries utilise. The aspects utilised include 
communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to 
institutional centres, pre-existh'1g networks, and occupational structure fu'1d 
growth.74 
Organisation is thus an important featme in mobilising the masses but also for 
conducting action. This version of resource mobilisation does not necessa.rily 
neglect the traditional aspect of potential and actual pa..rticipaIlts needing grievances 
in order to mobilise and act. Rather there mayor may not be grievances, there may 
be what McCa.rthy and Zald call 'conscience constituents' who support and join a 
movement for reasons of what they believe to be right. However, in order to 
aggregate resources there needs to be some sort of organisation. Furthermore, one 
can have all the grieva.l1ces and drea.llls in the world but if there is no 
(orgar.isational) structure h'l which one ca..'l discuss and act upon these grievances or 
dreams, not much can be done about them. The Palestinian Resistance whjch started 
in the 1960s gave the structure that enabled people to do something about their 
grievances. However, the previous Intifada showed that people are sometimes 
73 KlandermaIls, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 25-26 
74 McCarthy, J llild Zald, Mayer "Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory: 
American Journal ofSociologv (Vol. 28, 1977) p. 1217 
42 
willing to act collectively without a formal organisation. Nevertheless, we do not 
Know what effect the Palesti.11ian Resistance had on the Intifada, in terms of 
(learning from) experience, knowledge, maybe disillusionment witI'l the Resistance 
and so forth. LT1 other words, Palestinian Resistance activity before the Intifada may 
(or may not) have had lL.'l effect on the L'ltifada. Just because there is a supply of 
social movements or political groups does not necessarily mean that people will 
join, again referring to the lack of focus on grieVlL.T1CeS, emotions a.T1d ideology. 
Already, we can see a gap in tP..is theory. The reasons for mobilising are not present; 
it is just assumed that they exist. Nevertheless tillS orgrullsational approach to R..M 
theory brings to light the orgwisational features that are needed in social 
movements. 
Why We Need to Include Another Approach 
R.M theory focuses on the meso-level at the expense of important insights into tile 
other micro and macro-levels of analysis. This makes sense as RM theory focuses 
on resources lL.'ld orglL.'1isation. However, ignoring these other levels of analysis ClL.'l 
be seen as a clitical flaw in trying to understand mobilisation. The reason for the 
lack of interest in IPicro-level analysis is that RM theory developed in reaction to 
social-psychological expllL.'lations of collective action. Si..T..ilarly, the macro-level 
rulalysis of the pre-RM years of 'social disorga.msation and brea.kdown' was 
1 • .1 n~M l' • 1 1 TT h' 1 d sometfl.Jng tne ru. 1 tneonsts were trymg to move oeyonG. tlowever, t .ls.e to a near 
absence witl-..in RM theory of "the' larger' questions of social structure lL.'ld l-..istorical 
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change, and 'smaller' issues of individual motivation and social interaction".75 The 
micro- al"ld macro-levels of fuialysis are important in seeing the 'bigger picture'. 
Without an inclusion of these other two levels of analysis, R.J.\1 theory becomes a 
theory that shows us organisations with actors without any regard for the larger 
cultu.ral a..l1d structural constraints and without any social or historical context. Thus 
it seems that RJV1 theory would greatly benefit, and become more complete, by 
incorporating Lhe micro- a..nd macro-levels of analysis. 
Another problem is the self-interested actor who tbillks about maximising bis or her 
utility before engaging in any action. For many people, emotion does play a role in 
their daily lives and in the decisions that they ma.."l(e. Jaggar has argued that: 
oppressed people particularly, need and value emotions as a means of affirming 
the values and people that the rational standards of culture demerul. When 
rationality is defmed to include the reasoned choice of values as well as the 
selection of means, emotion may be an indispensable aid rather than a hindrance 
to reliable judgment.76 
Rational people have values, however, a..nd these values are defIned by experience 
and how we perceive this or that experience. "Emotions and values are closely 
related ... emotions provide the experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional 
responses to the world, it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one 
f N'· h 1" 77 r. 1 1 ,. 1 1 • • • 
state 0-': arrarrs more Lan anotner. reople are peop e, ana In tne ena It IS emotIon 
that will cLrive someone to do somethi..'1g, which does not mean that they are 
irrational or necessarily act in accordance with Lhe theories of societal breakdown. 
75 Buechler, Steven "Beyond Resource Mobilisation? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory" 
The Sociological Quarterlv (Vol. 34, No.2, 1993) p. 224 
76 Ferree, MyTa Marx "The Political Context of Rationality" in Morris, A llild Muller C M Frontiers 
in Social Movement Theory (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992) p. 42 
77 Jaggar, Alison ed GenderlBody/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing 
(Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1989) p. 153 
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Nevertheless, having said tlllS, RM theory does open a window for examining the 
orgapisationallevel, although we must not forget to look tlt..Tough the other windows 
of the 'social' atld the 'structural' as well. 
New Socia! Movement Theory 
Participation in a social movement is not only a means to an end but a 
fulfilment 78 
During the same time that RM theory was developing in North America, New Social 
M (NSM) ,,-., . . p S' , " ~ lOvement ~ 1 1 1 neory was emergmg m ~urope. cnolars saw tnat me new 
protests of the 1960s and 1970s could not be explained by traditional Ma..'Aist theory 
and that the protesters themselves were no longer working class people wanting 
better labour conditions.79 For the new scholars there seemed to be new reasons for 
mobilising £Llld collective action; tllere were new grievances and new aspirations 
a..rnong the new generation of protesters. In general, one can say that NSM theory 
focuses on the 'cultural' at the macro-level of analysis. 
The term NSM theory may be somewhat nllsleading. In reality NSM theory should 
be more correctly called NSM theories. Common themes include first, new values 
and new issues .. There is no longer a focus on production and distribution of goods 
as in the working-class movements, but ratller a focus on otller issues, such as the 
environment or peace, which is due to globalisation and increased awareness about 
78 Gamson, William "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" in Morris, Aldon and Mueller, 
Carol McClurg Frontiers ill Social Movement Theory (Yaie University Press, New Haven, 1992) p. 
56 
79 Darnovsky, M et al op. cit., p. xiv 
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wider (world) issues.8o A related concern is that with the decline of working-class 
issues, there arose increased prosperity which "has caused the demands for scarce 
goods to grow. Ma...I1Y of these are positional goods (e.g. cars). When used 
extensively, they become an obstmction to satisfaction of other needs (traffic jams). 
The general result is increased competition, wpich in tu..rn produces more 
grievances". 81 In other words, in today's world, we have different needs from 
yesterday's world. Our grievances are caused by our new needs as they clash with 
other needs. A second theme is the new forms of action, using different forms of 
action and protest to those used by the labour movement. The new movements 
"prefer small-scale, decentralised organisations, they are anti-hierarchical, and they 
favour direct democracy".82 According to Melucci the "actor's participation witpin 
movements is no longer a means but an end".83 Lastly, there is also a new 
constituency, again shifting from working class to middle class, as well as people 
suffering from the effects of modernisation. Accordi.TJ.g to Touraine, defining the 
constituency of the new social movements can only be done by looking at what the 
social movements themselves are doing. Within the context of the post-industrial 
society of today, the protest of social movements has spifted from economics to 
culture. All of these new changes are to be found \vitllin the cultural sphere of life, 
. h 1-. ]". 1 84 rather tl an tHe pOLItIcal. 
80 See Melucci, Alberto Nomads of the Present (Centwy Hutchinson, London, 1989) for more detaiL 
81 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 28 
82 Ibid. p. 27 
83 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 5 
84 See for exaIIlple, Plotke, David "What's so new about social movements?" Socialist Review (VoL 
20, 1990) who argues that the focus on the novelty of these movements is overstated. See Beuchler, 
Steven 1995 op. cit., for a brief review of the arglliuents. 
46 
Differences within New Social Movement Theory: Two major theorists: 
Melucci and the Cultural 
The argument of Melucci is that in the world of today there are "new forms of social 
control, conformity pressures, a..lld information processing to which new social 
movements respond".85 These issues relate to the 'new themes' of social 
movements. In contrast to old theories of social movements L~at draw from class 
bases, these new social movements draw across the classes and across regional 
bOlmdaries. New social movements come from the grass-roots of society. Whereas 
the old social movements such as trade unions were hierarcpical, the new social 
movements tend to be more informal. Melucci criticises the RM approach for 
focusing oPJy on how social movements develop and act, but not on the question of 
why. His work is a new framework, within which he explains how one is able to 
understand both questions of how and Why. Although hjs approach focuses on the 
cultural, he does understand that there is a deep political element to social 
1,· th' , T t t' h 1" ' TT movements as we 1 ill •• err am.Ity to, a •• 1mes, c. ange pO.ICY a..lla so on. ttowever, 
he emphasises the cultural and non-political sides of social movements. 
For Melucci, social movements are concerned wiLl-I the 'everyday life' of people. 
Tl>js means that there are aspects witl>jn the 'everyday lives' of people that may 
become social problems. There are also individual needs that need to be ta.ken into 
consideration. Individual needs are exa..Tllined witpin a context of culture where one 
can understand these needs more thoroughly. 
In all human groupings, even those most exposed to natural constraints, 
individual needs have always been bound up with a system of social relations 
and t.~e capacity for symbolic relations. Needs are inevitably the result of 
85 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 446 
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cultural perception, of a process of symbolic mediation that permits their 
defUlition (U"1d representation, on t.1.e basis of biological (U"1d enviromnental 
conditions86 
According to Melucci, social movements are social constructions in so far as they 
are constructed and built by actors. The cultural is of utmost importance to Melucci, 
as we have just seen. He places extreme h'TIportance on coliective identity, an aspect 
that we shall be looking at more closely within social constructionism below. For 
Melucci, coilective action is not solely a product of resources, but of identity. New 
Social Movements "act rather than react".87 Their concerns are different from the 
social movements of the past. "In post-material society, there emerges a further type 
f . 1 1 . l ' t 1 ' • ·ful " " 88 'T'1' • 0": ngn~, a ngnt to eXIstence, or ra.ner, !O a more meap.:mg 11 eXls.ence. lIDS IS 
one of the major points witbin NSM theory. Society has changed and with it goals, 
meanings, values, and issues for the people who live in it. FUrUlenTIOre, for Melucci, 
the new social movements are social constructions, and should be seen as "ongoing 
social constructions rather than as unita..ry empirical objects, givens or essences or 
t.tistorical personages acting on a stage". 89 In other words, new social movements are 
based upon social constructions fu"ld identity. These social constructions are ongoing 
and fluid, and it is from tbis that collective action stems, not from formal 
organisation and structure. The Sta.rtLllg point is the social construction of collective 
.. 1 'Ot / h· 1 ·11 1 1 1 1) 1" b 1 .... t 1 mentl.y ~ w lcn Wlll oe expanaea upon tater, ana It IS otn a prereqUlsI.e ana a 
function of the social movement. Social movements are able to achieve collective 
action with on-goLllg social constructions as the stem of the collective action. 
Resources and structures are important, but secondary. In tenns of the Palestipian 
Resistance, this argument shows that first and foremost it is an ongoing process of 
86 MI' Alb rt • 989 . . 19 • !e.uccl, . e .. o lOp. CIt., p. 1. 
87 Ceruio, Karen "Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions" Annual Review of Sociology 
0! 01. 23, 1997) (on printout from computer; p. 10) 
88 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 178 
89 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p.446 
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social constmctions and understandings which are built into the collective identity 
of the members. The formal processes of the va.rious orga.llisations a.Tld their 
resources become seconda..ry. 
Sociological Intervention and Touraine 
For Touraine society, social action and social movements are all intertwined with 
each other; he says: "social movements are the expression of the collective will".9o 
For Touraine, social movements are "the organised collective action by which a 
class-actor struggles for the social deflPition of historicity in a given pistorical 
b1 ,- 9i ~ ., th f· 1 . , . h "'t' , f ensem ~e -. lourame s ~eory 0 SOCIa movements IS concemea Wit ~ ~ne glUe 0 
social re1ations".92 For Touraine, "people do not act h,} a social structure, the 
structure of society is L~e structure of how a group moves; it has an identity only by 
virtue of its movement '" To a.llswer 'Wl1at is the stmcture of a modern trade 
union?' Touraine would respond, 'The question can only be answered by looking at 
h 1· d· 1 1 • 1 • 1 W ~at tne up.lons are omg: now tney are actmg ana reactmg, to otner groups, at a 
given moment of their ristory, that is what they are".93 W:'1at should be kept in mind 
when trying to lmderstand Touraine's work on social movements is that his idea of 
structure may differ from the one that we tpln..k of. Structure relates to social 
movements and social action. New social movements are located "between two 
logics: that of a system seeking to maximise production, money, power and 
• 1'; • 1.1 t f'· ki t 1 1'; 1 1 d t
' 
. . d' . 'ual· ,,94 lP~OrmatlOn, ana tna. 0 suoJects see lng.o ae~ena ana expan .TIelr m IVlQ 1 Ity. 
Issues have changed from being based on labour and class to other issues, issues that 
90 Touraine, Alain The Voice and tt'le Eve (Cambridge University Press, Cfullbridge, 1981) p. 29 
91 Castells, Mfuiue11983 The Citv fuid the Grassroots (Edward Arnold Publishers, London, 1983) p. 
301. His translation of Touraine's French version of "The Voice and the Eye" called "La Voix et Ie 
Regard: La Societe Invisible" Pfu-iS, Seuil, 1976, p. 49 
92 Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit, (forward by Richard Sennet, p. x) 
93 Ibid. p. x 
94 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 444. 
are 'culturally orientated' .95 The concern of new movements shows evidence of "a 
displacement of protest from 1i~e economic to the cultural realm, accomplished by 
the privatisation of social problems".96 
Social movements include three points: 'identity', 'opposition' and 'totality'; which 
are the t.lrree necessary ingredients for social movements. Identity and opposition 
explains who one IS and who the 'other' (the enemy) is. Totality refers to the 
grOlmds on which one IS fighting against the opposition. In tenus of Palestinian 
Refugees within the refugee CCL-rnpS ill Lebanon, tpis synthesis within social 
movements refers to 1) what constitutes the collective identity (how the refugees 
define themselves and "lheir situation); 2) how the refugees view the 'other', the 
opposition; and 3) on what grou.llds they are mobilising. This latter point refers to 
the framing of the opposition as well as to the pa...-rticipant's view of t..~e 'stakes' of 
mobilisation and participation. Regarding this latter point Touraine would say: 
what characterises the social movement is primarily the fact that what is at stake 
is represented by historicity itself and not by institutional decisions or 
organisational norms, and that t.':ie actors are t.':ierefore classes, the only actors to 
be defined by their conflictual relations with historicity.97 
In other words, if one is active m a social movement one should know on what 
grounds, i..~ \vhat na..llle and against \vhom, one is acting. These three concepts are 
important because: 
first, it limits the range of 'true' movements to relatively few, thus excluding a 
large nwuber of phenomena that are at the hea..-t of Atuerican (and other 
Europea..i) studies; second it draws attention away from the individual, to the 
exient that all three of Touraine's principles are collective properties of the 
95 TouraL'le, Alain 1981 op. cit., p. 80 
96 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p.445 
97 Touraine, Alai!l 1981 op. cit., p.81 
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movement; third, it itllplies a progression from lower forms of collective 
behaviour to hig.~er ones, with the highest forms of aU the social movements 
that can be proven to embody all three of the principles it. their enfuety.98 
Sociological intervention is needed for groups to llllderstand 'identity, opposition 
and totality'. It refers to self-a.Tlalysis of participants iII collective action with more 
emphasis than solely the situational context or the opir.ions of the pa..rticipants. 
"Such an analysis requires the assistance of the researcher who can not watch the 
movement as an object, but rather, has to intervene into t.1}e field he is studying 
although he .may be rejected and the results of his intervention may be 
neutraiised".99 This mefu'1S that the researcher has to try to be two people at once; to 
be a researcher but also to be ail actor. "It is this new conception of the researcher as 
neither observer nor ideologist that most clearly distinguishes intervention from 
other methods".loo 'L'1e researcher is thus the actor of intervention and stimulates the 
sell-analysis of the group helping t"'1e group go through 'conversion', which in turn 
helps the participa...nts in the group to understand their own actions. However, it is 
important that the researcher goes through the 'conversion' him or herself first . 
...... , 'hi' ., , ." (' fl '1 ) ,., . f Inrougn t S converSIOn tne group Wlll nope~uLy start to reanse tne meanmg 0 
its action and also then realise Touraine's principles of 'identity', 'opposition' and 
'totality'. It is necessary to reach tlns place of 'identity, opposition and totality' if 
the group would like to become a movement. 
In criticism of Touraine's approach it seems tllat the researcher seems required to 
ta.1(e on an almost 'God-like' and patronising roie, where the researcher has to help 
the actor to figure out the meaning of his own action and beliefs, or in the words of 
98 Tarrow, Sidney 1991 op. cit., p. 397 
99 Rucht, Dieter "Sociological Theory as a Tneory of Social Movements? A Critique of Alain 
Touraine" in Rucht, Dieter eo Research on Social Movements: The State oft.1}e Art in Western 
Europe and the USA (Westview Press 1991) p. 374 
100 foid. p. 374 - Ta.1cen from Touraine, A 1981 op. cit., 
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Melucci, ta.ke on a 'missionary role of the researcher'. This aside, Touraine's 
principles of identity, opposition and totality are key concepts for social movements. 
Why NSM theory does not give a full picture either 
If RM theory focused too much on the 'how' of mobilisation, NSM theory focuses 
too much on the question of 'why', with too little emphasis on the 'how'. However, 
there are even criticisms that apply to NSM theory where RM theory does not hold 
the answers. 
What neither approach has done is "demonstrated much awareness for the fact that 
. 1 1 1 t 1· t· 1 • ,,101 rr1. th 1 ·th 1 SOCia. prOOlems are no o0.lec.lvelY gIVen. IllIS mea.lls . a~ nel .• er approacn 
looks into how certain problems become issues and how others do not. Fu.rthennore, 
even if there is a social problem, it may not bling a social movement into being. 
There is no real micro-analysis into the construction of identity, ideology and 
looking at the individual in mobilisation a.l1d participation. As Hastings puts it 
"[W]hilst theorists stress the constmction of a collective identity within social 
movements, there is a tendency to ignore the way that political action is involved i.ll 
constructi.l1g the identity". i 02 
Another important issue that NSM theory does not look into is the issue of power at 
the meso-level of analysis. There is no exarnination of the group's power relations 
\\rithin itself, wpJch is just as import.ant in understanding the group's dynamics, 
101 Klandennans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 30 
102 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 213 
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tactics and general ideas. Finally, although NSM theory offers an explanation of 
social movements from a 'cultural' point of view, it is maiI'ly set in a 'western' 
context in a post-i..'1dustrial, post-modem setting. In relation to the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement, the context is somewhat different. Nevertheless, there are 
important insig.1-Its to keep in :mi..lld, such as the various areas of debate includi..llg 
types of action, social bases of movements, and level of analysis. 
Social Constructionism 
Social constmction literature attempts to fill the gaps in both Ri\1 and NSM 
literature. Social construction 1...1-Ieory stresses that social movements "actively 
engage in the production of beliefs a.'1d grievances, of ideas and meaning, for 
h1.emselves and for others", 1 03 thereby being an aitemative to beliefs that 
mobilisation is due to structurally given interests, selective incentives, rational 
actors, and institutional an.d structural reasons for mobilisation. WiLl! social 
constmction literature, we seem to have gone full circle in a sense, retuming to ideas 
and grieva..llces as mobilising forces. Lll filling the gaps in RM and NSM theory, 
social construction literature has rediscovered Goffma.'1's work. 
TIns section will address t.he core assumptions of social construction theory. The 
basic assll.1Jlption of tpis theory is that in order for people to mobilise and act t.1-Iey 
must collectively see the situation as ripe for action. 
i03 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 225 
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The main area of interest has been in micro-mobilisation processes; how people 
in social movements interact a.ld communicate in such a way as to produce a 
congruence between the changing interests, values and beliefs that individuals 
involved in a social movement have and the activities, goals and ideology that 
are being defined a.ld redefmed for the organisation. These processes are 
referred to as 'frru-ne alignment' .104 
The two major themes of construction theory (Snow a.nd Bedford's work, as well as 
TTl 1 ., 1 ) 1· 1 h 1 ,· • • b 1\..lanaermans worK, empnasise on tne one ~ana tne persuasIve comrnUlllcatlOn y 
movement organisations' L.'l relation to the fra..'Iling of situations. The other strand 
focuses on collective identity. Two other issues will also be explored: recruitment 
a.l1d 'the other'. 
Collective Action and Frame Analysis 
Social Construction theory often uses 'fra.111e analysis', which originates from 
E · G ffrn 105 T • • 1·· 1 1 rvmg o~ an. It IS Important to Keep m mma tnat 
the social constructionist approach rejects a.lY category that sets forward 
essential or core features as the unique property of a collective's members. 
From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artefact - a.l entity 
moulded, refabricated, and mobilised in accord with reigning cultural scripts 
a.ld centres of power. lOG 
Social construction theory's main concem is to understand and explain how social 
movements produce "beliefs and grieva.l1ces, ... ideas and meaJIing, for themselves 
104 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 226 
105 Goffinan, Erving Frame Allalvsis: An Essav on the Organisation ofExnerience (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974) 
106 Cerulo, Karen "Identity ConstrLiction: new issues, new directions" Annual Review of Sociologv, 
(VoL 23, 1997)p. 3 
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and for others".I07 The concept of 'frfu-ne' Cfu'1 be described and understood as "fu'1 
interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses tI~e 'world out tI~ere' by 
selectively pun.ctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one's present or past environment".108 GOffilifu'1 
explains that frames allow people "to locate, perceIve, identify, and label a 
seemingly ifI.1ipite nu..rnber of concrete occurrences,,109 or events witllin their 
immediate SUITOlUldings or the world at large. This interpretive schemata helps 
people to cla..rify, a..Tlalyse a..Tld a..rticuiate their experiences. 'Collective action fra..1Jles' 
according to Snow and Benford are "emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs and 
mefu'ling t.~at inspire and legitimate social movement activities and Cfu-npaigns".110 
They do this by 'fraining'; by simplifying the 'world out there'. Benford takes these 
fra..rnes even fiLrther, explaining that even with the above mentioned job of collective 
action frames, they have three further main tasks. The first task is diagnostic 
fr · 1 • l' . 1 fi d' 1 1 1 (). . 1 • 1 ~ammg, wmcn IS, as the name suggests, m mg out tne proolem s m tne SOCIal 
situation and (perhaps) the reason for it~ meaning fi ..nding who is to bla..1Jle for the 
problem, and then diagnosing the problem. The second is prognostic franling, which 
identifies the problem and its diagnosis, and then "LTlcludes the specification of 
strategies, tactics a..'1d targets".lll The third task of collective action frames is what 
Snow and Benford call motivational fral11ing. Thjs "entails a call to arms or rationale 
for engaging in ameliorative action. The diagnostic and prognostic fra..1Jlmg tasks 
focus on ac.hieving what Klandermans refers to as 'consensus mobilisation'. The 
107 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p.227 
108 Snow, David and Benford, Robert "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" in Morris and Mueller 
ed Frontiers in Social Movement Theories (Yale University Press, London, 1992) p. 137 
109 Goffinan, Erving 1974 op. cit., p.21 
110 Benford, Robert '" Y ou Could be the Hundredth Monkey' Collective Action Frames fu"1d 
Vocabularies of Motive \Vit.'lin the Nuclear Disfulllament Movement" The Sociological Quarterly 
(Vol. 34, No 2, 1993) p.199 
111 Ibid. p. 199 
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latter task, which addresses 'action mobilisation' supplies the motivational impetus 
f. ..." i 12 ~or partlcIpatIOn . 
These concepts show how social movements and their "agents frame or assign 
mea..Tling to and LTlterpret relevant events a..Tld conditions in ways that are intended to 
mobilise potential adherents a..'1d constituencies, to ga..'1ler bystander support and 
demobilise antagonists".ll3 For example, the Palesth-llan Resistance frmiles the event 
of all Israeli destruction of a refugee camp in Gaza in order to mobilise the people. 
Another important aspect of mobilisation and participation lS what IS called 
'Vocabula..ries of Motive' . As Benford tells us 
In the course of interacting with one another and L'leir significant others, 
movement actors and recruits socially construct rationales and justifications for 
their movement pru"ticipation (or lack thereof). These vocabularies of motive 
provide participants with 'good reasons' for identifying with the goals and 
values of the movement and for taking action on its behalf. 114 
These sorts of vocabula.ries of motive come into question when others question the 
participation of the participant, but also when the participant questions him or 
herself. Together with fra..'Iling, described above, vocabularies of motive are the 
prl_me movers behl11d 11licro-mobilisation. 
Klandermans also developed tools called consensus mobilisation and action 
mobilisation. The concept of consensus mobilisation refers to the diagnostic a..Tld 
prognostic fralnes, whereas action mobilisation refers to the motivational fra..'1le. 
112 Benford, Robert 1993 op. cit., p. 200 
113 Ibid. D. 200 
114 Ibid. p. 200 
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However, a few years later, Klandennans explained this further by emphasisi..ng the 
difference between consensus mobilisation and consensusformation: 
t~e former is defined as a deliberate attempt by a social actor to create 
consensus fullong a subset population; the latter concerns the llilplanned 
convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures. To fw-ther refine 
the concept of consensus mobilisation, he identifies two aspects: consensus 
mobilisation in the context of the formation of mobilisation potential in a 
society and consensus mobilisation in the context of action mobili~ation. 115 
Regarding the fIrst of these, Klandennans seems to be refelTing to people who are 
likely to join the group because of their beliefs. Regarding the second, it seems to 
point towards the actual action of the pa..rticipants within the group, which 
legiti..mates all the prior meaIlings, and seems to be similar to the motivational frame 
a.T1alysis of Snow and Befl.ford, where the beliefs and ideas, as well as the 
participants, are in place. The last step is also in place, namely the goals, direction 
and means to be used. 
Collective Identity 
Regarding work done 011 collective identity, Alberto Melucci, stands out from the 
crowd. He is, however, standing on a line between beL.T1g a NSM theorist and a 
social construction theorist, and it is not always easy to tell the difference. 
Identity is a social constmctioll. It IS formed through con...stant interaction with 
other(s). The fra.rping of the self, the question of 'who am 1', is organised around the 
115 Klandenna.1]B, Bert "The Social Construction of Protest and Multiorganisational Fields" in Morris 
and Mueller Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (Yale University Press, New Haven 1992) p. 80 
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ideas we have of ourselves and our surroundings. Mead's1l6 early notion of identity 
was based on the notion of the 'self' (he didn't use the word identity). There is the 
self as, for example, mother or teacher. However, one does have multiple identities. 
There is also the notion of identity as a social identity, as in identifying oneself as a 
group as shown i.ll self-categorisation theoryY7 Collective identity is about qualities 
of'sa.'1leness' of people within the collective, rather than the more individual 'self-
identity' referred to above. Melucci defines collective identity thus: 
Collective identity is an iIlteractive and shared deflnition produced by several 
i"teracfu,g individuals who are concerned with 1:t~e orientations of their action as 
well as the fleld of oooortunities and constraints in which their action takes 
placeYs •. 
Collective identity is a constmction which is negotiated into place through various 
descriptions of 'us' or 'we' giving meaning to the collective identity. Melucci 
explains that social movements, mobilisation and collective action are related to 
collective identity. He explains that an "on-going process of constmction of a sense 
of 'we' can succeed for various reasons ... for instance, because of effective 
leadership, workable organisational fonns, or strong reserves of expressive action. 
r.' 1 f'
" 
·hi 1 l' t' . 1". t" 119 'T'h 11 t' nut It Ca.ll a.so .all, m w cn case co lec.lve actlOn Qlsmtegra.es. I us cOHec.lve 
action is not possible without collective identity. Similarly, the construction of a 
collective identity is a central task of social movements. Therefore Melucci argues 
L"l:lat collective identity is an extremely important aspect of successful mobilisation 
116 Mead, George Herbert Mind, Self and Society from the Standooint of a Social BehavioUt-1st 
(University of Chicago Press, London, 1967) 
117 Tmner, John C and Hogg, Michael A ed Rediscovering the Social Group: Self Categorisation 
Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) 
liS Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 34 
119 Gamson, William "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" in Morris and Mueller Frontiers 
in Social Movement Theory (Yale University Press, New Haven 1992) p. 57 quoting Melucci, A 
1989 op. cit., p. 218 
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and collective action, as well as emphasising that collective identity is important in 
its own right. "The creation of an ongoing collective identity that maintains the 
loyalty and cornrnitment of pa..-rticipants is a cultural acr.,ievement in its own right, 
regardless of its contribution to the achjevement of political and organisational 
goodS".120 Therefore pa.rticipants witpin groups and movements are constantly 
engaged in the process of the construction of mea..%'lg a..'ld of collective identity. In 
order to do this "a group must defIne itself as a group, and its members must 
deveiop shared views of the social environment, shared goais, and shared opinions 
about possibilities and linlits of collective action".121 Collective identity is seen as a 
process leading to collective action. In other words, only in understanding 'we' can 
a collective group develop their expectations, their orientations, and decide on their 
actions. Therefore collective action car.llot be comprehended without an 
understanding of collective identity and the processes it involves. For example, a 
member of the Palestinian Resistance must understand what pis or her collective 
identity is, and through that, understand what he or she is trying to accomplish. Only 
through understanding this collective identity can one understand why someone acts 
the way they do. 
The Other and the Looking Glass Identity 
The constitution of the 'I' is acknowledged to come about only through the 
discourse of the 'other,122 
120 Gamson, Willifull 1992 op. cit., p. 57 
121 Klandermans, Bert 1992 op. cit., p. 81 
122 Giddens, Anthony Central Problems in Social Theorv: Action. Structure and Contradiction in 
Social Analvsis (Macmillan Press, London, 1979) p. 38 
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In relation to identity it is through relationships with other(s) that we manage to 
define ourselves a.'1d our collective: by understa.'1ding what we are a pa.rt of, and 
what we arp not 123 Tin terms of' orgar1sat10 ns arA socl'al mO\TernPnts 'the other{sl' " ""' .L.L.... ..l..L" .L.L.L L .I. ..IJ. I..I..J..J....I."'- .I. .J..1. .1..J..I.'-".J..I., \..J..J.. "'.l..J.\,I 
are the 'targets' of the organisations, including, for instance, employers, goveITl_ment 
institutions, political parties a.'1d so on. The 'other' is also related to diagnostic 
fra.T..ing. In the case of the Palestir..ian Resistance, the target changes according to 
the tactics and the issue and agenda of the day. For instance, the hijackings by 
va.rious groups wit"bin the Resistance during the 1970s targeted the international 
cornmur..ity. The Resistance wanted to show the international COIrLL'TIur..ity that they 
existed, a.nd were willing to take severe measures to do so. This tells us that 'the 
other' is not always just understood wit"bin an orgaroisation and social movement. 
The message of 'the oLlJ.er' is constructed wit1:>..in a community, but the message is 
not always intended solely for the supporters but also for the opponents: 'the other' . 
Construction of the collective identity is a process Lhat happens through constant 
interaction. In order to understand the 'we' L'1 collective identity, or the 'me' of 
,na"v'd'uai 'a'ent,tv one rrlust UInderstara' who one 's ,n relatl'on to the 'ot'npr{s)' The 
.1..1..1. .J. .I. .I. .J..1.\..J."), .I. .1...1..1.... ....J..l...I..1. .J. .J..J..I..1. .J. '" ... .J...1. .1."".1.\, • ..L.A..I. 
implication of this is the necessity for an lmderstanding of who the 'other(s)' are, 
what they stand for, and through that understa.'1ding, one defines who one is not. 
There is also a different notion of 'the other', tIns time in relation to the construction 
of the self. The looking-glass self, as originally formulated by Cooley, is about the 
perception of the 'self' through what we believe 'others' are t1:>..inking about us. 
i23 For similar notions of framing the other in relation to the self see Said, Edward Orientalism 
(Penguin Books, London, 1995) and Hall, Stuart "Introduction: Who Needs Identity?" in Hall, Stuart 
and Du Gay, Paul eds Questions of Cultural Identity (Sage Publications, London, 1996) 
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"E . fr hI' hi h h " 11 d h' If' 124 0 very new person IS a es g~ass m w~ c~ He IS Impe~ e to see Imse. ur 
notion of ourselves is thus in part created by how we h~~1k others perceive us. To 
restate the important point: the self is created th..rough relationships.125 "Vle have no 
means of knowillg our self except by observing how others respond to it". 126 
TriaJ.ld3-fyllidou argues that nationalists form a national identity based on the notion 
of defnung who 'we' are and who 'they' are. In order to li.llderstand the we-they 
dichotomy, national identity must be seen from wifl:>in and without. From witl>..in, 
"the national bond may relate to a belief in common descent and/or to a common 
culture, na..1llely a system of traditions, ideas, symbols, and patterns of behaviour a..lld 
COIr.u.'1lu..'1ication that are shared by the members of the community".127 National 
identity is also associated with a piece of territory: a homeland. Each of these 
elements is involved in national identity, although some may be stronger than 
others. For example, witl>..in some national identities, ethnicity is stronger than 
territory, aJ.ld so on. 
The other notion of 'they' is related to the definition of national identity from 
without. Tpis is because identities are negotiated by interaction. By understanding 
and deflI'ing the 'other', one can defIne oneself. National identity can be defIned in 
"contrast to other communities".128 The 'other' can also signify more L~an a 
distinction from the national identity. The 'other' can be perceived as a h~eat to h~e 
national identity in question, either by being a dominant force within society that 
124 Cooley, Charles Horton Life and the Student: Raodside Notes on Human Nature, Society and 
Letters (Alfred A !Glopf, New York, 1927) p. 194 
125 This corresponds to identity as explained within human needs theory. 
126 Cooley, Charles Horton op. cit., p. 198 
127 TriandafYllidou, Anna National "Identity and tJ.1.e Other" Ethnic and Racial Studies (Vol. 21, No 4 
July 1998) p. 599 
128 Ibid. p. 599 
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Ignores the minority national identity, or stretching fmiher, is seen as a threat 
intending to 'wipe oui'129 the national identity in question. Thus the concept of the 
'ot..~er' has ,vider sigrificance than soleI)' in shaping one='s national identity. 
Constructing Recruitment 
There is another view within social contructionism that points to issues of solidarity 
when trying to answer questions about recruitment. Solidarity relates to the 
orgarisation's use of "pre-existing social relationsr.ips". This mea.'1S t..~at recruitment 
is often done th...rough friends and fa:fl1jly, often because of shared values. "The 
argument that recruitment to a movement follows lines of pre-existing social 
reiationsrips a.'1d that recruitment networks are a critical part of the mobiiisation 
process has become part of our shared knowledge. Strong, pre-existing friendshjp 
• • 11 • 1'· 1 • 1· 1.,., 130 "T'1· 1 1 • tIes seem eSpeCiallY lIDportant wnen tne nSK IS mgn . lms may oe tne case III 
many instances; however, it is important that one keeps in mind the ability of 
organisations to frame debates, as refelTed to above in relation to framing. Cultures, 
communities, friends and family, often have different values. Therefore, one refers 
back to the way that issues a.'1d debates are framed. Laitin argues that "people with 
strongly opposed views can share a culture and that people with siInilar views can 
come from different cultures". 131 
129 Triandafyllidou, Alll1a op. cit., p. 603 
130 Gamson, William 1992 op. cit., p. 61 
131 Tarrow, Sidney "Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing 
Meaning through Action" in Morris, A and Mueller C M Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1992) p. 184 (Laitiil, 1988, "Political Culture and Political 
Preferences" Ainerican Political Science Review 589-90, VoL 82) 
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Concluding Remarks on Social Constructionism 
We have seen how social construction theory is essentially about the production of 
beiiefs, grievances, and identity. It is ej.bout "how people in social movements 
interact and conununicate in such as way as to produce a congruence between the 
changing interests, values, and beliefs that individuals involved in a social 
movement have, and the activities, goals and ideology that are being defined and 
redefined for the organisation".i32 Tris is what we saw within Goffma..'1's frames 
and frame alignment. 
Potential problems with this theory arise when one looks at what actually constitutes 
these frames. Is it a structure? If so, that goes against what social constructionists 
seem to be standing for. Furthermore, as Hastings points out; "Given that people are 
quite capable of retaining incongruous and at times conflicting values, beliefs and 
ideas in their minds, how well integrated does a set of ideas have to be to form a 
Groves134 points to another issue in reiation to social construction theory. In his 
analysis of animal rights activists, Groves argues that social constructionists focus 
too much on ideas and not enough on emotions. Both ideas and emotions "emerge 
fu"1d develop as a result of the interactive processes within social movements".135 1"1 
i32 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 226 
i33 Ibid. p. 226 
i34 Groves, Julian McAllister "Learning to Feel: The Neglected Sociology of Social Movements" The 
~ocial Review (Vol. 43, No.3, August 1995) 
105 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 227 
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tm'll, the beliefs and the meaJIings created by these processes "become attached to 
these emotions". 136 
Another point to t..hirLk about is whether or not the construction of identity is solely 
produced in t..l}e sphere of symbolic codes, as Melucci would say. One could also 
., t '1' . . , . . h"'" , . . . , tr.' ,., argue tna. COl.eCtIVe laentlty may ve snapea Dy 'pOlltlCal SuJggle ana tne 
relationship between political and cultural dh'Ilensions of a movement".137 There 
seems to be, especially within Melucci's collective identity concept, too sharp a 
distinction between "political action and collective identity formation". 138 This is 
importa.nt to keep in mind, and is sinlilar to the criticisms of NSM theory and ~M 
theory, in that each of them seems to be focusing on one particular aspect at the 
expense of others. However, because NSM theory and social constructiopism stress 
the cultural, the symbolic a.nd the social construction of identities, tlllS does not 
necessarily mean that actors do not use rational choice as outlined earlier on. Rather, 
as Ga.'11son tells us 
Nothing in this argument denies that social movement actors make strategic 
judgements based on their expectations about costs fulds benefits. The point is, 
rather, t,1.at any strategic paradigm necessarily presupposes a theory of identity 
... When people bind their fate to the fate of the group, they feel personally 
threatened when the group is threatened. Solidarity and collective identity 
operate to blur the distinction between individual and group interest, 
undermining the premises on which the utilitarian models operate139 
i36 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 227 
i37 Bfu~tholomew, Amy and Mayer, Margit "Review Article: Nomads o/the Present: Melucci's 
Contribution to 'New Social Movement' Theory" Theory. Culture and Society Vol. 9, 1992, p. 152 
:~8 Ibid. p. 152 
109 Gamson, Willifull 1992 op. cit.~ p. 57 
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Conclusion: How can we examine mobilisation? 
The approaches to social movements "compensate each other rather than 
comp~t~"l40 ~ 
How are we to examine mobilisation within the refugee camps in Lebanon? The 
theories outlined above are found lacking and wanting. Most focus on one level of 
analysis at the expense of other levels. Therefore I suggest that the fra.'11ework that 
should be used needs to encompass all of them in some way. Some of the theories 
outlined above are methodological. This will be reiterated in the next chapter on 
methodology; however the line between theory and methodology is an extremely 
thin one. What follows is my suggestion for splitting the fra..mework into three 
sections: structures, organisation and the individual. 
The Structural 
Starting with the macro-level of analysis, this encompasses most theories within the 
NSM approach as well as the Political Model within the RL\1 approach. The Political 
Model is of interest as it brings to light the issues of resources and societal 
constraints, pa..rticularly relating to 'opportu11ities'. Opportunity can refer to 
resources, but also to coercion, for instance the Lebanese government constraining 
Palestinian political action. Tris may be a demobilising factor, but at the same time 
it lllight have the opposite effect. 
The structural level is also seen within NSM theory(ies). From the NSM perspective 
the 'cultural' refers to changes within society as a whole. NSM theorists noticed a 
i40 Klandermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 205 
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change in society's and people's values, interests, issues, a.nd so forth. Touraine 
beiieves that collective action is inherent in the social structures, maintaining in this 
case that "people do not act in a social structure, the structure of society is the 
structure of how a group moves".141 Structures are important, and for a fuller 
understanding of mobilisation into political groups, structures, in whatever form 
they may take, need to be taken into consideration. Structures also explain how 
mobilisation is possible. At times structures also explain, by implication, why 
people would mobilise into groups. Again to use the example above, the Lebanese 
government's coercion of Palestiluan mobilisation may actually ma..~e Palestimans 
want to mobilise even more. Also liD_ked to issues of st.ructures is the hmna.n needs 
perspective. There will be an examination of what human needs are met within the 
ca..'TIpS and what effect, if any, the existence or lack of these hu..'TIan needs has on the 
refugee population. 
Looking at structural constraints a.lld hlL111an needs can show reasons and 
expianations for both how and why people mobilise. However, this may not be 
enough. Individual motivations and participation can also be due to other factors, 
such as organisational recruitment and resources. 
The Organisation 
The Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach within t.he R.J.\1 approach as well as 
sections dealing with recruitment within the NSM theories deal with the 
orgarisationallevel of analysis. Issues of recruitment are one focus witrin tJ:.is level 
i4i Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., (foreword by Richard Sennet, p. X) 
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of analysis. Within the OrgaJ1isational-Entrepreneurial Approach, the focus is on the 
importance of 'organisation' within social movements; this stresses that these 
organisations are what manage to mobilise people into the groups, apply for fhnds 
and so forth. What the orgaJ1isations do to get support is also important in the 
mobilising process. Similarly, what resources are available to the organisations is an 
important recrJitment factor. 
The stmctural arglllllent within this level of analysis, often refen-ed to as the 
'network' account, explains recruitment and collective action not on the individual 
level where the explanations draw from issues of identity and social construction, 
but rather on orgaJ1isational issues such as agents, organisation information and so 
forth. This theory also stresses what we looked at above - how relationships (friends 
and fa..'11ily and so forth) impact upon recruitment and mobilisation. L'1 other words, 
network accounts show that recmitment and mobilisation "cmmot occur without 
prior contact with a recruitment agent" .142 Structural accounts also look at facilities 
that orga..'1isations have in order to recruit potential members. These include, as we 
saw em'lier, finances, famous members and so forth. This con-esponds to issues of 
solidarity and 'pre-existing social relationships'. Similarly, how the organisations 
are able to frame events that correspond to the potential participa..'1ts' framing of 
events is impOlia.nt. 
142 Friedman, Debra and McAdam, Doug "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and 
the Life of a Social Movement" in Morris, Aldon and Mueller, Carol Frontiers in Social Movement 
Theory (Yale University Press, New Haven 1992) p. 158 
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The People 
The lIlicro-level of analysis analyses how actors define themselves and others, but 
also 'the self through the looking glass'. However, by negotiating one's individual 
identity, collective identity and the view of the 'other', context is L.'1lportant. The 
macro- and the meso-levels of analysis give us this context. They give us the 
societal structures, the culture and the role of the organisations that help people 
define who they are. Therefore a lot of research at the people level relies upon 
structural and organisational understanding and knowledge. 
In looking at the individual level, in tIns research there will be a focus on concepts 
of: 
a) The self: including the notion of '1' but also more specifically the notion 'we'. 
This is related to the idea of one's social identity being defined in how one identifies 
oneself as pa.rt of a group. Tpis group identity is a construction, as shown by 
Melucci when he tells us that collective identity "is an interactive and shared 
definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the 
orientations of their action as well as the field of opporttlI'ities and constraints in 
hi h " . 1 1 " 143 W 'Cu theIr actlOn taKes p~ace . 
b) The other: which is about who the people are that are different from the 'we' as 
well as, in many cases, who is to blame for a particular problem. Tbis relates to 
issues refelTed to above in the discussion on the 'we-they dichotomy' where identity 
is seen from within and without. 'From within' means that identity is related to a 
belief in COIr..mon descent or culture as discussed in, for exa.'1lpie, the self. 'From 
i43 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 34 
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without' is about contrasting oneself or one's identity with that of 'others'. This 
rdates to Giddens who tells us "[t]he constitution of the 'I' is acknowledged to 
come about orJy tlt..Iough the discourse ofthe 'other'''. 144 And finally: 
c) 'The self t11fough the looking glass' which is concemed with how we define 
ourselves through what we believe others perceive of us, and also how they respond 
to us. For exa..'11ple, Palestinia..'1 refugees being perceived as unwelcome outsiders in 
Leba.nese society can have an impact on their identity and willingness or 
unwillingness to participate iII changing this perception. 
All of these concepts, the self, the other, and the self through the looking glass, 
relate to collective framing of the situation and within these frames it is possible to 
Spp "ot;A"S o-fpercp;vea' sOf';a1 rea1;ty ard ;n't l1st;cp ""',"".1..1. L.I.'-'.I..1. ..L ~ ..L V..I. V.I..1. ..1..1.... .1..1. .I.JU- ... .1. v. 
144 Giddens, Anthony op. cit., p. 38 
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Chanter Two 
The Methodology 
Introduction 
How is one to examine 'how and why' Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps in 
Lebanon mobilise? My framework suggests that this is best done by examining 
different levels of analysis as developed in my previous chapter: "1) the actors and 
Lheir definition of the situation, 2) the institutional and fonnal movement 
organisations within which they act and 3) the overarching societal contexf'.! How 
can this be done? I argue that it requires a methodology t..~at is interdisciplina..ry and 
intersubjective. Interdisciplinary usually happens because of the question being 
asked. Intersubjective means subjective ideas as understood by individuals. By 
;rnnl;cat;"n th;s a'en;ps c"mp1ete ob;ect;v;ty 
.l...l..l..l.¥.l...L '-.LV.L..L IL..L.LL .l..Ll.V V.l. _.1.... :J .1..1.. 
Hllillan h.tersubjectivity manifests itself as an iillillediate sympat.'1etic awareness 
of feelh-lgs mid conscious, pmposeftll hitelligence in others ... On it depends 
culttlt-al lemT.ing and the creation of a 'social reality' of conventional beliefs, 
languages, rituals and technologies.2 
Exarpjning the how and the why of Palestipja.-rJ. re:fi..lgee mobilisation will depend on 
an L.~tersubjective understa.T}di..l1g on the p~rt of the researcher of reftlgee discourses, 
as well as of organisational leaders, and local leaders. 
i Kitschelt, Herbert "Critique of t.'1e Resomce Mobilisation Approach" in Rucht, Dieter ed Research 
on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Emope mId the USA (Westview Press,1991) 
p.338 
2 Wilson, Robert A and Keil, Frank C The WtiT Encyclonedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1999) p. 415-416 
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Within the social sciences there are usually two different lenses that the researcher 
3 "-'h d·f~ 1 1 1 •• •• 1 1 1 • 4"-'h ca.ll use. 1 ~ e two 1 lerent scnools are tne POSItlVIStlC ana tne nermeneuhc. 1 ~ e 
first tradition, positivism, is "an epistemological position that advocates the 
application of methods of the natural SCIences to the study of social reality and 
beyond".5 In other words it is a position that uses the sa.1Jle meLlIods as Lqe natural 
sciences. This means that 
[t]his perspective holds L;'at L;'ere are regullli-ities lliid laws inherent hi social 
processes, as in the natural world, and that these may be isolated, frozen, lliid 
studied. Social scientists may L;'en stand back from the process under observation 
and explain complex phenomena with some precision, detachment and 
objectivity.6 
This approach is like taking a portrait of a particular culture and its social reality and 
then, from a detached, objective sta.lld, describing what is going on in the portrait 
and explaining why. Criticism of this approach argues that people are not static and 
it is i..rnpossible to be objective when dealing wiLl} people and social situations. 
The hermeneutic school of thought argues that whereas positivists seek to find an 
expla.llation of human behaviour, it is preferable to find an understanding. 
Hermeneutics is an interpretive approach where the researcher's motives lie ill 
understanding how commmllties and their actors interpret and assign meamng to 
events and actions. In this case the researcher understands that he/she can not be 
completely objective and realises that he/she is subjective. It is therefore impossible 
to be objective when dealing with people. As Clifford has said, people and cultures 
3 Hermann, Tamar "The Impemleable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflicts by 'Insiders' and 
'Outsiders'" in Smyth and Robinson ed Researching Violently Divided Societies (Pluto Press, 
London 2001) p. 79 
4 Rothman, Jay From Confrontation to Cooneration: Resolv'ulg Ethnic and Regional Conflict (Sage 
Publications, London, 1992) 
5 Bryman, Al~m Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) p. 12 
6 Rotfullan, Jay op. cit., p. 71 
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can not lli'1d do not "stand stiil for their portraits". 7 Cultures and people are 
constfuJtly Chfu"'lging ai'ld a precise representation is not possible. The positivist 
notion oft.ruth and objective 'fact' is also in question th ...rough the henneneutic lens: 
Meaning is found within the realm of social iiltention and experience and not, as 
had been posed by empirical science, as a natural rule-conforming phenomena. 
"Facts" therefore are seen to be related to, or derived from, given contexts and 
interpretation about them. In other words, certain groups in certain times and 
given places gain a COIllillon understanding of specific phenomena and call 
tt~em "facts". Different groupings in different settings migM come up with 
different wlderstandi,lgs that to them would also be "factual".8 
The hermeneutic approach sees people as interpreting themselves and their 
su..rroundings rather tha..T} by the other \vay aroun.d. As \\'iii become apparent, tl1is 
thesis is based on the henneneutic approach. This is because people can not be 
researched in a positivist, objective, natural science, kind of way. Rather, people are 
naturally subjective, includi.'lg myself, and people interpret their surroundings and 
themselves in different ways. 
The Method 
Case Study 
First, tills work is what IS called 'case study research'. TIllS tenn has different 
cO!Ulotations and meaPings depending on what lens one sees it through. However, 
"usuaHy, 'case study' refers to research that i.'lvestigates a few cases, often just one, 
7 Clifford, James "Introduction: Partial Trut'lS" in Clifford, James Writing Cultwes: The Doetics and 
Dolitics of ethnographv (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986) 
8 Rothman, Jay op. cit., p. 71 
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In considerable depth". 9 Case studies also usuaily imply the collection of 
unstructured data fu""1d a qualitative fu""1alysis. 10 There are vfu-iOUS types of case study. 
Ha..rlunersley a..l1d GOITl ..nl present these differences as: 
1) h! the number of cases studied, and 1:t;'e role of comparison, 2) h! how detailed 
the case studies are; 3) in the size of the cases; 4) in the extent to which 
researchers document the context of the case, h! terms of the wider society and / 
or historically; 5) in the extent to which they restrict themselves to description 
and explanation, or engage h! evaluation and prescription.!l 
Case study for the purposes of this research involved fieldwork, which was 
conducted in camps L.ll Leba..llon including Shatila, Bomj el Barajneh, Mar Elias and 
EL.'1 el Helweh ca.'1lpS ft..rough 200 1 to 2003. The cases are described in as much 
detail as possible in order to help investigate the research questions asked in tIns 
thesis. The size of the cases differs. For example, most of the pa.rticipa.llt observation 
was done in Shatila camp, and ma.'1Y interviews with political leaders in Mar Elias. 
Visits to Bomj el Barajneh and Ein el Helweh Ca..111pS were less frequent, and 
resulted L.ll visits to particular places and people's homes, and L.ll some cases 
informal interviews or solely observatioI'h Context is of great import..ance to tpis 
thesis, a..nd is ta..lcen into accOlmt fully in temlS of history and society. TIns thesis 
does not aim to give prescriptions but rather to create a.ll understanding, albeit of an 
l·nterprpt;ve natllre o-tthe hOws arc' whys o-tPa1pst;n;ar Re-C.'gep ""oh.;l;satl·on .l.A. .l.~.l.""''''.l. .1..1. ,,"""- ., .I. ... .1..1. .1..1. .I..I..I...L..l. .I."" ".J...I...LL .I..l. .l~ V.I...l..1. U.l..l..1. '" .I.. 
This thesis uses the qualitative methodology of ethnography. If this were a 
quantitative work, the method used would be comparative social survey research. 
Tpis means using su..rveys and structured interviewing. Using surveys implies that 
9 Hamil1ersley, M fu!d Gomm, R "Introduction" in ed. Gomm, Ret al Case Studv Method (Sage 
Publications, London, 2000) p. 3 
10 Ibid. p. 3 
i1 Ibid p.4 
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there would be a standardised questiOlmaire or interview that are identical in 
wording and sequence and that very often have fixed answers that are then coded 
and aggregated to form some opinion result. This can lead to misleading findings for 
several reasons: quantitative analysis produces results that tend to be shown in such 
a way as to be seen as 'true' representations of the issues at ha.l1d. The.i ustification 
for this is that all the interviews and questior..naires have the sa..'1le wording, 
sequence, and so forth. However, what is often forgotten is that interviews and 
questiop..naires are opjy done on a sample of the popuiation and therefore do not 
Show t'ne -h111 p1cnure The second pr oh1PTrI l·S thp st<>nAarAl·sed Q"Pst1 0nna1re anA ..l...l. .. ..1. ..l.\A-..l..I. _.l." ...L..L..L .1..1. _..L V.l.'-"..L.l..1. ".l.V "-'&J...L'\,.I...... _ ...... '" .. ..L .l...L.I..l. ..1. ..1.'\,.1. 
interview itself. Respondents may misinterpret the questions. This may have to do 
with issues of different religions, ideology and so forth, where the interview and 
questioP.LLllaire questions are not sensitive to the range of differences witt-in the 
respondents' identity(ies). Third, having fixed answers (assuming this is the case) 
that respondents can choose from is pighly problematic. The answer that the 
respondent is looking for may not be there and he/she then may either choose the 
answer that is closest, or the next best answer. Because of problems such as these, 
and because of this thesis being a.11 interpretive work, it deploys a qualitative 
research method that is not based on survey research. 12 If we are to believe that 
people and cultures can not 'stand still for their portraits' then we need to find 
another way to conduct the field work that allows for a fuller understa.l1ding of 
people and their situation. It is h'1lPOrt..ant to stress that each case, by its very nature 
12 For exat]lple, the examination of values within Italian commw]ist subculture, as conducted by 
KerLZer, David Ritual Politics and Power (Yale University Press, New Haven 1990) using standards 
of Almond and Verba The Civic Culture (Uttle and Brown, Boston, 1964) versus the ethnographic 
accowlts by Banfield, Edward The Moral Basis of Backward Society (The Free Press, Chicago, 
1954), voting behaviour by Tarrow, Sidney Peasant Communism in. Southern Italv (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1967) at]d local governing practices by Putnam, Robert et al La niatita e Ie radici 
(Mulitlo, Bologna, 1985). These accowits told a very different picture that] the one by Kertzer. (for 
more discussion see Tmlow, Sidney Mentalities. Political Culture. mid Collective Action Frames in 
MOl1~s A atid Mueller, C M ed "Frontiers iti Social Movement Theory" Yale University Press, 
London, 1992 
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in being based on people, is unique, and any conclusions reached must not be seen 
't1 ·t . ., 1 1 as .ile way 1. IS as a wilole, but rather it shouid be remembered that the 
information gathered is subjective and was gathered not from all refugees but only 
from a sfu'1lple of them. 13 
Ethnography - Participant Observation and Interviewing 
This thesis uses eth.nography. Etlmography and field work usually refer to the same 
method, the former term beLTlg used by anthropoiogists and the iatter by sociologists. 
Ethnography requires the researcher to enter the setting of the researched, in order to 
find out the hows a..nd whys of a pa..rticular people. Ethnography involves the 
researcher gOLTlg into the cOmIDupity and observing and pa.rticipating in va.rious 
activities. For Shaffrr, on ris first ethnographic experience, this mea..'1t that as he was 
researching Hasidic Jews, he started off by visiting their synagogue. Shaffir does 
aa..rpit that this advice is vague, however: 
There is simply no formula, scientific or otherwise, to follow to achieve the best 
results. Of course, even the most seasoned field researchers, if given the chance 
to start over, mig.'1t approach the setting ruld individuals differently .... But if we 
are honest with ourselves, we realise that as the chief instruments of our 
research, the personal qualities that we bring to our work usually ovell;de the 
f. . • 1· t' t t·· 14 pro~eSSlOna! c.allllS .na. we presen aoout It 
It is often quite difficult to distinguish between ethnography and pa..rticipant-
observation. Both terms require the researcher to irrunerse herlPimseif in the field 
sett1~g "observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations both between 
13 This is the same problem that would be encountered by quantitative work. 
14 Shaffrr, William "Doing Ethnography: Reflections on Finditlg Your Way" Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnographv (Vol. 28, No 6, December 1999) p. 678 
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others fu'1d with the fieldworker, and asking questions".15 If a strict difference had to 
be made between paiticipllilt observation and ethnography, it would be that the 
former refers to just that: pa.rticipating in the field, like Shaffir attending the 
Synagogue, and observing the actions and conversations between people in the field. 
The latter, eth.Tlography, refers to the two meLl}ods of participant observation a.'1d 
1nterv1enNng "L'or th1s resparf'h 'n parrt1 f'111ar etPnographv rp-t.ers to' 
.1..1..&.", .l.. VV.LL • i· .I. l..l.La. .I. """ V.I..I..1..1. ~ ... .I.""" ..... .I.,.LL ~ .I...I..J ..L _..L.I. .. 
1) Being irrunersed in the social setting of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 
2) Observing the behaviour of the refugees within the camps. 
3) Liste:ning to, as well as, engaging in conversations. 
4) Lnterviewing refugees who are willing about issues that have not been visible 
through participant observation, or about issues that are unclear to the researcher. 
5) Reviewing the overall setting, history, a.'1d culture of the refugees and their 
behaviour within this context.16 
Furthennore there are different roles the researcher can have. These roles have to do 
with the degree of attachment the researcher has while in the field. They are: 
complete pa.rticipant (where the researcher is completely immersed 1....'1 the field and 
his/her identity is not known to the people of the community), participant as 
observer (where the researcher is as immersed in the field but the members of the 
corr~'1lunity are aware of who he/she is), observer as participant (where the 
researcher is mainly involved in interviews and t.here is observation but not too 
much participation), and complete observer (where the researcher does not L'1teract 
at all with the members of the community). The role ta.~en in tltjs research was that 
of participant as observer. This involved interacting and pruticipating in the daily 
15 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 291 
16 This list was found and amended in Ibid. p. 291 
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lives of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon where they were aware of my role as a 
researcher. The method of pa..rticipa..llt as observer was used mostly in Shatila ca..rnp 
where I spent most of my time and was a volunteer at a youth centre. Tpis included 
visiting dozens of families and as well as their friends from Shatila and their visitors 
from other ca..rnps. Participant as observer was used for the most pa..rt in the homes of 
the refugees. These family visits included most often the entire fa.Tnily, in other 
words all age groups and both sexes. In Shatila camp I also attended weddings, 
political meetings, followed cbildren to and from their UN"K WA school, a..lld during 
Eid, I visited many families with the youth centre as is the tradition. L'1 the other 
camps, Bomj Barajneh, Ein el Helweh, and Mar Elias, I also visited several fal11jlies 
as weil as another youth centre in Bourj Bara,ineh. Another youth centre I visited 
was the AJYi\L Centre in Beirut (located in the Cola district) run by Salah Sala..lJ.. 
The youth in this centre tended to be a bit older (in their twenties) than in the youth 
centre in Shatila camp, and many were sponsored to work on specific projects 
relating to Palestinian refugees, through tpis youth centre. Many of the members of 
this particular youth centre were not living in refugee ca.l1lPS, but in other clusters 
(informal camps) where refugees live in Bei..rut. This method of participant as 
observer did not always entail interview1~'1g, but rather a combination of observing, 
listening to, participating in conversations and at times, where the refugees would 
allow, interviews. 
Fmiher explanation is wa.rranted at thjs point regarding interviewing. The role of 
pa..rticipant as observer was also taken when conducting interviews. Interviews with 
the refugees were on issues regarding mobilisation, issues that were unclear through 
pruiicipant observation alone a.lld on other issues that I was unclear about. Thjs is 
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called a 'semi-stmctured interview' or in other cases an 'unstmctured interview'. 
The semi-stmctured interview refers to an interview where the researcher already 
has some general questions but does not necessarily use them in any particular 
sequence. The researcher is also able to come up with further questions during the 
interview. An unstmctured interview usually involves the interviewer having a few 
topics that they ask about in an informal way. The form of the question itself is 
developed during the interview. These two interview types, that is semi-stmctured 
and unstmctured interviews, are used for different reasons. The semi-stmctured 
interview come about when doing interviews or if Lh.e researcher has observed 
something that needs further questioping or if there is something the researcher does 
not understand. Using the serni-structured L.'lterview also allows for what I call 
'setting sensitivity', mea.nmg that some people need to be asked the same question 
but in different ways. For example the way I would ask questions to a ten year old 
girl L.'l a youth orga.'lisation may well differ from the way I would ask questions to a 
grown man who is a member of one of the local political groups. Regarding the 
unstmctured interview, this is a method that is important in a field such as a 
Palestirian refugee ca.'llP as it allows the researcher to ask general questions in a.'l 
infonnal way. 
Interviewing was not restIicted to the refugees. There was also interviewing of 
Leba.llese a.lld NGO officials, as well as PalestiPian orgaPisationalleaders. The sorts 
of interviews that were held in these cases va.ried between semi-structured a.'ld 
u..nstmctured depending on the circllllstances. However, where possible, the 
questions were as alike as possible for each of the officials. The reason for not 
wa.'lting to use a fully-structured interview for officials is because each official has a 
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different role to play and has a different agenda and may even be hostile. Similarly, 
depending on the official's role, bis/:'1er interpretation of a specific question may be 
d'-ffierent -frol'Yl that of' arothpr offic'a1 thus the nped to vary thP way r111est1Ans are .1...l...L .1. .l..1. .... ..L..L .1..1..1. I..L.L ... .L .1. ".1..1.."'.1. ..L..L.1..I..I.., ".I. '-.&...1. .l..l.V .... V .1..1."'" ~'-'I. .1.'-1.1..1. 
asked depending on who one is talking to. The colour red has different shades 
depending on who sees it, thus the need to be culturally and individually sensitive. 
Likewise with organisational leaders. However, if these people were met in a sudden 
or random way, then an unstructured interview is likely to ta.lce place. 
The Post-modern Debate 
Post-modernism questions the research and methods of the researcher as well as 
their writing. The essence of post-modernism a..l1d its effect on methodology is, 
A position that displays distaste for master-narratives ru'1.d for a realist 
orientation. In the context of research methodology, post-modernists display a 
preference for qualitative methods ru'1.d a concern with the modes of 
representation of research findings. 17 
This definition implies that post-modernism wants to deconstruct realism. 
different experiences a.nd points of view. All of these different experiences and 
points of view cannot be easily categorised to one reality. Post-moderPism seems to 
question 'findings' a...l1d 'truths' and feel more at ease with offering 'interpretations' 
of social actors and social reality. Post-modernism can, therefore, be seen as 
working with the hermeneutic and qualitative methods. 
17 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 506 
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Post-modemism is quite critical of ethnography. It urges the eth_llographer to give up 
pisrner realist pretensions, as it were, and see the work as opjy a.1'l interpretation of 
the situation. The post-modem critique regarding ethnography has to do with 'truth 
claims', meaning that the ethnographer thin..ks he/she is representing reality. For 
post-modernists it IS arrogant to asstl.'Ile that one knows the truth. W'nat a.1'l 
ethnographer sees IS an interpretation of the social lives of the people bei..'1g 
researched. It follows that in the course of writing up what the researcher has seen is 
opjy a representation of social reality. It is not necessarily the truth but only one 
interpretation of the many 'truths' that exist in the interpretation of people and their 
cultures. All in all, post-modernism leaves us with a sense of uncertainty. Questions 
of how one is ever to explai..1'l social reality are not a.1'lswered. The only form of 
knowledge we are left with is that all interpretations a.'1d "all texts are socially, 
historically, politically and culturally located. We, like the texts we wTite, can never 
1 t 1 t" 18 De ra..1'lscenaen . 
Bow Far Should We Take Being Post-Modem? 
It does seem, however, that if one completely follows the post-modem approach, 
there may seem to be no point in doing anything at all, since everything is just one 
person's interpretation a.'1d there are no truths. I agree that it is a.rrogant and elitist to 
believe that eth_l1ographic or qualitative research C£Ln have a tmth claim and that 
what is represented in any etp.Ilographic work is a.1'l interpreted representation of 
many different representations and interpretations of that particular study. However, 
18 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 470 
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some people would argue that there needs to be a point to any given work. David 
Ka..rp explai.lls that even if all realist pretensions must be given up it would be 
foolish to give up the belief that careful observers can systematically gather data 
that, in twu, can be used to catch imporuult regularities in the way human 
beings collectively achieve a comnlOn sense about their shared worlds. 19 
Kan)'s idea here is a l11iddle way between modernism and post-modemism, and also 
as he' puts it "an appeal to avoid the excesses of both positivism a..lld post-
modernism".2o KeepL.'lg L.'l rnind the problems presented by the post-modem critique, 
every eff0l1 needs to be made to keep interviews as value-free and unbiased as 
possible, as well as, retaiping constant consciousness of why the researcher is in the 
field in order to prevent what is often called 'going native' (see below). What I will 
be presenting in this thesis will be reported approximations of people's lives in their 
social world. My ethnograppic field research and interviews should not necessa..rily 
be interpreted as 'the truth' and how it is. They are my subjective observations on 
refugee mobilisation. Having said tlns, I hope that this thesis will prove to be 
valuable in that it may evoke important issues about the Palestipia..ll refugee issue, as 
well as cont..ribute to understanding the hows and whys of mobilisation in the 
camps. 
19 Karp, David "Social Science, Progress, and the Ethnographer's Craft" Journal of Contemnorary 
Ethnogranhv (VoL 28, No 6, December 1999) p. 599. For more on this issue and a defence of realism 
see Fine, Gary Alan "Field Labour and Ethnographic Reality" Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 
(VoL 28, No.5, October 1999) 
20 Karp, David A op. cit., p. 599 
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Potential Problems of Methodology in the Camps 
Suspicion 
The first issue that may present the researcher with potential problems is 
'suspicion'. By tpis is meant suspicion on behalf of the refugees under study, as they 
may wonder where the researcher's motives lie. Alice Bloch explains the problems 
of an academic study doing research on refugees: 
.... because the research was policy oriented fu"1d there was funding available to 
i.liplement policy recommendations, some of the gate keepers commented on 
the significance of the research for members of their own comnlUnities as well 
as refugees more widely, and therefore encouraged participation in the study. It 
might have been more problematic to negotiate access for a purely academic 
piece ofwork.2t 
A problem that the researcher may have lies in the fact that the researcher is in the 
field solely for acadeIPic study, a..l1d there are no proIPises of funding for the 
refugees a..lld so on. This may present a problem. Problems may also a..rise in 
interviewlJlg leaders of Palestinian Organisations and Lebanese officials, who may 
feel that the issues being discussed are of a somewhat delicate natpre. 
21 Bloch, Alice "Carrying Out a Survey of Refugees: Some Methodological Considerations and 
Guidelines" Journal of Refugee Studies (Vol. 12,No 4, 1999) p. 377 
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Seduction 
.... seduction is a dimension of fieldwork that is especially prominent in research 
on violent political conflict because the interlocutors have great personal and 
political stakes in making the ethnographer adopt their interpretations. 22 
It will no doubt be of utmost importance to be aware of the concept of 'seduction'. 
Robben explains the term thus to avoid confusion over its meaping: 
I have chosen t~e word seduction to describe those personal defences and social 
strategies because it means literally "to be led astray from an ititended course". 
Seduction is used here excessively iti its neutral meaning of being led astray 
unawares, not in its popular meaning of allurement and entrapment. I prefer 
seduction to other terms, such as concealment, manipulation, or deception, that 
C(h!), negative overtones and suggest dishonesty or malintent. Seduction can be 
intentional but also unconscious artd can be compared to the ways in which 
fiL-nmakers, stage directors, (h-tists, or writers succeed in totally absorbing the 
attention oftheir aUdiences.23 
This aspect of seduction is a problem as the researcher may not notice that he/she is 
being seduced. Robben mentions the etnnograpr.ic issues of 'empathy' and 
'dehumanisation'. Empathy combined with detachment is what the etlm.ographer is 
supposed to achieve. In other words the ethnographer must establish good 
relationsr.ips with the people under study and yet at the same tLlJle remain detached. 
It may sometimes be the case that in ethnograppic observation, where the human 
senses are used at their highest level (sight, hearing), seduction ta..k:es place in order 
to ma..1(e the etP~1}ographer thiI'.k he/she is seeing sometr.ing that is through the eyes 
of the observed, whereas what the ethnographer is really seeing is sometPing that the 
observed (interlocutor) diverts the ethnographer's eyes to. In other words: 
22 Robben, Antonius C G M "The Politics ofTmth and Emotion among ViCtinlS and Perpetrators of 
Violence" iti Nordstrom ~md Robben (ed) Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemnorfu-v Studies in Violence 
and Survival ('Jniversity of California Press, Berkeley, 1995) p. 84 
23 Ibid. p. 83 
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We believe to be seeing t.~e world t.trrough our h'lterlocutor's eyes. Yet these 
eyes are looking away from that which we t.Th'lk we are seeh'lg. 24 
With pa..'1:icular reference to the Palestinians, Jea..~ Genet's book 'Prisoner of Love,25 
is illwllinating. The book is about t.."'1e last part of Genet's lite which he spent in the 
'field' with the Black Panthers in America and the Palestiniap...8 in Jordan and 
Lebanon. He fonned a great attacw..lent to both groups of people, although he tells 
us he ll..T1derstood himself to be an outsider in these milieus. His book is inherently 
personal and very emotional. Although Genet's work is not strictly etl-.Jlographic, the 
question of emotions is valid for anyone working with Palestinians. Swedenbmg, an 
antp.Iopologist working with Palestinians, tells us how he managed to work in a 
"geographic/academic area that seems so emotionally and politically overcharged 
a..~d so excessively violent,,?6 For Swedenburg it comes down to his personal history 
of having visited t.."'1e Occupied Territories from a young age, as well as being 
enrolled at the A..merican University of Beirut (AUB). His personal bistory helped 
him in hi s fieldwork. 
The point is simply that my Beirut friendships and experiences were crucial to 
my subsequent fieldwork project in t.~e West Ba..'lk - because they ensured 
support networks and thus enabled my lmderstanding of, and capacity to 
m~age, life under military occupation.27 
This sort of understanding of the anthropologist is important not oPJy because of the 
;rnpl1f'at;on ofhP;ng ton. pmot;n.nally ;nvoivpo' 'out nnriPTstano';ng t'n;s sort n.-F1,;story 
.1..1..1..1. ..... .L.A.V ""'.l..l. u'tV.l..l. \.. V V.l. LJ.V.l...L.l..l. .1...1..1. .1. v, L u...t..l.U-'ItoI.l. .l..l..l. L...l..I. .1. L V.l...l...L..l. L 
is of i..mportance when reading and understanding his work. He admits that looking 
into personal pjstory and a researcher's previous links to the subject may be seen as 
24 Robben, Antonius C G Mop. cit., p. 85 
25 Genet, Jea..'l Prisoner of Love (Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1992) 
26 Swedenburg, Ted "With Genet in the Palestinian Field" in Nordstrom a..'ld Robben ed Fieldwork 
Under Fh-e: Contempora..-v Studies of Violence and Su.-vival (University of Califomia Press, 
Berkeley, 1995) p. 28 
27 Ibid. p. 29 
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not 'academic'; however, in cases where the so called 'field' is not virgin territory 
so to spea..1<., explaining personal }-listory can be seen as important. 
Another issue, somewhat c011nected with seduction and especially with regard to 
pl· • fi . 1 ,,,. • 1 1 . 1 ",28 1 ~ alestIma..ll re:.:ugees, IS wnere a nerOlc aura mlgnt oecome attacnea. to tne 
researcher (COIT'~'TIonly termed 'going native'). The term means that the researcher 
may become so i..flvolved in his/her research and in the research subjects' lives, that 
he/she in a sense loses their role as inlpa..rtial researcher. T}-lis is a risk as the 
researcher has prolonged stays in the field where he/she immerses hiIT'Jnerself h'1 the 
setting and tries to see the world th...rough the eyes of the people tmder research. In 
trying to avoid 'going native', researchers need to keep on reminding themselves 
why they are in the field. 
Conclusion: Researcher Reflexivity 
Keeping in line wiLh t.he post-modem approach, I will asprre to researcher 
reflexivity. Researcher reflexivity refers to the researcher being reflective about the 
research he/she is conducting, by reflecting upon personal values, decisions made in 
the field and the methods used. Reflexivity refers to: 
a greater awareness and acknowledgement of the role of the researcher as part 
an.d parcel of the construction of knowledge ... The researcher is viewed as 
i..llplicated in the construction of Ivlowledge throug.~ the stance he or she 
assumes in relation to the observed and through the ways in which an account is 
28 Swedenbrug, Ted op. cit., p. 29 
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transmitted in the form of as text. The understa.iding entails an 
acknowledgement of the implications and significa.ice of tt~e researcher's 
choices as bott~ observer and writer.29 
This implies that the researcher must keep Lhe readers aware of personal values and 
1 • 1 1 •• 1 • 1 1 1 ,30 31 Dlases, aTlQ aeClslOns maae In Ll}e field ana metnods usea . 
In tel IDS of personal values and biases I have tried my best to be as reflective about 
tpis as I can wpile conducting the research and writing up. It is difficult not to 
become emotionally involved when working in refhgee camps. Furthermore, as a 
volunteer in a youth orgaIlisation in Shatila camp, I became attached to many of the 
children and their farpilies and continue to have contact with them and visit them. 
For these reasons I am l11volved emotionally and socially with people in the refugee 
camps. However, I have kept tpis in !pind alJ.d have tried my best not to be too 
emotional in my work. My attachment to the refugee C3...'TIpS does not involve 
political work or any attachment to a particular political group. 
Although I believe t.he ethnographic and interviewing methods used to be preferable 
in examining mobilisation in the camps, there are various shortco!pings: First, I am 
alone in conducting fieldwork of 3...'1 interpretive nature. Tris has the obvious 
29 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 470 
30 Takitig the argument even further to include an ethnographic work on the 'self' (as researcher) a.Id 
the 'other' (the researched) together see Tedlock, Barbara "From Participant Observation to the 
Observation of Participation: The Emergence of Narrative Ettmography" Journal of Anthropological 
Research (Vol. 47, No.1, Spring 1991) This is extremely interesting, however, this u~esis shall be 
more conventional and focus on beitig reflexive while doing the research. 
31 Reflexivity has been used in sociology for a while starting with Berger, Bennett The Survival ofa 
Counterculture: Ideological Work a.id Daily Life Among Rural Communards (lJniversity of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1981) and Gouldner, Alviti The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology 
(Basic Books, New York 1970) Giddens, Anthony The Consequences ofModemity (polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1990) and Bourdieu, Pierre Homo Academicus (Polity Press, Cambridge 1988); and The 
Logic of Practice (polity Press, Cambridge, 1990); and "The Scholastic Point of View" Cultural 
Anthropology (Vol. 5, No.4, November 1990) taking it a few steps further. 
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shortcomings of potential mislUlderstanding, as I said earlier; the colour red has 
different shades depending on who sees it. 
Another issue is related to suspicion. Suspicion was not a big problem that I had to 
deal with. I was open about what I was researcping a.TJ.d that did not create a.TJ.Y 
problems. I was able to interview ma..'1Y of the political leaders. The ethnograp1>,ic 
research in the camps in general was not problematic. One main reason for the 
relative ease with wpich interviews a.TJ.d ethnographic research were acpieved, I 
believe, was because I was a volunteer, and people knew who I was or knew of me. 
There was one issue involved in volunteering at the youth centre. The youth centre 
is secular and it was therefore thought best that I spea.1<. oIlly to secular groups and 
avoid religious groups. Due to 'setting sensitivity,' I agreed to this. Nevertheless, I 
was able to overcome the lack of interviews with the leaders of the religious groups 
during my fidd research because of my method of pa.rticipant-observation. 
Although I was able to observe the religious groups, t1>,is thesis still focuses on the 
secular groups, as those are the ones with whom I was able to interview, although I 
do refer to the religious groups where they are particularly releva.TJ.t. 
When interviewing Lebanese officials I did sense some SuspIcIOn, although to a 
lesser degree than anticipated. In rdation to interviewing, in particular the 
orgar,isational leaders and Lebanese officials, there could be the potential for over 
or understatement of various issues. I was fully aware of this, and this is one of the 
reasons why exa.rpining mobilisation through the three different levels of analysis is 
so important. 
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Another issue that women within t.he field may face, pCLrticularly in the Middle East, 
is being treated as the tpird sex. I did not perceive tpis to be the case du.ring my 
research. Du..ring most of the interviews with political leaders I was accompanied by 
Salah, a yOlmg man from the youth centre, and although I was the only woman in 
these interviews, I never felt I was a tpird sex. I believe that !pis was the case for 
several reasons: 1) As mentioned earlier many of the political leaders already knew 
1 T ( 1 _ _ 1 1 ) 1 ,...) T" 1· 1 • • wno 1 was a VOlu.Tlteer at tne youtn centre ana L. 1 was illtegratea ill tne SOCIety ill 
the camp and I respected the refugees. I followed their rules alld customs and this 
brought about a certain amolmt of respect as a foreigner and as a woman. 
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Chapter Three 
The Legal Context 
Introduction 
Who is a Palestinian refugee? TIns question is of particular importance because it 
explains much of the context su..rrou..llding the refugees, which in tu..rn has a bearing 
upon the,r 'C'Pl'lt,hT as UTPll as rnOhlllSat10n ThP leg"'l contpxt o-f the Pa1est11'l1arn 
_ .I. lo.l..l..I..1. .I. ..... ..l...L ... .l. ... ; vv ...... .l..l. .1...1..1. V.L.a..&. ...... .I. .. ...L.l...L"'-".1. UJ. .l. ... ""L....L.I..I....L.I. ... .I..l...l:..I. 
refugees' lives is important in lll1dersta..llding identity and mobilisation as it relates to 
111· 111 .. 1/1kf)' . I' Dotn tnelr actual legal constramts ana ~laC or aaequate protectlOn as we 1 as 
re1at11'lg tA hAW the re-fllgees -f,."'rne ard 111'lrlprstanc' thplr sllrrOllnC'll'lgs "'l'ld l'dp l'ltlt1T 
.I. .I. ".I..I..l. ... V.l. V ... .I..I..I..L\,..I. ...L.L.:.i..i..I..&. .l. .......... .I.'-&...... ... ..I. ........... .1..1. ~..L \..i..L .L.L.l. u.i..A. ....... .l..l. ... .I."J .. 
In looking at the question of who is a Palestilnan, Lhe question can also be split illto 
two: first, what constitutes being Palestinia.ll, and second, what constitutes being a 
Palestinian rePJgee. In answering th.e first question, 'Palestir..ian' will be L.'1terpreted 
as belongillg to the non-Jewish Arab population who resided in Palestille under the 
Mandate inciuding people who escaped later from what beca.TIle the State of Israel, 
and later, from the West Bar.k and Gaza, and their descenda..'1ts. A Palestinian 
refugee illlplies any Palestinian, as described above, who fled from the area of what 
was formerly the Ma.lldate of Palestine. 
However, the legal defilntion of who constitutes a Palestinian refugee is more 
compiicated. Generaliy spea.1<ing in international legal parla.llce, 1948 refugees are 
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considered refugees, 1 whereas 1967 refugees (most of whom fled from the West 
BatIk at"ld Gaza), some of whom had to t1ee for a second time, are considered 
displaced persons.2 
Palestinian rehlgees living in Lebanon are exposed to multiple layers of laws 
concefI11Tlg their status, laws which at times conflict, both in terms of the national 
laws of their host country, regional a..rrangements by the Arab League, as well as 
international laws. Starting with the latter it is imperative to explore where a 
Palestinian refugee stands in terms of his or her intemationallegal status, rights, the 
T'p·Fllgees' exnpctat';ons -h-"m ';nteT'nat';ona1 laws arrl what ';s exnectprl of" the T'ef"llgpPs 
.LV..l........ 1:'''' "' .... .l..l...lJ..V .l..1. .L.a..&." .L.a..&. ...... .L.l. .I. .J.. .,.1.""".1..1." .I. 1-" ___..l. ... .1..1. ... ..L\A. v,"" 
t..hemselves. As these various laws (international, regional and local) are defined and 
analysed, the Palestinia..Tl refugees' legal status, rights, and expectations to and from 
these laws, will come to light. An understanding of these issues will show how 
Palestinian refugee status is precarious as they lack sufficient protection for their 
civil and hu.rnan rights. These laws cOll..fiict with each other, a..Tld, at times some of 
these intemationallaws are not i..TIlplemented by the host states, ma..1dng the lives and 
livelihoods of the Palestinian refugees difficult and lU1certain. This issue is of 
importance and relevance because an uncert..ain present and future for Palestinia..Tl 
reftlgees has an effect on how the refilgees define their su..rroundings and their 
identity. Fmihennore, an understanding of what it means to be a rehlgee IS 
important, as it IS one of the many identities the Palestinian refugees living III 
refhgee carnps have. 
1 According to the lJN agency which is in charge of the Palestinian Refugees in the Arab World the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency, lJNRWA, the only Palestinians who are considered 
refugees are the ones who registered as refugees with them following the first Arab-Israeli war. 
Complications thus arrive when one estimates the number of refugees and so forth. 
2 This is because of registration with lJNRW A originally set up for the 1948 refugees. 
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The lack of statehood for the Palestinians has created a group of people who, 
especially in Lebanon compared with other diaspora Palestir:ians.in the Arab world, 
remain stateless. In general, local integration, wpich was encouraged in the early 
years of the diaspora, has not proved viable, not only for the host states (all except 
I' T 1 L· 1 ., '988 . . ,. + .,.,. 1 .. 3\ 1 1 I' 1 IOr Joraan Willcn up U.l1tll 1 gave cltIzensmp to ra estW.llli'1S ) out alSO IOf tne 
refugees themselves. An answer to statelessness could be to allow Palestipian self-
determination.4 There has been mutual recognition between the State of Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)5 and subsequent interim agreements 
leading to the introduction of limited self-rule in the Gaza Strip and certain areas of 
the West Bw_k These agreements onJy transfer limited self-rule, power and 
., .,. • 1 'P 1 •• A +h . "nA,6 1... 1 h 1 responslOllltIes to tne alestlIuan ~Utl onty ~r ) wlllcn as SUCr, CeLl} not De seen 
as a legitL1nate state. Thus, at the time of writing, it seems the situation is such that 
there is no sovereign Palestinian State. Nevertheless, for the time being, parts of the 
Gaza Strip a.l1d parts oftne West Ba.n~k are u.l1der PA lLTPited 'self-rule'. 
3 Jordail issued Jordanian passports to all Palestinian refugees who fled to the East Bank. West Bank 
PalestiIlifulS were also given Jordanian passports. On July 31st 1988 Jordan ceased its admitlistrative 
ties to the West Bank and stopped issuing Jordanian passports to Palestinians residing on the West 
Bank. Kassim, Anis F "The Palestinians: From Hyphenated to Integrated Citizenship" in 
Butenschon, Nils ed Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Aooroaches and Applications 
(SyTaCUSe University Press, Syracuse, New York, 2000) p. 207-208 fuld p. 211 
4 Declaration of Principles, Cairo, Oslo II, Wye, the Roadmap and so forth have not in my view led to 
statehood. 
5 Althougt'1 there are still question marks as to whether or not the PLO is considered the legitimate 
reoresentative of the Palestinian oeoole. 
6ihe Palesfilliful Authority, alu'1dugh it has responsibilities, does not have the power of a sovereign 
state. The Israeli Defence Forces, IDF, have entered areas under Palestinian Authority Control when 
they consider it necessary. 
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International Law 
There are several aspects withill intemationallaw which are relevant to the topic of 
I' 1 • • 1 C P 1 •• R I' "" 1 11' fi remgees, a.TlG In pa.r1~lcU1ar lor ~ alestInlan ~ emgees. 1 ne ~egal aspects or re~ugee 
status in general, and Palestinian refhgee status in particular, have a bearing on all 
aspects of Palestinian refugee life; socially, economically and politically. There are 
several oLqer issues ~Tlder international law wpich are also of importa.Tlce and have 
particular relevance to Palestir..ian reftlgees, including the issues of 'the right to 
return', 'compensation', 'nationality and statelessness'. These issues are important 
as they are the building blocks behind 'refugee' status, for a.TlY possible solution to 
t'ne Pa1pst;ne ;SS"P as well as he1ng COntr1h.lltory f:actnTs ;n ;dpnt;ty ".L ..L ..l."" \,..L.l. .I. \.1._, .1..l.. V .1..1..1. .l..l.\...I...LV\A.\. ..L ,",V..L .1..1. .I. '" .l. .... .l." • 
Who is a Refugee? 
Within international law there is a specific definition of the concept of a refugee, 
and hence international recogpition as well as international protection of who is, and 
who is not, considered a refugee is based on tris defirition and various international 
agreements. 
Refugee status is identified in the 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations 
High Conunissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 1951 Refugee Convention 
(Refhgee Convention) a.'1d the 1967 Urited Nations Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (the 1967 Refugee Protocol). Both the UNHCR and the Refugee 
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Convention describe refugees in the sa.rne way. They both see a refugee as a person 
who: 
A. For purposes of the present convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any 
person who: 
(l) Has been considered a refugee under the Atillilgements of 12 May 1926 lliid 
30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 
1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the 1Iternational 
Refugee Organisation. 
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by L~e International Refugee Organisation 
during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being 
accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section; 
(2) As a result of events OCCUll ;ng before 1 JanUlliy 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
. bl . h 4-' ""11" " 7 events, IS una Ie, or OWing to SUCH lcar, IS unWl ling to retU..Lll to It. 
The lJNHCR8 fu'1d the Statute relate to the same peopie, m other words refugee 
status occurring before 1 JanUlliy 1951. It was not until the adoption of the 1967 
Refugee Protocol that refugee status occurring after this date was formally included. 
1.11 other words, within the 1967 Refugee Protocol the time line was removed. This 
was necessa.ry as new refugee situations had a.Tlsen that were n01 covered by· the 
Reftlgee Convention. 
For purposes ofL~e present Protocol, the term 'refugee' shall, except regards the 
application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition 
of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events OCCUtting 
before 1 January 1951 and .... " And the words " ... as a result of such events", 
in Mticle 1 A (2) were omitted.9 
7 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Adopted on 28th July 1951 by the United National 
Conference ofPlenipotentifu"ies on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under 
General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950. Entry into force 22 April 1954, in 
accordance ",ith fu"1:icle 43. Available at www.U11l.1chr.ch 
8 See Chapter II, 6 (i) and (ii) of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950 for a similar (using almost 
L~e same words) defmition. 
9 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; entry into force 4 October 1967, At"1:icle 1 (2). 
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Nevertheless, an important feature of the above deflnition to keep in mind is that the 
description describes refugees L'l an individual way, as opposed to groups ofpeopie. 
Goodwin-Gill asks the follovving question regarding this issue: 
Wherever large numbers of people are affected by repressive laws or practices 
of general or widespread application, the question a..-ises wheu'1er each member 
of the group can, by reason of such membership alone, be considered to have a 
well-founded fear of oersecution: or does oersecution necessarilv imolv a 
further act of specific discriminatio~, a singling out of the individual?lo .-
It would seem wTong to do so. However, the law does seem to be rather speciflc. 
Reft1gee statt1S is detefIIli'led on an individual basis. Although the UNl-ICR and the 
1967 Refugee Protocol ha"ve their deflrJtion of the term 'rerJ.gee', tpjs is not., Ch'1C 
should not be, considered a strict definition. The tenn can be modified and the High 
COrP ...... 1Jlissioner can, by adopted resolutions in the Generai r\~ssembly, lend pislh.er 
'good offices' to refugees who fall outside the strict and technical deflnition as 
given by the UNHCRl1967 Refugee Protocol. Apart from the UN good offices, 
there has been another attempt to widen the defmition of refugees. This was carried 
out b)' the Orgarisation ror i~;Lfrican Ur...ityll (Oft"'-U) in 1969 In the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems ill Africa. 12 This 
convention in its fIrst pa.-L "outJiJleS the term in a way siiTIilar to the 1951 Refugee 
Conventiol1J1967 Refugee Protocol".l3 However, the second part of t}1js defwition 
refers the concept of refugee as the following: 
10 Goodwin-Gill, Guy The Refugee in International Law: Second Edition (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1996) p. 76 
11 Now called African Union (AU) 
12 Availabie on A.nmesty International NOf\vay website www.amnesty.no 
13 Melander, Goran "The Concept of the Term 'Refugee" in Bramweil, Anna Refl.lgees L'1 the Age of 
Totai War (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988) p. 11 
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[the] term 'Refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domitlation or events seriously distllTbitlg public 
order itl either pa.-t or the whole of his cOwltry of origin or nationalit'j, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 14 
Tlus definition attempts to fill some holes within the previous defllutions. It is "an 
attempt to describe in legal terms the refugees and/or displaced persons, assisted 
throug..1. the good offices ofthe lJN-:;:qCR".15 
Although this is a regional agreement and is not binding on the intemational 
carIn-nUllity. RetUfIling to the international agreements on refugees, A.1a-a.T!1 tells us 
that some very h'TIportant changes to the defip.1tion of refugees were made to the 
Refugee Convention compared to earlier agreements. A..laam explains these changes 
as: 
a shift in emphasis from returning refugees to their places of origin to a 
principle of non-refoulement (non-ret'ilil1) against the refugees' wishes, as well 
as a new emphasis on resettlement in third states. .... [I]nstead of addressing 
refugee problems in an ad hoc fashion involving only the states directly 
affected, the new approach viewed these problems as being the responsibility of 
the entire world community. 16 
The prl..llciple of non-refoulement is about Lhe 'prohlbition of expulsion or return'. It 
,. d 1" 1 " r- 1" . . ,.... .. 1 .. "J"J 17 
can oe mterprete as oemg tne IOunaatlOn stone or mlernatlonal protectIon , 
because t1:-..rough t1:-.1s principle, refugees are not forced to retu .. rn to their country if 
they would face persecution or torture. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
1 • -r; T t' exptams non-re.,owement nus: 
14 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa entry into force June 
20th, 1974 (at-ticle 2) 
15 Melander, Goran op. cit., p. 11 
16 Akram, Susan "Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and Implications for a 
Just Solution" Journal of Palestine Studies (XXXI, No.3, Spring 2002) p. 36 
17 Goodwitl-Gill, Guy op. cit., p. 30 
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No contracting state shall expel or retU.lll (refouler) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to L,.e frontiers of te.l.l~tories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. 18 
The Refugee Convention, because of its principle of non-refoulernent gIves 
reftlgees certain rights when they enter a..?J.other state. Because the refugees are not 
required to rehml to their counlry if they are under threat of persecution, states, 
because of the convention, need to gra..l1t the refugee a number of rights. These rights 
include the "freedom of religion (A..rticle. 4)~ rights in movable and iIT'~ovable 
property (Article. 13); access to courts (Article. 16); freedom from undue restriction 
on employment (Article 17); prima..ry education (A..rticle 22); a..l1d identity papers 
(Article. 27)", i9.20 These issues and rights of the refhgees are secured in order to 
- -
ma.ke sure that the refugees are guaranteed their human rights, while remaining 
refugees in a state ot.1}er than their own. 
The issue of hmnan lig..hts is also linked to that of protection, III this case 
.. ..• 1 _ ,. 21 ry"'Il" .. 1 _ .. .. 1 ·1" _ 1 
mtematIOnal protectIOn. lne mtematIOnal protectIOn aspect IS neaVllY mcorporatea 
within the lJN:--ICR Statllte of 1950. The UNHCR emphasis on international 
protection of refugees has two main aspects. One is protecting refugees on a hmnan 
• 1 1 • ""'hi l' 1 t l' h 1 l' 1 . i 1 ngnts oasls. 1 's mea..l1s ~nat aay-.o-aay Issues, suc~ as scnoonng, emp~oymen., ana 
so -fnrlh -hor rP-h'gPes hav;ng enterPa' other states as 1'Ylent;oneA abnve ;n thP Refugee ..I..V ..... \..L..I.. .I.. .LV.Ly. V .1...1.. .L.1..L .1. " .I.V .1...1...1..""', .1..1...1.. .L.Lt,...l. ..1...1. '""'" V .L.L.I. ... .L.I.....,.L ..L 
Convention, are addressed and refugees protected. The other main aspect is trying to 
find solutions for the refugees, depending on what is possible. Ll1 other words, 
18 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Article 33 
19 Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37 
20 Lebanon does not provide these rights to the PalestiL"lian Refugees in Lebanon. However, Lebanon 
is not a signatory. 
21 We shall see later within the Historical chapter just how iinportant ii"ltemational protection for 
refugees is. 
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whether the refugees should settle in their host cOlmtry, go back to their own 
t ii' ,,22 coun~ry, or rese.~le somewnere else. 
The lJNHCR statute does, however, specify more regarding the protection of 
refugees. These aspects include "promotin.g international agreements for refugee 
protection, supervision and mopjtoring complia..T}ce \\rith those agreements., assisting 
govemments and nongovernmental orgwisations in the vohmtary repatriation of 
refugees or in their resettlement in host or third states, a.'ld assisting refugees in 
protecting their properties, such as restitution or transfer of assets left in their states 
of origin".23 These aspects l-,ighlight the UNHCR Statutes' basic principles of 
protecting refugees' day-to-day lives as well as finding solutions regarding their 
future settlement. 
Who is a Palest=J1lian Refugee? 
The United Nations Relief and Works agency (U~"RWA) was established by 
General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) in December 1949, beginping its operations 
in l\lfay 19"0 to nrovide rp1ief -t.or the Palpstine re-hlgees The m· tprnational regime 
.1..&..1. 1\..... .L...".,...!-'.L .1. .1."".L.1. ..L.l. ... .L.L ..L .I.'" t,...L.I...1. .l...t..u. ..L.I..1. ........ "".1.. .L 11..1. .1. .L.l. .A..l..l. 
described above regarding refugees as set up under the Refugee Convention 1951, 
and the UNHCR ma.'ldate, is not wholly applicable to Palestipjan refugees. The 
Statutp has <> snecia1 provision Where it does not inc111de refilgees ... ... "'_.L.L ...... 1:' .L.l. ~.L .l..1..L.l. .L.L.l. ..... '" .1..1...L...L.L.a........1. \A. 
22 Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37-38 
23 Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37 
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who continuers] to receive from other orgill's or agencies of the United Nations 
protection or assistance.24 
Since 1950, UNRWA's mandate has been contLl1ually extended as a tempora..ry 
orga.1lisation and a subsidiary organ of the lJN. This has been because of the absence 
of a workable solution to the Palestine problem, especially regarding the Palestinia..'1 
refugees. Thus lJNRWA's role is to "carry out direct relief and works and to plan 
(' " t' , ,. ('., , ,,, 25 UNRWTA . t ,. , ,. lor me Ime wnen renel IS no lOnger neeaea . 1 IS no. omy mVOlvea m 
direct relief of refugees but also 'works'. \X/orks refers to a series of work 
programmes that aim to 'Ll1tegrate' the refugees into the working and economic life 
of the host countries and the lvliddle East It is/was, hoped that the 'works' 
progra..T.u111e ,vould sufficiently integrate the refugees to remove them from needing 
relief. As we shall see later, the 'integration' into Lebanon has proved difficult. 
UNRWA works in Leba.'1on, jordan, Syria, the West BarLl( and the Gaza Strip. 
T o day UNRWA is the main agency dealing with Palestinian refugees. Before the 
creation of lJNRWA there was another agency that was set up to deal specifically 
with Palesti11ian refugees, cailed the UrJ.ted Nations Conciliation COIr.uTJ.ssion on 
Palestine (UNCCP). This agency was set up under United Nations General 
A ' , 1" "4 C"') , ,.,,, , (' h n., .. ssemOlY reso utIOn 1';1. lll, tne sa.rne reSOlUtIOn tnat callea lOr L e ralestImans to 
be able to return to their homes and be compensated for any losses. Its role was to 
try and achieve a peaceful settlement. Its instmctions were to 
Facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of 
the refugees and payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with 
24 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Comlnissioner for Refugees; adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950; Chapter II, 7 ( c) 
25 Besson, Yves "u~'RWA and its role in Lebanon" Journal of Refugee Studies (VoL 10, No.3, 
1997) p. 336 
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the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palesti"e Refugees and, L1rough 
him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.26 
r..l1e lJNCCP tried to negotiate several proposals on the above issues, however it was 
1 ., 1 t" ., t' ·t· ,.. t' an· ,,27· , ''T'' TUNCCP no~ posslO.e.o reconClle ne POSI IOns or ne p nes mvolvea. 1 ne 1 • 
understood that this problem could not be solved quickly. Other agencies beca..'lle 
involved, such as the Economic Survey Mission (ESM), which concluded that the 
refugee problem could not be solved LTnmediately and that they were in need of 
general aid and "a prograrr~'lle of public works, to increase the productivity in the 
area".28 Thus Cmile about the resolution 302 (iv) of 8 December 1949, to create 
UNRWA. 
We know from the above quotation from the Statute that lJNHCR does not have the 
,. ,. 1 4O" r ,. ..,. r- ,. • 29"...., . 
manaate to aeal wltn rerugees tnat receIve am Ifom otner agenCIes. 1 ne agenCIes 
and their regimes are "grounded in special principles enunciated in a series of lJN 
~esoi"+;ons conce~;~g ~efugees" 30 The a~e~c;es ~~d· the;~ reg;mes ~~e gro"~d·ed ;~ 
.1 .lUl.l.l .1 ..l.lllJ.! .1 1. 4O..L.1.1 b.l.l 1 au. .1.1.1.1 ll.1 (ll .1 Ul.l ll.l 
the principles of the resolutions that founded them. For example, Resolution 302 (iv) 
along with setting up UNRWA, is also guided by resolution 194 (iii) that calls for 
the right ofretLml of Palestinian refugees. 
26 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) Paragraph 11, plli"1: 2, 11th December 1948. 
27 Takkenberg, Lex The Status ofPalestinillil Refugees in International Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998) p. 25 
28 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 26 
29 Akrllili believes that this is a misi"terpretation, that in fact part ID of the Convention explicitly 
says that it is a fall-back in case L'1e other agencies (i.e. UNRWA) Cllil not protect them llild bring 
about what is called for i" resolution 192. Akram, Susan op. cit., 
30 Ibid. p. 38 
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Although this is the case, another look at the requirements for the detennination of 
refugee status under the UNIICR is helpful in gaining a..Tl understanding of how the 
detenrJnation of refugee status comes about. 
Recalling the previous section, there are four conditions within the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees: first that 
she must be outside her country of nationality or her country of former habitual 
residence; second, she must be unwilling or unable to avail herself of the 
protection of that country; third, her ul1willingness or inability must be 
attributed to a 'well fOwided fear of persecution' <md; four, the persecution must 
be individualised and based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a p<h-ticular social group, or political opinion.31 
The problem with this definition in relation to the Palestinian refugees is that they 
are unable to fulfil all of the conditions. With regard to the PalestiPians who fled to 
Lebanon in 1948 two problems in pa..rticular arise: first, these Palestinia..'1s are not 
able to show that when they fled they had a 'well1ounded fear of persecution' for 
{' l' P 1 •• 32 'T'1 1" 1" 1 1 1 fi . f 1 reasons 01 oemg ~ aleslUllan. 1 ne secona pomt IS IlP..Kea to tne . lrst one: even 1.: tne 
Palestinians who fled to Lebanon could prove that they left Palestine because of fear 
of their lives being th~'eatened by the Israeli military, it is difficult for them to show 
that they feared 'individualised persecution' .33 However, it is difficult to draw a line 
of distinction between individual and groups of refhgees. The reason for this is that 
often within groups of refugees there are Lndividuals who 'left their COlll1try of 
origin', owing to a 'well-founded fear of persecution'. Tpis issue of 'fear' still 
31 Arzt, Donna Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Council 
on Foreign Relations Book, New York, 1997) p. 68-69 
32 Fear is difficult to prove because they left in a war zone, and the discussion of whether they were 
forced to leave, left under encouragement, or left voluntarily is ambiguous. 
33 At this point we need to remember from the previous section that the UNHCR recognises refugees 
individually <hid not collectively. 
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remams a problem, particularly regarding the argument that many Palestinians 
remained LTl the newly founded State ofIsrae1 and actually became Israeli citizens. 
The above mentioned dilemma(s) of 'fear' as well as the individual definition of 
refugees to the determLTlation of th.e status of refugees has been cla..rified to a certain 
extent by other means within intemationallaw.34 lJNRWA has its own definition for 
Palestinian refugees. Palestinian refugees include: 
any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during t.'1e period 1 
Jwie 1946 and 15 May 1948, ruid who has lost both home ruid means of 
livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War?5 
This lJNRWA definition helps the Palestinian refugees in that they do not have to 
fulfil the requirements of t..1,.e convention. Tpis definition also includes descendants 
as well as non-refugee wives of registered rerJgees. Nevertheless, tris defirition is 
not without problems either as this UNRWA definition of Palestinian refugees does 
not include ail refugees. There are two categories of refugees: 1) Palestinian Arabs 
who left what was to become Israel; and 2) the rerJgees that are eligible for 
UNRWA services. The refugees that are eligible for UNRWA services are the ones 
who registered when they arrived in the host countries, that is, for the most part 
'ca.'TIP' dwellers, but may also include later a.rrivals from 1967(ifthey were already 
registered). This means that UNRWA took the ones in need, and thus have never 
1 l' • d' . 1 1 1 f ~ 36 ...... ,' • 1 • fi 1 naG Jli..TlS lctlOn over tne total numoer 0 remgees. 1 illS IS li..TlSettlmg or a nmnoer 
34 These solutions are not without their own problems. For example the above mentioned OAD 
convention of 1969, may be informally recognised but it is still not part of the international regime on 
refugees. Melander, Goran op. cit., p.13 
35 Neither resolutions 194(iii) nor 302(iv) defined t.'1e term refugee. This defillition becrulle the 
working defmition oflJNRWA in 1952 Takenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 72 
36 In Lebruion many Clli-istian Palestinians were given Lebruiese citizenship dw":illg the 1950s and 
1960s. This has to do with the confessional of the Lebrulese political system and its chruiging 
demographics according to different sects. See Sayigh, Rosemary Too Manv Enemies: The 
Palesthiian Exuerience in Leba.ion (Zed Books, London, 1984) p. 23 ruid 33. fuid Mah.1:abi, Rruiia 
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of reasons. First, not all refugees are entitled to help from lJNRWA lIDless they or 
their families registered in 1948 and, second, tpis ma..1(es it difficult to know the 
exact number of refhgees. Thirdly, the legal status of those who are not registered 
remain stateless and, in Lebanon, they are regarded as illegal innnigrants. 
Nationality and Statelessness 
Another issue regarding the international legal status of Palestinian refugees relates 
to citizenship (known in legal contexts as 'nationality') and the opposite, 
statelessness. 
According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28t.h 
September 1954 article 1, a stateless person is 
a person who is not considered a national by any state under L~e operation of its 
law.37 
One would expect that tlus Convention would apply to Palestinian refugees; 
however, witPin the next article it says: 
This Convention shall not apply: (i) To persons who are at present receiving 
from orgrulS or agencies of the United Nations other than L~e United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistrulce so long as L~ey are 
receiving such protection or assistance.38 
"Citizenship in Lebanon" esp. page 156 in Butenschon, Nils ed. Citizenshin and the State in the 
Middle East: Anproaches and Applications (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 2000) 
37 Convention Relating to the status of Stateless Persons. Adopted on 28 September 1954 by a 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social Council Resolution 526 A (XVII) 
of26 April 1954. Entry into force 6 June 1960 in accordance with article 39. At-ticle 1, Paragraph 1-
38 Convention Relating to the Status of StateleSS Persons, 1954, Article 1, Paragraph 2 (i) 
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Hence, because Palestinian refugees are receiving help and aid fi'om l.JNRWA, they 
are not allowed to come under the protection of the Convention on Statelessness. 
Palestinian refugees particularly in Leba..'1on could be considered stateless, as they 
do not have Lebanese passports nor do they have the right to work and other civil 
rights. TIlis Convention, therefore, could have limited their suffering greatly had it 
been applicable to them, as it stipulates certain rights for stateless persons. These 
rights are included within various articles of the convention and include rights such 
as non-discrimination (Articie 3), exemption from reciprocity (Articie 7), residence 
and acquiring property (A..rticle 13), employment (Article 17 and 18), welfare 
(Chapter IV, Articles 20,21,22,23,24), freedom of movement (Article 26), identity 
( • ., 77) , , (Ar ., 78)' ,.. (Art" "''"') papers Artlcle _ ,travel aocuments rtlcle _ ,ana naturansatlOnlcle ;)L . 
All of these rights are applicable as far as they are already applicable to the citizens 
(or in other cases such as employment to that of other legal aliens) of that particular 
j 1 .,.., , t' ., t t ' 1 ' . , 1 Ii· (Arl" 1 ... ) t t s~a~e. l'or example, .ne ngn. 0 movao e alIa unmovao e prope .y .lCte usa es 
that: 
The Contracting States shall accord to a stateless person treatment as favourable 
as possible and, in any event, not less favourable thfu"l that accorded to aliens 
generally in the Sfulle crrcwllstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and 
immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other 
contracts relating to movable and i.wnovable property39 
This article ma.kes sure t..hat the stateless person residing in the host country is not 
discriminated against and ma.l(es sure that he/she is treated the same as other legal 
aliens. The Convention also stipulates in other areas that t..1J.e stateless person is 
treated t..he same as other citizens and not pUllished for being a non-citizen. For 
example A..rticie 29 dealing with fiscal charges says that 
39 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Adopted on 28th September 1954. Entry 
into forces 6 Jw"le 1960. Article 13. 
1 Ii '1 
~VJ 
The Contracthlg States shall not impose upon stateless person's duties, charges 
or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or 
may be levied on their nationals40 
What these two examples show is that t..l}e Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons protects stateless persons residing in host states - providing the 
host states are contracting states. 
However, a major problem with intemational law with regard to nationality and 
statelessness is that it is unable to intervene as nationality comes under the 
jurisdiction of domestic law. Another problem allses as t.1J.ere is no Palestinian state, 
and arguably has never been one as Palestinians were previously citizens of the 
Palesti.Tle Mandate, and therefore Palestinian nationality becomes non-existent. 
Palestinian refhgees, who have not acquired the nationality of a..'1other state, remain 
stateless, without the support of this convention. 
Another legal doclLlllent which relates to this issue of statelessness is the 1948 
Upiversal Declaration of Human Rights, more specifically ..A~rticle 15. A.rticle 15 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to a 
Nationality". Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is considered, or 
at least parts of it, as evidence of customary International Law, this sentence is 
rather a..1Jlbiguous and difficult to implement as it is not binding. Furthermore, 
because of the ambiguity in the sentence 'Everyone has the right to a nationality' 
there are two obvious questions that a.rise: what is the mewing of nationality? W:'10 
is in charge of, or responsible for granting nationality? Regarding t..he latter, it is not 
40 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Adopted on 28 September 1954. Entry into 
force 6 June 1960. Article 29 
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the international conllllll11ity, so the only answer to this is that it is the country 
1 • 1h· T 1 ( ,. 1 1 1 ) Art· 1 15 1 t 1 ,. . . 1 concernea, ill ~~.ls case, LeOaTJ.On Qlscussea oelOW . lCle 1 Goes .ry ~o al.TlllnlSn 
statelessness by stating that 'No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived o/his nationality'. 
However, this has only a mil1 i lllal, if any, effect in that it can work as a disincentive 
to create statelessness. There is nothing in this that forces states not to make persons 
stateless. Regarding the former question on what the actual mearjng of nationality is 
within article 15, there are no set answers. It is ambiguous because of its relationship 
to the term citizenship. However, 
when it [the term nationality] appears in a human rights text, it is clearly 
intended to refer to rights rat.,.er t.,.an whose subject the person is, and it goes 
beyond the question of diplomatic protection hI hlternational relations. 
Although admittedly there was some ambiguity in the positions of those who 
drafted the text, the only reasonable meaning of the word nationality hI this 
human rights provision is the right to citizenship.41 
The parallels that can be drawn between the concepts of refugees and stateless 
persons is that sometimes people can be both refugees and stateless. The problem is 
that 
refugees and stateless persons are similarly situated, for they both suffer from a 
lack of national protection. While initially no distinction was made between 
refugees and stateless persons, later the stateless were included in the group 
receiving international protection only if they could fit into the narrower 
defillition of refugee; statelessness alone was not decisive.42 
The concept of statelessness with regard to all stateless people, including the 
Palestinian refi.lgees in question, makes any international protection of these groups 
41 Eide, Asbj0ITl "Citizenship alld International Human Rights Law: Status, Evolution and 
Challenges" in Butenschoen, Nils ed Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and 
Application (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 2000) p. 109 
42 Batchelor, Carol "Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in Llternational Protection" International Journal 
of Refugee Law (Vol. 7, No 2,1995) p. 239 
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of people very difficult as nationality is what links people to international law. 
Nationality is thus imperative if people want protection ll.llder international law. 
Right of Return 
The issue of the Palestinia.ll 'Right of Reu.LTn' is one of the most important issues to 
PalestiPian refugees. 
The rig.'1t of retUJ.ll cannot easily be discarded by PalestiJ.'ians. Since 1948, it has 
(concept of right of return) acquired emotional connotation of such significance 
l:t'1at the term became the basis of Palestinian nationalism in much the same way 
that the return to Eretz Israel became the foundation of Zionism. The concept of 
retwll permeates modem Palestinirul literature; it is at the core of history taug.'1t 
to children in refugee camps throug.'1out the region, ruld is usually the first 
thought expressed by average Palestinians when discussing Middle East 
problems. To many, the right of return is rul h"11por-..ant symbol; recognition 
would remove the stigma of second class citizenship imposed on Palesth"1ians, a 
stigma that exists even in Jordan, where by law the refugees have equal rights.43 
Under international law the issue of rehml tends to be somewhat ambiguous, even 
more so \¥hen one relates tbis issue to the case of PalestiJ1i~11. refugees. The 
Upiversal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, established on December 10th 
1948), which is a relevant, although again non-binding, international legal 
docmnent, in tbis case states that 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
includi.'lg pis own, and retu..'ll to pis country'. 44 Knowledge of the pistory of the 
Mandate of Palestine and the partition plan tells us that the Palestinians who fled 
43 Peretz, Don Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process (United States Institute of 
Peace Press, Washington D.C, 1993) p. 72 
44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, Paragraph 2. 
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from this land did not strictly leave from their 'own COlUltry', because their 'own' 
country did not exist. Tpis is obviously most unsettiing to most Palestipian refugees; 
however, under international law, tris issue is resolved to a certain extent under 
other General Assembly Resolutions. Fmther questions arise, such as can 
descendaIlts of these Palestinia..lls who fled, have a right to return? These 
descendants have never lived in Palestine and thus never left their 'own COll,11try'. 
With regard to descendants, modifications were made to the language of the 
Universal Declaration of Huma..ll Rights in the International Covena..llt on Civil and 
Political Rights of December 16th, 1966,45 (ICCPR) saying "No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country".46 There are two main 
issues vvitt'1 the ICCPR: :first, it is considered a binding international law, although it 
was o[lly ratified by Israel in 1992. Second, althoug..h this may mGL1(e matters easier 
for descendru'lts of refugees, 4 7 this Covenru'lt does not chru'lge the 'right of return' for 
Palestinian refugees, as 'own country' implies tt'1at they had or have (as has already 
been mentioned, it is arguable whether what they have now can be considered a 
country) one. Thus, Llltemationallaw does not seem to give the PalestiPians a 'right 
of return', as they techPically did not have a 'country' to sta..rt with when they left. 
On the other ha..'1d it is clear that international law, with regard to hu..'.Ilan rights, is to 
be understood in humanistic terms, rather than strictly technical. Artz argues in this 
context that with regard to the Palestipjan refugees, the phrase '''one's own country' 
should be interpreted liberally, to include a homeland with wrich one has ancestral, 
reiigious and cultural, if not geographical and political ties".48 Unfortunately 
45 Arzt, Donna op. cit., p. 64 (the ICCPR had entry date into force March 23, 1976) 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200 (xxi), 
1966, entered into force March 23rd, 1976 - Article 12, paragraph 4. 
47 Because the word 'return' has been changed with 'enter' thus not implying that the refugee would 
have had to have lived there before. 
48 Arzt, Donna op. cit., p. 64 
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intemational law with regard to this issue is conLllloflly understood to mean that a 
refugee can enter or return to pistner pre-existing country. 
There is, however, another intemational legal document, which is the one that is 
most relevant to Palesti..nian refugees. Alt.1}ough this legal document is considered 
, ft" ., 1 •• h' 1 f' , ,. h.f • 4</ so • mternatlOnal ~aw, It IS one t ~at nas a ~ot 0 relevance to tne ngt~t 0 ... retthrn'. -
This docllllent is General Assembly Resolution 194, and in pa..rticular part (iii) 
paragraph 11, of this resolution which 
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace 
wiL~ their neighbours should be pennirted to do so at the earliest practicable 
date, (hid u~at compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing 
not to retlli"1l and for loss of or damage to property which, under the principles 
of International Law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or 
authorities responsible5o 
By reading this we can see at once the problems this sort of language has in 
sustaining a firm ll.TJ.dersta.TJ.ding of what paragraph 11 of General Assembly 
Resolution 194 (iii) actually means. First, regarding the actual issue at s~1(e here, 
the 'right to return', it is omitted D.-om tIllS resolution. The word 'should' is used 
instead, wpich is a non-compliable word when taken in relation to other words that 
could have been used, such as 'right to' or 'shall'. Secondly the term 'refugee' is by 
itself, meaning that it could include both Jewish a..l1d Palestinian refugees, and the 
, 1 1 ..., • • 1 1 ... 1 1 r- 1 1 T l' 1 govern..TIlents ana autnonhes wntten m plUral cOUla a~so rerer to ootn Israe~l a.TJ.a 
other Arab gove~'llents. Finally there is a condition attached to the return of 
refugees that they 'live at peace with their neighbours'. For many years, tIllS 
49 'Soft' international law refers to nonbi11ding declarations made by the UN General Assembly and 
other international organisations. On the other hand, what we have seen above may be referred to as 
'hard' international law which consists of binding treaties. 
50 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) Paragraph 11, 11th December, 1948 
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resolution was viewed as not doing anything for the Palestinian refugees' case 
• 1 .gh 1 1 ..... 1 1· 1 1 1 
concemmg tne n a t to retarn, not omy oecause OI tne a.rnOlguous ~anguage usea, out 
also for what they saw as the illegal existence of the State of Israel. This has been 
Israel's case for a long time against Palestinian 'right of return', nanlely that a 'right 
of return' for Palestinia.ll 'refugees' would mean the end of the State of Israel, as the 
Palestir,ians (a.'1d to a large extent the Arab world)5i did not accept the existence of 
the State of Israel. However, in 1988 the PLO, which was at this time based in 
".., •• , 1 T'lI 1 _.. D 1 t- r- T 1 1 52 -·i'· 1 ., h 1 UP.lS, Issuea tne ralestiman eClara.lon or Inaepenaence WLilln Willcn L ey 
recogr,ised the UN Pa.rtition Resolution 181 of 1948. This in itself, recognised the 
State of Israel, as this document calls for 'two states, one Arab and one Jewish'. 
lpjs may then complicate the final status issues on the 'right to retu..rn', as the 
Israelis ca.'1 claL.TIl that not all Palestir,ians can come back as tl'o,is w,ight ruin the 
demographics of the Jewish-Arab ratio in Israel. 
RetUl11ing to Resolution 194 and regarding a right of retm"ll, tlns is also part of tlle 
Universal Declaration of Huma.ll Rights. ~rt:icle 13 states: 
Everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state; Everyone has L1.e rig..1.t to leave any country, includitlg his 
own, and to return to his country.53 
TIns corresponds to tlle ICCPR looked at earlier. There are discussions as to what 
exactly 'his own coalltry' refers to. Although there has been, as yet, no precise 
exp1aratl·on of'the terrrl the a'efim;t;on ;s consl·dered "at a rom· ;n;l1m fto ;nclua'e1 L .L .L " ..L \..J....L .. .1....1.. ........ , 11..1.... ..L .&.\,.... ..l...I.. ..l. ~"'.I..~ ..I.. _.... ............. J .•. 
51 Egypt a.l1d Jordan were the first to recognise Israel by accepting Resolution 242 foliowing the 1967 
War. This was followed by agreements between the two countries and Israel later on. 
52 Available on the internet on the Palestine Mil1istry of L'1formation site. In parTIcular paragraph 6. 
www.pna.irglmil1info 
53 Universal Decla.ration ofHlL'1lan Rights, 10 December 1948, A!1:icle 13 (i) and (ii). 
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in addition to the State of which the individual is a national, the country in which he 
or she permanently resides. It has also been suggested that one's 'country' is to be 
equated with 'a country wl:>ich one considers 'home' and to which one is corm.ected 
through history, race, religion, family, or other ties",.54 
An important event took place in 1974 when the lJN General Assembly recognised 
t
' 
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.ne L anane ngn s olle rales lma..ll people. 1. rougn \Jeneral SSemOlY 
Resolution 3236 (x,'Cix) Palestirian 'right of return' was linked to the principle of 
'self-determination'. The resolution: 
Reaffirms the inaliable rig.1.ts of the Palestinian people in Palestine including: 
The rig.1.t to self-determination without external interference; The right to 
national independence fuld sovereignty. [It also] Reafjin7ls also 1:t1.e hlalienable 
right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they 
have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return5G; 
Fu.rthermore, this resolution does not distinguish between 1948 and 1967 refugees, 
but rather, refers to them as a single group. As we can see from the reference above, 
there is no talk of Palestinia..'1 reihgees, wl:>ich would make the deterrr.ir.ing of who is 
a.lld who is not a refugee into a question. General Assembly Resolution 3236 speaks 
about the PalestiPia.ll people, removing in the process questions about who is a.lld 
who is not a refugee, as well as moving the debate from individuals to a group of 
people. This resolution has been described as yet another "milestone toward the 
recogpition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People in Palestine including 
the right to self-determination, the right of national independence and sovereignty, 
54 Lawand, Kau'11een "The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law" International Journal 
of Refugee Law (Vol. 8, No 4, 1996) p. 551: This deThlition is, to reiterate, only part of various 
interpretations as there is no formal defmition. 
55 Zuriek, Elia Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process (Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Washington DC, 1996) p. 110-111 
56 General Assembly Resolution 3236 (xxix). Question of Palestine, 22 November 1974. Point la and 
b, fuld point 2. 
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the right to retllill to their homes, the rig..~t to regain their rig..~ts by all means". 57 
However, again, t.1.is resolution is not binding. Nevertheless, the right to national 
self-determination alld return are thus rights that are "enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and lJN Resolutions 194 and 3236".58 These 
resolutions and international agreements need to be on the agenda of any future 
peace talks as they are considered to be, as said above, the international recognition 
of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People. 
Compensation 
Compensation for Palestinian refugees is also an issue of huge importance, usually 
I" .. • T" ,. 1 1 1 .. 1 -f 1 1" 
relemng to monetary compensatIOn. It IS llm<.ea to tne ngnt 0': retu..rn ootn ill terms 
of property and hu..1Jla..'1 damage for retu .. T..ing refugees, and also as being a potential 
altemative to the rig..h.t of retum. Therefore the term is associated on its own or in 
combination with the 'right of retu..rn' . 
By itself compensation is linked to UN Resolution 194 (iii) where it says "that 
compensation be paid for the property of those [refugees] choosing not to retu..rn a.lld 
for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of intemationallaw or 
in equity, should be made good by t.~e governments or authorities responsible".59 
Again t.~e problem arises of resolution 194 being non-binding. Nevertheless, 
57 Baman, Abra.1'}am "The Role ofUN"KWA: Refugee Statistics and UN Resolutions" in Ginat, 
Joseph and Perkins, Edward J ed The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems - New Solution (Sussex 
Academic Press, Brighton, 2001) p. 259 
58 Aruri, Naseer H "Towards Convening A Congress of Return a.'1d Self-Determination" in Aruri, 
Naseer H ed Palestinia.'1 Refugees: The Right of Ret"'11 (pluto Press, London, 2001) p. 268 
59 United National General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) Paragraph 11, Pa.rt 4, 11th December 1948. 
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compensation has to do with the principle of restitution. Exactly who is the 
responsible government or authority in this case is a matter of OpInIOn. Most 
Palestirians and Arab states view the Israeli goveIT'.u'TIent as being responsible and 
therefore as the state liable to pay compensation.6o The Israeli governments "Sh'1Ce 
1948 have disclaimed responsibility for 1:t~e refugee deplli-ture, placing 1:t~e bllli-ne on 
the A...rab states and A...rab leaders"Y Tnis disagreement stems from the differing 
perspectives, Arab and Israeli, on why the refugees left Palestine in 1948 during the 
first Arab-Israeli War. However, Peretz does note that there has been a change in 
Israel'; pn'o'l';" op';nll·on Th';s has to do unth the van'ons f-i1na'';ngs ,...f" t'ne NleUr 
..l. ..L..l. ~"'" ..L ........ _..L.1. .1..1. • ..L..l....L.I.. .I..L '" \lVl..l. \...1...1. "-'I. ..l...L..I. .1..1..1. V..l. \..1. ..J.. 't'v 
Historians,62 who have been using official Israeli arcl'..ives in their research and have 
refuted 1:t~e opinion that the Palestinians left voluntarily or under Arab leadership 
(telling them to). Instead, what the New HistoriaIls have found is that many 
Palestinians were forced to leave their homes and livelihoods. Whatever the opinion 
about responsibility, the payment of compensation to Palestinia.Tl refugees would 
have a large psychological sigrificance and would be a large step towards creating 
an atmosphere for possible negotiations. The issue of compensation has been left for 
final status negotiations and therefore has not been an issue at the moment. 
Restitution a.lld compensation is also anchored withjn other parts of intemational 
law. Within hu.TIlanita.rian law, the foarth (civilians) Geneva Convention propjbits 
'extensive destruction <h'ld appropriation of property not justified by milita..ry 
60 Peretz, Don "Refugee Compensation, Responsibility, Recipients, and Forms and Sources" in Ginat, 
Joseph and Perkins, Edward J The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems - New Solutions Sussex 
Academic Press, Brighton, 2001, p. 88 
6i Ibid. p. 89 
62 The New Historians are looked at withitl the Chapter Four. 
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necessity and cfu'Tied out urJawfully and wfu~torJy' .63 Again there is a problem of 
interpreting how the PaJestinifuis lost their land and livelihoods. The :foOOh Geneva 
Convention is li!l~ked to armed conflict a..l1d there needs to be proof of state action in 
tbis regard. The case is similar within human rights law, as both within the UDHR 
and the ICCPR for instance, there is the right to restitution. The restitution in this 
case is li..'1...1ced to the right to own property and property having been taken away 
"11 11 l!!ega!!y. 
Nevertheless, several ideas have been put fOlward regarding how compensation 
might work when and if applied Lll any final status negotiations. The first issue is 
about how much the Palestinian compensation clai..111 ought to be. Esti..111ates va.ry, 
and are usually based on the losses made in 1948. There has been difficulty getting 
an accurate evaluation of Palestipian refugee property as "most Arab property was 
absorbed into Israel's economy, and has been transformed, often beyond 
recognition. In ma..llY cases it has passed throug.h. several owners and has been 
classified and reclassified under a variety of Israeli laws".64 There were early 
attempts by the lJNCCP to locate, identify and evaluate land and property 
abandoned by the Palestinian refugees. The UNCCP failed in its mission, though its 
f " t t 1 1 • • "1h 1 1 1 1 1 11 b 1 , e lOT.S may no nave oeen m vam, as ~44e aocumen.s genera ea oy ne oay s 
Tecr.nical Office detailing the refhgee property losses constitute an indispensable 
resource for any future talks on compensation". 65 
63 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War «Fourth Geneva 
Convention) entry hito force 21 October 1950, article 147. Available at www.unhchr.ch 
64 Peretz, Don 1993 op. cit., p. 86 
65 FischBach, Michael R. "The United Nations and Palestinian Refugee Property Compensation" 
Journal of Palest hie Studies (Vol. xxxi, No.2, Winter 2002) p. 48. For more detail on the UNCCP 
and it mission read it'1is article. 
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Rashid Khalidi for instance tells us Lhat 
A third element is reparation for all those who will not be allowed to return, and 
compensation for 1:t'lose who lost property in 1948. Given that most refugees 
will not be able to return, the SUins involved are large indeed, accordi.lg to 1:t'le 
most authorative recent estimate of property losses alone. Depending on the 
criteria used, they range from $92 billion to $147 billion at 1984 prices, when 
the study was done.GG Even if one uses UtI entirely different approach, $20,000 
per person for an arbitrarily chosen figure of 2 million eligible refugees and 
1:t'leir descendents yields a figure of $40 billion. However, lest it seem like a 
great deal of money, we should recall that it amounts to little more than a 
decade worth ofDS aid to IsraeL67 
The figures are based on estimates of Palestinia.ll losses, but according to Brynen 
there could perhaps also be an attempt here to "place a.Tl appropriate price tag on a 
historical injustice".68 (Khalidi's figure is just $40 billion). Gazit, an Israeli 
researcher, has suggested that Israel should pay up to "$7 to 10 billion in 
. 't· . , $' a 000 f,"" 69 compensatlOn, or al emanvelY 1, per ~amlly.· 
After having established the varyi ... ng estimates of va.rious scholars and researchers, 
Brynen points out that there has been too little attention paid to how tpjs 
compensation vvill be paid. Lt1 other words, what resources are available to pay this 
sort of compensation? Brynen points out that, at the time of writing in 1997, only 
$? 5 "'1' ' " '" , rt t' "W t y-,., , G I' t' , t' f ~. DILlon naa oeen pleagea :0 suppo~. ne es tlaP...K ana Taza lOr .ne aura.lOn 0 
the Oslo process, a quarter of which is in the form of loans. The a.TTIounts of money 
that were referred to above therefore, seem rather unli.k.ely. His estimates for likely 
66 Khalidi is referring here to a study done by Hadawi, Sami and Kubursi, AtifPalestinian Rights and 
Losses in 1948 (Saqi Books, London, 1988) 
67 Khalidi, Rashid "Towards a Solution" in Khalidi, Rashid et al Paiestitiian Refugees: Their Problem 
and Future (Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington DC, 1994) p. 24 
68 Brynen, Rex "Imagini.lg a Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in 
LebUtlon" Journal of Palestine Studies (VoL xxvi, No 2, WhIter 1997) p. 50 
69 Gazit, Shlomo The Palestinian Refugee Problem Fitlal Status Issues Study, No 2, (Tel Aviv, Jaffee 
Center for Strategic Studies, 1995) 
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available fw'1ding for compensation is as little as $1.2 billion.7o This fuliOUt'1t works 
out at $358 per UNRWA registered refugee. Already we can see tt'1e problems here. 
This is obviously not an adequate amount, and while compensation is about 
psychological significance as well as compensation for lost property CLnd 
livelihoods, amounts tpis size are most likely to be viewed as insulting. wThat are the 
solutions, if any, to the compensation issue? The peace process is cu..rrently off track, 
and the final status negotiations seem a long way away. However, there are various 
interpretations to these questions. First, one needs to figure out who gets the 
compensation and how much they get. The involved pa.rties are the PalestiI'ian 
Authority (PA) if the refugees retmn to the West Bank and Gaza, and different 
amounts of compensation for different refugee choices. In other words, refugees 
deciding to return get less and refugees deciding to stay where they are get more. 
Other pruiies may include the host governments if refugees decide they would like 
to stay. All of these questions remaLll to be solved. Furthermore, the issue of how to 
finance compensation remah'lS as well. However, as Brynen points out, there is an 
imperative issue that must be tackled regru'ding this issue which is that 
Any compensation fund must be designed so as to maximise the prospects for 
Israeli, regional and i"ternational contributions. This i"evitably will involve 
addressing a number of apparent contradiction: Compensation must be seen by 
Palestinians as satisfying their desire for some expression of Israeli 
responsibility for the refugee problem, be seen by Israel as ailillitting no such 
blame, by Arab and international donors as contributing to peace and regional 
development rather than representing third party payment of Palestinian 
property claims arising from Israeli actions. 71 
70 Brynen, Rex The Funding of Palestinian Refugee Comoensation available at Palestinian Refugee 
Net www.arts.mcgiILcaimeppinewyITD 
71 Brynen, Rex 1997 op. cit., p. 52 
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A.nother issue that needs to be sorted out is the question: does compensation mean 
that there is no right of return? Or does compensation mean resettlement either in 
host Co"ntn'es or th'rd cAllntn'es? Tllrlg'ng -ITA ..... my rpsparch 'n the re-hlgee camps T ~.l. ..............1. .1. \..I...l....LL. "' ......... .1......... . oJ\..&.'-'I.~.l. ...L..LV.1..1..1. .1...1. .......... "" .1. \...1...1. .I. ..L..... .1..1, .L 
argue that the refugees would not be happy to receive compensation instead of a 
right of return. Similarly Lebanon would not be happy to resettle Palestinia..ll 
refhgees permanently on their territory. Judging from recent events, it seems that 
compensation would mean that there would be no right of retmn, if indeed 
compensation is considered appropriate by the Israelis in the first place. Recent 
events ma..l(e resolution of both the issues of compensation a..'ld of the rights of retuLrn 
rather unli..kely. 
Regional Arrangements: The Arab League 
The Palestinian refugee bmden is one that has mostly been calTied by various Arab 
l 1 .,' t' . " . l' S1 t {' T 'T' J' S' (t' S a.es, eSpeCIallY .nose nelgnoounng .:.ne t:a e 01 Israel: Leoa..llon, oruap..., yna, .ne 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank), as well as Egypt, Libya and Iraq. Ma..'lY refhgees 
have moved from tllese countries to the Gulf countries, making their legal status a 
little bit more complicated. The lJN has been responsible for the PalestiPian 
refhgees t..lrrough U1\TRWA. However, both the refugees and many Arab states view 
the UN with suspicion, as the UN was involved in the creation of the State of Israel. 
Fmthermore, as seen above, the Palestinian refugees do have a 'rig..lIt to retu..rn' 
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through va.nous UN Resolutions, however, for vanous reasons (i.e. Israel), the 
LTIlplementation of these resolutions has been prevented. Thus the host countries 
have had to deal with the Palesti..'1ian refugees until such v..me occurs when they can 
retlU1I to their homes, or to a Palestinian State. Reactions to the Palestinian refugees 
have varied from COli..lltry to country, from on the one hand being extremely 
accom..'Ilodating, to the other hand where the refugees have been treated as a tp..reat 
to the political system. 
The question of Palestine has always been one of the main concems of the Arab 
League. Since 1952, there have been a series of resolutions regarding Palestinian 
refugees.72 There seem to be two guiding principles of the iuab League \vit..~ regard 
to the PalestLnians. First, there is a great deal of Arab solidarity with and sympathy 
for the Palestipians and the whole question of Palestine, in other words seeing the 
Palestir.ian reftlgees as their fellow brothers.73 Secondly, the members of the Nab 
League regard t..h.e preservation of Palestinian identity as essential (with the 
.. r'T 1 ) T1 .. .. I" .. ,... _ ,. ,. ,. ,. 1 
exceptIOn 01 Joraan. illS preservatlon or mentIty seems to oe tnougnt to oe tne one 
'SS"P that n"ll ll"'k'e s"re that the Patestl·m·ars arp not 'gnorea' ThUS thP,r l·dent'hT 
.... \,.I."" ............ .... v, ........ .l. .l..l.UJ: "- ......... .. .I..... .L .I. "'.l. .L '-'.L .... .L .I..I..L .. .1..1. ., .... .I..I._..LL .I. ....... J 
has been preserved "so as to avoid providing Israel with an excuse to evade its 
·b·'· -h ,. .. ,.,. .,.,74 responsl lllty lor tnelr pngnt . 
The Arab League has tried through valious resolutions alId agreements to ensure 
some sort of mipimum sta.lldards of treatment for the PalestiPians within the various 
Arab states. However, these resolutions and agreements seem to be more of good 
.. ,.,. ·11 r p" .... ..,. ,.,. ..,. ,. ,... 1 
mtent ana gooa Wlll, as treatment OI ~ alestIma.lls IS largelY aetermmea oy pontIcal 
72 As well as the important Casablanca Agreement in 1965 
;3 Opinions on this vary. See Chapter FOUL 
;4 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 133 
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conditions and policies towards the refugees within each host state, and this can 
differ from being extremely accommodating, meeting the conditions of the 1951 
Convention for example, to the extreme opposite. Treatment of the Palesthrrians 
depends on political conditions within the host C01Ultry and t.heir policies as well as 
the relationship between the goVeI11ments in question vis-a.-vis the Palestinian 
rerJ.gees a..Tld also the PLO. Policies towards Palestir.ia..Tl rerJ.gees may also differ 
between refugees living in refugee camps a..l1d those who do not. 
Ta..k..kenberg points out that a possible explanation of why the AJab League has been 
unable to create a well-defmed legal status for Palestine refugees in Arab states 
could be due to the attitude of the Palestir.ia..Tl leadersr.ip itself (PLO) vis-a.-vis the 
Palestinian refugees. 
For many years t.~e PLO was reluctfult to see individual Palestinians recognised 
as refugees. The PLO has on some occasions explicitly given instructions to 
Palestinifuls residi,"1g in Western states not to apply for refugee status. On at 
least one occasion, the PLO explicitly requested UNHCR not to resettle 
Palesti,"1ian refugees in Western countries. Formally granting refugee status 
would i,l1ply individual rather than a collective approach. In the vie-tV of the PLO 
a solution to the Palestine question should notfoeus on the individual refugees. 
but rather on the Palestinian people as a whole .... Only in the early 1980's does 
the PLO appear to have come to the conclusion that these two approaches are 
not necessfu-ily contradictory, but they may verj well complement each other. 75 
As with intemational law, Arab League laws a..nd agreements are not fully binding. 
Members do not have to ratify the agreements and refugee status and rights come 
under domestic jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the regional legal fra..'1lework is userJ.I for 
its contextual backgrOlUld. 
75 TUb T .~ '34 aKKen erg, Lex op. ClL., p. 1 
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Arab League Arrangements Relating to Palestinian Refugees 
The Arab League was founded hi Cairo, on March 22nd 1945.76 It was the first 
regional organisation to come into existence following World War Two, even before 
the lJN. Nevertheless, it did account for the future existence of the lJN, and 
incorporated tIlis witllin several provisions. The League is considered a regional 
77 
a..rrangement and has a 'permanent observer' in the lJN as well as numerous 
agreements \vith the specialised agencies within the UN. 78 p~rticle 1 of the Cha..rter of 
the League of Arab States 79 opens with the notion that every independent Arab state 
has a right to join. There is a special anliex regarding Palestine, which says that 
Palestine, although not an independent Arab country, may have one representative 
anvwav .
80 These renresentatives tended to be annointed on an ad hoc basis. Li 1964 
.,J.J.... .....J.. 
t.~e Arab League supported the formation of the PLO, which soon thereafter, m 
1974, became the representative for Palestine, in the sa..rne year that the PLO was 
76 The members states include, here in the order in which they joined; Egypt (1945 Founding 
Member, was temporarily suspended following Camp David from 1979-1990); Iraq (1945 Founding 
Member); Jordan (1945 Founding Member); Lebanon (1945 Founding Member); Palestii1e (1945 
Founding Member-see below for details); Saudi Arabia (1945 Founding Member); Syria (1945 
Founding Member); Yemen (1945 Founditlg Member as the former Yemen Arab Republic; Yemen's 
People's Democratic Republic joiiled in 1968); Libya (1953); Sudan (1956); Morocco (1958); Tlmisia 
(1958); Kuwait (1961); Algeria (1962); Ba.'1rain (1971); Oman (1971); Qatar (1971); United Arab 
Emirates (1971); Maurita..ia (1973); Somalia (1974); Djibouti (1977); 
77 For example, ifthere is a regional conflict the relationship between the UN and the League is such 
that it relies on Articles 33, 34, 35 and 52 of the UN Charter. For instance, article 33 refers to the 
pa.-ties seeking help and a solution through a regional a.,angement and a.-ticle 52 similarly refers to 
the parties first seeking help in a regional a.,angement before going to the tJN. This does not mean, 
however, that the UN may not intervene at all as the same article 52 allows the Security COUt"1cil to 
investigate as well. For more information on this as well as examples of regional conflicts see 
Hassouna, Hussein The League of A..ab States and Regional Disputes (Oceana Publications, New 
York, 1975) . 
78 Agreements with for example UNESCO, fLO, WrfO. Another important treaty between the Arab 
League and the UN is that Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950. This treaty is 
important in that it allowed the League to qualifY as a regional aiTangement within the UN. 
79 Available on www.arableagueonline.org 
80 The Charter oftbe League of Arab States; .Ann.ex on Palestine: which states .. . "Even though the 
outward signs of [Palestine's] independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure, it is 
not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League 
." Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's 
special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to 
pa.-ticipate in its work Utltil this country enjoys actual independence" 
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granted observer status in the l.i'N. However, as of 1988 when the PLO declared 
upilateral statehood, Palestine has been a full member of the Arab League, with 
Yassir Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, acting as Palestine's President. As we shall 
see, Palestinian refugees have always been a maL11 concern of the Arab League, 
although the extent to wpich the League is capable of enforcing its resolutions and 
agreements on t!:lis issue are at best debatable. 
There was no detailed action ta..ken by t..he League regarding criteria and procedures 
for the issue of travel docu.rnents for the refugees until 1954, when they issued the 
League Council Resolution 714 on the 'Issue of Unified Travel Docu.'1lents for 
Palestinifu'1 Refugees' Y Tl-...l.s is of extreme importfu'1ce as the majority of 
Palestinians, as we have seen above in the section on International Law, are 
regarded as stateless. The resolution stipulates that the member states of the League 
have agreed that they will issue Palestinia..11 refugees living in t..heir territory with 
temporary travel docu.rnents upon their request, providi.llg the Palesti.11ian refugee 
had not already been gra..11ted citizenspip from another country. '\lith regard to the 
A_.rab states, this included Palestinian refugees in Jordan who had been given 
citizenship. However, as seen above with the international agreements, Brand points 
out that "[i]n all cases, Arab League decisions were nonbinding and, therefore 
largely ignored. No cOlmtry wanted to be perceived as accepting the status quo and 
no country but Jordan had any desire to lay the ground work for permanent 
incorporation of the Palestirians".82 Despite the desire of the League to provide 
lmifol111 identity papers and travel documents for the refugees, this has not 
happened: to reiterate, the refugees come under domestic ju.risdiction. 
8i Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., (Appendix 3) 
82 Brand, Laurie Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1988) p. 26 
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One of the most important agreements made by the Arab League is the Casablanca 
Protocol of 1965. It was an attempt to develop a.l1d strengthen the regional regime 
for Palestinian re:fhgees. Ta..1d<.enberg states that "although it contains orJy 5 articles, 
the Casablanca Protocol has been the clearest manifestation of the intent of Arab 
• 1 f. 1 . f P ,. . ~ ., 83"-,, C 1 1 states to provlUe ~or tile treatment o· alestlman re.mgees. 1 ne asaOla.l1Ca 
Protocol does not explicitly ma..l(e reference to Palestinian refhgees, instead using the 
telID 'treatment of Palestinians'. TIns could be for a variety of reasons. However, the 
most obvious one is that the legal status, as well as the social conditions, of 
Palestinian refugees is as close to the legal status of non-refugees (as referred to 
above, only 1948 refugees are considered refugees, whereas 1967 refugees and all 
,1 ) A ,. 1 t . , , {' t' t . rtar t " omers are not. s tms aocumen. IS regaraea as one or .ne mos lIDpO . 11· maae oy 
the Arab League conCelT' .. i.11g Palestinia..l1 refugees, it merits a closer look. 
A..rticle 1 envisions 'National Treatment' of the Palesti1nan renlgees with regard to 
economic activity. This means that PalestiPian refugees are not supposed to be 
discri .. T..mated against or even treated differently from nationals, when it comes to 
obtaining jobs. With reference to t.his A..rticle 1, Ta.kkenberg points out the 
interesting fact that with regard to this issue of economic activity, the Casablanca 
Protocol is even more generous than the 1951 Convention. Many Arab countries 
have complied with tlns, not only because of signature, but also because they have 
.c: d 1 .. ....... 1 •• .. ,. 1 1 l"" h " d _," 1 _ 1 10un navmg ralestlmans m theIr laOour mrce .as nelpe tnelr marKets ana 
economic life. This, however, varies from country to country and according to the 
political situations within the countries, and to cha.nges in these. 
83 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 141 
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Article 2 of the Casablanca Protocol IS rather slll1ilar to the UDh'R article 13, 
paragraph 2: "Palestinians residing at the moment ill [whatever Arab country] in 
accordance with the dictates of their interests, have the right to leave a..'1d retu ... rn to 
this state".84 On the other hfuld, UDHR fu4:icle 13 states "Everyone has the right to 
leave any country, iilcluding his OvvTI, and to return to his country".85 This Article 
has been rather more difficult to Lrnplement as movement in aIld out of other 
countries is subject to intemal inlll1igration laws which vary from country to 
country. 
Article 3 grants PalestLnians movement tlll·oughout the member states of the Arab 
League. However, the right to reside in a.l1Y Arab League COll...l1try is rather more 
difficult than that4 Similar reasons to those above m~~e this article difficult to 
implement fully, because the right to reside in any of the Arab League countries 
depends upon the internal L.TfI.migration policies of the various host states, wpich can 
contradict each other, as well as this article in the Casablanca Protocol. Tak.~enberg 
calls this article "Good ll1tent rather than as a hard C0l111nitment on part of most 
b tt ,,86 mem er sa es . 
The last two articles, articles 4 and 5, deal with travel documents for Palestlluans. 
Article 4 obliges the member states of the League to give travel docmnents to 
Palestirians residing in their country. The "country offrrst refuge remains prl.u.?Jla..riiy 
84 Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinian Refugees (Casablanca Protocol) Aiticle 2 - unofficial 
translation. Available at www.badil.org 
85 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13 
86 Taki<enberg, Lex op. cit., p. 142 
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responsible for the issue mid extension of travel docllilients" _ 87 This is where there 
seems to be ratt~er a big difference between the Casablfulca Protocol fuld other 
international agreements relating to refugees, this tLl1le the 1951 Convention_ "V.illile 
the 1951 Convention provides for the transfer of responsibility in respect of the 
issue and renewal of travel docll.TIlents, the CasablaIlca Protocol leaves this 
-b- l - - 1-. h - - 1 h - ,,88 responsl hlty WItt.1 t.1 e ongma.1 .1 ost countnes _ 
Aliicle 5 similarly relates to travel, but with respect to equal treatment for 
Palestipians and other Arab League nationals when it come to visas and residency_ 
This has always been a rather ambiguous a...rticle. However, it was cla...ti.fied in 
December 1982 by a resolution made by the League_ It states that 
Bearers of L'1ese travel doclh"11ents residhlg in LAS states receive the same 
treatment as all other LAS state citizens, regarding visa, and residency 
applications_ 89 
This is not the case in Lebanon, for Lllstance, even where the refugees have been 
able to obtain travei documents_ The intention of the Casablanca Protocol may be 
uTell 'Om a' gooa' b"t hAW b,ndl-ng 's ,t? it UTas accepted h y ma'o,,;ty a'pc's'on of thP "l' ........ (Ai..... ., ..... " ........ v ..L..L.J...l. .J.. .1.-"' ....... 11. "'f ~ l.J..L:J .L.A.'" ""'.l..l..l. ""-.I.V 
Council and is thus only binding if the member states accept it_ Acceptance can be 
in full, or with reservations_ OPJy seven states, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, 
Egypt and Yemen (the first two of which are major host states), accepted a...'1d 
ratified the Protocol in full without reservations_ Kuwait, Libya and Lebanon have 
ratified the Casablanca Protocol with reservations_ Saudi Arabia and Morocco did 
not ratify the Protocol. All ot.her members of the Arab League joined after the 
87 Ib·d lA" 1 1 . p. ..,..j 
88 Ibid. P. 143 
89 The Casablanca Protocol (Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinian Refugees) article 5, 
Casablanca, 11 September 1965. Unofficial translation taken from badil.org 
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Casablanca Proto.col was signed. Unfolilmately, whether the Casablanca Protocol 
has been ratified or not, corrrrnitment to the PalestiPian refugees with regard to the 
issues taken up by the protocol has not been consistent for all the member states 
who signed it. In Lebanon, for example, the protocol has never been fully 
., t' Implemen.ea. 
Palestinian legal status as understood by the Arab league became complicated after 
the 1967 War when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This war 
caused a huge displacement a..'IlOng many Palesti..'1ians. Palestinians 
lost their rigJlt to reside there as this was only granted by the occupying 
authorities to t..1:iose present dur.ng a census carried out shortly after the 
suspension of hostilities. Displaced Palestinians from Gaza, a.ld especially those 
who either as students or workers found themselves in the Gulf States, were 
beginning to face problems with the Egyptian authorities in having their travel 
docllillents renewed or reissued. As Palestinians in possession of Jorda.lia.l 
national passports were not facing similar problems, a nllillber of ex-Gaza.lS 
requested the Jorda.lia.l authorities to provide them with a Jordanian document 
instead. In response, the Jordanian authorities sta.-ted to issue temporary 
Jorda.lia.l passports, valid for one year, to those Palestinia.ls who had lost 
residency iil Gaza a.ld who were in possession of a valid employment contract 
in an Arab country.90 
However, the Palestinian refugees in the various host countries continue( d) to face 
difficulties in getting a clear legal status with regard to employment, and with regard 
to renewing travel docu..'Ilents and ill cards. The PLO decided to raise the matter of 
Palestinians who had problems with their legal status with the Arab League. A series 
of bilateral agreements were made between the various host COll.Tltnes and the PLO, 
tr.rough the Arab League. For exa..'Ilple, the Cairo Agreement of 1969 between the 
PLO and Lebanon had important consequences for Palestinian refugees in the 
COU.lltry. 
90 Ta.1c1<:enberg, Lex op. cit., p. 145 
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It was realised that implementation of t.he Casablanca Protocol needed to be 
carefully watched. To this end, Arab League representatives travelled to various 
signatory states of the Protocol to see what progress was being made, and what 
could be done better. Unfortunately this was very slow due to several delays and the 
A.rab League could not directly enforce the various issues regarding the Palestinian 
refhgees under the Casablanca Protocol. In the follovving years concerns have been 
raised by the League over treatment of the Palestinians. However, again the League 
is largely unable to do much about it. Other declarations have been made by the 
Arab League concerning refugees and displacement h'l the Arab world in general, 
within which there are usually ~rticles referring to the implementation of the clauses 
in the Casabia.l1ca Protocol relating to the treatment ofrefugees.9i 
The PLO decision to support Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 had severe 
-f4 ~,. ...o ..... ..,.. f . 1 Ar 1 ,. 92 'T"1 
consequences ..:or ralestIrnan relatlOns VIs-a-VIS many 0 - tne ao nost states. lne 
PLO decision to back Iraq caused Arab support for them dwindle, and they had to 
start to rely on themselves. It can be argued that it was because of tins realisation of 
dwindled support, both psychologicaHy and fInancially, that t.he PLO agreed to enter 
negotiations with the State of Israel. However, apart from tris, an important 
resolution was passed on 12 September 1991. The relevant passage is paragraph 7 
wpich concerns the treatment of Palestinians in Arab States. It states that: 
Having taken notice of the memora.."ldUnl presented by the delegation of 
Palesfille, the Conference expresses t.~e hope that all A..ab states, in spi.-it of 
brotherhood and solida..-it-j, will seek to abide by the Protocol Relating to the 
91 See for example Elmadmad, Khaduja "An Arab Declaration on the Protection of Refllgees and 
displaced Persons in the Arab World: Report on tt'le Cairo Seminar, 19 November 1992" Journal of 
Refugee St-lldies (Vol. 27,1993) 
92 For an analysis on the motivations of the PLO ~md the consequences of their support ofIraq see 
Khalidi, Rashid "The Palesftllians and the Gulf Crisis" Current History (VoL 90, No. 55, January 
1991) 
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Treatment of Palestinians fin accordance with the rules and laws in force in 
each stateJ93, and calls upo~ Arab states to overcome L1.e negative hllpact of the 
Gulf crisis, as regards the implementation of this Protocol h. respect of the 
Palestinian people.94 
Commentary on the meaning of this paragraph differs. Takkenberg argues that this 
resolution does not cha.llge the meaP111g and importance of the Casablanca Protocol. 
Tl-is seems to be a recommendation and the Casablallca Protocol an international 
agreement. Therefore TCLkkenberg understCLllds the Casablanca Protocol still to be 
valid. Shibla.1(, on the other hand, understands tJ,is resolution to be such that it 
revokes the CasablCLllca Protocol, which, according to tins resolution, has been 
superseded by the internal laws and policies regarding Palestinians in the various 
host states. He puts it very clearly when he says 
For some time, the Arab states on an individual basis had been annulling by 
ad..llinistrative decree the rights accorded the Palestinians under the Casablanca 
Protocol; after the Gulf War, this trend culminated in the adoption by the host 
countries of the Arab League Resolution 5093 officially revoking the protocol, 
which has been superseded by the intemallaws of each host state. 95 
No matter how one interprets t.his resolution, events of tile past show (as was 
• _~f: 1 1 t' ", f ) t' t t' " 1 1 P t 1 1 t "th ,. 1 f rem.:lOrcea oy ne \Jut.: war ,na ne l.....-aSaOla.llca rO.ocol nas no naa .. e KIna 0 
strong influence that had been envisioned in terms of having a positive impact on 
the life of many of the Palestinians in the various host countries. Most Palestilnan 
refugees, especially the ones who reside in Leba.llon, still live in precarious 
conditions. 
93 Addition made by the Arab League Council. 
94 League of Arab States Resolution 5093 of 12th September 1991; taken from Takkenberg, Lex op. 
cit., p. 149 
95 Shiblak, Abbas "Residency Statlis and Civil rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries" 
Journal ofPalesfille Studies (xxv, No.3, Spr'illg 1996) p. 42 
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Laws and regulations regarding Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
U!1Jike the Jordwians, who had a govel11ment policy of integrating Palestinian 
refugees into their society, the Lebanese have done their best to prevent any sorts of 
integration Of' Palestinian rp.c:.ugees into their cOllntry Thp Dirpctorate General of 
..1...1..1.... ..I.. I,....I...l..l...L ..I.. t,...l..I...L1...L.1. ..l. ..... 1~ .L.l..l.'" \'.l..L.l. """-.I..l....L .l..L...... .l..l.V"..L '" ..L..L .I. .I. 
Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPR.A) within the Mi!1istry of Interior is responsible 
i' f' P'" . L 1 96 W1 f' Pl" . l' T 1 • lOr .ne ~ ruestlmans ill eoanon. nen me a.estlma.'ls a.rnvea ill Leoanon ill 
1947-48, they constituted approximately 10% of the population. Since their arrival, 
the Lebanese goverrl.tnent has viewed them as a threat to the balance between 
Christians and Musli..'lls i..'1 the country. In the 1950s and early 1960s the Lebanese 
govel11ment did give citizensbip to a large segment of the Christian Palestinian 
l' • L 1 97 'T'1' h 1 l' h 1"> 1 •• l' h pOpUlatIOn ill eoa.'lon. 1 ms as resUltea ill Le ralestimans oeillg seen as a t rreat 
to both the political and social balance in the cOlmtry. Their situation has been often 
described as precalious. 
Legal Status: Foreigners, ID Papers alld Travel Documents: 
Regarding the legal status of the PaiestiDian refugees, they are subject to the sanle 
legal status as other foreigners. However, as win be discussed shortly, from 1969 
to 1987 the Palestinians were regulated by the Cairo Agreement. Decree number 319 
from 1960 is the general guide to foreigners in Leba.llon: 
96 On 31 March 1959, Decree No 42 was issued which established the Palestinian Refugees 
Department within the Lebanese Mhlistry of Interior. Kassim, Allis 2000 op. cit., p. 215 
97 Maktabi, Rania op. cit., p. 156 Also in Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 23 and p. 33. 
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Les non -Libanais se trouvant au Liban doivent regler leur situation en ce qui 
concerne leur residence. Ils rentrent dans w.e des Ch'q categories suivants: (1) 
Etrangers residents en vertu de visa de transit ou de sejour provisoire appose sur 
leur passeport; (2) Etrangers detenteurs de passeports, residents en vertu de 
cat-tes de residence pour w.e duree determinee et non delivrees par Ie Ministere 
des Affaires Etrangeres et des Emigres ou par la Direction de la Sfrrete generale 
'sur base de leurs passeports; (3) Etrangers non detenteurs de papiers d'identite 
de leurs pays d'origine et residents au Liban en vertu de cartes de residence 
delivrees par la Direction de laSurete generale ou de cartes d'identite delivrees 
par fa Direction generale de l'Administration des Alfaires des refugies 
palestiniens au Liban,,98 (4) Etrangers dont l'entree au Libfu. est autorisee sur 
presentation de leurs seules cartes d'identite et sejournant dans Ie pays en vertu 
de Cfu-tes de residence temporaires ou permanentes; (5) Etrangers detenteurs de 
pieces d'identite de leurs pays d'origine ou d'organisation dont iis dependent et 
Qui resident au Libfu. en veITu de docurnents proviso ires veses par les Services 
de la Sfrrete generale.99 • • 
Article three is releva.llt to Palestinian refugees as they do not carry identity papers 
from their cOli.Tltry of origin and are, therefore, considered foreigners, a.Tld need to 
apply to the Directorate of the Affairs of Palestinian Refugees. 
From a.rticle four we can see t.h.at Palestinians were urged to settle their legal status 
and obtain temporary or permanent residents permits. This article does provide for 
"the issuance of special Palestinian rerJgee identity cards which provide the holder 
legally, there are ott~ers, such as those who are not registered witt~ UNRWA or are 
1967 refugees, who are not legal residents. Although these identity and travel cards 
help the situation of the refugees by allowi~lg them to travel, they still remain 
stateless. 
98 As this is the inlportant point with reference to Palestinian refugees the translation is "Foreigners 
who do not have documentation from their cOwltry of origitl, and who live itl Lebanon (by virtue/on 
the basis) of resident cards issued by the Directorate ofSfrrete Generale, or identity cards issued by 
u'le Directorate of the Department of the Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon". This decree 
can be found in Takkenberg, Lex The Status of Refugees it. International Law as well as Said, Wadie 
"The Obligations of Host COwltries to Refugees Under Llternational Law: The Case of Lebfulon" itl 
Aruri, Naseer ed Palestinian Refugees: The Right ofRetum (Pluto Press, London) 2001 
99 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 163 (emphasis added: taken from IJNHCR Centre for DOCwllentation 
on Refugees) 
100 Said, -Wadie op. cit., p. 136 
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As tmderstood by the above only Palestinians who c~me to Lebanon during or 
iIP~TIlediately after the 1948 War are considered legal residents in Lebanon. Ll1 other 
words, this includes those who either registered with UNRWA or those who 
managed to obtain Lebanese citizenship. There are two other categories of refugees 
who are not considered legal residents in Lebanon. These two categories are 
"rerJgees who arrived in Lebanon from second or third countries ... t"bjs category 
includes those not registered with UNRWA, even thoug.h. they may benefit from 
lJNRW A services ... The [ other] category covers the 1967 reftlgees who are not 
registered \V1'th UJNTDTITA" 101 Thosp \>Tho CaI1'YIP later ha\Te bpen .l.l..l..l. .J.. ~.r\.. V\ • ...L.l..l. "'" iV.J..L .l..l.V.L ".J...l. ...., .1..1.. derjed legal 
residency. 
Property, Employment, Social Security, and Health. 
Even those Palesti11ian refugees who are considered legal residents are considered 
foreigners. Tpis has a range of implications with regard to property, employment, 
soc'al secllMty ard health care Pa1pst,n'ar rpt'ngeps res,A'ng 'n Lebaron are not .I. .I. Y-l..l.l. .1..1..1...1. .1..1. • ..L .1.'-" ~.L.L ..I. ..L""'..L\,.4. '" .I. .l.'-A.-.l. .1..1. .1..1. .1..1. 
allowed to acquire immovable property without presidential consent, which is not 
easily obtained. SLTPilarly, following the Civil War, lTh"'RWA and the Palestipian 
rerJgees were not allowed to rebuild the ca...'1lpS that were destroyed. The refugees 
displaced from destroyed camps, either moved into other canlps where space 
• 1 d . 1 '1 l' 1 1 11.,~ C" 1 perrmttea, or squatte In empty ouumngs arOUlla tne cOll.l1try. lvlOS! remgees nave 
101 Zureik, Elia op. cit., p. 33 
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now moved back into the already crowded refu.gee Cfu'1lpS. I 02 The right to work and 
employment in Lebanon is also very difficult. 
The right to work in Lebanon is regulated by the Labour Law of 1962. This law 
sets out t..~e pru.ciple that a foreigner is allowed to work in Lebanon provided 
(a) his country allows Lebanese to work in that c01mtry, and (b) he obtains in 
advance a work permit. 103 
Regarding point (a), Palestinians in Lebanon are unable to practice any of the legal 
getting a work pennit is extremely difficult for PalestiDian refugees considering that 
, T' , . ,,,,. (', . . 105 ... f. ' . h tne ~eoanese govefIl..ment nas Issuea a 11St or aoout SIxty actlvItIes ~or wmc. 
work pennits were not to be issued to foreign workers. The list excluded virtually all 
memai jobS".106 Thus, with work permits from the Ministry of Nationai Economy 
being difficult or almost impossible to obtain, many Palestiniail refugees are forced 
into working illegally. Brynen sees the situation as such: the Palestipian refugees in 
Lebanon were 
routinely denied documentation necessary for legal employment in the country. 
In 1969, only 3,362 of the tens of thousands ofPalestinia... workers in Lebanon 
had legal work permits. SitJ.1ilarly, many Palesflliian professionals were 
prohibited from working, or were forced to do so under restrictive 
circumstances. Palestit.ia... teachers, for example, required an annual license 
from the Lebanese Ministry of Labour and Social Affait-s if they wished to work 
102 This issue will be examined later on. However suffice to say at the moment, following the civil 
war there were many displaced people. Bot..~ Palestinian and Lebanese. There is now a Minister of 
li'1e Displaced that deals with these issues. Regarding the Palestinian displaced there was the 
(in)famous Qurai'a project envisioned by Walid 10umblatt, then Minister of the Displaced, to build 
new houses for the refugees, however this never flourished and most refugees have now had to move 
from the abandoned builditlgs in li'1e cities into the refugee camps, as the Lebanese authorities are 
dealing with the reparation of a post-civil war country. 
103 Kassirn, Anis Fop. cit., p. 215 
104 At this poit.t it should be noted that wit..~in intemationallaw, A.-ticle 7 (ii) of the Refugee 
Convention, it says: "After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from 
legislative reciprocity it. the tell~tory of the Contractit.g States" 
105 The' exact number of professions was hard to obtain. From my interviews they ranged within the 
seventies. Haddad sites 'more than 72'. Haddad, Simon "The Palestit.ian Predicament in Lebanon" 
Middle East Ouarterly (VoL 7, No.3, September 2000) p. 27. The Lebanese law restricts the practice 
of professions such as medicine, engineering, law, to Lebanese citizens. Non-Lebanese must obtain 
work permits for construction, agriculture and sanitation. 
106 Kassitl1, Allis Fop. cit., p. 216 
1'1{) 
J.JV 
in. the private sector. Private schools were limited to a maximum of two 'foreign' 
(including Palestinian) teachers. Under regulations issued by 1:t1.e Lebanese 
Miilistry of Education, mrulY Palestinian teachers were prohibited from teachi,lg 
in the social sciences or other politically sensitive SUbjects. Political activity was 
expressly prohibited, and teachers hired by UNRWA required advance 
clearance from the Deuxieme Bureau (Lebrulese Militruy Intelligence). Such 
legal statLls reflected and reinforced the adverse economic StatLlS of the 
Palesti,lians in Lebanon. l07 
Not only have the Palestinians in Lebanon been in a precarious situation vis-a.-vis 
the state, but th.ey have also, since "LlJe early 1970s, been affected by va..rious 
"onfl1cts 'n thp co"ntry H1fst;n i 97' the iSrael;s st<lrtpd to attack ref11 gee "amps l'n v J...l..l..l. '- .1..1. " .... V 'I.4.1-.l.'-.l. • ..L.l. ... .l...L.l..l. .... ., l,...l..l. ..L.l. .1..1. '-U..i. "'_ .l. .l..l.u. V .L.l._ .1..1. 
Lebanon, apparently as retaliatory measures for various raids made by Palestinian 
com..rnandos from Lebanon iP .. to Israel. The Leba..llese Civil War that lasted from 
1976 to 1991 resulted in enOlTI10US human suffering and displacement for the 
Palestipian refugees as well as many Lebanese. The attacks on Sabra and Shatila in 
. 98' ' 108 1 "'"' are an exa..'Ilple. 
If we move back to 1969, the situation for Palestinjan refugees changed to a small 
degree. The Cairo Agreement between the PLO and Lebanon was signed on 3 
N h 1 969 109 T • Pl" . T h h' gh , .l. lovemver .L • It was meant to gIve ..L a.l.estlr'.Jans In Levanon t.L.Le n ... t to worK, 
the right of residence and movement in Lebanon, and especially interestingly, the 
right to ta..1(e pa..rt in the Palestinian revolution. Under the Cairo Agreement the PLO 
was able to gain compete control of the then fifteen refugee ca.'IlpS in Lebanon. The 
PLO was also allowed to engage in guelTilla attacks against Israel from South 
Leba..rlOn, toget.lJer with the Lebanese a..lTIly. However, apart from the PLO's control 
107 Brynen, Rex SanctuarY and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) p. 
25-27 
108 This will be looked at in more detail within the Chapter Four. 
109 The Cairo Agreement was a result of bilateral contacts mediated through the Arab League. 
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over the camps, life in tenns of residency and work did not change too much for the 
Palestinian refugees. Tne Civil War that started in 1975 had severe consequences for 
the refugees in terms of hu..'1lan life and suffering as well as general conditions (in 
tenns of living standards and Palestinian refugee/pLO relations vis-a.-vis i-he 
T , 1) T M 1 A87 th T , C" I'D t· ., t 11 Leoanese goverP.men~ . In ~ lay 1 ':J ~~e Leoanese n~rnoer or I epu les urma.erallY 
abrogated the Cairo Agreement \vith President Gemayel officially confirming tbis 
abrogation a month later. 110 
Even during the 'life' of the Cairo Agreement, after the Israeli invasion in 1982, the 
Palestinians in Leb~l1on fO~l1d it difficult to renew their travel documents. UNRWA 
intervened several times on their behalf (through protests and representations to the 
t) tu 11 t' , , , , ',' t " 1 governmen· ; even lallY .ne proolems were sOlvea, ana~ne ravel aoc~rnen~s were 
again issued, a..'1d t"bis ti..'1le extended for one year at a ti..'1le. 
In September, 1995, the Lebanese govem.ment decided to tighten the measures again 
regarding Palestini~l1s wanting to travel. Tne Lebanese govemmerrt managed to 
Prevent Pa]pst;nn·ars "nth T eharpse rps;dency from rehurrn;ng to the "o"ntry "nt'nr.llt _.I. .I. .l.V ".1..1. .I. V'i.l.L..L..L.L...J V.l.V ..I..V.1. ..1..1.... .1..1...1. ...I..L.I...L'" \..1..1. V '-LL..I. ... .1. V'f..L ..LV\,.4.L 
obtaining fe-entry visas. This new policy was issued by the then Minister of Interior, 
Michel El-M~rr. The background to this confusion was Colonel Gadhafi's message 
tr. the 1"\Pop1e ;nvolved ;n the TsraeLPalest;ne Peace Process "Then he arnOllnCPrl the v .I...L !-''''"'' _.I. .L.I..I..1. .1..1. "'.1..1. ..L..L ..L..&. .I. 1I..L.I..l...L ..L.I. , \o"V.I..1. .1..1..1..1. ..L.L.l. \,..I..L.I. V"-'- '-.1..1. 
deportation of all foreigners from his COlilltry. The Palestinians were unable to enter 
the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, and thereby pis message that the Israel-Palestine 
110 The Cairo Agreement was nullified by the 'Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of 
Deputies, 21 May 1987', where it states in article two; 'The agreement signed on 3 November 1969 
betl¥een t.l}e head of me Leba.Tlese delegation General Emile Bustani a.Tld the Chairman of the PLO 
and which is know as the 'Cairo Agreement' is hereby null and void as if it had never existed. 
Further, all armexes a.Tld measures related to the Cairo Agreement are hereby null and void as if they 
had never existed'. Taken from Appendix in Brynen, Rex 1990 op. cit., 
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Peace Process was a hoax was 'proved'. However, this had enormous consequences 
for the refugees: ail PalestiPians who usually resided in LebaIlon and were outside 
the country were lL.'1able to retu ... '1l, urJess they had already received tltis re-entry 
visa. Palestinians who then wanted to leave Lebanon had to first obtain their exit -
re-entry visa before they could leave, in case they fOlLTld themselves unable to 
return. This ruling was overturned in 1999. Iii 
Conclusion 
Palestinia..n refugees residing in Lebanon lack adequate intemational protection. 
They are not protected by the lJN"':..fCR because of the creation of lJNRW A. The 
time-line on the Refhgee Convention makes tltis convention inapplicable. UNRWA 
is mainly concerned with elements of relief a..nd 'works'. Issues such as right of 
retmn and compensation are covered by various General Assembly Resolutions. 
Ho\vever., these are considered non-binding. The issues of right of return and 
compensation have been drafted as final-status issues that are to be negotiated when 
and if the time comes within the Peace Process. The Arab League has tried to fill 
certain loopholes within the international law defir..itions of refugees. They created 
the Casablanca Protocol to provide for adequate treatment of Palestillian refugees. 
However it too is non-binding. Many of the provisions and agreements envisioned 
by the Arab league have not been implemented as many of the issues are dictated by 
domestic circumstances. The situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is an 
exa.lTIple of domestic circumstances which have led to an inadequate legal status for 
111 Haddad, Simon op. cit., 
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the refugees. In the case of Lebanon, Palestinian refugees remain in effect stateless 
and do not have basic civil a.lld huma.ll rights. They have difficulty acquiring travel 
docu..'1lents. They lack access to employment, health and social services alld car,not 
own property. All in all, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon lack adequate legal 
status, intemationaliy, regionally and 10caHy. T.bis lack of adequate legal status 
leaves the Palestir.ian refugees, pa.rticularly in Lebanon, in an extremely precarious 
situation. This context is important as it has a bealing upon why Palestinian refugees 
would choose to mobilise or not. As I emphasised earlier, an uncertain present and 
fiftuTe for Palestirian reftlgees has an effect on hO\\l the rerJgee define their 
sUITOlU1dings alld their identity. 
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Chanter Four 
,......,.. H O to" C -f P" to ° R.f ° T .. 1 ne .IS oneal ontext o •• ales Inlan • e.ugees In Lle03non 
Introduction 
The histOlical framework is part of the context within which the Palestinians in 
Leba.T1on find themselves. The history of the Palestinian refugees, starting in 1948, 
defmes their refhgee status, is pa..rt of their recent national narratives, and is pa..rt of 
their identity. 
The flrst part of this chapter will focus on why the Palestinians left Palestine. Was. it 
by force or voluntary? Tpis is important for understanding the concept of the 'self' 
and the' other', as well as of responsibility. The first section will explain the various 
myths surrounding the exodus. The second section will look at the rise of the 
Palestinian Resistance Movement prior to the 1967 \Var, the events su..rrounding the 
1967 War, and those of the September 1970 Civil War in Jordan. These two wars 
had an effect on the Palestipian Resista.T1ce Movement in terms of PLO bases in the 
Arab world, PLO policy and opinion, as well as physical movement yet agaLll of 
Palestipians. Tne third section will look at the history of the refugee camps III 
Lebanon. A brief account will be given of the major events that have affected the 
refugees. These events are signiflcant in that they raise a mmlber of questions about 
mobilisation in Leba.T1on. For exa.'11ple, how far was the PLO really defeated in 
1982, and does tl>,is defeat apply to the opposition groups as well? wnat events 
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during and after the civil war have had a significant bearing upon refugee 
mobilisation LT)to groups and why? Within the field work chapters we shall see how 
these events affected mobilisation and identity of Palestinian refhgees. The 
historical context shows that the Palestinjan refugees in Lebanon live in a precarious 
situation wbich has a bearing upon why they would choose to mobilise or not. 
aI-nakba: The 1948 War 
There are many different versions of the events leading to and followl_ng the creation 
of the state of Israel. Essentially whether any of these viewpoints are correct or not, 
does not really matter. What matters to the refugees is what they themselves (and 
their Lebanese hosts) believe to be true and it is this belief that helps them 
understand themselves, others, and their su..rroundings. 
Nevertheless, there are several accounts of these historical events: Israeli, 
Palestinian and Arab literature, as well as new revisionist Israeli literature. Tbis 
revisionist Israeli literature started in the late 1980s when Israeli and British archjves 
had passed their tbirty-year embargo and were opened to the public. What the 
rev
'
s
'
on' st h1st0r1<lnsi -t.o"na' n"th1n thPse arch1ves was pVl'rlenf'e that both the israp11 ~ .l..I..l..L.l.".L..L.L'" ..L.l.u..i.l. .J.. Y.I..l. VVi- ... ..L~.l. .l....L'" .1..1..1. '" U. .1...1."",, ... .1..1... .1..1. ... .1..1. .J...l. ""..L.1 
and ArablPalestinian histories of the events of 1948 were based on a series of 
,\,," 2 T"'l "t t h 1 1 .. .. .. t 1 .. .. t" .. ,.. l' m J ~ns. l' ~apan se. ..~e agenua wnen ne reuuceu .ne mS.onograpny or ':"'1e 
j The Israeli New Historians include most notably, nan Pappe, A vi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Simha 
Flapan, Tom Segev and Anita Shapira. 
2 It should be remembered that these works focus on Israel and other great powers such as Britain as 
the archival evidence is from these countries. 
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foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 to seven myths: that the Zionists accepted 
the lJN partition resolution and pia..rmed for peace; that the Arabs rejected the 
pa.rtition and launched the war~ that the Palestinians fled voluntarily intending 
reconquest; that the Arab states had muted to expel the Jews from Palestine; that the 
Arab invasion made war inevitable; that a defenceless Israel faced destruction by the 
Arab goliath~ a.'1d that Israel subsequently sought peace but no Arab leader 
responded".3 Sl'Jaim 4 has sho"\\-TI us that the war between Israei fu'1d the Arabs was 
not one of an Arab Goliath wid an Israeli David. FUl-'-thermore, he points out that L"'1e 
myth of Israel being ready for peace following the war, a..lld that none of the Arab 
leaders wanted peace, is untrue. Pappe5 has pointed out that the myth believed 
within Israel dIat Britain was against them building their own state is also untrlle. 
Morris6 argues that it is Israel who bears responsibility for the refugee problem. 
Some of the myths pointed out by the New Israeli Historians had already been 
refuted by other Arab and Palestipia.ll historians. The Palestinians in the refugee 
ca.1JlpS are very ada.1Jla.'1t when they tell us that they were forced out of their countf'j. 
Critical lustorians also exist on the Arab and Palestiluan side regarding the 1948 
3 Introduction ofRogllil, E and ShlaiiTI, A The War for Palestine: RewTiting the History' of 1948 
(Cllil1bridge University Press, Clli11bridge, 2002) p. 3 
4 Shlaim, Avi Collusion Across the Jordllil: King Abdullah. the Zionist Movement and the Partition 
of Pales title (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) Shlaitl1 also goes into details of Arab 'peace-feelers' at 
the LaUSlliille conference which he says that Israel ignored. See Shlaim, Avi The Iron Wall: Israeillild 
the Arab World (penguin Books, London 2000) as well as Shlaim, Avi "Husni Zaim llild the Plan to 
Resettle Refugees in Syria" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xi, No.4, 60, Summer 1986) For 
another sin1ilar view see Rabinovich, Itamar The Road not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991). 
5 Pappe, Ilan Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1948-51 (Macmillan, London, 1988) 
6 Moms, Benny The Bir..h of the RefLlgee Problem (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) 
as well as nmnerous articles on subsequent research involving various operations that point towards a 
'blueprint' regarding movement of Palestinians out of Palestine. He has recently changed his mind 
regarding some of these issues which will be addressed later on. 
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War. Although many of these works7 have been influential in "t~e Arab world, Walid 
Khalidi points out the main problems that arise from these are that they 
portray the Zionist forces as mere terrorist gangs which had been surrounded in 
all directions by the Arab armies in the fust phase of the war (15 May - 11 
Jw,e). The Egyptian vanguard had reached t.'le sout.'lern suburbs of Tel Aviv, 
the Iraqi advanced forces had come very close to the Mediterranean coast to the 
west of Qalqiliya a.."1d Tulkra..u, and the Jorda..,ia.., Arab Legion had reached the 
eastern suburbs of Tel Aviv. All that was needed was a few more days to deal 
the enemy the mortal blow which would decide the matter once and for all when 
international pressure escalated into threats and menaces and imposed the first 
truce on the At-abs. Thus the Zionist enemy snatched victory from the jaws of 
inevitable defeat.s 
There are certain parallels between the Arab and Israeli literature. Sela9 points to a 
focus on collective memory in Arab and official Israeli literature on the birth of the 
State of Israel. The problem that critical Arab historians have is their lack of 
material. They do not possess the same archival material, and where it may exist in 
other countries it is not open to the public. Hence the problem of pistoriography of 
the Palestine War. Bea..ring these problems in mind, the next pa..rt of this chapter will 
focus on the events of the 1948 War in relation to the refugee flow out of Palestine. 
7For instance Consta.."1tine Zurayq and Musa al-Alami, who wrote on t.'le nakba dudng the in1illediate 
years following the events of 1948. Among the more recent Arab literature regarding the nakba, are 
for instance Walid Kt'lalidi, Rashid Kt'lalidi, Nur Masalha and Issa Khalaf. 
8 Khalidi, Walid Fifty Years since the 1948 War, the First of the Arab-Israeli Wars Beirut, 1998, p. 
13-14, written in Arabic. Quoted in the "Introduction" in Rogan E and Shlaim, A "The War for 
Palestine: RewTiting the History of 1948" (Cambridge University Press, Cambddge, 2001) p. 4 
9 Sela, Avraham "Arab Historiography of the 1948 War: The Quest for Legitimacy" p. 125 in 
Silberstein, Laurence ed New Persnectives on Israeli Historv: The Early Years of the State (New 
York University Press, New York, 1991) 
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The Voluntary Exodus? 
The Paiestinian reiugee probiem was born oi war, not by design, Jewish or ArablO 
The quote above by Morris is controversial for Palestinians and Israelis. Israeli 
bistory emphasises that the Palestipia..ll exodus was a result of instructions given to 
them by Palestirian and Arab leaders. Israeli New Historians a..'1d .Arab Historians 
challenge tIllS my-th by pointing to mass expulsions, massacres and other atrocities 
cO:rIl..mitted by the Israelis du..ring the war. The major challenges that occur when 
looking into why the refugee flow in 1948 and 1949 happened are twofold: first the 
idea of ZiOlllSt transfer thinking that arose during the 1930s and 1940s and whether 
or not tbis idea of 'tra..llsfer' of Palestinia..lls out of Palestine was a..rticulated as a 
policy or not. The second issue is that if 'transfer' was not a policy, how widely held 
t" t' T ,. ~fj " /TD") TT , , l' T 1', " was ne VIew a..TIlong .ne Israen ue..:ence 1"' orce ~ 11 1"' , naga..llan ana ~ne lrgun .na. L 
happened anyway, or if indeed it happened at all. 
MO""';Sll s+""'ds o~ a i;~e betwee~ t-he v;ews 0+ schoi., .. S HThO hei;eve +ha+ o~ +he o~e ~.ll lU.H .H. l.ll.l L .1.1.1 1. .l.1.1.lUi. vv l.l U II L.1.l L, .1J. U.1 .1.1 -
hand there was a direct policy of expelling tI1.e Palestinians, and on the other hand, 
that there was not one. His work has cha.llged over the years, starting with The Birth 
of the Refi-tgee Problem, 1947-1949 (The Birth), various additions to The Birth 
fou..lld in journals and edited books, a..lld now there is The Birth Revisited. In tbis 
ne\v book Morris has added a chapter on transfer trir.u.1cing. However he does not 
iO Morris, Benny The Birth of the Palestinian refugee nroblem, 1947-1948 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1988) p. 286 
ii His relevant work is Morris, Benny 1988 op. cit., and "Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus" in 
Rogan, Eugene and ShlaLt'11, Avi The War for Palestine: Revisiting the Historv of 1948 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2002) as well as his latter additions to his new The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 
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seem to conclude that transfer thilLking has a dil'ect lilLk to what actually happened, 
although it seems to have had an impact. 
Monis in The Birth tells us that the refugee problem was an outcome of war. It was 
the outcome of shooting and bombing, and the fear that tbis engendered in the 
Palesti..'1ians. The refhgee problem was also an outcome of incompetent Palestirja.'1 
ieaders_hip.12 Although. originally MOLL~s points to the refugee flow being at'} 
outcome of the war, aiJd not of design, the evidence he points to even as early as in 
The Birth, shows otherwise. Morris revised The Birth after havLl1g had access to 
even more archival material which 
reh,force[d] L1.e version of events of those who would stress the Yishuv's ru,d 
Israel's pru-t in the propulsion of the Palestinian At-abs out of the areas that 
became the State of IsraeL rather than that of those who would reduce Israeli 
responsibility for what happened. 13 
How does Morris reach this conclusion? He looks at the nature of 'Transfer 
Tpinking' a.TIlongst the Ziopist leadersPip before the war, in the years between 1937 
and 1947. Morris stresses that Transfer Tr.jn..lcing "goes to the hea.rt of Ziorjsm and 
to the root of the Zionist-Arab conflict".14 For Morris the connection between 
Transfer Thinking and what actually happened in 1948 is only cOlliiected indirectly; 
12 Khalidi and Khalaf also point to Palestinian Society when looking at L1.e Palesth,ian defeat h' 1948. 
Khalaf points to w,even development within Palesti.,ian society ru,d class dimensions within 
Palestinian society. There was dish,tegration berween nlL-a1 and urban workers, landowners and 
peasants, a schism between rich and poor that made Palestinian society vu1nerable. Khalidi points to 
structural weaknesses wiL1.in Palestinian h,stirutions and factionalism amongst the Palestinian 
notables ,md political pru-ties. For more information see I<-'1.alaf, Issa Politics h' Palestine: Arab 
Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939-1948 (State University of New York Press, New York, 
1991) as well as "The Effect ofSocio-economic Chru,ge on At-ab Societal Collapse in Mandate 
Palestine" International Jow-nal of Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 29, 1997) ruid Khalidi, Rashid "The 
Palestinians and 1948: The Underh'ing Causes of Failure" hi Rogan, and Shlaim ed 2002 op. cit., 
13 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 38 
14 Ibid. p. 39 
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there was no fon11al policy of transfer. Why? Monis points to reported speeches and 
the dia.ry of Ben-Gu..rion in demonstrating whether or not there was a transfer policy. 
For instance from the diary of Ben-Gurion dated July 12, 1937, where he is referring 
to the Peel COlllinission Report of 1937 about the reCOl11.111endation of the transfer of 
at least 225,000 Palestinian Arabs out of the proposed jewish state Ben-Gu..rion 
notes: 
A,ld we did not propose this - the Royal Commission ... did ... and we must 
grab hold of this conclusion [i.e., recorrmlendation] as we grabbed hold of the 
Balfour Declat-ation, even more than that - as we grabbed hold of Zionism 
itself, we must cleave to this conclusion, with all our strength and will and faith 
because of all the Commissions conclusions. t.~is is the one that alone offers 
some recompense for the teat-ing away of oth~r pat1:S oft.~e country. IS 
For Monis, tillS diary entry in itself does not prove that Tra.l1sfer ThiILking was a 
policy, but it does prove that the Transfer TplnliTlg was there as an idea. L'1ere is 
much material that gives the general mearjng of 'what was shown above. According 
to Monis there were ideas about 'transfer', but no policy. The thiIl.king in itself 
generated a consensus whereby there was support for it and it was ca.rried out by 
Israeli troops. This is Morris's general idea in his new work The Birth Revisited 
However, even before this work Monis added 'Operation Hiram' into the picture. 
Operation Hiram is viewed as being different from a direct policy or 'master plan' to 
transfer the Arab population. Morris tells us that there is evidence that from April 
1948 many Palestilllan villages and towns were subject to concrete expUlsions. TIllS 
had to do with the individual Israeli cOIP~rnanders and their view of expulsion and 
how they viewed the situation in each village and town. Morris adds; "the 
proportion of the 700,000 Arabs who took to the roads as a result of expulsions 
15 Morris, Befl.11Y 2002 op. cit., p. 42 Ta..lcen from Ben-Gu.rion's diary, 12th July, 1937, Ben-Gu.rion 
Archive, Sede Boker. 
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rather than straightforward milit~ry attack or fear of attack etc. is much greater than 
indicated in The Birth. SLTflilarly, the new docli.TIlentation has revealed atrocities that 
I had not been aware of while writing The Birth ... Those atrocities are important in 
understanding the precipitation of va..-ious phases of the A..'"3.b exodus".16 Morris' 
point here shows 1i~at evidence now exists 1i~at 1i~ere were more atrocities carned out 
in other A.-rab towns and villages. 17 Previously, Morris believed that Operation 
Hiram did not instruct the IDF to drive out Palestinians from their homes and 
villages. The expulsion of PalestiPians from their villages was haphazard, some 
staying a..'1d some leaving. However, with newer material available, Moms explains 
that "there was a central directive by Northern Front to clear the conquered pocket 
r- .. A .... 1 .. 1 ..... .,., 18 ..... 1· ,... 1 1 ~ 1 .... 
or Its .'"liao IP.naOltaTlts. 1 nere were mrect oraers gIven to expel tne ralestmmn 
Arab population in the va..rious villages. 19 
This, however, is not the end of the story. IDF expulsion of local populations from 
villages did not end after the operation was fmished. There were 'acts of cruelty' 
a..'1d 'lack of restraint'2o by IDF troops after the fighting had stopped. Ivioms is 
refening to a "series of massacres carned out ... mostly after the end of the 
16 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 49 
17 In other words, towns like Lydda and RamIe were cases of fighting. Other towns and viii ages, 
uIlder Operation Hiram witnessed massacres. An interesting case related to this is Katz's work on 
oral histories where he fOlmd that overwhelming evidences pointing to a massacre having taken place 
in a town called Tantura. This was not mentioned in Khalidi's All that remains. This points to further 
massacres that took place during the 1948 War. Katz's thesis was published as an a..rticle and he was 
sued for libel. It became a messy case, however, the evidence he uses seems valid. fI<atz, Theodore 
"Tne Exodus of the Arabs from Villages at the Foot of Southern Mount Carmel- University of 
Haifa, 1998 - SUlllIDary in Ma'ariv article) Pappe, Han "The Tantura Case in Israel: The Katz 
research and trial" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxx, No.3, Spring 2001) 
18 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 51 
19 At this point Morris refers to orders given out by General Moshe Carmel at the end of October, and 
Yigael Yadin (IDF OC Operations at the time) in addition to Major Moda'i's description of events. 
For example Yadin issued an order saying "we are not interested in Arab inhabitants [in Israel] and 
their return [to Israeli territory] must be prevented at all costs" IDFA 922/75/189 'Operation Hiram' a 
report by Major Moda'i - cited in Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 52 
20 This is taken from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Foreign Ministry (FM) 186117, 18th November 
1948. It by Shimoni (acting Director ofthe Israeli Foreign Ministry's Middle East Affairs 
Department) in a letter to Eytan the ministry director general. 
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fighting".21 The question rulses whether t.~ese massacres were direct orders or 
wheL"'1er L"'1ey were carried out by individual localised battalions. Morris believes L"'1e 
general lines of what happened are clear, pointing to orders made as being corrunand 
enough for the Vru'"l.OUS battalions to interpret how they liked.22 There are two things 
that indicate L"'1at L"'1ese orders were interpreted as L"'1e right to expel: "'the patterns of 
the actions and their relative profusion; an.d the absence of any punisb~rnent of the 
perpetrators".23 The impression one is left with is that because no one was plli"1ished 
for this, L"'1e action is interpreted as being the result of an order. The massacres were 
all sLl'flilar in their pattern: 
the lUliform or at least similar nature of the massacres POhltS to a belief, among 
the perpetrators, of central direction and authorisation ... AL.liost all the 
massacres followed a similar course: a llilit entered a village, rollilded up the 
menfolk in the village square, selected four or ten or fifty of the army-aged 
males ... lined them up against a wall and shot them.24 
On the lU1k between transfer thinku1g and actual movement of Palestinian refugees, 
Morris states in pis new book that 
transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s 
was not tantamount to preplanning and did not issue in the production of a 
policy or master-plan of expulsion ... But transfer was inevitable and inbuilt 
into Zionism - because it sought to transform a land which was 'Arab' into a 
'Jewish' state and a Jewish state could not have arisen wit.1.out a major 
displacement of Arab population ... Thinking about the possibilities of transfer 
in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned helli"ts and minds for its 
inlplementation in the course of 1948 so that, as it occlh"Ted, few voiced protest 
or doubt; it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish 
population.25 
2i Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 54 
22 In other words, whether or not the orders were precise regarding expulsion is not as yet clear as 
most of the sources are come from Arab oral and written testimony, United Nations llild Israeli 
documents, the latter of which are limited. Most IDF documents are still classified. 
23 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 54 
24 Ibid. p. 55 
25 Morris, Benny 2004 op. cit., p. 60 
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Arguing, on the other hand, that there was indeed a Jewish policy to expel the 
r. 1 .. 1 "W "d Kl 1'1·26 1 N M 11 27 M T l' d r. 1 .. ralestlmans, stana . all ~ nallUl a.Tla 1 ur 1 lasama. 1 lost IsraelI an ralestlma.Tl 
writers wouid agree that the massacre at Deir Yassin28 had the effect of precipitating 
the Palestinian exodus. That, however, is their only point of agreement. Whereas the 
Israeli history will stress that this massacre was carried out by dissidents, the other 
historians would argue that the Haganah was in charge and knew what was 
happeping, and depending on the version, that they had a direct policy in Deir 
Yassin. nis direct policy was called Pla..'1 Dalet or, Plan D. According to Pappe, the 
massacre "was ca..med out by a group of soldiers belonging to the Irgun ... The 
Irgun later ciaimed that its operation had been authorised by the Haganah and was 
pa..rt of a larger Je\vish operation in Jerusalem,,?9 
The essence of Pla..n D, according to Khalidi, was an "all-out offensive to conquer 
and hold territory in the wa.1(e of the retreating British forces ... the purpose of Plan 
D \vas 'control of the area given to [the Israelis] by the UN in addition to area 
occupied by [the Israelis] which were outside these borders,,,.3o T1:-.tis seems explicit 
enough to Khalidi. He maintains that Plan D was indeed a blueprint, a plan that was 
the last of many plans to destroy the PalestiPian population. 
26 Khalidi, Walid "Plan Dalet:Master Plllil for the Conquest of Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies 
(Autumn 1988) as well as All u'lat remains: The Palestinian Villages Occuoied and Deoooulated bv 
Israel in 1948 (Institute for PalesfIne Studies, Washington DC, 1992) 
27 MasaL'la, Nur Exoulsion of the Palestinians: The Conceot of 'Trllilsfer' in Zionist Political 
Thought. 1882-1948 (Institute for PalesfIne Studies, Washington DC, 2001) 
28 Deir Yassin is an infamous massacre by the Irgun where an estimated "250 residents, mostly 
women, elderly people llild children were slaughtered" Masalha, Nur Imperial Israel and the 
Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (Pluto Press, London, 2000) p. 44. For an eyewitness account 
a few days following the massacre see Jacques De Reynier "Deir Yassin" in Khalidi, Walid From 
Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948 (Institute for 
Palesthle Studies, Washington 1987) 
29 Pappe, Han The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (1. B. Tauris, London, 1994) p. 85 
30 K.1.alidi, Walid 1988 op. cit., p. 16 
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Plan D was the name given by the Zionist High Command to the general plan 
fOi military operations within the framewOik of which the Zionists launched 
successive offensives iil April aild eruly May 1948 in various pa,'1:s of Palesth,e. 
These offensives, which entailed the destruction of the Palestinian Amb 
community and the expulsion ,md pauperisation of the bulk of the Palestine 
Aiabs, were calculated to achieve the military fait accomoli uoon which the 
state ofIsmel would be based.31 ' • 
Masalha argues that Deir Yassm and Plan D must be seen in the light of an already 
aggreSSIve policy and strategy adopted by the Haganah, starting as early as 
December 1944.32 MasaL~a points to arcp.ival sources revealing that there was a 
premeditated plan to massacre the residents in Deir Yassin.33 A lot of information is 
taken from Ben-Gurion's war di31y where he says L'1at he "had no qualms about 
C'earing n~ores of Ara'o vi'laoes from what he ca"e'l the Terusa'e01 ~orridor" 34 'T'his ! ___::)1; _ ~ _L 0 ~~ ___ __ __ 11 U __ J _ ! ___ I; ___ _. L_ 
IS seen as refening to Transfer ThilLking and as a backgrOlmd for Plan D and the 
expulsion of the Palestine .Arab population. According to Masalha, Transfer 
Tp.ip~1dng is almost as old as political Ziop.ism itself, having particular roots ,-,vith 
Helizl and Ben-Gurion. Although Transfer Thill.king was not always in the 
foreground of discussion, it was a.1J. essential part of the 1948 War, as the Ziopists 
wanted as homogenous a state as possible. Although there is no written docli..Tfient, 
there seems no doubt for Masalha, that the shared lmderstanding of the concept of 
transfer was enough to cause the Palestipian exodus. 
The fact that no written blanket orders uilambiguously calling fOi the wholesale 
expUlsion of the Aiab population have been found has been cited as indicating 
,m absence of premeditated design; in similar vein, the inconsistencies in the 
31 Khalidi, Walid 1988 op. cit., p. 8 (emphasis mitle) 
32 NUT Masalha points out that although Plan D was adopted by the Haganah itl Maich 1948 it had 
been envisaged and planned in 1944. She gets her infOimation from an inteiView with Hagana.'1 OC 
operations officer Yigael Yadin who states that 'I prepaied the nucleus for Plan Dalet in 1944 when I 
was head of planning in the underground', taken from Ba.J.k:s, L "Tom Country: An Oral History of 
the Israeli War of Lldependence" Fra.lklit, Watts, New York 1982 p. 110; itl Masalha, NUT 2001 op. 
cit., p. 177. 
33 Masah'1a, Nur "On Recent Hebrew and Israeli Sources for the Palesfrnian Exodus" JOllilial of 
Palesfrne Studies (Vol. xviii, No.1, Aut-will, 1988) p. 126 
34 Masalha, Nur 1988 op. cit., p. 126 (Taken from Ben-Gurion's diary - Yoman HaMilhahamah 
1948-49, Vol. 1. entry for 6 Janua.-y, 1948 - Tel Aviv 1982) 
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behaviours of Vru-ious field commanders are given as proof u1.at the exodus was 
born of the exigencies of war. But the exodus was not the less the result of 
painstaking pllli"llling and rut unswerving vision: ... it is the tenacity of a shared 
understanding, stated and restated with almost tedious repetitiveness for almost 
50 years. The exodus is nothing if not testimony to the endurance of a vision 
that mns in rut unbroken line from the earlv davs of Zionist colonisation to this 
day.35 • • 
For Shlaim, Plan D represents a strategy whose main aim was to "to secure all the 
areas allocated to the Jewish state under the UN pa..rtition resolution as well as 
Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them ... its objective 
was to clear the interior of the country of hostile a.'1d potentially hostile Arab 
, ,. ,. . .,' fi 11""1'" "'6 elements, ana m tms sense It provlaea a wa..rrant ~or expeumg CIVl~la..'1S' .-
On the other hand Shapira37 argues that the Zionist leadersr..ip at the time, including 
Ben-Gurion, did not take the idea of Tratlsrer Thinking seriously atld that there is no 
liD_k between the idea as formulated in the 1930s a..tld 1940s and what actually 
happened in 1948 and 1949. 
vVhether or not Zionist Transfer Thill-king was an official policy is difficult to know 
completeiy, considering that the acadeIPics working on tbis issue ca.n..not agree. 
AcL'TIittedly, there are agendas on both sides of the arguL'TIent, one side stressing 
Palestillians as victims and Israelis as aggressors and the other side stressillg L11at 
Israel did not force the majority of PalestiPians from their homes a.'1d livelihoods. 
Nevertheless, the Palestinians with whom interviews and etlmographic research was 
held would tend to agree with the fonller, i.e. the Palestillians were forced to flee 
35 Masalha, Nur 20010p. cit., p. 208 
36 Shlaim, A vi 2000 op. cit., p. 31 (My emphasis) 
37 Shapira, Anita Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force 1881-1948 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1992). 
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from their homes and livelihoods, by what was an unfair UN decision to partition 
Palestine, as wen as by an aggressive Israeli policy. 
In the end, whether or not Plan D, Operation Hiram or Transfer ThilLking were for 
the pllrposes of 'uprooting, expulsion ~1}d pauperisation' of the Palestinian 
cornrnlln;ty thPfP;S no dOllbt that the war lea' tA Palest;n;ars flee;ng the;'" tAwns arrl .L.1..l..l..1..1.Y..J...LI.l.. ,\..J. .... "" "'.L.1..1. \A. \".1..1..1. .I. f.,V.J...I. .... .LI..LI. .I. .L.I. .1..1. ..... .1..1. '-V.L.l,. .1.'""-
villages. There is also evidence of massacres. The reasons behind it may not be 
clear, but the effects of it are. 
The Palestinian Resistance: The Importance of the 1967 and 1970 
Black September War 
The Palestinian Resistance Prior to the 1967 War 
'T'he DT 0 was -ho"nded o~ J"~e 1 st 1964 lI'~ C~~~o Wi'+-h M~ad ShUKl a~rv38 ~s 1'+S +;~s+ 
.1.11 .1 L .L Ul .1.1 Ul.1 .1 , .1 a.l.1, it.! ll.1.1 1 1.1.. a l.l-ll l 
Chainnan. The Palestinian Resista11ce can be seen as a reaction to the events that 
took place in 1948 and as being driven by a motivation to recover lost land and 
rights of the Palestinian people. Politicisation had happened prior to the formation 
f l' p T '" T ., AS "1 TT· A' 1 11 1 ('> T t • t 1 1 -no 1 t·· 39 0": ~ne ~ LV. m 1Y 1, l\.mg oaullan or Joraan was assassma.ea oy a rales.m.l~1}. 
38 Shukairy was a Palestinian lawyer, originally from Acre. He was one of the founding members of 
the Istiqlal, party, one of the important political parties dur'illg the Mandate which was critical of the 
Mufti and the Husseini-Nashashibi rivalries. For more information on this period of time see Mattar, 
Philip The Mufti of Jerusalem: AI-Haji AI-Husseini and the Palestinian National Movement 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1988). 
39 According to Nassar, the assassination was iil reaction to what was widely believed to be King 
Abdulla.1's secret negotiations wit.1 Israel. This led to feelings of betrayal among many Palestinia.,s. 
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.I."" 
With the ar~~val of Nasser in 195440 and Egypt's subsequent unity with Syria ill 
1958, Arab unity was on the agenda. 
The initial creation of Fatah occurred separately from the creation of the PLO. Fatah 
originall y sta.rted as the 'Movement for the Liberation of Palestine', and consisted of 
eight core members: Yasser Arafat, Sala..l-t Khalaf, K..l-talil al-\Vazir, K..l-talid al-
Hassan, Farouq Qaddoumi, Zuhair al-Alami, Kamal Adwan, a.nd Mohanmlad 
",\T 1""41 "T'1· •• 1 _, 1 1 1 -i ... A58 1 t' 1 l'" ~ ousser. 1 nerr ongms can De ~racea oaCK ~o 1':J ,nowever, .ney oec~TIle I~TIlOUS 
after their first (fake) communique in 1965, when they ciaL.'11ed to have made a raid 
inside Israel. The reason for tilis COlmllll!lique was 'to ma.ke the group known in the 
A ~ , , " 42RFt ' • 't" , 1 .,.... 1 ' 43 T, 't f' '1 
.'"\.fao worm, a~ er wmcn ney oeC~TIle Known as a~-t'a.an. 1. wasn • UU.ll a1.er 
1967 that the PLO beca..'11e a..'1 umbrella organisation encompassing Fatah. Once 
inside the PLO, Fatah quickly became the dominant party. 
The Arab Nationalist Movement (AAV!) was established in the early 1950s and was 
supported by President Nasser of Egypt. The core of the group was predominantly 
Palestiria..'1, mostly students at the A..'11erican Uriversity of Beirut. It was dedicated 
to Pan-Arabism and changing Arab goverrnnents (before the liberation of Palestine). 
Nassar, JamaL R The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration 
ofIndenendence (Praeger, London, 1991) p. 18 
40 Nasser was Prime Minister from 1954-1956. In 1956 he became President. 
41 Becker, Julian The PLO: Th.e Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1984) p. 41 
42 IDid. p.44 
43 Becker claims that the com..'llunique was fake from the start, although Cobban tells us that it was an 
actual operation but went wrong, and the communique was sent out arlyway as if it had been 
successful. Cobban, Helena The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) p. 33 
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It was the main alternative to Fatah. However, Fatah was the leading force at this 
time (pre-1967).44 
Following the break-up of the United Arab Republic (UAR) 111 1961, questions 
sta..rted to a..Tlse as to whether pan-Arab unity was really a prerequisite to the 
liberation of Palestine. The years following the brea.~-up of the UAR "revealed 
growi ..ng differences within the A-NM between those who advocated closer 
.. 1 _.fj" ..... N . (N '\ 1 _1 .. _ .... T"- 1 .... .. lUenlLIcatlOn witn 1 asir " asser, ana tnerr opponents - maInlY ralestulla..TlS - wno 
now sought to assign a .higher priority to armed struggle and Palestine".45 There was 
a 'left' and a 'rig.h.t' within the group. The leftist Clment was anti-cOlmnmust and 
1 N ., .. 1· -C". 46 1 .. 1 "'\. If "1 .. Tl 1" .. supportea 1 asser s SOClallSt relOrms ana was representea oy Ivlunsm lOramm a..Tla 
Moha.'TIillad Kisr.Ji and later on Nayif Hawatamah, who sta.rted the Popular 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP, later the Democratic 
Front r"or the Li1oeration or" Palestine "'T'T~"n' 96" 47 .,..,., se f ~ ~ ~~.. ~ ...... _.. ~ .. ~ ~ .. ..~.. - IJ.!:' Lr) L 1 ':J. lne more con rva.Ive 
. 't' t ,. t A' G H b h W A' H '" 'H' H' d' ~, ngn.lS.s were aormna.e... Dy Teorge... a aSH, a ... l... aaaaa ana ...... anl ... ill 1. 1 ne 
right wanted to focus more on Palestine and wanted to create a separate Palestiluan 
bra..Tlch of the Al'TM, wpich happened in 1964. "Tne structure of the Palestinian 
comma.'1d, dispersed as its sections were, parallell?d that of regional cOIIlmands. 
There was a separate Palestinian 11lilitary action committee, based in Lebanon and 
... 1 1... TT 1 1 1'" 48 ..... .. t no... t· .. .. ... ... f'" fl AN" " neaaea oy naaaaa. I ms separa.e rales.Iman commana orancn or .ne 1 IVI was 
not supported by the left because they felt it caused divisions within the A.l\JM. This 
44 For more information on the A}"Vt prior to 1967 see Sayigh, Yezid "Reconstructing tt.'1e Paradox: 
The Arab Nationalist Movement, Armed Struggle llild Palestine, 1951-1966" Middle East Journal 
(Vol 45, No.4, AUtllillll 1991) 
45 Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p. 614 
46 Ibid. p.616 
47 Muhsin Ibrat'1im and MohaffiLl1ad Kishli although Lebanese remained trusted confidants of the 
DFLP. They later were the heads of the Organisation of Lebanese Socialists. 
48 Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p.618 
149 
division within the A..NM cha.nged its objectives. "Palestine was now the means. 
• 1 .j f' ," 49 iliao UP ...LY .ne ena . 
Fatah, on the other hand, was not as ideological as the ANM: it has not defined its 
.,.,. . ,. . _ 50 T ,. 1 • .,. .... ,r! ,. ,. ,. A' . laeolOgy m expnclt tenns. m tne oeglnnmg tn.ey were lIlilUencea oy tne 1genan 
exa..T.ple, pa..rticularly Fanon's51 approach. 52 However, there is no ideology in Fatal>..., 
their reasons being "that if it adopts an ideology, it would contribute to more splits 
w1 ... • C ... nin fne ~ ... "'a' ... lestiTlll· <on ...... Tn ...... ovem ... e ... n ... t".53 T. sees 1"tse1f Tn "0 aI·sf Tnov t __ _ _ = _ L ............... ore as a na~l n 1. ......... emen., 
not an ideological pa.rty. 
The Effect of the 1967 War 
In the space of only six days between 5 and 10 June 1967, the IDF shattered the armed forces of 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied large tracts of their territories54 
Apa.rt from the many casualties for all parties involved, the 1967 War also had 
consequences in tenns of international, regional and domestic politics witpin Israel 
and the Arab states, as well as consequences for both the Arab and Palestinia..'l 
National Movements. 
49 Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p. 619 
50 Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 80 
5i Fanon, Frantz The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin Books, London 1990 (1961)) where the 
solution to bein.g colonised is through violent struggle. 
52 Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 80 
53 Ibid. p. 80 
54 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement. 
1949-1993 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) p. 143 
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The fn'st major consequence was the movement, yet again, of Palestinians out of 
Palestine. Tnere are L-rnportant differences between the movement of Palestinians in 
1948 and 1967. First, the movement ofPalestipjans during the 1948 war took place 
over an entire year, whereas in the 1967 War it was the result of a single campaign. 
The second difference is that the Palestipians who fled their homes in 1967 did so, 
knowing that the Palestinians who fled in 1948 were unable to retQrn to their homes. 
r.. 1 1 1 t 1 t' 19 r 7 {' l' t'" " j 1 vne wOUla nave expec eane 1 0 rerugees, navmg HIS K...TlOWlea.ge, ~o nave 
thought twice before leavL.'1g their homes. Various questions a..rise: why did they 
leave their homes? Was it by force, was it a result of war, or did they flee 
voluntarily? The evidence is unclear, although as during the 1948 War, the IDF 
seems to have been involved in the new refugee flow, in some cases levelling entire 
villages. Morris points out that 
in several locations Arab houses were deliberately destroyed after the fighting 
ended. A nllillber ofIDF commanders, apparently without cabinet authorisation, 
thoug."l most probably with Dayan's approval, tried to repeat tI'1e experience of 
1948 - to drive the Palestinians into exile and demolish their homes. Altogether, 
some 200-300.000 Arabs fled or were driven from the West Bfutk fuid the Gaza 
S....: 55 • U.Lp. 
Mou~s and Hirst56 report IDF loudspeakers ordering people in the West Bank to 
leave and go to .Tordwl. There were also free, Israeli-organised buses taking Arabs 
from East Jerusalem to the Allenby Bridge. Some of the Palesti!1ians who fled were 
already refugees, having fled to either Gaza or the West BID'Lk. dming the 1948 War. 
There is a conception that the Palestipians who became refugees du..ring tbis war 
were mostly refugees from the 1948 War, that they were poor and lived in refugee 
55 Morris, Benny Righteous Victims: A Historv of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2001 (Vintage 
Books, New York, 2001) p. 327 
56 Hirst, David The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (Faber and 
Faber, London, 1977) p. 227 (more details about how the Palestinians fled, see pages 224-229) 
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Clli'1lpS on the West Bank. However, contrlliJ' to popular beiief,57 tl-..is IS not 
necessarily t.~e case. 58 Dodd and Barakat point out that the 1948 refugees were in 
fact fewer than half the number of 1967 refugees. 59 It is estLlTIated that about 200-
250,00060 people went into exile. 
In tel111S of regional consequences, Sayigh explains that the 1967 war "moderated 
the attitude of key Arab states towards Israel, but at the same time complicated the 
peace process by eIL.q}eshing it ,vith superpower rivalry. The h~~iliating defeat of 
Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'th's Syria heralded the decline of interventionism 
between Arab states".61 The death of Nasser and the a.rrival of Sadat was also a 
factor contributing to the retreat ofPan-Arabism.62 
An important factor in regional politics was the creation of lJN Security Resolution 
242 in November 1967, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the newly-occupied 
tP"";torlPs <>nA recognltlAn of'Tsrap'l 'DY the surrOllna'lng f>o"ntn·es Both Pgypt <>na' \"V.l..l..l.L .l..l.V , Ui..l.U- ..I.. .Ll.\...l.V.l..l. ...L ..L V .. L.l..l. .l.....u...l...LL.l. v \A..L.l.I..l. • \...1..1. J...J ~"u..i..l. 
Jordan accepted tIns resolution, showing that they were will1ng to moderate their 
57 Most writers on this issue have an assll.lIlption when dealing with the 1967 refugees that most of 
them were previous 1948 refugees. For example Frangi, Abdallah The PLO alld Palestine (Zed 
Books, London, 1983) 
58 Dodd, Peter and Ba.rakat, Halim River without Bridges: A StlJ.dy of the Exodus of the 1967 
Palestillian Arab Refugees (The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beimt, 1969). This report is based on 
a series of interviews and visits to jordan, where t..l}ey interviewed refugees living in refugee camps as 
well as those not living in refugee camps. They tested for four theories of why Palesti.llians left 
during the 1967 war (shock-panic, riff-raff, previous refugee, and nomadic mentality) fmding each 
one wanting. Some of these imply a socio-economic condition where the refugees had no steady jobs, 
no real property; where a decision to leave their homes in the face of danger would be made easier 
Their conclusions, apa.-t from raising many more questions, were that many of the refugees h'1deed 
did have their own property, did have jobs and income thus they did leave something behind and they 
also, hllporumtly, have somethh'1g they wish to retU.lll to. Their a.'1swers to why people left is later 
explah'1ed in this section, but it happened as a result of situational pressures generated by airborne 
attacks, h'1cluding use of napahll, destruction of their villages, and detention of ma.'1Y male civilia.'1s. 
They were not equipped to resist these situational pressures a.'1d were taken by su..-prise. 
59 Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim op. cit., p. 6 
60 Morris, Benny 2001 op. cit., p. 328 
61 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 141 
62 For an eloquent obitua.y of Pan-Arab ism see Fouad Ajami's fa.llOUS a.-ticle. Ajami, Fouad "The 
End ofPan-A.-abism" Foreign Affairs Vol. 57, No.2, Wh'1ter 1978-79 
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policies regarding the Palestine question. Syria rejected it. The Palestinians were not 
asked whether or not they accepted it. 
Regarding domestic consequences and those for the PalestiIlian Resistance, the 1967 
war created instability in the Arab states surrounding Israel. Tpis domestic 
instability "orJy encouraged a greater focus ... on raisons d'etat, at the expense of 
rhetorical cOiThilitment to Arab unity and the Palestine cause". 63 ~'1ereas previously 
tt"'1e PaJestini3.tl Resistance had been reli3.tlt upon, and worked in conjunction witt\ 
A..rab states, they would now have to work more independently. LIl other words; 
"after the defeat of 1967, Palestinians began to combine their longing for 'retlml' 
with emphasis on the maintena..Tlce of their identity. Thus Palestipian nationalism 
beg.,n to rpp1ace Arab nat'Ana'l'sm wh'ch 'naA AOIlll'natea' Pa'lest'n,.,n nol,hca1 Ui..I.-.... ..L""'~..l. ••• .L ..LV.I.-..&...L i.li.L..L '-l- '\..I. .I....L ..L "'.J....L.L1ai..&.!-, .I..I.Ll ..L 
culture prior to 1967".64 There are two important issues here: Palesti.'1ian identity 
3.tld lack of Arab commitment. Regarding the tormer, it was made all tt"'1e more 
important because there was a complicit lack of international recognition of the 
Palestiniru'l people.65 Tl-..is lack of recogr..ition was important in the reassertion of the 
notion of Palestine first, and the emphasis of a distinct PaJestini3.tl identity. 
On the other hand the lack of cOI!llnitment to the Palestinian cause by Arab States 
was reip.£orced following the war, especially in Jordan. Tne PalestiPian movement 
was seen as a destabilising factor within these countries. Sayigh points out that the 
63 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 141 
64 Nassar, Jamal R "The CultLlTe of Resistance: the 1967 War in the context oftI'1e Palestinian 
struggle" Arab Studies Quarterlv (Vol. 19, No.3, Slll1ID1er 1997) p. 5 ofintemet pr'intout. 
65 For example UN Security COlll1cil Resolution 242 which addresses the war and its consequences 
for Palestinians made no mention of 'the Palestinians' as a people, only as refugees. Similarly, it was 
arolll1d this time tI'1at Golda Meir made her infamous speech saying that the Palestinian people did not 
exist. "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine consider'ing itself as 
Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took tI'1eir country away from them" (Sunday 
Times, London, 15th Jmle 1969) 
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rise of the Palestinian (guerrilla) movement "challenged the diplomatic moderation 
d .. 1 .... .. 1 1 I' .. r- .. . _ .,., 66 ".....1.. r- 1 an par'ncmanstlc natIOnal agenaas or tne conrrontatIOn states. I HIS relers to tne 
Arab states realising that they needed international backing, and seeing that they 
were unable to confront Israel and win. 
TIus had implications for the Palesti1uan Movement. However, they tried their best 
in "tu.rp11lg defeat into opportu.Pity".67 The Paiestipian Resistance was disappointed 
with the Arab governments., and the conclusion of the \var sho\ved that the 
Palesti1uan Resistance would have to become self-reliant and find a new way to 
t ' . 1 T 'Arm' 1m ' , t' . l' , 68,...." Ar' s ruggle agaIlls~ ISrael. ea s. ggle oeca.11le ne answer III ~ne ena. I ne ao 
arrnies were unprepared and too wea..l( to resist the Israeli a..'11ly. Their interest in the 
liberation of Palestine was only indirect and not sufficiently sustained. "TIle 
Palestinian people needed a new organisation under Palestinian leadersPip to set it 
on the path back to Jerusalem. By the defeat of 1967, the Arab governments had 
forfeited ali c1ah'1lS to sneak or negotiate on behalf of the Paiestinifu'1 neonie". 69 
~ ~ ~ 
Now that the West Bank and Gaza were lmder Israeli control, there was the 
opportupity for Palestipians to ca.rry out raids witpin Israel. Fatah decided to lau.llch 
what it called 'popular rebellion' inside Israel. "In September [1967] there were 
thirteen acts of sabotage against Israeli targets"/o a1'1lost all of which were h'1side 
Israel proper. They continued into October, November and December. The Israelis, 
however managed once again to get the upper hand. "By the end of 1967 the Israeli 
66 S ·hY ·d'999 .~ '4' aylg, eZl lOP. CIl., p. 1 1 
67 Sayigh, Yezid "Turning Defeat Into Opportunity: The Palestinian Guerrillas After the June 1967 
War" Middle East Journal (Vol. 46, No 2, SprllJg 1992) 
68 Kainal Nassar sees the popularity of armed struggle being reinforced by the battle of Karameh in 
1968. Nasser, Kamal 1997 op. cit., 
69 Frangi, Abdallfu,. The PLO fuJd PalestitJe (Zed Books, London, 1983) p. 107 
70 Morris, Benny 2001 op. cit., p. 366 
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security forces had arrested about one thousand Palestinian operatives and killed 
about two hu..l1dred. In January 1968 t.l-Ie Palestinians launched oIlly six attacks. By 
then the Fatah leaderspip had ack110wledged defeat: The popular uprising had failed 
The effect of the war on the A...NM was devastation. The AJ."\J.M had been extremely 
close to other Arab nationalist groups in the neig..l-Ibouring states a.l1d the defeat in the 
war came as a major shock. Witpin the Al'JM there emerged different political 
groups followi.Jlg the 1967 War. Habash fOlmded the Popular Front for the 
T ., t· f ~ 1 t' (T"t.T"'IT~) TTl t' T"t.T"'IT T"t. 1 t' 11 LlOera IOn o~ rales me r.r Lr. unaer .ne r.r Lr oanner many oner smaller 
Palestinian groups that had emerged prior to the 1967 War (such as the Vengeance 
Youth, Heroes of the Retul1l and Alnllad Jibril's Palestine Liberation Front) also 
•• 1 72 'TIl· 1· • 1 p~ 1 -fi r . 11 Jomea. Ims new coantIon, nowever, sunerea ~rom ITagmentatlOn, especiallY 
dlL.";..ng the a..rrest of Habash in Syria. As in the Al"TM a left- and a right-wing 
emerged within the movement. The left was led by Hawatamah and the right by 
J..l 1 1 (' 1· r1 1·1 1 ..) B r TT 1 1, ~. • t' ~~aoasn oy ms suppo~~ers wnlle ne was m pnson. erore naoasn s retum mne 
autum.'l of 1968, A..~'llad Jibril, an important military leader and strategist, defected 
and created his own orgCL11isation called the PFLP-General COllulland (PFLP-GC). 
A.l1other split occu..rred foHowing Habash's retu..rn, tbis time due to Nayif 
Hawata..'llah, who created the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, PDFLP (later to be known as DFLP). The following year Hawatamall's 
group was recogpised by the PLO. They kept relatively quiet duri..ng the time thal 
Fatah was trying to UI'Jeash its 'popular uprising'. However the PFLP was to take 
71 Moms, BelltlY 2001 op. cit, p. 366 
72 Established 1959. Joined the PFLP and the A~~1 in 1967 then defected forming the PFLP-GC in 
1968. Not to be confused with the Iraqi sponsored Palestine Liberation Front. 
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the lead in the years between 1968 and 1971, in bringing the Palestinian Resistance 
Movement to international attention throug..1} international pjjacKLl1gs. 
Another effect of the 1967 war on the Palestinian Resistance was the addition of 
Syrian- and Iraqi-sponsored Palestinian groups. Syria supported the formation of 
Saiqa 01 anguards of the Popular Liberation War - Saiqa literally mea..1Jing lightI'ing 
bolt) in 1968, headed by Dati Jamani. Saiqa's view of the two other main groups, 
Fata..1} and the PFLP, meant they tended to agree more with the former (at least at 
tpis time). According to Quandt: 
politically, Saiqa 1."1itially tended to side with Fata.~, supporting the doctrine that 
the liberation of Palestine must precede the settling of ideological quarrels. 
Saiqa was generally hostile to t.~e PFLP, reflecting Syrian attitudes toward a 
fonner rival, the ANM, but was usually cooperative with Hawatamah's PDFLP 
[later called DFLP] and pa.-ticularly with Jibril's PFLP-General Coffitlland. A 
major difference between Saiqa and these fedayeen groups however, was the 
presence of a large population of non-Palestinians in their rank. 73 
Syria's Baathist rivals m Iraq created the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) in 1969. 
These groups however, never had very large popular support. Although not created 
by Iraq, Iraq supported ano"lher newly created Palestinian group, the Palestinian 
P , Sf 1" t (""""S")' " B'· t A' G' ,. ,74 ...... , T • ~ opUlar .rugg~e .rron rr .r lea oy ~Ja ou narDlyyen. Ine Iraqls were 
also sponsors of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) with Muha..T.u'TIad Abbas 
Zayda..'175 as its secretruy-general. 
73 Quandt, William "Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism" 1."1 
Quandt, William et al The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (University of Cali fomi a Press, 
Berkeley, 1974) p. 64-65 
74 Gharbiyyeh was an ex-ba'athist from Jerusalem. His successor was SamIT Ghosheh. 
75 Zaydan was the former spokesperson for the PFLP-GC. The power-sharing within the PLF was 
between Zaydan a."1d Tal'at Ya'qub and Abd al-Fatta.~ Ghanim both also fom1er PFLP-GC members. 
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Another effect on the Palestinian Resistance of the 1967 war related to the PLO . 
.. l' . l' Sh 1 • • 1 76 'T'1 1 1" t ., .1
'
. l' p T 0 1'0 lOwmg ~ne war ~~u.l(ayn reslgneu. tnere was a 10. or :u.rrnoll WI-mn me L , 
and finally in Janua..ry 1969, "the PLO executive com..'TIittee announced that the 
composition of the new congress had been agreed on and the fifth session of the 
National Congress would be held in Cairo Lll February. Fatah received the pighest 
"n."ber of'seats -C:ol1ouTed by Sa1r1a and the PPi P Thp Pi A "'"d the Pi P reCel·Verl .L..L\,..LLl..L ..L..L .... , .l~..l...1. "''Y .1.'1.1. .... ..... ..l. LJ.J.. ••• .... .l...l.V ..L LJ u.i.l. .... .l...L ..L.L...J..L .I. "'" 
only fifteen seats between them, and in reaction refused to participate, as did the 
PFLP".77 Fatah was able to take advantage oftpis boycott and Yasir Arafat, head of 
Fatah, was elected as the Chairman of the PLO. The Executive Corrunittee was 
mainly made up of Fatah, Saiqa and other fonner members of the Executive 
Cornmittee, much to the preference of Fat~l}, but much to the dismay of the PFLP 
and the other groups who did not side with Fatah. 
Once the Palestinian Resistance realised the difficulty of guelTilla activity within the 
Occupied Territories, they bec~rne more reliant upon other Arab states. Althou~l} 
disappointed with the Arab states, the 1967 war gave the Resistance Movement 
new leverage with Arab governments. The latter eiL~er lacked the political and 
physical strength to deny the guerrillas use of their tell~tory or saw positive 
benefits in aiding guerrilla activity.78 
The Resistance Movements' influence grew in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Egyptians 
helped both Fatah and the ANM with their activities in the West Ban~1( foHowing the 
war. The Egyptian milita.ry intelligence even "posted an officer to &T..man as a 
pennanent liaison with them. It also sent two planeloads of Illilita..ry supplies to 
76 Yahya Hammuda took his place. Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 54 
77 QUfuldt, Willifull op. cit., p. 71 
78 Sayigh, Yezid 1992 op. cit., p. 258 
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Jordan for their use, although the real surge in material support for Fatal1 was not to 
tart i·' D '" 79 T S . t' i "tw -n .', ' S un~ll ecemDer. myna .nere was a power s.mgg1e De. een rreslQen~ a1-
Atasi a.'1d assista.'1t secreta.ry-general of the Baath pa.rty, Salah Jadid, against the 
Defence Minister al-Asad. Nevertheless, the Palestinian resista.nce was able to forge 
a liILl<. with the Syria.T1S as weil. Fatah supplied the "Syrians with fresh information 
on Israeli dispositions (remember Syria had lost the Golan). In retu .. rn, Fatah was 
pem1itted to maintain a hjgh level of activity at its trainjng ca.l11pS in Syria and to 
bri.ng in hundreds of new recruits".8o Tne Ai'\JM was also allowed to "resume 
activity on Syrian soil a.'1d [was] formally assigned an officer to liaise with the 
Syrian authorities. It also benefited from the covert assistance of sympathetic 
ft- . 1 n· .,.,& 1 82 T 1 1 1 . 1 'no 1 .•• R·. T 
o..:ncers ill tne ~yna.T1 a.rmy . rraq also gave nelp to tne ralestmla.T1 ~ eSlstance. m 
the months following the 1967 war "Iraqi trucks ca.rried guerrillas and trainees ... 
between Syria or Iraq at"ld the Jordat"l River to evade Jordat-uan checkpoints".83 
Because of tJ~e Resistance's influence in tJ~ese three countries, as well as tJ~e help 
they received from them, they were able to work more freely in Jorda.1'l and 
Lebanon. 
Thus, their influence in Egypt, Iraq and Syria helped them in their relationshjp with 
Jordan and Lebanon, where guerrilla activity had not previously been endorsed. 
iora'<>n <>nd i p}.",non a';,1 not l;ke Palest;n;<>n guem·lla act;vl·ty on t1-.e;r temtorlps ~ ~ u.i..l. u.i..l. .L...Itw'UUi..l..LA. .1.""-.1..1. "'..L.1....I.: ..L.l. "'.L.L.l...I.u..i..l. .LA. .L ..... to. .1..1. .. .L..l. .1...1... .. .l...l..L1. .1..1.'"'" • 
Following the war the guenilla movement became more active and this resulted in 
bot..l} govermnents cracking down on them again. King Hussein annoli.T1ced in 
79 Ibid. p. 258 
80 Sayigh, Yezid 1992 op. cit., 259 
81 !nid. p. 260 
82 The ANM had been in trouble in Syria after they had supported an attempted coup in July 1963. 
ANM activity was forbidden and many members went to prison. 
83 Sayig..lJ., Yezid 1992 op. cit., p. 260. 
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September that he opposed "any !l1jlit~ry activity that 'was not part of an overall 
" 1 1 .,.,., 84 TT r- 11 l' 1 t' t t ' t' Arao plan. nowever, lOr all ~ne govefI1..IIlen~ measures .na. wereaKen, .ne 
guerrillas, especially in Jordan, kept on with their activities. 
The Effect of Black September 
The PLO and the Palestini~l1 Resistance were powerful in Jordan followi_llg the 1967 
War. As Abu Iyad explains 
The Six Day War opened before us a new horizon for development. The 
Jordanian regime becatTte too weak to challenge our program. King Hussein 
released hWldreds of Palestinian nationalists who had been imprisoned in the 
years preceding the conflict. He also closed his eyes to us when we embarked 
on establishing bases along the River Jordan [on the eastern side] to be used as 
staging points for our commandos. Neither did we lack the support or sympathy 
of the local inhabitants nor the support and sympathy of t.~e Jordanian at-my 
with whom we had established excellent relations.85 
The Jordanians and the Palestinians worked together in the battle of Karameh in 
M ' '968 '. T 1 86 ,,-., . , h f 1 P' .. D' . larcn I agamst ISrael. I ne rapm grOWL o. tne • alestIman ResIstance 
Movement, pa..rticularly the corrmlando ll..'1its, did cause King Hussein to question pis 
own authority. 
84 Ibid. p. 260-61 
85 Abu Iyad (Salat'l Khalaf a principal founder of Fatah and also accused - by Israel- of being a part 
of 'Black September'). "A Palestiniatl without Identity" Manshurat al-Maktab al-Filastini lil-Khidmat 
al-Sanafiya, Jerusalem 1981, wTitten in Arabic, p. 102 in Abu-Odeh, Adnan Jordanians, Palestinians 
and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (United States Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington DC, 1999) p. 151. Abu Iyad was the PLO's second in command at the time, after Arafat. 
86 Although not a military victory the Battle ofKarameh in 1968 was one that gave the Resistance an 
enormous boost. The Israelis a~tacked KaratTteh in March 1968 atld were met by resistatlce from the 
Palestiniatl commando wlits atld the Jordatliatl at-my. This boost itl morale mobilised Palestitlians into 
joining the Resistance. Hudson points out that prior to Karameh Fatat~ had about 2,000 men. 
Followitlg the battle t.~e nwTtber increased to 15,000. Hudson, Michael "The Palestinian Arab 
Resistatlce Movement: Its Significatlce in the Middle East Crisis" Middle East JOwlial (Vol. 23, 
Spring 1969) p. 300 
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The resistance movement was responsible for administering and organising life 
in the refugee camps. Heavily-ru-med Palestinirul COITuliruldo groups 
demonstratively patrolled the streets of the capital, AIfulirul. Open conflicts ruld 
armed clashes between Jordanian state forces and these commando groups 
became increasingly frequent.87 
Because of the growth of the Resistance, King Hussein a...lld the "Jordanian state 
apparatus could no longer impose the rule of the royal fa..1Jlily as absoluteiy as 
before".88 However, he had a dilerr~1Jla: about half of his country's population was 
Palesti11ian. 
According to Quandt, the PFLP sparked the match for later conflict between the 
jorda..rrian regime and the Palestinian Resistance by executing "its own program to 
bring down the Jorda.'1ian regime, to emba.rrass Fatah, a.'ld to stall the movement 
towards a peace settlement with Israel".89 There were three international hijackings 
on September 6t.\ two of which landed in the Jordanian desert. Three days later 
"another plane was also pijacked to Jordan".9o The situation in Jordan between the 
authorities and the Palestinian groups deteriorated as a result. By mid-September 
King Hussein caned for a milita..ry govel1L1Jlent. There were negotiations with the 
Resistance but to no avaipl 
The fighting continued. The war lasted 10 days and ended on September 27tl!. The 
Palestinian groups "had been placed on the defensive throughout Jordan, and with 
no Arab support in sight, t..hey agreed to a cease-fue".92 The agreement signed by 
Arafat and King Hussein in Cairo, called for "the two parties to tenninate all 
hostilities and media ca..1Jlpaigns. The army had to withdraw from A.TfI..rna..rl to their 
87 Frangi, Abdallah op. cit., p. 115 
88 Frangi, Abdallah op. cit., p. 115 
89 Quandt, William op. cit., p. 125 
90 I' 'd 12-01 ~ p . .L 6 
91 [bid. p. 126 
n Ibid. p. 128 
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previous positions. The fedayeen had to evacuate ArrLnlan to new bases reflecting 
the appropriate fedayeen activity outside the cities".93 
In t..he aftermath of the war the Resistance Movement lU1derwent changes. Many of 
f' 
.fie smaller groups disappeared "as autonomous parts of the Palesti.Tlia.l1 
movement",94 either disappea..ring or joining Fatah.95 The Jordania..'l authorities were 
not satisfied that the Resistance had left Anmlan, and they did not want guerrilla 
groups on a.l1Y of their territory. In July 1971, the Jordwia.l1 authorities asked the 
guerrilla fighters to leave Ajlun (a strategic mountai..l1 north of AIT'.u.'llan). The 
Palestinian guerrillas did not leave, which resulted in heavy fighting dming the 
following days. Tpis battle was to be an important one in terms of the PalestiPian 
Resistances' relationsr..ip with Jorda..'l, as well as for the Palestinian Resistance as a 
whole: 
The battle of Ajllli"l marked the filial destruction of ti.e guerrilla movement's 
prilicipal Arab sanctu.arj. This represented the defeat of the strategy of people's 
war championed by the various guerrilla groups since 1967, and posed a 
fundamental challenge to their professed aims, political programmes, and 
organisational struct .... rre. Both in reaction and as a means of obscuring ti.eir 
predicament, the guell~lla groups launched a campaign of sabotage and 
subversion against Jordfu"l in mid-August ti.at was to continue sporadically for 
the next 20 or so months.96 
The Palestinian Resistance and t..he Jordanian authorities were again engaged in talks 
in Cairo du.ring the following months. The JordaPians were not willing to have the 
PLO return to Jordan. Prime Mir.ister Tal was involved in these talks, but was 
assassinated by 'Black September', a newly-fonlled group that took its name from 
93 Abu Odeh, Adnan op. cit., p. 185 
94 Quandt, Wiliiam op. cit., p. 129 
95 Quandt gives examples of small groups that either disappeared or joined Fatah as the Iraqi ALF, 
Tne Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP), the Organisation of Arab Palestine 
(OAP), the Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Popular Organisation for the Liberation of 
Palestine (POLP). (p. 129) 
96 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 280 
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the events in Jordan on 28th November 1971. This was t.~e end of llitY negotiations 
over the PLO presence in Jordan. The PLO offices in Amman were closed down and 
the Resistance moved out of Jordan. As a result, the PalestiPian Resistance beca...rne 
more dependent upon their bases in Syria and Lebanon. 
The effects of the September war were many. First, it sparked a "new phase of 
"" 1 •• • 1 .,.,97 . 1 1" ... t· 1 11·· 1 r-
ralestiman VIOlence as It naa orougnt In.O eXIstence tne group CallIng ltsen 
'Black September'. Tpjs group was responsible for the assassination of Prime 
Minister Wasil al-Tal, as well as its well-known operation in Munich in 1972. 
Second, the PLO had to close down its offices and stop IPilitary attacks from Jordan 
into Israel. Tpjs mea..'1t that more attacks were to be launched from Lebanon. 
Although Syria had a new leader, al-Asad, who had ta...ken conLmand in the autumn 
of 1970, it still allowed the Resistance to continue its activities a..'1d receive support. 
Tpjrd, they had learned more lessons from the September war. Again they realised 
that they could not count on Arab leaders in their struggles. Similarly, they were 
made acutely aware of how they would be 'disowned' if the host state authorities 
suddenly decided that they were no longer willing to support them. Tpjs was to be 
made even clearer in Leba.non in the following years. 
97 Hirst, David op. cit., p. 310 
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Arriving in Lebanon: A History of the Refugee Camps 
The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon have been there for over fifty years. 
Although meant to be temporary, they have become permanent sites of residence. 
ThiS SPCtiOn elTIphasises the state of' affialI·rs -t.olloWl·ng tbp i 967 are' i"rc'<>nian CiVl·1 .L~.l...I. '"'" \..1. .1..1. .I..I..I.._........L L.I..l..... .L.L.L .L...... ... L.l.V.I. .I. ~ V.L ai..l...I. .L .L .I. 
wars. It is during tbis period of time that the Palestinian org3l1isations and the 
refugee ca.rnps played a larger role in the political reality. 
Most of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon a.rrived during the first Arab-Israeli 
War in 1948. Most of the refugees ca.rne from northern Palestine and the areas along 
the coast, parts of Palestine that today constitute Israel proper. When the refhgees 
first a.tTived, most of them settled in refugee camps arOlIDd the larger Lebanese 
towns of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, as well as III other camps scattered 
throughout the COlIDtry. These camps were for the 1110St part ta."ken care of by 
~KW A, wpich was set up to fu..l1d emergency relief for the refhgees. The refugee 
ca..1JlpS were established as tempora..ry accorr~1Jlodation consisting mairJy of tents. 
The chart below shows the va.rious official UNWRA-supported Palestinian refugee 
• T 1 98 
camps III Leoanon. 
98 Beirut and Mount Lebanon have been put together as one section as I believe that most of the 
camps put i11 the Mount Lebanon section actually belong to Beirut. The sections on this table 
regarding the surface area has been taken from Abbas, Ma.'unoud et al "The socio-economic 
Conditions ofPalesfmians in Leba.-lOn" Journal of Refugee Studies (Vol. 10, No 3, 1997) p. 379 and 
the latest population numbers have been taken from UNRWA: Registration Statistical Bulletin for the 
third quarter 2003 (3/2003). Department of Relief and Social Services, lJ~'RW A - HQ (A.-nma.i.), 
given to me at the Beirut Field Office, November 2003. 
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UNRWA CAMPS 
DISTRICT CAMP DATE SlJRFACE UNOFFICIAL i TOTAL I 
I 
I (SQ. M) REGISTERED I POPULATION I 
I 
I 
I 
PERSONS I 
I 
I I I I I South Al Buss 1936 I 80,000 1,010 I 10,058 I I I I I I I I 
I I 
I I I I 
Lebanon I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I 
I 
Rashidiyeh 1936 I 367,200 413 I 
25,431 I I I 
I I I I I Bourj el 1949 134,600 475 18,581 I I I I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I 
I I Shemali I I 
I I I I 
I I ELY} el 1949 I 301,039 1,256 I 45,i47 I I I I I I 
I I I I I I Helweh I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I Nabatiyeh 1956 103,455 I (destroyed) I I I I I I I I I I I 6,973 scattered I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I 
I I I I within other I I 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I ca.'llpS I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I MiehMieh 1956 I 54,040 620 I 5,015 I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I 
Mar Elias 
I I 
I Beirut / I 1952 
I 5,400 801 I 1,410 I I 
I I I I I I I I. Mount I I I I I 
I I I 
I I I I I I I Lebanon I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I Bourj E1 1949 I 104,000 5,174 I 20,312 I I I I 
I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I Barajneh I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I Dbayeh 1955 I 83,576 221 I 4,207 I 
I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I (Destroyed 1976 I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I 
I 
I I I 
I I I but some people I 
I I I I I I 
I I I have moved back I I I I I I I I I 
I I I to area) I I 
I I 
I I 
Shatila 1949 39,567 4,116 12,156 
I 
I 
Tal al Zaatar 1949 I Destroyed 
I 
I 
I 
JisT al Basha 1952 I Destroyed I 
I 
I 
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I North I Nahr el 1949 I 198,129 1,531 I 30,812 I 
I I I I I I I Bared I I Lebanon I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Baddawi 1955 1 200,000 832 16,119 I I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I Bekaa Wavell- 1948 43,435 I III I 7,521 
I I I I I I 
I I I I Galilee I I I 
I I I 
T£VI'AT 16,560 I 223,107 I.lv. L I 
I 
! 
The refugee camps are scattered around the country. Some of the camps were 
destroyed du.ri.ng the civil war, thus creating displaced rep.lgees who now iroJlabit 
different ca..1JlPS, sometimes split from their fa..1Jlilies. 
In addition to tillS, illJOnnal Paiestilllan refugee camps or gatherings also exist in 
Leba.1J.on. Ip..£ormal camps are usually areas smrounding the refugee camps, for 
exa..1Jlple Sabra (or Daouk) next to Shatila ca..1Jlp, or clusters found close to towns and 
cities. In most of the infolnlal camps, or clusters, Palestinians reside with Lebanese, 
as they are usuaily located witp11J. submbs or very close to viilages. Ll1e conditions 
tend to be comparable with refugee ca..1JlPS, although the refhgee camps tend to be 
better equipped with better community services than informai Cfu"'IlPS.99 As these are 
informal, L~e population numbers of L~e people living wiL~in each camp are only 
esti..rnates, thus making it difficult to be sure of the exact numbers of Palestimans 
living in these informal camps. The latest estimate from 1993 lllLrnbered the people 
. t' ._C":' , 't t '"'8 ')0" 100 m .ne lIilormal ca.TIlpS ana ems ers a .) ,_ u. 
99 Ugland, Ole ed Difficult Past. Uncertain Future: Living Conditions Among Palestinian Refugees in 
Canms and Gatherings itl Lebanon (FAFO-Report 409, Centraltrykkeriet AS, Norway, 2003) p. 205. 
The refugee camps are better equipped as they have popular committees, youth clubs and social and 
political groups. 
100 Abbas, Mahmoud et al. op. cit., p. 380 
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Significant Events Prior to the Lebanese Civil War 
Until the Cairo Agreement came to fruition the refugee camps in Lebanon were 
governed by the Deuxieme Bureau a.lld the Ministry of the Interior. Du..ring the 
1950s and 1960s 
[s]ecurity posts of the ... Forces de Securite lnterieure existed in and aromld 
the Palestiniru"l Crullps. Palesth"liru"ls were routinely questioned at army 
checkpoints around the refugee camps and on major roads; during some periods 
of political tension during the 1950s and 1960s Palestinians required permission 
to travel within Lebanon itself.JOI 
The political situation of the Palestinians began to change in the mid-l 960s with the 
formation of the PLO as an armed resistance group. 
The Palestinian Resista.llce in Lebanon had been growmg smce the late 1960s, 
pa.rticularly following the Cairo Agreement in 1969 which allowed the Palestinia.llS 
• -h- T' iO? n . T' , h to ca.rry out operatlons Hom LeDanon. - .... ney were usmg LeDanon's sout .... em 
border to carry out attacks into IsraeL These attacks, however, had consequences, as 
the Israelis retaliated with air raids into Lebanon. Although Syria had always been 
considered the Resistance's main sympathiser and most secure base, Lebanon did 
have the advantage of having a larger border with Israel. The Resistance was able to 
continue its attacks on Israel and operate independently because they had popular 
support. 
The fedayeen were able to capitalise on the strong backing of u~e Muslim half 
of the population, which identifies itself closely with pru"l-Arab national issue, 
101 Brynen, Rex Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Westview Press, Boulder 1990) p. 28 
For more examples of how the deuxieme Bureau ruled the camps see Salibi, Kamal S Crossroads to 
Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (Ithaca Press, London, 1976) 
102 See Chapter Three. 
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and on the strong general feeling of dissatisfaction with the goVelThllent's 
reaction -or rather lack of it - to the devastating Israeli raid on Beirut Ah-port 
on December 28th 1968. Moreover the growing number of disaffected 
intellectuals of all creeds who have become estranged from the political system 
... foULld in the issue of freedom of action for t.~e fedayeen from Lebanon a 
rallying cause with which to challenge the 'establishment,103.104 
Already by 1968, there was the potential for problems between the Palestinian 
Resistance and the Lebanese authorities. T..l1e PFLP attacked an Ei Al airliner m 
Athens. 105 Israel retaliated by attacking Beirut International Ah-port, This was 
Israel's first intervention into Lebanon, before the Cairo Agreement wid before the 
Leba.l1ese Civil War, However, this did not lead to a crack-down on the Resistance, 
but rather the opposite with the making of the Cairo Agreement. 
Five months prior to the Cairo Agreement there was a similar agreement proposed 
1 G 1 B 1 11 1 t 1 7 rn At· A '1' "68 106 Alt1 1 t1 oy Teneral ous~any callea .ne LlaUSe greemen., III pnl l'j. Inougn ne 
Cairo Agreement was accepted on 3rd of November 1969, the rejection of the 7 
Clause Agreement which was silnilar to the Cairo Agreement, shows the uncertainty 
wpich some of the Lebanese authorities had in granting the PalestiPians v~rious 
rights. Nevertheless, the Cairo Agreement ca..'TIe to fruition in November 1969, 
grantillg the Palestillians rights, including the light to ca.rry a.rms and attack Israel 
( 
1,1 l' l' l' .1' t 1 T 1 ) 107 T! . 1 t h ' al~nougn m coorama~lOn Wl~n .ne Leoanese army . .1 HIS marKs a vas. c~~ange m 
103 Jabber, Fuad "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics" in Quandt, William, Jabber, 
Fuad, and Lesch, Ann Mosely The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (University of Cali fomi a 
Press, Berkeley, 1974) p.193 
104 The ULliversities played an important role in u~e mobilisation process in the 1960's ,md 1970's. 
Many of the different student and left-wing groups supported the Palestinians and the Palesthlian 
Resistance. See the chapter by el-Khazen 'The Age ofIdeology and Mass Politics' in el-K.l'1azen, 
Ffu-id The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967-1976 (I B TaUL-is, London, 2000) 
105 See for instance Bulloch, John Death ofa country: The Civil War in Lebanon (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1977) 
106 Sayigh 1999 op. cit., p. 190 does not name the agreement but mentions that there was one between 
Boustany, President Helou and Arafat and that it did not take place. Al Jazeera in its documentmy 
harb-lubnan gives this agreement the nfulle of the '7 Clause Agreement' and eAplai"s that it was 
Pdme Minister Kfu-ameh who rejected it. 
107 See Chapter Three. 
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the lives of the Palestinjan refugees in Lebanon, both on an individual basis, 
regarding the ri~ht to work and so forth, as well as on a collective poiiticai basis, 
where t.~e Palestir...ian Resistance was given the opportur...ity to run the ca..'1lps as well 
as conduct a revolution. 
With hindsight, one can see that there was potential for problems deliving from the 
Cairo Agreement. In a sense, mixing the Lebanese state and Palestinian revolution 
together triggered problems for all parties involved: Lebanon, the Palestir...ians and 
Israel. Israel was attacked by Palestinia.ll guerrillas and Lebanon became the victim 
ofIsrael's revenge attacks. 
There was trouble brewing among these three parties even before the start of the 
civil war. The PLO moved its headquarters to Beirut in 1972. Tne Palestinian 
Resistance started to become more active towards Israel. Following the Munich 
Olympics attack, Israel started bombing southem Lebanon as revenge: 
In. September 1972, Lebatlon paid a heavy price for PLO-Israeli violence. LI 
direct retaliation for t.~e Munich operation, Israel ca..l~ed out t.~e most intensive 
la..ld atld air raid in south Lebanon to date. The operation went on for two days 
and resulted in a high casualty toll. 108' • 
The attacks from Israel into Leba..llon continued. The following year, on April 10, 
different interpretations. 109 However, the effect of it was increased h'lstabiiity witt.tin 
108 el-Khazen, Farid op. cit., p. 198 (};13! This author is known for his pro-Maronite views. 
Nonet.'1eless, many of his contributions are valid; however, in relation to specific viewpoints, his bias 
should be kept in mind). 
109 The Israelis landed in Beirut by sea meeting other Israelis already in Lebanon using false 
European passports. The attacks on Mohatw:nad Youssef al-MalJar and Katllal Adwan from Fatah 
and PLO spokesman Kamal Nassar took place hI Verdun and Sabra, both in Beirut. Among others 
killed were al-Majjar's wife, atld three Palesthlian guards. In t.~e Verdun area one Lebanese 
1t:Q 
.LVO 
Lebanon, which had been ta.ken by smpnse. The next tuming point for the 
-n 1 •• (' 1 T 1 "1 110 ralestlIl..lan remgees was tne Leoanese CIVIA war. 
The Start of the Lebanese Civil War 
The Civil War is often bla.llled on the Palestinians because the PLO had become 
such an orgapjsational force, with such a significant political influence, that it was 
considered a state witl>..in a state and thus a threat to the delicate nature of the 
LebfuJ.ese sectfu'"ifuJ. democracy.lll It is often thought that the LebfuJ.ese civil war 
started with Phalange (Maronite Militia) reacting to a shooting in a chmch in East 
Beirut by shooting at a bus carrying Palestipians on their way to Tal al Zaatar ca.rnp 
Lll April 1975. The shooting was also in pru1 due to a general feeling rullong t.he 
Phalarlge that the PLO had become an uncontrollable force in Lebanon. 
Followi_l1g the start of the Civil War, Palestinirul CrullpS in East Beirut witnessed 
sieges. The refugee camps of Tal al Zaatar and Jisr al Basha in East Beirut, as well 
as Dbayeh ca.'IlP close to Tripoli, suffered several sieges by the Phalange before they 
were eventually destroyed: 
policeman was killed and six injured. EI-Khazen, Fa.."id 2000 op. cit., p. 204. There are still 
unanswered questions: why were L~ese three men targeted and not other, higher ra..'lkh'lg PLO 
officials? One answer is clear, the attack destabilised Lebanon. Prll'11e Minister Salam resigned. 
110 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur) started on October 6u'1 1973 when Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli 
troops on their territory occupied,in 1967. There were 19 days of combat ending with a cease-fIre 
brokered by Kissinger and Kosygin on October 21 st. For the PLO the war had consequences in that 
what followed was various diplomatic processes from which L~ey could benefIt. Peace talks were 
proposed by Kissinger and Gromyko in December 1973, however these never flourished as there 
were questions as to who would represent the PLO (the PLO itself? But that would contradict its 
covenant a..'ld so forth) See Becker, Julian 1984 op. cit., p. 102-105 for more detail and other 
conferences. 
III See for example Bulloch, J01m. op. cit., 1977 Although it may be correct to assume that PLO 
armed resistance presence was a factor there are ot.her issues too that are relevant, such as student 
protests, protesti~T1g not just i.T1 solida.rity with the Palestinians, but raisi.T1g other import..ant issues, such 
as the need to reform the sectarian democracy, the need for more equality 
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On 3 January 1976 the Maronite militias started a full blockade of food, fuel, 
and medical supplies to 1:t~e Tal al-Zaatar, Jisr al-Basha, atid Dbayya refugee 
CatllPS.112 
Tlus action led the Resistance to resort to usmg force against the Lebanese 
Phalange. Fighting continued the whole month of january. Wbile tbis was 
happem'ng m' T<>l a1 Zaatar carrrln lOlnt Pa1estm' lan arc' T ebanese gronps Wl'th1n the 
..L..L ~ ~ ..L.L .I...l. U.i..l. ... '&'.l...!:-'", J .L.l....L ... ..l. .1. ....L..L ..I.. ..I.. L..J .I. ...... ~ ... .l...L..L.L.I..1. 
Leba..'1ese Nationai Movementll3 (LNM) at'"..acked Da..llour and nei&-~bouring 
villages. 114 These villages are south of Beirut and are part of a Christiai1 enclave. It 
was meant as a diversion to the Christian militias who were attacking Tal al Zaatar 
Ca..llp.115 Immediately followillg 1i~e Da..llour attacks there were massacres in 
Karantina as yet fu"'1other diversion, this time carried out by the Christian militia.1l6 
There were indiscri..rninate killings of residents and bulldozi..l1g of most homes. 
These diversions did not stop the blockade of Tal al Zaatar camp. By mid-March the 
Maropite Militias had reimposed their blockade on Tal al Zaatar refugee camp and 
the district of Naba'a. In Tal al Zaatar ca..'11P the situation went from bad to worse. 
By June, the smaller of the two canlps, Jis!" al-Basha, had fallen. Tal al Zaatar ca..mp 
was still ll.l1der blockade and there was a serious shortage of medical supplies, food 
and water. ii7 The end of the siege ca..'11e in Il'id-August when the last water tap ra..'1 
dry. Defenders of the camp could no longer fight a..nd the camp fell to the MaJ.·01ute 
ii2 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 372 
i13 The LNM worked together with the PLO in what is called the 'joint forces'. The Mourabitoun was 
also involved with the joint forces. The Mourabitoun was a Nasserist organisation led by Ibrahim 
Kleilat. Their alliances durillg the war were mostly with the joint forces and, following the Israeli 
invasion, with the Druze. 
114 Salibi, Kamal 1976 op. cit., p. 150 
115 More detail on militat-y engagement of the two sides during the Tal al-Zaatar and Damour conflict 
available hi Bulloch, John op. cit., p. 100-106 
IIGKarantina was a poor shantytown. During this episode there were also at'"..acks on equally poor 
neighbouring Maslakh. Bulloch describes Karatitina thus; "pitiful shanty towns, inhabited by the 
poorest of the poor - so abject was the poverty of Karantina that a previous government surrounded it 
by a higt~ wall to prevent it offendhig the eyes of motorists" Bulloch, John op. cit., p. 194 
117 The lack of water and medicine had severe consequences; malnutrition and diseases. For more on 
this pat-ticular siege, referred to as 'the siege of Tal al-Zaatar see Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 398 
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militias. 11 8 Syria intervened1l9 in Leba..'1on, and a cease-fire was implemented. The 
cease-tire wid settlement u"'1at was worked out resulted in a revised constitution and a 
new, written, national covenant, and the Cairo Agreement was fully Ltnplemented.120 
The 1982 Israeli Invasion 
The immediate background to the Israeli invasion raises a variety of issues. The 
most immediate was the assassination attempt in JlLlle, 1982, on the Israeii 
Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, by a Palestinian group led by 'Abu 
Nidal' .121 T.his gave the Israelis a pretext to invade Lebanon in order to wage a war 
on the Palestinians there. The other reason was that, prior to 1982, there was 
growing activity between the liF a..l1d the Palestipjans. Israel hoped it could secure a 
friendly northern neighbour by supporting the Christian Leba..'1ese Forces. 122 As the 
Israeli forces moved up the country it had to go through and 'capture' vw-ious towns 
and refugee ca..tnps. rne longest battle between the PLO a..l1d the IDF was in 
Rashjdiyeh camp where the PLO managed to hold out an entire week. The Israelis 
1 i8 The ICRC evacuated 334 wounded and 500 children in August. Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 
AAA 
'+VV 
i i 9 Syria intervened prior to the fall of Tal-al Zaatar in June. In January they sent in Syrian backed 
Palestinian forces, a.'1d in June Syrian forces entered Lebanon. For more detail see Dawisha, Adeed 
Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (St M~~'1's Press, New York, 1980) p. 99-139. Most of the groups 
accepted Syrian intervention (even Maronite groups) except for Shamoun. Salibi op. cit., p. 155-159. 
120 Salibi, Kamal op. cit., p. 159 
121 According to British poiice it was Iraqi intelligence, not the PLO, who was behind this 
assassination attempt. (Guardia.'1 7th March, 1983; also Sayig.~ 1999 op. cit., p. 523). Apparently the 
Israelis had been prepar~'1g their invasion prior to ti-..is event. 
122 Researchers from Israel's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies na.T.e the main goals tmder t.~e vision 
of Defence Minister Aliel Sharon as 1) creating a 28 mile PLO free zone in southern Leba.'1on; 2) 
making sure Syrian troops leave Lebanon; 3) destroying the PLO forces especially in Beirut; and 4) 
ma."'<.ing a peace treaty with the Maronites, who they wanted as leaders of Lebanon. They mention two 
other implicit objectives by Sharon that would be the outcome of the other four; complete and eternal 
Israeli control over the West Bank a.'1d Gaza strip, and the maki.'1g of a Palestinian state in Jordan. 
For more i.'1formation see Feldma.'1, Shai and Rechnitz-KUner, Reda Deception, Consensus and War: 
Israel in Lebanon (Paper No. 27, October 1984, Tel Aviv University Press, Israel, 1984). 
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managed to move northwards eventually reaching Beimt. Originally, it seems that, 
the IDF was not intending to go all the way to Beirut, but to stay approximately 40 
ki' tr fT t' b ' i23 TWh t t' t· t' ID~' ., 't tt' lOme es ...... om .ne oraer. ~ a.ever .ne mO.lve, .ne 1 l' aeeta.ea .0 a.taCK 
Beimt. Dming 'The Battle of Beirut' the PLO and other Lebanese militias 
cooperated, depending on what area they were defending. For example in the 
southern suburbs the Shiite group, AWlAL, helped defend the area with the PLO. 
There was also help from the LNM in other areas. 124 The IDF had the Christian 
Leballese militia (the Lebanese Forces) on its side. 
In August 1982 the United States brokered a deal between the Israeli government 
and the PLO. The PLO was forced to move its forces, along with Chairman Arafat, 
out of Lebanon. They eventually moved to Tu..'1is. "The Upited States promised 
safety and secmity for the Palestinians left behind, as the PLO would not be there to 
, A ,. . 'f. . ,,125 AfI' . f protect lnem. mUltmatlOnal ~orce was sent m . ~er tne evacuatIon o· 
Chahrm~'l Arafat and the PLO, Lebanon elected a new President, Basl>ir Gemayel. 
The sequence of events leading up to the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, the next major 
event, are as follows: on 10 September, US Multinational forces left. On 14 
September, Italian, British, ~'ld French multinational forces left and the newly-
elected President Gemayel was assassinated. On 15 September the IDP entered 
B . ., , , S ' 'S'·' fu (B . , elrut once agam ana surroUllaea aora ana natlla re~ 1gee camps OUI] el 
Barajneh e~'11p was surrou..'lded by the Lebanese army at tl>is point). At tl>is stage 
123 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 528 
124 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 528 
125 Siegal, Ellen 2001 "After Nineteen Years: Sabra and Shatila Remembered" Middle East Policy 
(Vol. VIII, No 4, December 2001) p. 90 As an eyewitness, she remembers water, electricity, food 
and medicine behig cut off by the IDF in West Belt-lit. 
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Lhere was no strong PLO or Multinational Force to protect the refugees from what 
was about to happen. 
On 15 wId 16 September, Eitwi and Amir Drori, coml11wlder of the IDF 
norti.ern front, met Lebanese Forces hltelligence chief Elie Hobeika (Hobayqa) 
... and agreed that Li.e militia would enter Sabra WId Shatila to kill wId capture 
remaining PLO personnel. The IDF transported several hlliidred militiamen to 
Shatila in the morning of 16 September, and provided wireless commlliJications, 
aIlliullilition, food rations, and night-time illUillhlation for the next 48 hours 
while the Lebanese Forces conducted a systematic slaughter of every living 
thhlg, human or anhual, they met. Much of the killing took place on the mahl 
road of Shatila, h"! plain view of Israeli posts on the ridge above. Israeli 
roadblocks in Sabra tllt-ned back tell~fied refugees tryhlg to flee, and hundreds 
of prisoners were herded hlto the nearby sports stadium, where, hI the presence 
of Israeli officers, Maronite gllilluen led young men away for execution126.127 
Estimates vary of the number of refugees who died in tlus massacre. Many refugees 
were wissing and others were found dead in mass graves. There is the conservative 
Israeli esti..'Ilate of 700 people dead; however, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross CICRC) reported 1,500 dead and an independent international 
commission reported 2,750.128 
Following the massacre the multinational forces decided it would be wise to retLml 
to Beirut. The Israeii troops withdrew from Beirut on 29 September, and stayed just 
south of Beirl.lt for the following year. 
126 Yezid Sayigh (Sayigh tells us that lti.e Israelis also contributed to interrogation in the sports 
stadilliu; which is also documented in Schiff WId Ya'ari Israel's Lebwlon War (Unwin Paperbacks, 
London, 1986) 
127 For eyewitness reportS, see Shahid, Leila "Testimonies: The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-
Witness ReportS" Journal ofPalesfllle Studies (Vol. xxxii, No 1, Autlillln 2002) 
128 Sayigh, Yezid, 1999 op. cit., p. 539 (the international commission COlliit is taken from "Israel in 
Lebwlon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of 
International Law by Israel during its Invasion of Lebwlon" (Ithaca Press, London, 1983) 
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What were the consequences of the PL0129 withdrawai from Beirut h'1 1982? First, 
they did not completely withdraw. Arafat returned to Tripoli. There were continued 
battles in Tripoli, particularly between Fatah and dissidents of Fatah. 130 The second 
consequence of the PLO withdrawal was the marki..l1g of the end of the phase of the 
'hey-day' of the Resistance movement in Lebanon. Lebanon was no longer a state of 
'sanctua..ry' for the Resistance Movement. The Resista..'1ce had been active in aImed 
action for over fifteen years, and the end of this phase was marked by major choices 
for the Resistance movement regarding what methods and progra..rp..mes it should 
henceforth adopt. It was now scattered among various Arab states, and its options 
for the il11 .. mediate futme were difficult to assess. 
AMAL and the War of the Camps 
Between 1985 and 1987 another longer battle was to take place. This time the battle 
, , S,·· Af' 1 M ' T' .. 131, 1._ , was oetween tne illlte group TWCl:l a~-l mqawa..'lla al-LuonaP~l.1a, Detter l'J1own oy 
its acronym AMAL, and the Palestinia..'1 refugees witrin the ca..'llpS in Beirut and in 
Southem Lebanon. TIllS confrontation is referred to as the 'War of the Camps', and 
129 T"" 1 r 1 T"'I" .• .... r S . 1 Y . 1 " ....... 1 •• !'or a general assessment or tne ralest!llIan mmtary perronnance see aylgn, .. eZlQ ralest!llIa .. l} 
Military Performance in the 1982 War" Journal ofPalestin.e Studies, Vol. xii, No.4, SUuliller 1983 
130 The argwllent started wiL~ a memorandwll given by Abu Musa in 1983, discussing the problems 
the Resistance had faced since the Israeli invasion. The problems encow,tered were fragmentation of 
political parties and criticism of the Fez Accord calling for the establisi:unent of a Palesti"ian state in 
the West Ba.ik a.,d Gaza Strip; L~ereby implicitly acknowledging Israel). For excerpts of the 
memora.,dum see "Arab Reports and A.,alysis" in Jow-nal ofPalesti"e Studies (Vol. xxiii, No.1, 
Fall 1983) (1',TB! Abu Musa was within the opposition i"side Fata.~ when he opposed the Fez plan. 
The PFLP, PFLP-GC, Sai'qa and PPSF also opposed the plan) For more on the PLO followi"g its 
withdrawal from Lebanon see Sahliyeh, Emile The PLO After the Lebanon War (Westview Press, 
London, 1986) 
131 For more information on this group see Norton, Augustus Richard AMAL and the Shi'a: Struggle 
for the Soul of Lebanon (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1987). See also Ajami, Fouad The 
Missing Ima.ll (I B Taw-is, London, 1986) on L~e origi"al fOwlder Musa al-Sadr who disappeared in 
Libya 1978. For short and condensed material on AMAL see for instance Hamzeh, A. Nizar 
"Isla.llism i" Lebanon: A Guide to Groups" Middle East Quru'1:erly (Vol. 4, No.3, September 1997) 
or Deeb, Ma.-ius "Shia Movements in Lebanon: their formation, ideology, social basis, and links with 
Iran and Syria" Third World Qua.'1:erly (VoL 10, No.2, April 1998) 
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led to the destruction of many camps and wide dispersal of, and casualties among, 
the Paiestipians. 
The Shiite - Palestinian relationship is a complicated one. Initially it seems that 
Palestinians a.l1d Shiites, particularly 111 Southern Lebanon, got along and 
"Palestinian orgarisations had successfully recruited Shiites into their rar.u.~s for 
several years. At the same time, however, Palestinians competed with Sbiites in the 
, '1' , t ' . t t" 132 'T" S"'t j rt 't c: 't' j lOcal aoour marKe s, engenaenng resenmen. 1 ne IDles s~area . 0 :Leel na~ 
they were being dominated by Palestinia..'1 forces in their own country. This may 
seem stra..nge as the PLO and a..n_lled guerrillas were forced to leave Lebanon in both 
1982, from Beirut, and again in 1983, from Tripoli. However, armed fighters had 
retu ... 'TIed again a..'1d there was rea..'1lling witi'in the camps. 133 
Abu...Khalil explains the re-emergence of the AWtAL movement and sympathy for it 
by the common perception that the PLO was guilty of excesses a.l1d misconduct 
h" • ,. d h T , • • • S h T' 134 ,"In. ' w ... ..lcn 111 tu...'TI allenate t ... e LeDanese maJonty 111 out ... em LeDanon. IV Hen the 
Israelis first invaded in 1978, they were able to manipulate and ta..l(e advantage of 
the rift between the Lebanese inhabitarIts of Southern Lebanon a.l1d the Paiestinia.l1s. 
132 Hudson, Michael "Palestinians and Lebanon: The Common Story" Journal of Palestine Studies 
(Vol. 10, No 3, September 1997) p. 253-254 
133 For evidence ofthis Brynen points to Israeli iIitelligence that estimated that about 2000 Palestinian 
fighters had returned to Beirut by 1984. Whereas the Middle East Contemporary Sw-vey (MECS-
Dayan Center, Tel Aviv 1984-85) estimated that there were about 10,000 armed PalestiIlians in 
Lebanon. However how many of these fighters were returning fighters and how many were 
Palestinian residents in the camps that took up arms to protect themselves in the war of the camps, 
remains unknown. Bryner.., Rex 1990 op. cit., nt 30, p.230 
134 AbuK.,.alil refers to two ot.,.er factors hlvolved in the re-emergence of AMAL. The Iranian 
revolution and the charismatic leader Musa al-Sadr. AbuKhalil, As'ad "Shiites and Palestinians: 
Underlying Causes of the AW~L Palestinian Conflict" p. 10 in Hagopiful, Elah"1e AW~ and the 
Palestinians: Understanding the Battle of the Camos (Arab World Issues, Occasional Papers, Nu.uber 
9, Association of Arab-American Graduates Inc, Massachusetts, 1985) 
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Thus, according to AbuKhalil, initially, it seemed that the Lebanese inhabitants 111 
S -, T 1 1 1 l' T ,. 1 1 1 ,'. 1 1 1 135 outnern Leoanon welcomeo ~ne Israens, rutnougn ~ms was ~o cnange later on. 
The War of the Camps included Sabra a..lld Shatila and Bomj el Barajneh in Beimt 
and Rashadiyeh in Southern Leba..Tlon. Bou..tj el Barajneh suffered several sieges, 
when food and fuel were not getting into the ca.'1lP and there was constant shelling 
- • -h 136 S1-. ·1 d· -. d· hi h and smper .lIre. .l.latha camp too was lit'} er SIege several tImes mmg tl ·s PI ase 
of the war. 137 There were several 'rolli"1ds' of this war and several sieges. The first 
one bega..11 on 19 May, 1985,138 in Sabra ca..rnp and then moved on to both Shatila 
and Bomj e1 Barajneh. TIns round offig..hting ended on 17 June, 1985, with a cease-
fire between the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF)139 and Al\1AL in 
Da.'1lascus. With trjs agreement the Palestipjans agreed to give up their heavy 
weapons. 140 There were still clashes between AMAL and the Southern ClliupS 
135 AbuKhalil in discussing ANIAL attitudes to the Israeli invasion, mentions that although not 
uniform, many AMAL regional leaders aIld members initially welcomed the Israelis, because of the 
three factors referred to above (PLO excesses and misconduct, Iranian Revolution, and the 
disappearance of Mus a al-Sadr), although AJ.\1AL did eventually shift to an anti-Israel posture. 
AbuKhalil, As'ad 1985 op. cit., 
i36 There are witness accounts of the sieges ofBolilJ el Barajneh see Rosemary Sayigh's article "The 
t~ird siege ofBoliIj Berajneh camp: a woman's testimony" Race and Class (Vol. 29, part 1, Summer 
1987). The sieges were not yet over when t~is testimony was written. For another eye-witness 
accolil,t see Cutting, Pauline Children of the Siege She was a nliIse who stayed at the hospital in 
BOlliJ el Barajneh camp dUIing the sieges. Both testimonies cooberate certain gruesome elements of 
t~e siege, for eXrullple, dlli":illg cease-files when women were supposed to be allowed to leave the 
camp to get food (fuel was not allowed) they would be snipered at and killed. M,my were not allowed 
to retliIn and some had t~eir accompanYh,g children killed in front of them. 
137 There are eyewitness accounts ofthe Shatila sieges too; Sayigh, Rosemary Too Many Enemies: 
The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (Zed Books, London, 1994), and Giarillou, Dr. Cl:ilis 
Besieged: A Doctor's Story of Life and Death in Behut (Olive Branch Press, New York, 1990). 
138 This is the day the actual fighth,g begru', however, AbuKhalil traces the beghl11ing of this first 
round to May 12th when the new leader of AMAL in the south, Daoud Daoud pronounced "We want 
their [palestinians] retuIll, but only to plli,ish them" (AI-Nahar 13 May 1985). Abu.T(halil, As'ad 1985 
op. cit., p. 12 
139 At the time the PNSF consisted of the PFLP (rejoined PLO h' 1987), t~e PFLP-GC, t~e PPSF, 
Saiqa and the Fatah dissidents of Abu Musa (later called Fatah Intifada). These groups were pro-
Syria 
140 This clause seems irrelevant as the Palestinians did not have ru'y heavy weapons in the refugee 
camps. As one journalist put it 'the Palestinians ... will be able to keep their assault rit1es, and other 
light personal weapons which leaves the situation exactly how it was before the siege began" Kifner, 
JOl:ill Palestinians in Settlements Bitter at Syria's Role New York Times, June 24th, 1985. in 
Hagopian, Elaine ed. op. cit., 
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following the agreement and again in Beimt in September and March 1986. On 19 
May, 1986, the second round began. As before, AlvlAL su.rrounded the ca.T!lpS with 
tan..lcs and the fighth'1g started. Syria...'1 troops intervened and the fighting died down 
in late June. However, more fighting began in what was to be called the third round, 
, . , 
Willcn 
began with an incident September 29 at the Rashidiyya refugee camp ... iIi 
which PalestirJifu,s allegedly fired on an AW~L patrol. AW~L imtllediately 
swtounded t.~e camp, demanding the swtender of all arms inside it. The 
demand was refused. By late October, the fighting had spread to Sidon and 
Beir-ut. In an effort to relieve the pressure on Rashidiyya, Palestinian forces ir, 
Sidon broke throug..~ AW~L lines November 24 to seize the strategic hilltop 
village of Maghdusha, overlookir,g the coastal hig..~way south of the city. 
AN~L' s military weaknesses became evident, Syrian special forces reportedly 
aided it in the battle for Shatila. At Sidon, I.~rael launched multiple air-strikes 
against Palestinian positions arow,d the city. I". 
The Beimt canlps were heavily shelled and there was a blockade of food and 
medical supplies. Refugees died, not only due to fighting but to sta.rvation and 
sickness. Again, Syria intervened and on April 7 lifted the sieges on the refugee 
camps. 
There are many important issues regarding the War of the Camps. First, AWlAL and 
their Shiite counterpart, Hizb'allah, were fighting throughout the -War of the 
Ca...'TIPS' . Therefore, AMAL was fighting on two fronts. 1.'1 addition, the 
M b· 14'") • • oura ItOun' ~ were also supportmg the Palestinians, thereby adding an extra 
enemy to tIght. Second, Syria intervened several times on behalf of AMAL llild 
helped to negotiate cease-fires. Syria's role in the War of the Ca.rnps is instmctive, 
not only when looking at the bigger 'Lebanese picture', where Syria allied itself 
with different sects, but also when looking at the -Palestinian picture'. Regarding the 
141 Brynen, Rex 1990 op. cit., p. 190 
142 See footnote 113 
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fomler, S)'lian. intervention on behalf of AWLAL was not necessarily because AM-.AL 
was one of its closest aliies, but because Syria did not want the PalestiPians and the 
lefll·st Lebarese gro"ps inclllding thp Mourahito"n 143 to t-:>lre control ~ln' is lpaa's to ~..L\." ..l. .J,. u.~ ,,L.L.L..J..\A- .1...1..1. .I.'-'..L V.L ""'-.I.., i..U..L""\... ..&...L'-..L.L. ~..&.."" " 
the 'Palestinian pictme', where the S)'l'ians wanted to disarm the Palestinian 
militants. There is also a..TJ.omer factor: the opposition groups supported by Syria. In 
effect, Syria wa..TJ.ted to get rid of Fata..1J. activists, but during the battle of the camps, 
the Palestinian groups, united in order to smvive. This was a ITliscalculation on 
S ., 1 AIM"" AT' rt 144 yna s ana . lL-\..L S par. 
In APlil, 1987, Syria took up positions smrolll1ding the camps in Beirut and 
managed to bring an end to ruv"lAL' s sieges of the camps. Later in April the 
Palestirians and A..VlAL negotiated an end to the siege of the camp in southern 
Lebanon. The siege was officially over. According to Abbas, the War ofthe Camps 
led to 80% of ShatiIa being destroyed, 60% of Bou.tj eI Bar~jneh, a..TJ.d 40% of 
R ., ...... 14':; .L aSl11myen. -
However, Syrian forces were now present. BI)'llen explains that "in the context of 
continued tensions between the PLO and Da..lllasCUS, the Syrian (and ruv"lAL) 
presence in Beirut meant the continuation of a de facto siege of the West Beirut 
refugee Cfu'TIPS".146 In May, 1987, the Cairo agreement was abrogated by a 
resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. This was very 
143 it is not entirely known how much the Mourabitoun and the LNM helped the Palestinians during 
the 'war of the camps'. The Mourabitoun ad.1!litted in interviews with al-Jazeera (harb lubnan) t.hat 
they did help (from outside t.he ca.1!lps) the Palesti.llians. 
144 For an insight into Syria's role in the first round of the war of the camps (also a brief analysis on 
Syria's earlier interventions) see A.ruri, Naseer "Pax-Syriana and t.he Palestinians in Lebanon" in 
Hagopian, Elaine ed 1985 op. cit., 
145 Abbas, MabJ!loud et al. op. cit., p. 381 
146 Brynen, Rex "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons" Jou..rnal of Palestine Studies, (VoL 
xviii, No.2, Winter i 989) p. 65 
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problematic for the variolls political groups left in Lebanon. In addition to these 
external problems, the PLO in Lebanon suffered iIlternal problems too. There were 
revived problems between Fatah and Abu Musa's Fata..~ (FataU dissidents, pro-
S)'lian) 111 May 1988 in Shatila camp and Bomj el Barajneh camp. The latter 
conquered over the former. However, in the southern camps, the situation was 
different as they were still being occupied by Israel and did not have Syrian 
intervention. Therefore, Lhe Arafat loyalists had more power there although power 
struggles also occurred there during this tLTJle. Fatah's stronghold stili remaLllS in the 
south. 
Post-TaU· 
The Taif Agreement marks the end of the Civil War in Lebanon. It was signed in 
Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989. It stipulated more distribution of power among the 
va..rious sects i..'l Parlia..'1lent. The sectarian system was to stay in Lebanon for the 
time being: the troi..K.a remains the sa.me - the President is Maronite, the Plime 
Minister Sup.Pi, a.lld the Spea.1(er of the House remains Shiite - although the powers 
given to each of these positions changed to allow more equality. Following the war, 
there were many important issues to be dealt with, such as rebuilding Lebanon and 
dealing with the Leba.llese displaced by the war. The Palestipians were, however, 
not part of the Taif agreement and their status in Lebanon remaL'led, and still 
remams, precarious. They are no longer govemed by the Cairo Agreement and 
therefore do not have any rights in Lebanon. Instead they are governed by va.rious 
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laws issued by the Ministry of Interior regarding their status, including issues of 
land ownership, work permits, and travel documents. 
Althou~h the Civil War in Lebanon is over, Syria's role in Lebanon is not. Since its 
first LTJtervention in 1976, Syria has had extensive influence over Lebanon and 
Lebanese politics. Syria's interests in Lebanon extend from secu..rity issues to 
economic and political ones. Ln relation to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon Syria's 
1 .. ~ 1 , .. .... ., 147 11" 1 1 1'" 1 T 1 
sponsorsmp or tne re.JectlOmst groups , as well as Its nara me towaras Israel, 
rna.lees it perceived as the comltry that, as Bashar Asad has said, 'will never be a 
sword to stab the Palestinians in the back' .148 This may be the case, but what does it 
really say about Syrian intentions towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? Syria 
has a firm hand regarding the current 'peace process' a.nd what it believes the 
outcome should be for t.he refugees: 1) the refugee problem must be solved as a 
whole (not on a country by country basis); 2) Lhe solution to the refugee problem 
m"st he basea' unon the 'n·ght of'ren1rn '· ana' 3' th". PalestlnlaI' AnthOMty shonla' not ..L.a. ...... " v 1:-' .1. \'..L..L ..L.L.J...L "'\,.4..L~., .L -' .L.l.V..L .L "'..L..L..L..L .L '-4 ... .L.1. ..t..I.'" .1. U. .L.L .... 
be alone in agreeing the fate of the refugees with the Israelis. The Arab host 
t . Tn 11 1 ' . , ,. t' t· t· 149 S· , , t' CoUll nes ~~~us: a so oe mVOlvea m nese negO.la.l0ns. yna alSO nas oner 
intentions with the 'peace process', namely to recover the occupied Golan Heights. 
There are two mai.n arguments regarding Syria's intentions vis-a.-vis the 'peace 
process'. Some argue that Syria wants to keep the Palestinians in Lebanon as a card 
to play against Israel h'1 order to recover the Golan Heights. T1>.1s relates to point 
three above, namely that any agreement with Israel about refugees should include 
147 The 'rejectiollist groups' or the Alliance ofPalesti-Dian Forces is an alliance of Pales till ian groups 
who oppose the Oslo process. They are based in and sponsored by Syria. These groups will be further 
explained below and in Chapter 6. 
148 Interview with Bashar Asad in al-Hayat by Joseph Samaha, October 27th 2000. Taken from 
Sayigh, Rosemary "Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: implantation, transfer or retu..rn?" Middle East 
Policy (VoL 8, No.1, March 2001) 
149 Sayigh, Rosemary 2001 op. cit., p. 7 
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the Arab host states. Others, (including Lebanese Maronites and others who are 
sceptical to Syria's intentions both in Lebanon a.TJ.d regarding the 'peace process' as 
well as the pro-Oslo Palestir..ian groups) argue that Syria prioritises itself over the 
refugee issue. According to this view, it is argued that "Syria ... values relations 
·1' S'··1 ' 1\.K ·1~' , ,. , . " ,,150 t' ·t' f' , . t· . f' Wl~n mLe ana Ivlarom.e leaaersmps more mgmy .nan WI n .ne r~lec.lOms. 
groups. 
In temlS of Palestinian politics much has happened sLnce the end of the Lebanese 
Civil War. The PLO moved to Tunis in 1982 a.TJ.d 1983. As we have seen in t:Pis 
chapter, they were unable to protect and (in many cases) provide for the refugees 
who remained in Lebanon. Meanwhile, in the Occupied Territories an Intifada 
(popular uprising) broke out in 1987. The PLO remained in Tu..'1is but retu~ .. rned to the 
Occupied Territories in 1994 after they had signed in 1993 their first, of many, 
peace treaty wiLlI Israel. Tills 'peace process' between the PLO and Israel started in 
1991 with an international peace conference, sponsored by the US and the Soviet 
Union in Madrid. Israel and Arab delegates (Palestinians represented alongside 
Jordan - not independently) were invited; however, these talks did not prove 
successful They did, however, lead to secret negotiations between the PLO and 
Israelis in Oslo which did end with an official agreement - The Declaration of 
Principles. In this agreement, there was official mutual recognition, in other words, 
the PLO recogr..ised the state of Israel ahd the Israelis recogr..ised that there did exist 
a Palestinian people with a right to self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The agreement stipulated that during a five year interim period, Israel would 
gradually withdraw from pa.rts of the West Ban."I( and the Gaza strip. Ot..~er issues 
150 Saygih, Rosemary 2001 op. cit., p. 7 
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related to the conflict, such as, Jerusalem, settlements, secmity arrangements, 
borders, a..'1d importantly in the context of tpis thesis, refugees, were to be dealt with 
at a later stage. The withdrawal from the Occupied Territories ca.'Ile with several 
conditions, mostly about seeming Israeli secmity. Because this treaty was tlle result 
of secret talks, there was no referendu..TI1 by the PalestiPian people. Similar 
agreements were signed in 1995 and in 1998 in Wye. These agreements fe-state that 
Israel will withdraw from the Occupied Teuitories conditional upon Israeli secmity, 
however; again the important issues to the conflict were not properly addressed. 
S'1'Yl,lar1v '11·f:e fior the Pa1estl·m·ars l,v,ng 'n the Wpst Bark ana' Gaza a'l·a' not ilil .. Ll. ..I..] ,..L .J. " .... ..1. ..L .L ..I...&...I...I.....l...L.L.L... .... "" " .LI. .I. .L.l.. ... 
improve. Although the Israeli army had withdrawn from some towns and villages in 
the West Ba..'1k and Gaza, these towns and villages were isolated from other towns 
and villages, with the Israelis controlling the areas around them as well as the main 
roads. Palestinian sovereignty, or at least pa.rtial sovereignty, was supposed to have 
, d' '''''8''''''''· ri·' . tyh' " "1998 ' ·t nappene oy 1':J':J • Ims PaI.Ial-SOverelgn. au nor nappeneu oy ~ , nor nas L 
happened today as the Palestinia..'1 Authority (PA) is unable to have jurisdiction over 
its people, tillable to provide seclllity, unable to allow its people to travel freely 
witpin what is meant to be its own territory, a..'1d, as we have already seen L'1 the 
previous chapter, 1L'1able to provide basic provisions of citizensr,jp such as passports. 
The year 2000 proved to be a year that started with hope for Israeli withdrawal but 
ended with violence, reoccupation, and failed peace plans. L'1 May, the Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Bara..1( ar..nounced the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern 
Lebanon after 22 years of occupation. This was greeted by Palestinians as a sign of 
Israeli intentions to withdraw from Arab la..'1ds including their own. In july, Arafat 
and Barak met in Camp David to discuss yet another peace treaty. The Camp David 
182 
talks collapsed, as the two parties fail to agree on, most notably, Jemsalem. Two 
months later, Ariel Sharon151 visited the al-Aqsa mosque, provoking violent 
t· -tr P' t·· A ' . t . -f. db' fi ht· t " reac.lOns Hom ... ales.L'nans. secona m.l ... a a ega..'1 a..'1a ..... g ... umg erup.ea Detween 
Palestinians and the Israeli army. In response Israel decided to re-occupy the 
Palestinian Territories. L'1e next month Egypt hosted a peace s~TP.mit at Sha.rm el-
She1k}h trylng to e"a' the CO"-tro"tat10n between the"two parrt1es hllt the p1ar AlA not .1..1. .1..1. .L \. ... ~ " .l..L .I. .l..L.L..L.L.l. ".I. .L .L.L .L.L ~ \.... ., U\A.\. .. ..L.L _.L .L ""-.1.'"-I..L ... 
succeed. 
The following years are marked wiLh. violence as well as the Israeli construction of a 
wall to enclose the West Ba..11k. In 2002 there was a marked increase of 
assassinations and imprisonment of Palestinian leaders by the Israelis. Arafat's 
headquarters in RamaHah was besieged with most of it demolished and Arafat 
unable to leave. Reoccupation of land as wen as assassinations of Paiestirian leaders 
continued by the Israelis as well as violence from the second intifada and suicide 
attacks by PalestiPians. In 2003, an Arab peace initiative to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was proposed in Saudi Arabia called the Saudi Plan. It insists on Israeli withdrawal 
from the Occupied Territories in renml for Arab recognition of Israel. The latest 
peace treaty is the Roadmap presented to the PA and the Israelis in 2003. Again this 
treahr ls not u:TJ.·tho"t pr ohleITls the ITla1" ones 1"C111A1"g Vam1P"eSS 0" Aefin1 t10nS .1. ..... ).L ~ VV \..1..1. \.4.... .L v ... .1..1..1. ., ".1..1. .l..I..1...L.L.L .L.L .L.L.I. ..Lu.u.-.L.L.L b\A.Y.l...I. .1..1. u.- ..L.l..I.Ll..1. .1..1. , 
sequencing (who does what when), and the lack of real issues like refugees, as was 
the problem with all of t.1-te agreements above. The agreement is more about ending 
violence, halting new settlements, reform of the Palestirian institutions and Israel's 
secmity. All the other issues are to be addressed in final status negotiations. 
151 Sharon has been accused of being a main player in the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, see p. 174-
175. 
183 
Although lIDofficial, the Geneva initiative, signed by Amran Mizna and Qadoura 
Faris in 2003, is the agreement that actually deals with most of the vital issues. In it 
jerusalem is addressed whereby jerusalem is to be split. East jerusalem will be the 
capital of the Palestinian State, although the Jewish quarters in this area will be 
under Israeli control. The Old City is under Palestinian control with two exceptions, 
the Wailing Wall and the jewish Quarter. Refugees are also addressed - with the 
solution to the problem being according to lJN General Assembly Resolution 194 
and Secu.rity Council Resolution 242. Palestinians may receive compensation and 
they will be able to retu ... '11 to the new State of Palestine. Refl.lgees wanting to retu .... '11 
to Israel will have to gain the approval of the Israeli authorities. Although this 
solution remai..l1s unpopular for refugees wanti..l1g to retmn to their original homes, 
this agreement does at least try to deal with the issue. Nevertheless, the fact that this 
agreement was made unofficially shows how broken the peace process is at the 
moment. 
What seems to be the problem with all of these agreements (save the unofficial 
Geneva accords wpich has other problems) is that they all neglect the important 
issues such as refctgees, Jerusalem, and borders, which are the core problems to the 
conflict. In addition the agreements are conditioned upon Israeli security, which the 
P A cannot guarantee. The P A ca.l1llot guarantee this security for practical reasons, 
such as not having jmisdiction in towns, police stations being demolished by the 
Israelis and so forth. Arafat, for example in 2003, was accused of 'not doing enough 
to stop terror', wpile he was imprisoned in his Ramailah compound. There are other, 
more serious, reasons too, that may be related to this, including dismrity between 
Palestinians of those who believe in the peace process and that Israel will eventually 
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withdraw, and those who do not. 
As a result of the many peace agreements signed by the PLO and Israel, there exist 
many groups who oppose this peace process. These groups joined to form the 
Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) h'11993 and origh'1aily inciude ten factions: the 
PFLP, the DFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PLF, the PPSF, the Palestinian Revolutionary 
C ." T"' 1 T ..... 1 S' "TT 1 TT .. MAS ,",,1 APT"" 1 l' ommll.1)lst rarty, rata.11 mtHaaa, alqa, rlJ, ana l:"lAl l.i • Ine r IS oasea III 
Daruascus and has Syrian sponsorship. The relationship with Syria is not new as 
many of the groups were ah'eady headquartered Ln Syria or Lebanon prior to the 
formation of the APF. As we shall see later, many of these groups are popular in 
Lebanon, not only because many of them were actually founded in Lebanon, but 
precisely because they do not agree with the Peace Process. 
The Peace Process and its many agreements, as well as the events in the Occupied 
Territories are worrying for the Palestinian refhgees living in Lebanon for several 
reasons: 
show the refugees in Lebanon that Israel is not willing to make peace with the 
PalestiDians. Even if the Israelis were willing to follow the agreements a second 
point is that: 
2) None of the agreements bring up the refugee issue properly by addressing how 
the refugee issue wight be resolved. Furthermore, the status of Palestinians who 
were displaced by the 1967 War is not addressed at all in any of the agreements. 
3) The agreements stipulate a two-state solution where a Palestinian state is based in 
pa..rts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thereby worrying refugees originally from 
what is considered Israel proper about being able to retu.rn there. 
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4) Based on point three the entire Issue of right of retm'll and compensation, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, has not been adequately discussed. The Roadrnap 
stipulates an 'agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refhgee issue' wrich is 
not only worrying as it does not mention 'the rig.ht of retmn' but also because the 
word 'realistic' is perceived to be in the Israeli sense. In other words, the perception 
is that the Israelis consider a right of retu .. rn and· adequate compensation as 
'lU1realistic' . 
5) Palestinian refugees in Leba.llon are in a pighly precarious situation. Many worry 
that, hypothetically, if a provisional Palestirian state were occur because of the 
Roadmap and be able to grant citize!lsnip or at least passports, at the same time as 
1 .~ •• 1 1 1 "rG] f T 1 • 1 tne remgee Issue IS not resOlvea tne L T overnment 0 Leoa.1l0n I!11gnt attempt to 
a'eport so""e Pa1est;n;<>ns tA the new ent;ty in rleea' a protractea' scen<>no uThprp ~.I." .l..l..l..L..t. \,..LJ...Ll.(..Li..l. \.'" "'.LJ.. .1..1.\..1.",.. ..... .LI..l.~ ., ~.l. L-.L" .l..l.u..i..l. "'V.L.A.""'''''V 
final political agreement on the refugee issue might be delayed for many years could 
create serious problems for refugees in Leba.llon. Faced with a lack of LT!lIPinent 
resolution ofthe issue, the Leba..'lese govern.1Jlent might intensify economic and legal 
pressmes on Palestinian refugees to encomage them to leave the country by 
.. .,.. .,., 152 rpl .. .. d .. 1 ·1 .. .. 1 .. 
wnatever means pOSSlOle. 1 ms scenano oes not seem LTIlptaUSlOle conslGermg 
what has been shown in both tris chapter on the r.istorical context as well as the 
previous chapter dealing with the legal issues sUlTounding the Palestinian refugees. 
i52 Brynen, Rex "The Roadmap llild the Refugees" Presentation at the Stoc~..aking Conference on 
Palestinian Refugee Research Ot-..awa, Canada, June 17-20,2003, p. 5-6 
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Conclusion: Understanding the Palestinian Situation in Lebanon 
The historical context surrounding the Palestinian refugees involves intemational, 
regional a.TJ.d local dimensions. In the section of tpis chapter focusing on the na.1<.ba, 
the myths surrounding the 'Voluntary Exodus' are challenged. L'1e literature 
focusing on vollmtary migration seems to be vulnerable to the new docmnents that 
have been declassified. There is still discussion as to whether the refugee flow 
occurred because of policy, or whether it was an outcome of the war. No matter 
which viewpoint one ta.kes, the Palestinian refugees have not been able to retlLrn. 
The second part of this chapter focused on the fonnation of the Palestinian 
Resista.l1ce, the 1967 War and the jorda.11ian Civil War. Prior to the 1967 War the 
Palestinian Resistance believed that pan-Arabism was the answer to their problems. 
Others witpin the Resista.TJ.ce were sceptical about pan-Arabism. The 1967 War had 
several consequences: first, Israel occupied the West Bar..k a.l1d Gaza Strip and more 
Palestinians became refugees. Second, the Arab states were faced with the new 
reality of Israeli power and occupation. Tpird, the Palestinian Resistance, because of 
t1:>is second POhl1t, realised that they had to be more independent and fig,.~t for 
Palestine before t.he Arab world could change, as had been the ideal of pan-Arabism. 
A.TJ.other issue was change of location of the Resistance from Palestine to other host 
states. Tne September war in Jorda.l1 forced the Resistance to cha.l1ge their base of 
operations, and again reinforced the view that they could not always rely on the 
u.l1ending support of Arab regimes. The Palestinian Resista.l1ce did try to take the 
initiative from inside Israel a.l1d the Occupied Territories, and pursued II'ilita.ry 
campaigns from there. However, tlus did not succeed, so they slufted their bases to 
jordan, Lebanon and Syria. "From then on it was the reality of exile that shaped 
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strategy and tactics and detemlilled the balance between military, political, social, 
d · t· fl t· 1 t··" 153 '1""'1· 1 • 1 1 t ' . 1 Ar 1 ,. • f 1 • an mS.1...!.lonat ac.lvlty. IP.lS alSo mvolvea .nem m tne aD pontlcs o~ tnerr 
host co"ntn·p s anA thPY wprp t'n
"
s "exposea' to mass
'
ve Arab st<>te lnterventl·on" i54 
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The move from Palestinian soil to host countlies had massive implications for the 
movement, and for the Palesti..rrians in exile, in p~rticular during the September War 
in jordan and the Lebanese Civil war. 
The period starting from approximately around the time of Black September lllltil 
1982 was marked by i..l1creasing political, organisational ~l1d milit~ry activity in 
Lebanon. In addition to tris., it was a tL.1Jle that included "u..11ion action., cultural 
endeavours, ru'1d the building of social institutions".155 Apru1: from this, the 
Palestinian Resistance was joined by oL,er Lebfulese groups fuld pfu-ties who were 
disillusioned with the status quo. The Lebanese civil war changed the situation for 
the Palestinians in Lebanon drastically. There were many massacres and sieges at 
different camps, and the PLO was forced to withdraw. Th.e end of the Cairo 
Agreement meant that they could no longer ca..rry out their revolution from Lebanon. 
The Taif agreement ended the war in Lebanon. The Palestinians living in post-civil 
war Lebanon do not enjoy the rights they had during the Cairo Agreement. 
Meanwr..ile, the PLO has moved back to Palestinian soil and is involved with a 
peace process that, so far, has not been able to adequately address the refugee issue. 
All of the above sets the scene for, and gives a context to, the Palestinian refugees 
living in the camps today. Today, they live, after over fifty years in exile, in harsh 
and llllcertain conditions. 
i53 Sayigh, Yezid 1992 op. cit., p. 265 
154 Ibid. p. 265 
i55 Suleiman, Jaber "Report from Lebanon: The Current Political, Organisation and Security Situation 
in The Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vo1. XXIX, No 1, 
Autumn 1999) p. 67 
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This chapter seems to indicate many reasons for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
to mobilise LTltO groups and (re)act against their conditions, There is clearly a 
perceived injustice, not just in terms of their general living conditions a..'1d lack of 
adequate legal status and protection, which are all consequences of this historical 
context, but also in terms of a) isolation, alienation, and (often) hostility from their 
host state a..'1d b) the 'bigger picture' of the injustice done to them throughout their 
diaspom history - the nakba, their experiences in Jordan as well as their experiences 
in Lebanon, Ail of these experiences - forced !Iligration, hostility from host states, 
massacres - are ada'ed to the Palpstlnlan ref'llgee (collpf'tlve l lrlentl'ty W'lth not'nm' g .I...L..L " L.I..L .I. ..1.,"" .. ..L.l..L.L .L.L.I. ........... .I..l.VV.l. l.J..-'.I."". .I.&..I...L.l...L......I. 
much left to lose, it would seem likely that the refugees in Lebanon would try to not 
, , '" 1 t j j "(p , ')" t' omy mOOlllse, ou. ~o ac~ on tIllS ercelVea lIlJus.lce, 
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Chanter Five 
The Structures Surrounding the Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon 
Introduction 
The societal context is of utmost importa.nce in any kind of understanding of a) 
people's defipition of themselves, b) people's deflPition of their collective identity, 
"'nrl c1 neon1e's o'efin;tl'on OI~ w'no constl'hutes t'h'" 'oth"'r' ",no' notent;a1 threats W;th Ui~u. J ¥ y..L ..L~~".1. .I. .I. .. ".. .1..1."'" .I..I.V.I. u..a..... 1:-' .. ..L..I.'-.1. ..I. IL..I.L.L • .l.U.l. 
an understanding of the societal context, these questions can all be answered, 
However, the societal context by itself may also be able to create ~1l understanding 
of political mobilisation, By itself it can explain the social forces at work in the 
smrOllldings of the Palestinian refugees living in the refugee ca.mps, These social 
forces, it will be argued, do in fact have a be~r1~llg upon mobilisation, l..'1ese social 
forces include the present structural context as well as P..istorical and legal contexts 
outlined earlier. Structures will be looked at th...rough the lenses of Lebanese 
governmental policies for Palestwians and the Palestipian refugee's interpretation of 
these policies, As we saw earlier in the P..istorical chapter, policies regarding 
Palestil1ia.n refhgees have changed du..ring the years, for instance regarding laws 
treating them as foreigners in comp~r:ison to the more tolerant years of the Cairo 
Agreement, lJNKWA and its role in the camps a..'ld lives of the refugees will also be 
exa.mined, The structmal context also allows for an examination of hlllla!l needs: 
what needs are met and what needs are not met. l..'1is final p~rt on hu..rnan needs will 
be use:fhl for the next two chapters on orgar..isations and identity, as hu..'11an needs (or 
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lack thereof) are also subject to interpretation, CLnd can be seen as mobilising factors 
in and of themselves. 
Governmental Policies Towards Refugees and tawteen 
When the refugees arrived in 1948 most of them believed t..heir situation to be 
temporary. The lJl-J too believed it to be temporary. Even after the creation of 
UNRWA there was no comprehension that the refhgees would still be living in 
refugee camps over half a centu..ry later. The conditions in the refugee camps in the 
early years were Lrnprovised and primitive, as it was originally thought that the 
emergency relief a.'1d tents were needed only on a tempora.ry basis. 
I am Palestinia., a.,d my family came here in 1948 like most of the other 
Palestini,Uls [here in Lebanon] ... The situation was very miserable [then] ... 
We lived a.,d still live in a situation that is non-human, a very tellible situation. 
During my childhood ... we lived in tents between the sewage and when it used 
to rai., every-thing i.,cluding the tents used to float. 1 
Today the tents have been replaced with concrete blocks or mud and wooden 
structures with tLll ceilings. T.'1e standard of livLllg remains rather basic. In Lebanon 
the ca.'TIpS are restricted in size and are not allowed to move outwards, therefore the 
concrete shelters have had to be built upwards. Water, sewage and electricity are 
., " 1·tl 1, .,' 1 'T'1 ~ 1 ·t·· ~ turn C j 'PRr1) avauaOle, al'1ougn nO[ III cons~am SUpply. lne rales lillan Ke. 1 ~~ en.re ~~ L 
1 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila Camp, Interview held in his office in 
Shatila camp 09110102 . 
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reports that there is a lack of 'general basic environmental prerequisites for healthy 
1.. . .. .,.. 1 .. T 1 2 llvillg ill tne ca.11lpS ill Leoa.TlOn. 
The lack of proper drahJ.age, pure drinking water, and the proliferation of 
garbage dumps have made all the camps enormous health hazards ... 
Throughout the camps, the issue of electricity supplies has reached its most 
critical and disturbing stage. For despite the growing need for electricity, a great 
matlY Palestinians were unable to renew their supplies with the various 
networks in Lebanon after failing to pay dleir monthly bills .. . [T]he companies 
. . . have totally ignored the economic hardships facing the refugees. For one 
thing, the mere instahllent of a meter costs half a million liras .. . 
Additionally, it should be noted tbat the running of telephone lines to the camps 
is absolutely forbidden,3 .4 
The Lebanese goven1!nent does not help the Palestinian's social conditions in the 
camps. Reasons for tpis vary, the most CO!TI.TJlon reason being that Lebanon does not 
havp the -hnarcps to 'np1n thP Palpstl·nlars ~lhe ha e too TYlar rO'D1eTYl ·th th 
..L..l. """ .... ..l...l. ..I...La..J. .A. ""'" .... .L _..I..p ... .I...I._.i. .... _ l..I..&...I. ... .. .... .... y .L.l. V.... ..L.I..I. .... y p.... .I. .L.I..l.S Wl".I..1. .... .I..I.e 
reconstruction work following the war. There is also an element of not wanting the 
Palestipians to settie in Leba.rlOn, therefore, giving t.hem civil and human rights in 
tenns of better social conditions and in tenns of their rights to work and so forth are 
not priorities, as many believe tpis would give the wrong picture to the Palesti.1uans 
and .the world. Tnis issue is called 'ta'r'vteen', meaning Palestinian settlement in 
Lebanon, and is discussed in greater length below. 
2 For more general information see Rosemary Sayigh who describes ,the general conditions of the 
refugee camps in the 1980s in her section on 'Camp as Habitat' in her book Too Manv Enemies: The 
Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (Zed Books, London, 1994) p. 38-41 . There doesn't seem to have 
been that much change in the general conditions. The main difference is that the camps are more 
crowded due to natural increase of refugees as well as other refugees from destroyed camps moving 
into the surviving ones. See also lJNR'vVA web-page VvW"w.ui1.n¥a.org 
}'Exclusive Report on the Paiestinian Camps iIl Lebanon'. The research conducted for this report was 
by Majed ai Zeed. Availabie at www.prc.org.uk 
4Duri11g my research I too witnessed what this report is referring to. The smeii ofthe rubbish dlL'llps 
is overwheiming. The rivers of rats that appear in the evening are evidence of the poor environmental 
conditions. Water and electricity are in short supply. I was told though, that a lot of the electricity in 
the camps is there illegally. When I asked what this meant people explained that they were bringing it 
in through using extensions to the various existing circuits and lines. Phone lines are indeed still 
forbidden, and when I asked why I never got a clear answer, apa.rt from heari.'1g complaints by 
Lebanese that the Paiestinians do not pay their biBs. 
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Ln contrast to present conditions, the Palestinians did enjoy some years of better civil 
. 't T 'A6" T 1 ... -.1 r.T O· 1 t 1 ,("""1" A t 5 'T"1 ,..., .. ngns. 1..11 l~ ~, Leoanon ana. ~ne rL slgnea. .ne LaIro greemen.. lne Larro 
Agreement mea..'1t that the Palestirjans had rights in Lebanon, including the right to 
work and the right to residence, and also autonomy of the refugee camps. 
Commando activity by the Palestinian resistance was also allowed. With the Cairo 
Agreement the Palestirjan refhgees and the Palesti..'1ian Resistance were gIVen 
opportunities and chances in both the political and socio-economic sphere. These 
chances and opportunities induded the sta.rt of the Palestinian Revolution, where the 
Palestirjan Resistance Movement was able to operate politically witt-in the cmnps 
and ca..try out raids from Southern Lebanon into Israel. Furthermore, with autonomy 
of the camps, there was a flourishing of popular corrm1ittees, rU .. 11 by the va.rious 
political groups in the camps. People were able to rebuild their homes, hospitals 
were opened by the Palesti..'1ian Red Crescent society6 and so forth. This 'liberation' 
of t..;e cainps did go through difficult periods. This was felt on two levels, that of the 
individual level a..nd at t.he Palestinian Resistance Level. On the individual level, 
regarding the rebuilding of houses, people were ecstatic as building materials 
previously not allowed could now be obtained. But there arose dashes. One ma.11 
told Sayigh: 
When the Revolution cattle to the camp, everybody wanted to build. This 
created problems between neig.~bours; 'You are too close to me!'; 'You 
shouldn't ODen a window here!': It was the role oft.~e Kifat~ Musellat~7 or t.~e 
Popular Co~ittee to solve such problems8 
5 This is also explail1ed in Chapter Three. 
6 Sayigh, Rosemary Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutiona.r:ies (Zed Books, London, 1979) 
7 Kifah Musellah refers to the Palestinian Milita.ry Force of the .Asmed Struggle. Tney were part of a 
special unit drawn from the PLA and had been traLl1ed in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Sayigh mentions that 
there were very often rifls between t.i1e Kifah Musellah and t.he residents in the camps as the camp 
residents felt that the Kifah Musellah were arroga.l1t and treated the residents as ift.i1ey were livLl1g in 
a barracks expecting to be saluted and so forth. Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 94 
8 Abu Moha.'1illlad in Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 92 
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For the Palestinian Resistance Movement immediately following the Cairo accords, 
the trial and error of liberation was about how to deal with the autonomy of the 
camps. The most pressing issue was the establish.'1lent of the 'local committees' that 
were mentioned in the Cairo Accords. The popular committees still exist today 
. ,. ..9 I' " 10 
servmg quasl-ffiUIl1Clpat runcllons. 
Through the Cairo Accords then, the Palestinian refugees in the camps were given 
the green light to fUIl their own affairs, politically, rnilitarily and socially witpin the 
camps. Similarly the Palestinian people were given more civil rights. Tp..is 
atmosphere enabled a 'revolutionary environment' to exist, where the political and 
social groups could build schools, hospitals and so forth witpin the ca..lTIp. All of this 
was possible wp..ile Lebanon remained a 'sanctu~ry'. II As we saw in the history 
chapter this did not last very long. Even before the Leba..nese Civil War started there 
were troubles between the PalestiPian Resistance and Israeli retaliation as well as 
between the Palestinia..n Resistance and the Lebanese govemment. Brynen sites 
Chairrna..ll Arafat saying the following after the implementation of the Cairo 
Accords: 
Commando action in Leba,.lon is an established fact, as evidenced by our 
presence in the streets, in L1.e camps and in L1.e border villages. However we 
callilot base our action in Lebanon on the fait accompli alone. The comnlando 
movement needs to deepen itself from the human, ideological, and struggle 
point of view. This cannot be achieved, either in Lebanon or a,.lywhere else, 
except through the commando movement tying itself to the masses. To depend 
9 Suleiman, Jaber Report from Lebanon: The Current Political, Organisational, and Security Situation 
in the Palestinian Refugee Camns of Lebanon (Journal of Palestine Studies, Vo1. xxxix, No 1, 
Autumn 1999) p. 75 
in For more information on popular c0ll111ittees see Chapter Six. 
11 Brynen in his book describes Lebanon as a sanctuary for the Palest'.tI1ian Resistance Movement 
dur'.tI1g the years between 1969 and 1982 where the PLO in a sense 'institutionalised' a Resistance 
Palestinia,.l Identity and put the movement on the political map, regionally and internationally. His 
analysis of sanctua,.y involves both state support a,.ld popular support, as well as issues of risk for the 
host state regarding the target state, their militruy capabilities and acceptable risk. Brynen, Rex 
Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) 
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on the fait accompli itself alone means depending on force alone. Force evokes 
force, which means a clash between us ai1d the Lebruiese rullly. Even if we wi,1 
i,1 this clash we must ask ourselves: what next? Lebruiese territory is not what 
we want. What we want is Palestinian territory. The Lebanese army is not our 
enemy, but our enemy is Israel. We were forced to fig..1.t Lebanon despite 
ourselves, and in order to stop what we thought were attempts to liquidate the 
Palestinian revolution there. We have to stop 1hose attempts, and to draw the 
attention of the Arab nation to what was happeni,lg12 
One of the interesting points within this extract from Chairman Arafat's statement is 
when he taL1<.s about the comma.lldo movement tying itself to the masses. Tnis relates 
to the political consciousness and the willingness to participate of refugees within 
the camps during t.his time. From my field work the impression relayed to me was 
that all of the men as well as most of the women who were of age during the 
revolution pa..rticipated. It was a th'lle when there was hope and a belief that the 
Palestinian Resistance was capable of, if not win.nLng all the battles, then at least 
becoming known to the world and showing the Israelis that they were a movement 
capable of resistance. Ti-is picture is a complete contrast to how ti-ings stand today, 
where Lebanon is no longer considered a 'sanctuary' state. Regarding the rest of 
Chairman Arafat's extract, it was rather prophetic ofihe events that were to come. 
The Lebanese Civil War was a long war t.hat had devastating consequences for 
everyone involved. For the Palestwian refugees there was increased insecurity as 
allies a..lld enemies were constantly changhl1g. Worse still, the reality of the 
Palestinians being lLllpopular in Lebanon came to the fore. With the sieges and 
{'. 13 t' P' 1· . 't' ,,' ·t·"" ,. " massacres or va.TIOUS camps, .fie ales~mlans, a1 nougn mey s 111 naa ngm weapons 
for their protection, were unable to defend themselves properly. With the end of the 
Civil War, so too came the end of the Cairo Agreement: no more cO!l1 ..l11ando activity 
12 Arafat in aI-Abram (newspaper published in Cairo), 7 November 1969, from Brynen, Rex 1990 op. 
cit., p. 52 
13 For exa..TJlple Tal al Zaatar, Shatil~ and BOUti Bar3:jneh Camp_ See the Chapter Four for more 
detail. 
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on Lebanese soil, no more gillS for Palesti..nians. There is a marked change in 
attitude towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon followi..llg the Civil War. The 
Taif Agreement that governs post-Civil War Lebanon ended the allowances made to 
Palestinia.ns tllder the Cairo Accords to one where various Lebanese laws were 
issued to govern t..1}em. As pointed out in the Chapter L'lfee, Palestinia.ll refugees are 
now treated as foreigners and do not have the right to work or own property. The 
camps in the south have checkpoints upon arrival and departme. Why is the 
Lebanese government so strict towards t..1}e PalestiPian refugees? Apart from public 
opip..ion, Lebanon does have domestic and international pressures. Domestically, 
there are three issues to problems vis-a.-vis a) giving Palestinians civil rights and b) 
• I' fl 1 11 • ~ -t-' 1 • / ) '1""'1 • gomg mf.: .. '1er ana allOWIng perma.llem seuemem ~tawteen. Inese Issues are 
economic as well as a combination of demographics and politics. Regarding the 
former, relating to both economic and financial issues, the Lebanese govenLlllent is 
trying to rebuild its country followi..llg a long civil war a.lld therefore has pressing 
issues with its economy. The second (and t.rJrd) reason is demograplo..ics. Because of 
the delicate nature of the Lebanese political system, giving Palestinians civil rights 
t· 1 I" , 1 1 ,. .,' • 1 1 or accep.mg perma.llen: se.uemem WOUla nave senous reperCUSSIOns as lillS WOUla 
imbalance the different sects. Tlo..is issue of tawteen is extremely sensitive in 
Lebanon. It is sensitive to other Arab govemments as well as to Palestinians 
themselves. It is a term that "is generally used in connection with the long-held 
assu.rnption a.rnong PalestiI'..ians and Arab goverr.ments that the international 
commmrity intend to liquidate the 'refi.lgee problem' by incorporating the 
PalestiPians wit..1Jin the host states (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) and the areas of 
Pl' . 1 • 1 h 1 -fi (h W t B 1 1 G ," 14 T T 1 1 
.L a ... estme m wmcn t .Ley sougnt re.L..lge Le es. anK ana aza/'. In LeDanon tne 
i4 Weigt'lill, Marie-Louise "Palestinians in Lebanon: The Politics of Assistance" Journal of Refugee 
Studies (VoL 10, No 3, September 1997) p. 306-307 
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demographic issue is sensitive, particularly to the Christian Maronite population 
wpich would be in a IPinority, and the whole political system would probably need 
to f'harge 15 
'" V.1..l. .1. '" 
Chfulge in the demographic structure would perhaps have limited political 
significance if L1.ere was one group in Lebanon that had an absolute nUillerical 
majority; if national reconciliation had really taken place follow1.'g the ending 
of military confrontations; if Lebanon enjoyed sovereignty, which translated 
into the ability of the govemillent to make fmal decisions on domestic and 
external matters; ... Unforttmately these conditions are lacking. Post-war 
Lebfulon is highly factionalised .... For these reasons, decisions imposed on 
Lebanon which will alter the demographic structure of the country will be 
greatly destabilising1G • 
In general Lebanese opinion towards integration of Palestinians is negative. The 
Leba.T1ese govefIl..ment line is against any resettiement of Palestinians in Lebanon. 17 
The widely-held governmental conception has been a...rticulated by Tou..rism Mi..'1ister 
Ali Abdullah, saying that "We the Lebanese, are at a domestic level in unanimous 
agreement on rejecting resettlement for two reasons: one is local and the other is 
15 Leba.l1on is a sectarian state based on the 1932 Census where it showed that the Maronites 
constituted 29%, Sunni Muslims 22.5% and Shiite Muslim 20% of the population. The rest of the 
population as stated in the 1932 Census Ll1clude minority religious groups: Druze, Greek CaLl-wlic, 
Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Armenian Orthodox, A.rmenian Catholic, Jews (still a small community 
in Beirut), Syriac OrttlOdox, Syriac Catholic, Chaldia.l1 Ortl-todox, Chaldian Catholic and va.rious 
oLl-ter sects. Since 1943, when Lebanon gained its independence, it has relied on the confessional 
National Pact which stipUlated that political representation is based on the sizes of the various sects 
as shown in the 1932 Census. There has not been a new Census since the one in 1932 and there has 
been obvious emigration by va.rious sects, whereas others have increased. The fact that there has not 
been a new census shows the sensitive and delicate nature of the Lebanese state and this has 
consequences for issues of citizenship, immigration and refugees. 
16 EI-Khazen, Farid Permanent Settlement of Palestinians 1., Lebfulon: A Recipe for Conflict (Jow-nal 
of Refugee Studies, Vol. 10, No 3, 1997) p. 281 ~TB! EI-K.1.azen has been criticised for be1.'g too 
critical towards the Palestinians and their role in the Civil War. He has a pro-Maronite bias in his 
work, nevertheless, he bril1gs up impor-..ant issues, such as the Palestinians being blamed for the war. 
With or without proper evidence this is still a popular view among some Lebanese. We shall see this 
more clearly when Lebfulese public opinion is discussed. 
17 The Lebanese government is against any resettlement ofPalestiniful refugees. Recently, the 
Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, has had discussions with both Ew-opean Union diplomats and 
A."11erican diplomats refeuillg to Lebanese rejection of resettlement fuld demanding the establisfu"11ent 
of a Palesfillian state. (Daily Star, Bet'llt 14/11103). This comes after proposals of settling Palestinian 
refugees in their host countries, as a possible solution to L1.e Palestine-Israel problem. This is not 
considered an option hI Lebanon. 
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regional".18 The local reason refers to economICS and demograpllics, and the 
regional reason refers to the right tor the Palestinians to have their own country. One 
interesting event took place in 1994, when the then Minister for the Displaced, 
Walid JOlmlblatt, "in his attempts to evacuate the buildings illegally occupied [by 
Palesti..nians] dari..ng t.he war, came face to face with the problem of re-housi..l1g the 
6,000 displaced Palesti..1Jian fa.'nilies".19 There were plans to build new houses for 
the displaced Palestinians in the Chouf Mountains. The destroyed camps of Tal al 
Zaatar, Jisr al Basha, Dbayeh, and Nabatiyeh were all built on land belonging to the 
Maropite church wpich had been leased to UJ\TRWA. Follovving the war, rebuilding 
the camps on Maronite land was seen as too politically sensitive. Resettling the 
refugees in other ca.T!lpS was not an alternative either, as they could not 
accormnodate all the fa.'nilies (that is, there was a lack of space for 6,000 families). 
After negotiations back and forth wiLh lJNRWA on the funding and building of the 
camp in July 1994 it was decided that the project should go ahead. Joumblatt had the 
, kin l' P . M·· t TT •• 20 TT t' b ·ld· {' -" l' Dac~ mg or .L nme ~ .LlI'..ls.er tla.'1n. nowever, .ne U1 mg or morrem nouses ror 
Palestinians caused much controversy_ 
The creation of a new, permanent housing area was seen as COnfllll1ation that 
the Palestini&is were being resettled in Lebanon and that the problem of the 
refugees was being resolved at Lebanon's expense. There was filly over the fact 
that the Minister for the Affairs of the Displaced was giving priority to the 
Palestinians over the problems faced by displaced Lebanese.21 
BOLh Palestinians and Lebanese opposed tIns plan, which was called the Qurai'a 
project. The Palestinia.l1s felt that this was part of a larger pian to move ail the 
Palestinians to this site, especially Palestipians from ca.'1lpS in Bei.. .... .lt as the new 
18 Daily Star, Beirut, 08111103 
19 Nasrallah, Fida "Lebanese Perceptions of the Palestinians in Lebanon: Case Studies" Journal of 
Refugee Studies (Vol. 10, No 3, 1997)p.351 
20 This shows the more accommodating attitudes of the Dmze and Sunnis. 
21 Nasrallah, Fida op. cit., p. 352 
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post-war goven:Ll11ent has been rebuilding its image in Beimt. This suspicion came 
about as the site was seen as far too large for the intended number of fa.rniiies. 
Some Lebanese seemed to believe that JOlL.'11blatt was trying to settle Palestinians in 
the largely CILTistian Chouf MOlmtains in order to balance the ChJistian -Muslim 
population in the area. Some Clt.TIstians believed that Joumblatt was blaming them 
for the displacement of the Palestir...ians and was thus resettling them in the Chouf. 
Still others argued that resettling the Palestinian in more pennanent housing would 
give Israel the signal that the refugees could stay in Lebanon, thus removing the 
refugee card from the Peace Process. Others argued that JOlL.'11blatt thought that he 
would get money from Israel and L~e international community for this project.22 The 
arguments against the project continued thus: in the end the project was abaildoned. 
The displaced Palestinians were forced to settle within existing refugee ca.rnps. In 
Shatila for example, lJNRWA built two apartment houses by the entrance for 
displaced fa.rnilies, maiPJy former Beirut camp residents who had ta.ken lodging in 
Rouche and Ain lVrreisse (empty houses by the sea). The Qurai'a project shows how 
ma.ny problems beset the Palestinians. The reaction of the Lebanese people (media 
and govefIl..ment) shows the Palestinia.llS that they will never be settled in Lebanon. 
There have also been opinion su...rveys done on the Lebanese population, regarding 
1 • 1 i""",", 1 •• ..1 • T 1 23 0 11 1 .... .. tne mea or t"ruestW..lan setnement m Leoa.llon. veral1, tnese are conSIstent wrtn tne 
governmental position of being against settlement. Questionnaires have been cruried 
out, asking the va.rious sects in Lebanon about their opipions on tawteen. The 
22 Va.rious conversations including lJNKWA spokesperson in Beirut (November 2003) 
23 Haddad, Simon "Sectarian Attitudes as a Function oft.1}e Palestinian Presence in Leba.rlOn" Arab 
Studies Quarterly (VoL 22, No.3, Summer 2000); and Khashan, Hilal "Palestinian Resettlement in 
Lebanon: Behind the Debate" Montreal Studies on the Contempora.ry Arab World (Occasional Paper, 
The Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies, April 1994). More views also available in Asmar, 
Christine a.'1d Kisirwani, Maroun "Clash of Politics of Civilisations? Secta.ria.'1ism }Lrnong Youth in 
Lebanon" Arab Studies Qua.rterly (Vol. 21, No.4, Fall 1999) 
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overall result was negative. Haddad's survey shows that the Sunni Muslim 
'.'.. , ·t" ",..,. , i·· t' J' I'O'.j" ( " popmanon nas more sympany wwaras me rales~mmns nan .ne L!LTlS~la.l1 mosuy 
Marom·tp) p01"\nlatlon The Shu·'te popn1atlon was not as symnathetlc as the Snnm·'s .J.. .I.. .J. "..... ~ 1:-''''" .... .J. .J....I.. ..l..I..1. ..1..1.1. ~""".I."'.I..1. .1..1. .1..1..1.1:-'......1. ... .1..1. \"oLL..L.L , 
though they were more so than the Cillistians. The Shiite and Clnistian negative 
attitudes towards Palestinia.l1s have been thus since the Civil War. As outlined in the 
history chapter, the Maronite Militia besieged and slaughtered refugees in Tal al 
Zaatar in 1976 and Sabra and Shatila in 1982. The Shiites were involved in the 'War 
of the Ca.111PS' in the mid-1980s. However, all in all, Haddad's study shows that all 
Lebanese groups "showed a lack of enthusiasm to resettli.l1g the Palestinians in the 
sense of granting them citizensrip and political rights".24 However, granth'1g the 
Palestinians civil rig..hts was welcomed by the SUl111i Muslim and Dmze 
1 _"'.. 25 TT"J 1" 1" ·1 _~ 1" t TTl 1 1" T T t r. 1 popmanon. l\.llasnan s su..rvey snows SllIl..llar nnmngs .0 naaaaa s. ne .00 ~ouna 
that the Su..'11llS and the Druze were the segments of the population that were the 
most positive, althoug..h most tended to oppose the idea. The fears of the Lebanese 
population regarding Palestipia.l1 settlement includes: a) fears that it would upset the 
domest.c s1·mation apd mig.rt pvpn rpsu1t m· arnother ("vi1 war· b) e('onoT"l'lic UTornes .I. .... .1. " ... .I..I..l. .I. .I...LI- .1.1. '"' V.I..I...L_.I.\,. ..1..1. .&. _.1..1..1. , V .1..1. .l..I..I..1. ",y .1...1...1. .. 
"The resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon was viewed by many as an unbearable 
burden on a country that is still unable to lau..l1ch progrmns of recovery of its 
shattered economy".26 There was also a fear that it would upset the demograpric 
balance. 
This negative opiIlion of tawteen on the part of both the Leba.llese people and the 
T , t ' i' t' ..,., ,.. i' • t i' " Leoanese goverP..men nas consequences lOr ne ralesnman rerugees merms OI me 
24 Haddad, Simon op. cit., p. 97 
25 Although the most welcomi.TJg in compa..rison to others, it is important to note that the opIDjon 
welcoming rights for Palestinians were still under 50% within each of these two groups. 
26 Khashan, Hilal 1994 op. cit., p. 10 
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govemmental policies that are issued for them. The Lebanese govenunental policies 
towards the Falestipian presence in Lebanon make their lives i!lcredibly difficult. 
Because the Palesti..'lians do not have the right to work, they remain poor, often 
having to res0!1 to illegal jobs or even crilne. The policy of treatillg Palestiluans as 
foreigners ma.~es life extremely difficult, resulting in unemployment and poverty. A 
recent example of Lebanese policy towards Palestinian refhgees concerns university 
fees. Before this new policy Palestinians could attend muversity by paying Lebanese 
,.. ,....... "I .1· "I "I "I "I 'T"\o "I 1' - · "I t C' .'" 27,......., . lees. 1 ouay, rillS nas cnangeu a.1J.U rales ~!ma.1J.s nave .0 pay lorelgn lees. 1 illS 
m"kLes ;t a11Ylost ;1YInoss;h1e -f.or arny Pa1est;n;ar to attenrl 11m·vers;ty D"ru· ng the Ca;rn .1..1."'-1: .... "- ..1....1....1...1. '" il..i...i.y ......... .I...L ..L .I. ",.i...i...i...i. .I." "" .1..1.""'- ""-I. .I. ... ". '-4..1..1. .1. .1. ..LJ..V 
Agreement a..lld dming the Palestinian Revolution ill Lebanon, Palestiluans received 
a very good education. The UNKWA schools were better fl..mded a.1J.d the FLO a.1J.d 
other organisations, as well as supporting countries, helped in financially supporting 
some of the refugees to go to muversity, for example. Today, the picture is very 
different. The political groups are not as wealthy as they used to be, therefore, the 
refhgees are forced to rely on U1\TR W A and other aid agencies for their survival. 
This is so for a variety of reasons, most notably their prevention from being allowed 
to work i.11 the country. Si.TIlilarly the groups have had to cna.l1ge their tactics. As 
they are no longer governed by the Cairo Agreement, they no longer have the right 
to can)' weapons and can)' out anned stmggle agaillst Israel from Lebanese soil. 
The Lebanese government is against military work from here . .. It has no 
problem with media work. And the Lebanese government considers itself non-
resDonsible for our camDS. It doesn't Drovide allv work for Palestinians ... CYiller 
th~gs around the camp <are provided by UNRWA and other organisations.28 
27 This was an issue that was brought up dUling almost every interview r had. It was also an issue that 
was depressing the youth. The PRe tells us that the increase in tuition fees amounts to an increase of 
500%; Hanafi, Mahmud The Decline in Education Standards Among Palestinians in 
Lebanon . .. Wny? Available at www.prc.org.uk 
28 Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Leba.'1on, interview held in Abu Moujahed's office in 
Shatila camp, 10/10102 
')() 1 
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Lebanese policies a..nd Lebanese opinions towards the Palestinia..n presence is one of 
not wanting them to integrate. Reasons for tpis vary. As we saw above, this has to 
do with demographics and politics as well as econOlric reasons. However, tmvteen 
was not very popular with Palestinians within the camps either. Questions regarding 
tawteen varied: 
There are some solutions like emigrntion and nationalisation. I am not ready to 
migiate or become a Lebanese citizen: L1.e solution is to go back to Palestit"le29 
We c,m not accept tawteen, no matter what it gives us ... The situation we are 
living in reminds us that we should go back to Palestine30 
Tawteen, therefore, is not seen as an option, by Lebanon or the Palestinians. 
Nevertheless an important question for Paiestipian refugees is whether or not they 
perceive a difference between tmvteen and the Lebanese authorities giving 
citizensrJp.31 The fu'lSWerS for L~e most pfu4: were L~at trJs would either make the 
Palestiniful plight of returning to Palestine diminish, as implied by the statement 
above by Abu Hasan when he argues that the conditions the refugees are living in 
renl111d them that they have to refiLm to Palestine, or that accepting tawteen would 
ma.l.;.e it harder for their plight of a "right of return' at a later date. However, there 
were some who did ask for hu..'Uan a..'ld civil rights understa..'lding that these were 
basic rights t.hat should be given to all, although this too was seen as separate fi."Olll 
taw teen. In other words, having civil rights does not necessarily mean becoming a 
Lebanese citizen. A corr~'Uon view is as follows: 
29 Interview with Naji Dawali, Leader for the PFLP in Shatila camp, iilterview held in his office in 
Shatila camp 09/10/02 
3D Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias 
CatllP, 1211 0/02 
31 The difference between citizenship and tawteen is the assumption that tawteen would mean 
permanent settlement. 
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I full against tawteen, but I am for people to have their political and civil 
rights.32 
The leader of Fata.h in Shatila, however, was one of the few who had a different 
answer to the question 'does tawteen necessarily mean that you give up your right of 
retu ... rn?' when he answered 
For the Lebanese government, from their view yes. But for me it is not, because 
the Palestinians living in the United States and elsewhere are still asking for 
L1.eir right of retu.l-n33 
Regarding Palesti..nian attitudes towards Lebanon in general, most people saw a 
difference between the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government. 
The relations with the Lebanese people are not the Sfulle as with the Lebanese 
goVelThllent. We have lived together with the Lebanese people for 54 years, as 
with the Lebfuiese government, but it is more difficult [and complicated] ... Not 
all Lebanese people love the Palestinian people, but most of them [have 
supported] us for 54 years and still do. The difference with the Lebanese 
government is more complicated. Weare forbidden to work. Some procedures 
and laws that the government are taking are not in the interest of the refugees 
[fuid do not help the refugee situation]. We do not have the right to OvvTI 
property. Regarding universities, the Lebanese government have increased the 
price ffor us; we now pay the more expensive foreigners feesl. They say they 
~upport the Palestinian ~ase but tt~ey make it quite difficult [for ~S].34 
Some but not all of the Lebanese public opinion is supporting the Palestinians, 
they lived the same as the Palestinifuis dUL-ing the war in LebfuIon35 
32 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinifui Communist Party in Shatila camp, 
interview held in his office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02 
33 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader ofFatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in 
Shatila camp, 15/10/02 
34 Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, leader of the DFLP for Lebanon, interview held in his home in 
Shatila camp 07/10/02 
35 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias 
camp. 12/1 0102 
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These opinions show how the Palestinian refugees distinguish the Lebanese people 
r- _.1 T 1 -1 ..,. K t -.1 1 rt- t1· """'1 ITom me Leoanese govefI1..men~. lYlOS. see ~ne people as suppo .mg .nerr cause. 1 ne 
Lebanese govermnent, however, is ma..1dng the lives and livelihoods of the 
Palesti..nians difficult. Regarding activities of Palestinian political groups, the 
Leb~l1ese goveI1L-lJ1ent makes tpis difficult as well. rvlilit~ry activity is forbidden. 
The Revolution a..'1d the Resistance has had to move elsewhere in their battle against 
Israel. However, as Mr Hisha.m implied above, the groups are able to organise other 
activities witpin the camps that are not considered to be tbJeatening. T:llTough my 
interviews I also realised that some people joining Palestinian political groups were 
watched carefully by the Lebru"1ese goverllil1ent?6 This adds another element into the 
mobilisation process: fear. The willingness to obstruct tI~s fear will be looked at 
later on. However, the question wbich is relevant to tbis section regarding 
mobilisation is whether or not the host country context allows Tilly's notion of 
, 0 tup'ty' t o'o"'se 37 Tf wou" that opp r .. h 0 m Ill. L 1Q seem L__ _ !:he Palestinian refugees are 
controlled under a rather tight regIme when it comes to revolutiona..ry activity. 
Palestinian refugees and the political leaders told me that members of the various 
groups were watched by the Lebanese authorities. But is tpis a factor that would 
constrain mobilisation? In the West Bank and Gaza strip tris does not seem to be the 
case. The Intifada is still continuing despite Israeli crack-downs and re-occupation 
of va.rious towns and villages. Political repression in Lebanon prior to the 
Palestiria..'1 Revolution throug.1-t the Deuxieme Bureau ma..'1aged to keep the 
Palestinians constrained.38 However, after 1967 and Black September, when the 
36 For more on this see Chapter Seven. 
37 Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 
1978). Tilly's notion of opportunity is linked to - 'the degree of coercion or repression that may be 
used against the contender'. See Chapter One. 
38 For more information on political oppression during the 1960s under the deuxieme bureau see 
Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., esp. p. 130-136 
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Resista.nce came to Lebanon the times had changed, and soon after the Cairo 
.. ~ ... t 1 A.greement was Implemen.eu. Thus, ill Lebanon there is no precedent for 
comparison of the mechanisms of Lebanese control over the Resistance movement 
before and the ways things are now. It was only a few years before the Cairo 
Agreement was implemented that the PLO was created and the Resistance came to 
Leba..'1on. Therefore a compa..rison as to whether or not constraining Lebanese 
policies have had an impact on suppressing the Palestinian revolution in the early 
days is difficult. However, what we Ca.ll see is that the Lebanese government 
realised that the Cairo Agreement did not help their o\vn situation, but rather 
brought them closer to other conflicts in the Arab world. For example, carrying out 
revolution and a.rrned struggle from Lebanon broug..lIt the wrath of the Israelis upon 
Nevertheless, the political groups40 can orga..1ise certaL."1 activities on a social a.."1d 
political level wiL~in L~e camps. As long as dlesedo not cause any disturbance to 
Lebanon, they can continue. But are these activities enough to mobilise a population 
that have lost their country, lost their civil rights, a.nd lost their livelihoods? These 
are LTIlportant questions, a.lld the a.llswers will become clearer in the subsequent 
chapters. What can be seen from the structural context is that 'opportu .. nJ-ty' for 
political mobilisation into political groups is present but would have consequences: 
consequences for what action is viable and consequences Lll being watched by the 
authorities. This might cause some people to want to mobilise even more, though 
39 This was the basic arg-lll-uent of Minister of Displaced, Abdullah Farhat (Interview, Beirut, 
24/11/03), altt'lough the terms used are my own. 
40 The ones I interviewed - Fatah, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Palestinian Liberation 
Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Communist Part, Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine General-Command (pFLP-GC), Saiqa, and Fatah Intifada. 
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there are past experiences and present conditions to take into consideration. 
Nevertheless, this statement by the leader of Saiqa afflrms the point: 
No Palestinia.l group can give L'1e Palestinian people all of their demands. We 
are not in a position of aUL'1ority or powei. [Therefore} ... we cannot tell the 
Lebanese govemment to revoke some decisions it has taken in parlia.llent such 
as the decisions made regarding fees for Palestinians going to university, the 
right to work or the right to own property41 
On the other hand, tlus situation also gives rise to such views as the following: 
My situation in Lebanon is a reason to rebel against my situation.42 
These two statements show the contrasting views of the effects of societal structures 
as enforced by Lebanese policies towards the Palestinians. The opportupities and 
constraints that the Leba..'1ese goverrunent enforces upon the Palestinians can have a 
dual effect as we just saw: the harsh reality of the policies can either make people 
comply with them, or on the other hand, make them want to react. Tpis importa.llt 
question of motivation will be explored fu.11:her witpin the next two chapters. 
Another factor involved in Lebanese governmental constraints and mobilisation of 
the PalestiPian political groups is the role of Syria. As mentioned earlier, Syria has 
considerable influence, not orJy in Lebanon, but also vis-it-vis the Palestirjan 
groups that are members of the 'Alliance of Palestinian Forces' (APF). Although 
Syria's intention towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is hard to understand, it is 
41 Interview with Abu Hasan leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office, Mar Elias 
Camp, 12110/02 
42 Llt~rview with the leader ofL'1e PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Mouja.'1ed's office 
10/10/02 
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clear that Syria, too, is opposed to tawteen in Lebanon. Rosemary Sayigh explains 
that for Syria, although: 
Palestiilian national politics remains a primary concern, the community in 
Lebfuton does not appear to be a key factor ... An incontestable Syrian aim has 
been to exclude 'Arafatism' from the camps, a task greatly facilitated by Oslo. 
Though some Palestinians hoped that Damascus would use its influence to have 
the Lebanese extend to its refugees the rights they enjoy in Syria, there has been 
little to encourage this optimism. However, Synan opposition to tawteen may 
be deduced from its refusal to meet RWG {Refugee Working Group} missions, 
its opposition to t.~e rehabilitation of the camps; it is likely that, in a final 
settlement, Syria would refuse the naturalisation of refugees both in Lebanon 
(md in SYTia. \-Vhile SyTian interests and influence in Lebanon are indisputable, 
policies towards particular parties or on specific issues remain hard to detect43 
Sayig..h's explanation leads to the followi_ng th..ree points: 
1) Syria would like to see the camps following APF groups that oppose the peace 
process; L'l other words, groups sponsored by itself. 
2) Syria is opposed to tawteen in Lebanon. 
3) Because of the point above, Syria also opposes the rehabilitation of the ca.TfiPS, 
sometiting that Leba..'lon agrees with. The argu .. '1lent is that rehabilitation of the 
camps implies a more permanent condition. 
In addition to this, there is also t.he assumption that because one of Syria's mam 
reasons for being in Lebanon includes security issues, point one of the above is of 
utmost importance. Palestir..ian presence in Lebanon is viewed, by many Leba..'lese, 
as a disruptive force to the delicate balance of Lebanon's va.-rious sects. By being 
able to control the APF, Syria can thereby also control its own secu..r:ity situation vis-
a.-vis Lebanon as well as Lebanon's situation vis-a.-vis Israel. For instance, the 
43 Sayigh, Rosemary "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future" Journal of Palestine 
Studies (Vol. xxv, No.1, Autunill 1999) 
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Palesti.tllan groups being pmdent and not lLlldertaking any military action from 
Lebanon. 
UNRWA's Impact 
UNRWA was set up by General Assembly Council Resolution 302 (iv). It provides 
relief, aid and social services to the PaiestiPian refugees in the region. lJNR W A has 
tr...ree main progra.T~'1leS; Relief and Social Services (RSS), Health, and Education. 
They work on donations a.lld cooperate with host country authorities in making t.h.ese 
tp..ree programmes work. In tenns of contextual structure, u'NRWA is part of the 
setting in which the refugees live. Each repJ.gee who is registered with lJ1\TRWA 44 
receives a registration card (or is added to his or her father's, or that of her husba.lld 
depending on situation, age and marital status) that allows the person/family access 
to UNRWA's three prograIl1..mes. 
When it comes to determiDing who needs help for special hardship cases, the criteria 
go by fa.1Jlily. Tnere must be one man in the family with an income (in Leba.TJ.on, 
even if he d..';'ves a lorry illegally he is considered employed). If there is no man in 
t.h.e family, if he is in prison or deceased for exanlple, then the family can apply for 
"special hardship assista.TJ.ce' . 
The foundation for the current Special Hardship Case (SHC) Programme was 
laid in 1978 when welfare workers registered 27,196 fa.uilies as 'hardship 
cases'. As of 1983 UNRWA officially restricted rations and direct relief only to 
those families lli!dergoing special economic hardship .... Since then the refugee 
44 Providing he or she ca.! satisfy L'},'RWA's definition of who is a Palesfruian refugee (see legal 
chapter) 
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population has increased to over 3.7 million people (registered with UNRWA), 
but UNRWA still provides a safety net of quarterly food rations/cash subsidies 
to 191.156 Dersons out of a total of 205. 114 refugees registered iIi tIle SDecial 
Hardship A~sistance Programme.45 · - - • 
The SHe is positive in that it is an extra programme that helps the very desperate 
falnilies within the ca..TIlps. SHe fa..TPilies receive food rations, and higher subsidies 
for medical care a..'1d shelter repair.46 However UJ\TR\VA orJy has fhnds from 
donors, w"ld thereby has limited funds,47 and is clliiently facing cutbacks. Because of 
UNRWA's financial difficulties and cutbacks even people registered under the SHe 
may not be receiving enough help. 
For the Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon the criteria for SHe are most 
unsettling as most fa..TPilies cannot find legal work. Many, however, do ma..TJ.age to 
f1~'1d illegal jobs which help with their income. For exa..'Ilple driving lomes 
(illegally), being a guard at a school (also illegally), are forms of income.48 
However, tt,ese jobs are risky as they lack any guarantees ii1 many areas, including 
payment, and there is a threat of being fired, as well as being in trouble if the 
authorities find out that they are working. 
45 lJ'1'.'RWA: ~'RWA: The Relief.md Social Services Programme: a iournev ofdignitv. resilience 
and success (Department of Relief and Social Services, ~'RWA HQ Amman, 2000) 
46 Ibid. p. 8 
47 Ghandour, Nahla "Meeting the Needs of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" in Aruri, N ed 
Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return (Pluto Press, London, 2001) For more information on the 
liiTJtation oflJ'1'.'RWA funding see for example Albrecht, Kirk "L'1'.'RWA's Uneasy Future" Middle 
East Today (No 245, 1995) on infOlmatioll of changes in UNRWA after the beginning of the Peace 
Process; See also Cutbacks in U1\!'RW A services - where to? (Published 5th FeblUalY 2004) 
Avaiiable on www.prc.org.uk for more on cutbacks in UNKWA. 
48 I have used these eX~TTIples as they are jobs oft,,"o of the people I LT1terviewed 
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The following chart shows how many refugees and families are registered in the 
r1YT/""t ., .. -t· ·1 1 1 49 ~.t11....- ana now ma..TlY fa Ions are avallaDle. 
! Location: [ Widows I Orphans I Aged I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I Beirut I I I I I 
I D"rso"s ! 269 I 2fl I k~l 1""-'-'1. ..LL I v I V.JJ. 
I Rations 1271 I 17 1477 
I I I I 
I Families 121 I 12 274 
Mountain I 
Persons 
I Rations 
I Families 
I I Saida 
I 
Persons 
Rations 
i Families 
I I l.xre 
I Persons 
I Rations 
I Families 
I Trivoli 
! Persons 
I Rations 
I Families 
Beaaa 
Persons 
Rations 
I Families 
I1'.i'T Tn I .' .E.aJ.V' 
I TOTAL 
I Persons 
I 
I Rations 
Families 
1
452 
1225 
I 
I 
I 
880 
805 
I ""IV'., 
I ;)'11 
I 556 
I 510 
I 
1226 
I 
I 175 
! 155 
I 75 
I 
125 
124 I 1,203 I 
I 1 A 1677 I 1 ... 
I I 
I I I 
I I 
I I 192 
I 82 
145 
I 
I 
I I 
160 I 3,510 
154 12,895 
134 I 1,428 
I I 
I 37 
I 
I 1,805 
129 ! 1,552 I I 
I 18 1773 I 
I I 
J 10 I 613 
19 ! 477 
[7 1223 
I I 
I Medical I Education 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I I 
1347 i 44 
1326 144 
I I 
73 12 
I 172 
I 160 
138 
138 
I 130 
1
29 
I I 
12,300 282 
12,210 1265 
1443 52 
I 
! 1,508 I 161 
I 
I 1,473 I 144 I 
1 31 1274 
I I 
1 238 I '"fA I IV 
! 237 167 
148 113 
I I 
867 
810 
175 
I Others I Total 
I 
I 
I I I 
I I I 
1362 I 1,673 I 
I 331 I 1,446 I 
I I 
58 
I I 
I 9,110 I 16,142 
I 8,718 I 14,947 
1 ... "" .. "" 1,;) 1;) t "'\ rr,.., ;),001 
I I 
1 7,298 ! 11,365 
16,973 I 10,681 I I 
1934 12,256 
I I 
I nl"v"'\ 2,098 I 'I'lL 
I 914 1,859 
I 158 524 
I I 
The chart con·esponds to the quotation above, showi-Ilg that there are not enough 
rations for individual persons suffering from SHe. However, the cha..rt also indicates 
that people witl>..in the same family suffer from, for exa..lllple, illnesses (medical). 
This implies that a family with for example two sick children may only be receiving 
rations for one. 
49 Data taken from UNRWA Registration Bulletin (for the third quarter 2003) Depai1ment of Relief 
and Social Services, UNRWA HQ, Ammatl. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Althoug.n UNRWA's main office is not within the camp, the UNRWA officials do 
meet with the popular COIlLTittee withlTJ. the camps and speak with them mostly 
about social issues. The popular cormrittee brings up special needs and cases, as 
well as general issues that are affecting the people in the camp. UNRWA ma.kes a 
...... 1 • _'" 11 .. _ 1 ,.. 1 50 . 1 1 , 1 . _ 1 1 
P01nL OI speaKillg [0 all or tue pontical groups ill oruer to try ana aea~ Wltu tne 
social issues and problems that a..';'se. 
What impact does lJNRW A have in Lne lives of Palestinian refugees? lJNRW A is 
part of everyday life. u"'NR W A's iInpact starts at the begiP...ping of a cbild' s life when 
he or she is added to their parent's registration card, when going to school and 
further gains an impact when leaving and starting a family. As most of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not allowed to work, they need to register with 
UNRWA for their vocational trairJng, medical and social services. 
In the early years, lJNRWA was viewed with suspicion.51 As one refugee told 
Sayigh: 
We felt t.'at UNRWA had a certain policy that aimed at settling us. They 
wanted us to forget Palestine, so they started work projects to give us 
e~Dlovme-~ 52 ill.... .. 111 llL. 
However, today, lJNRW A is a symbol of Palestine and being Palestinian,53 through 
its mere existence and resilience within the international commuility. In other words, 
50 Interview with Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Leba.T\on Field Office, Beirut. 
Interview held in pis office (i 7/11103) For exa.T\lple the PFLP is not on the popular cornmittee in 
Shatila camp, but they too spea.k with lJNRW A. 
51 Interview with Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut. 
Interview held in his office (17/11103) 
52 Palestinian activist from Tripoli in Sayigh, Rosema.ry 1979 op. cit., p. 109 
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UNRWA still exists and shows the world by its mere existence that the PalestiDja..n 
rep.lgee problem remaLT1s and is still on the agenda. Although there was suspicion in 
the early years, Ul\TRWA did symbolise sometring that helped the cormnurity. The 
schools, for example, "though not under Palestinian control were the foci of national 
consciousness".54 Tltis refers to teachers teaching national songs, ltistory, and 
through memorial days. 
Nevertheless, as with all organisations, UNRWA has come tmder attack by 
,. ...... 1''' 1 0..·., _i" ... 1 1 •. p 
msappomtmg tne people m the camp. ne IarP.l1Y, fOr mstance, wnere tne wlIe was 
expecting a baby, were having arguments with UNRWA about the delivery of the 
baby. UNRWA is tmderstaffed and this family was not considered a special 
(hardship or medical) case, so they were not guaranteed hospital space and care 
when the ti..1Jle a..rrived. Besson, in his work on the major problems facing lJNRWA 
in Lebanon, confimls this problem with hospital care for Palestinian renlgees: 
".4 ... "' -~ "(TT 1 1 TT 'tb 0 .. j_. /WITO) t' t' f' 'ta'" Accormng [0 W ona near. rgamsa.lOn ~ n norms, ne ra.lO o· nospl 1 oeas 
to t..1J.e population should be a rrinimum of 2 per 1000 persons. In Leba..'1on, the 
subsidized number of beds which the agency could afford is far more scarce, at 0.25 
"I f\f\1"\ T"'lIo." ._~.. l' 1 1 1· 1 d -f. .... ,. {" .. per 1 VVV. rnonues nave oeen estaollsne .or emergencIes ana llIe-savmg cases 
wrile waiting lists become longer and longer".55 Si..1Jlilarly, with health care ill 
general. Regarding health care, one resident of Shatila had t.hjs to say: 
UNRWA Cfu"1 not cover all of the services for the patients. Just the people who 
have the strongest [worst] diseases. So like me, I Cfu"1't go to LT}..'RWA because 
they don't have the medicine that I need. They just have panadol for all the 
53 Interview with Richard Cook, Director ofU1\i"'RWA Affairs, Lebfu"1on Field Office, Beirut. 
Interview held in his office (17/11103) 
54 Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., p. 133 
55 Besson, Yves UI\i"'RWA and its Role in Lebanon Journal of Refugee Studies (Vol. 10, No 3, 1997) 
p.339 
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patients. ... Sometimes they give you a prescription to buy medicine from 
outside the camp, but tt'1ey Cru.'t cover it.56 
The state of affairs in the UNRWA schools has also faced il11 ... mense criticism. The 
problems LTlcluded: 
There are fifty students in the same class and the periods run for one hour. If 
each student asks a question there will be no titlle left for teaching.57 
Besson too raised this issue. He explains: 
UNRWA's education progrrullme runs 75 schools with ru. enrolment of 35,000 
pupils and student; it operates one vocational training centre, offeru.g 19 
different courses to 635 students, and provides 40 university scholarships with 
only partial coverage of tuition fees (worse now, this was 1997). Over recent 
yeru-s, this programme has faced serious problems of double shifts and 
overcrowding, lack of up ... to-date teacrili.g facilities, it.adequate physical 
facilities, and freezing of training places at vocational installations. 58 
Rosemary Sayigh has commented on what she calls 'the education crisis'. She 
m· O'l·"at",s that t'n",r", ;s a s""ali",r pronort;n" O-f "hl1rlre" -fro"" each age gro"n att"'no';"g ~ "" LV \'LL L L.I. ,"",.l.V .1. 1..1..1. .l.J.\"I.l. .... .1. !-' .1.L.1.V.I..l. .J.. V.l..Ll..l.\.i..i. .l..l..J...l. .1..1..1. .1..1. U up "","".1. .1..1..1. 
school in comparison with other Arab host countries. She also fOlUld that "a recent 
survey suggests a rising Palestinian illiteracy rate in Lebanon, alone among host 
countries".59 She also comments on the ending ofPLO 3..'ld UNRWA scholarsl:>.ips to 
university. 
56 Interview with Abeer, Palestinian from Shatila camp. Interview held in her house in Shatila camp, 
27/11/03 
57 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader for Fatah in Shatila camp. Interview in his home, Shatila 
camp 15/10/02 (he spoke now on a personal level, not political, with reference to his worries about 
his children who were attending UNRWA schools) 
58 Besson, Yves "lJNRWA and its Role in Lebanon" Journal of Refugee Studies (VoL 10, No 3, 
1997) p. 340 
59 Sayig.'1, Rosemary "Palestit.ians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future" Journal of Palestine 
Studies (Vol. xxv, No 1, AUtllillll1995) p. 49. She is referring to a SUtvey done by the PLO Central 
Bureau of Statistics in 1994. Also an unpublished survey looks at six UNRWA schools in Ein el 
Helweh camp where the drop-out rates are very hig.'1. 
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The following chart indicates how many healt.h centres and schools exist in each of 
t' 60 
.ne camps: 
1 CAMP 
I Dbayeh I 1 I 75 i 0 children I 0 i 254 I 
! 1 ! attend an ! I ! 
I I I • I I I 
I I II eleme~tID?' II I I 
I I schaal in the I I II 
I I I I I ! ! BOUIj Hammoud I I ! 
I I I area I I I 
I Bourj Ell 
I Baraineh 
- ".1- -
i Mar Elias I 1 
I Shatiia 1 1 
I MiehMieh ! 
I I Nahr 
lB' I a!"ea 
! Baddawi 
I I Wavell-
I Gaiiiee 
I Al Buss 
1 
I Ein eI I 2 
I Heiweb I 
I Bourj el I 
I Shemaii I 
I Rashidiveh I 
, '" 
114 
I 
I 53 
155 
195 
I 
1 210 
I 
\135 
1 65 
I 
1201 
I 
1355 
174 
160 
12 10 
12 I 1 
!2 10 
I I 
17 10 
I 
I I 
15 10 
I I 
12 1° I I I 
I II 10 I .... 
I I 15 I 1 
I 
I 
I I 
13 1\ IV 
I I 
I 
\0 14 
I 3411\ I ' IV 
I 
595 
7,263 
1 735 I 5,892 
I 
! 2,653 I • 
1
800 
11,872 
I 7,263 
I 
1
2
,264 
! 2,705 
As has already been mentioned Palestinians have no right to social serVIces and 
education in Lebanon, which is something that leads to these educational problems 
witl-in the UNRWA schools. The Lebanese state schools are not available to 
Palestinians. Some private schools are available but have very high school fees. A 
typical UNRWA school in Shatila camp is overcrowded, with minimal physical 
space in the classrooms. The school works in shifts with girls in the morning and 
boys in the aftemooll. The teachers are overworked. The students face an extremely 
challenging cu..rriculum yet are given hardly any teaching time. If a student fails his 
60 Infonnation taken from Hajjaj, Nasri Saleh "Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Until Vv'hell?" 
Shaml Publications (July 2000). The figures are based during the years 1998-99 
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I 
I 
or her exam, they CaIl ...not repeat the year. This leads to disillusionment and apathy. 
First, there is no need to try hard a.l1d succeed as you will not be able to do anyt.1J.ing 
with your education once you fir.ish school. The schools only go up to ninth grade 
and it is ul1likely that you will have funding for a private Lebanese school. Even if 
you are lucky enough to receive funding, you probably win not be able to receive 
fu,,·t.her funding for ur.iversity, and the Lebanese governrnent does not allow you to 
work. Even if there was a will to do well in school (as some of the children I spoke 
t ' ') ... . 1· ·11 • ft 1· • 1 11 ,.. 1 1 
.0 naa , tnerr mSllluslop.ment came a~er graauabon Wltn ~ne reansatlOn tnat tney 
could not do anytr.ing with their education. 
What implications, if any, does UNRWA have for t.he mobilisation process? 
~K W A is certaiPJy a part of everyday life for the Palestinian refugees in Leba.l1on. 
Although it may be inadequate, it does provide a lot for the refhgees. However, even 
with the existence of UNRWA the socio-economic conditions remain poor. It would 
seem to exist to ensure the survival of the Paiestinia.11S, more to the extent of 
physical survival than meeting many other needs the Palestinians may have (see 
, , " ') T JNRWA "t . t t t' "~ "t oelOW unaer numa.l1 neeas . U 1 ana I s assls a.l1ce 0 ne re:mgees leaaso 
other problems and issues such as refhgee reliance upon, and the politics of, 
assistance. The politics of assistance refers to assistance which is externally funded 
and designed but tends to both reduce capabilities and also increase vuinerabiiities 
of the re:fhgees.6i Reduction of capabilities refers to, for exarnple, the setting up of 
refugee camps which isolate refugees in tenns of employment, thereby preventing 
them from improving their status. This isolation then increases refugees' 
vulnerabilities, as they are more accountable and relia.'1t upon the outside agency 
6i Weighill, Marie-Louise "Palestinians in Lebanon: The Politics of Assistance" Journal of Refugee 
Studies (Vol. 10, No.3, September 1997) 
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than their own con1..111unities and political organisations. In other words, outside 
assistance reduces refugee autonomy a..T1d their capacity to orga..rnse themseives 
within their host countries. For the Palestinian refhgees, the assistance structure 
leaves little room for meaningful Palestinian refugee "representation or 
accountability to the refugees themseives. Tneir role is to sit in ca..TI1PS, receive what 
medical, educational or economic assistance is deemed necessa..ry for them, and wait 
for the resolution of their 'crisis",.62 However, tr-tis is not solely due to UNRWA, but 
also due to the harsh Lebanese governmental policies toward tt'le Palestinians. 
Within tbis sort of structural framework, the refugees are marginalised not oIlly in 
their daily lives but also in their specific diaspora role in the Arab-Israeli cOl1.ilict. In 
other words, the Palestipjan refugees living outside Palestine as parties to the 
.-C!' h 1 • rl 1" d 63 cor ...ulct ...... ave oecome slu-e-... me . 
This is all part of t.he socio-economic dimension of the situation of t.he Palestinian 
refugees. The refugees themselves are unable to help their situation, but neither is 
UNRWA their very own international agency. Not orJy is UNRWA unable to help 
their situation fmther, but even the United Nations cannot help them, even though 
they have L.T1ternationallaw a..T1d resolutions on their side. The international structures 
sU.1Toundi...'1g the Palestinians are paralysed and unable to help them, in tu ... rn 
prolonging their situation as refugees with no civil rights. 64 
With reference to the mobilisation process, u~"'RWA is not directly involved, 
although it works with the popular committees. However, what UNRWA stands for 
62 Ibid. p. 311 
63 T1 • 1 '"' ..... 
10lG. p. J!! 
64 Referri..ng back to the Chapter Tnree and the discussion about t.he UN being unable to guarantee 
rights to the Palestinians as they are not covered by the UNHCR and other international mechanisms. 
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can be seen as a mobilising factor. The mobilising factor is two-fold and has to do 
't' h t UNRWA l' h t th TT 't 1 NT ti C·) ,. tl t 1 f ...,. t WI n w~~a 1 ~ as we 1 as w~~a .~~e Ulll ea ~ a.~ons In mrec. y s anas ~or. l:'ITS , 
as mentioned above, by its mere existence, UNRW A reminds the world that the 
refugee issue still exists. Second, the United Nations stands, tlu'ough its various 
resolutions ~1}d the creation oflJNRWA, for five main pr1~ciples: solving the Arab-
Israeli cor,flict; refugees and their right of retu..rn; the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people; violations of human rights; and general peace in the Middle 
East. 65 
Human Needs? 
Do the Palestinians who live in the refugee camps in Lebanon have their basic 
hu.r:nan needs satisfied? What hu.r:nan needs are satisfied and which ones do they 
lack? At tbis point reference is made back to t.he hH-lllall needs approach outlined by 
M 1 S· B 1 G 1 66 'T'1 {' 1 • 1 d . I laslOw, ltes, urton ana altung. 1 ne roUT Daslc numan nee s are seclL.TIty-
smvival, welfare-sufficiency, identity, and freedom-choice. Identity is seen as the 
key issue as to whether or not there is conflict: all issue that could be a result of 
1·'· t· 67TT 11· r t, 1 1 111 1 mODlllsa.lOn. tlowever even laCKIng some or nese nlL.r:nan neeas coma De enougn 
65 Badra..l, Abraham "The Role of UNRWA: Refugee Statistics and UN Resolutions" in Ginat, 
Joseph and Perkins, Edward The Palesfulian Refugees: Old Problems - New Solutions (Sussex 
Academic Press, Brigt~ton, 2001) p. 258 
66 Maslow, Abraham Motivation and Personality (Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1970); 
Sites, Paul "Needs as Analogues of Emotions" in Blli'1:on, J ed Conflict Human Needs Theory 
(Macmillan, London, 1990); Burton, John Conflict: Human Needs Theory. Burton also has several 
ot~er writings, for exa..llple "Human Needs Vs. Societal Needs" in Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel 
The Power of Human Needs in World Society Lynne Rielliler Publishers, London, 1988; Galtung, 
Johan "International Development in Human Perspective" in Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel The 
Power of Hllillan Needs in World Society (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1988). - The works of 
these authors is explained in Chapter One. 
67 Although mobilisation may not always lead to conflict; the assllillption is t.~at if basic human needs 
are lacking, people will become angry, mobilise, and act. As discussed i,'l Chapter One regarding the 
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to sufficiently frustrate the population to mobilise into political groups hoping that 
they can help them with their human needs. 
Table 1.1 
A List of Basic Human Needs68 
Needs: Satisfiers: Refugee Camps: 
I Security Needs (Survival 
I Needs) to avoid violence 
I 
Against individual violence Police x - No - there exists a security 
committee but it is unable to 
provide this security need. 
Against collective violence Wulitary x -No - not allowed 
(wars, internal, external) 
I Welfare Needs (Sufficiency 
I Needs) to avoid misery 
I For nutrition, water, air, sleep Food, air, water 
ror movement, excretion 
For protection against climate, Clothes, shelter 
environment 
For protection against excessive Labour-saving devices 
strain 
* Yes - available 
? - But not sa.'1it >lry in all cases 
? - There exists shelter, a.'1d 
religious groups, UNRWA and 
so fort.h give out clothes. 
However heating in winter is 
lacking a.'1d the wa.rm SUIThrner 
months are excruciating. 
I X -No-
I 
hu..'llan needs approach acultural problem, tl>,is table is used just in order to demonstrate what needs 
the refhgees have and what they are lacking. 
68 Galtung, John op. cit., p. 136. I have check marked the chart below with stars, crosses and question 
marks. (* refers to the fulfilment of a hu.YTIan need; x refers to inadequate or non-existence ofhu..-rnan 
needs, and? refers to somewhere ill between). 
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For protection agaillst diseases I Medical treatment 
For seif-expression, dialogue I Schooling 
and education 
Identity Needs (Needs for 
closeness) to avoid alienation 
For self-expression, creativity, Jobs 
praxis, work 
For self-actualisation, for Jobs and leisure 
realisi11g potentials 
For well-being, happiness, joy Recreation, family 
For being active and subject, Recreation, family 
not passive, client, object 
For challenge and new Recreation 
experiences 
For affection, love, sex, friends, Pri~1Jl<Lry groups 
spouse, offspring 
For roots, beiongingness, Second<Lry groups 
support, esteem; association 
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? -lJNRWA provides basic 
healthcare, but only to people 
who are very sick. Have 
inadequate funding and 
physical space. UNICEF gave 
vaccines to the ca..YfipS a few 
I 
I •• I years bacK 
I 
I ? - Schooling provided by 
UNRWA. University normally 
ll.'1available. 
x -No - not legal 
X-No 
X - No - no recreational 
activities available. 
x - No - Lebanese government 
does not allow very much for 
Palestinians. With hardly any 
income, any social recreational 
activity is not available. 
x -No - people are poor and 
live in camps. Very few 
venture out. 
* Yes 
? - Yes these exist but because 
of the general conditions in the 
with similar hlh'1lans 
For understanding social forces, Political activity 
for social transparance 
For partnership with nature Natural Parks 
For a sense of purpose, of Religion, ideology 
mefuling with life; closeness to 
the trcmscendental, 
transpersonal 
I Freedom Needs (freedom of 
I choice) to avoid I"epression 
Choice in receiving and 
expressing infonllation and 
opinion 
Choice of people and places to 
visit and be visited 
I Choice in consciousness 
I 
I ~ • I IorrnatlOn 
I 
Choice in mobilisation 
Choice in confrontations 
Choice in occupation 
Choice of place to live 
Choice of spouse 
Choice of goods and services 
Choice of way of life 
Communication 
Transportation 
11eeD~gs, media 
Organisations, meetings 
Elections 
Labour marker 
Marriage market 
I (super) market 
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I • - vup .t'\.J. t.,..l..L .LLl '-'..L.l 
I +hOY "an rio l'S doba+<>b1o I L..L..L"'"' \.I u. U \,.I LU. J.1",I 
X-No-
* Yes - available through the 
Mosque and the political 
groups. 
* - Yes - As much as anyone 
else is able to 
I X-No 
I ? - Only in ca.TTIps. Restrictions 
I 
I" t f I on now mucn can corne ou o~ 
I I these meetings 
I 
X-No 
X-No 
? - Not always 
X-No 
X-No 
This table shows a marked lack of basic hlllllan needs for t..he Palestil1ian refugees in 
T 1 Leoanon, 
First, with reference to the security needs, the Palestinia..n refugees in Lebanon are 
not covered at all by this vital need, Although the secu..rity need is dependent upon 
actors in order to rJ...'1ction, it is also dependent upon structures for its existence, 
especially in the refugee Ca..111PS, The police and military are st.ructmal in the sense of 
a being state-led force that can maintain the secu..rity needs of the popuiation, 
Palestiria..'1s have no ir..fluence over, or are able to work witrin, the Lebanese police 
or anlly. Neither are they guaranteed protection by them; the Lebanese police force 
do not enter or deal with issues L.ll the ca.rnps, It is unlikely that the military would 
protect the camps in case of any internal or external war, Tris seems evident if one 
draws conclusions from the previous war in Lebanon, but also in conjlll1ction with 
Lebanese laws regardL.llg Palestinia.lls, Although the camps do not control their areas 
as they rI,r1 dllr1ng the Cal'''o Agreement sa-hetu -hor th p1r m' hab1tants 1s ma1ntai'ned hy l..L.L u..Lu. u...i..i.l..L "'.1-.I..L .1..1. ..1..1.'-, ...L "J ..L.l. .L"".LL .Ll..l. .1. "'.I. .l..l...L..L.L .1..1. V 
the internal popular and security committees. Unfortunately, the secmity conl111ittee 
• 1 1 1 1·· 1· • 1 1 • 1 ( .) 69 IS u..llaOle to secure the neeQ agamst mmVIQual VIOlence protectIOn. 
The chart also shows that welfare needs are only partially met. Welfare needs are 
d ,. 1 ,. ., " .c: , fu UNRWA" , epenQent upon structures a.llQ wnat IS avallaOle lor tne re gees, 1 m tms 
case is the body responsible for satisfyi..'1g these needs, As we have already seen, 
UNRWA is facing immense flnancial difficulty, something that is clear from the 
table of welfare needs, Lebanon is also nol considered to have the 'emergency' 
status that the \Vest Ban ... l( a..'1d the Gaza Strip are endu..ring at the moment, Anot...lJ.er 
factor that has contributed to continual and increasing poverty in Lebanon is the loss 
69 We shall see the opinions of CfullP residents regarding this issue later on. During my field research 
I did not enCOllI"lter the security committee being capable of doing very much; there were several 
murders and a child who was killed by an old bomb within the camp durillg one of my stays. 
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of income from relatives that used to reside in the Gulf states. DUling the Gulf War 
in the early 1990s many Palestipians were expelled from the Gulf countries and, 
once back in Lebanon, have been unable to return. 
The identity needs are also dependent upon structures, and apart from prima.ry 
groups, none of these needs are OeLTlg met. In this case tbis is due to many of the 
Lebanese governmental policies towards the Palestinians that keep them in abject 
poveliy and thereby do not satisfy these important needs. Originally, the freedom 
1 t
' 
1 rt t 1 l' t 1 1 t 70 TT • 1b neeas on ne cnar . represen neeas ~na. are oasea on acors. t1owever, m ~ ~e case 
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, these pa..rticular needs are again linked to 
stmctures. As the refugees are confmed to the ca.mps, and CaIl_not compete with the 
rest of society as integrated citizens, these needs cannot be fully satisfied. Tbis does 
of course differ from camp to camp. Most of the camps in Bei..rut are relatively open 
so people can leave when they please. The southem canlps are much worse off, with 
check points at the entrances. 
Returning to security needs, there is the additional issue of what is termed 
"perceived threat'. Threats may be real or imagined; however, whether or not the 
case is one or the other does not really matter. If a tp..reat is perceived, it means that 
there is a view that a threat actually exists. This issue will become more clear within 
the next two chapters; however at the moment I would like to link the notion of 
perceived tr..reat to Sites' notion of control. Sites' notion of controt71 is relevant to 
how the refugees can tmderstand and predict their enviromnent. TIllS is releva.nt to 
70 Galtung, JOhful op. cit., 
Ii Sites, Paul op. cit., 
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mobilisation in the sense of predicting what might happen if one joins a political 
group witbin the Palesti..11ian resistance. For Sites, control refers to 
The possibility of gratifying each of the needs discussed depends, in large part, 
upon t.1.e degree of control people have over t.1.eir envirOIltllent. IF people 
Cai1l10t control the responses of others, they can be expected to be iil constant 
fear that the actions andlor words of others directed towards them will damage 
eit.1.er their physical bodies andlor themselves.72 
In other words, control is about interpreting and predicting the responses of 'others', 
and the impact tbis has in controlling one's own Efe. The 'others' i..'1clude UNRWA, 
the Lebanese and the International COIr.u'TIurity. The interpretation of the 'other' is 
fmiher explored in Chapter Seven. With reference to the politics of assistance 
referred to above in the discussion on lJNRWA, it is clear that UN"KWA assistance, 
although useful for survival needs, reduces the refugees' control over their own 
lives, their capabilities to establish themselves within Lebanon and Ll-teir ability to 
have autonomy. Regarding control over predicting 'others' responses, what can be 
understood from t.he st.11lctural context is that if the prediction of being politically 
active is that the Lebanese government will put you under surveiliance and possibly 
put you in jail, would t.llls motivate or de-motivate people from mobilising and 
wanting to join political groups? This is an i.mportant question which has come out 
of the structural context, and wbich is linked to identity. 
The table raises a number of questions. There are a number of hmnan needs that are 
1 ,. I' 'fil F. 1 p'.. fi . ,. 1 I' • T 1 aCKlng rut":l ment ~or tne alestIman re~J.gees Wltmn tne rerugee camps m Leoanon. 
What impact does tJ-.is have on mobilisation, if a...'lY? Clearly the lack of rJ.lfilment of 
72 Ibid. p. 25 
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hmnan needs raises concems a.tnong the residents and the political groups in the 
ca.TIlps. Each of these classifications, secu.rity, welfare, identity and freedom, have an 
impact on people a..'ld their potential to mobilise into groups. This is, of course, if 
they believe Lhe group is capable of changing the situation. This will be one of the 
focuses within the following chapter on 'groups'. W:'1at we Ca.ll already see from this 
human needs section is that there is an obvious lack in satisfying hu.'Ua..'l needs, as 
well as the ability to 'control' these needs. 
Themes Resuiting from the Structures and their Relation to 
Mobilisation 
What themes mise from these stmctural conditions on the Palesti..niml refugees in 
Lebanon, and do these conditions constrain or facilitate mobilisation witpin the 
refugee camps? 
Withill the context of the stmctures SUlToUllding the Palestinians, there are two main 
.. .. .. 1 TT" 1 N' 1 ( ') .. _.. 1 .... 11 pomts to oe maae: tne umtea 1 atlOns nas maae mternatIonal resolUtIOns ana laWS 
for the Palestinians but is unable to enforce them and; second, their host country 
Lebanon provides them with very few rights. In a sense they are a people who have 
no civil and political rights whatsoever, for the rights not granted to them within 
Lebanon cannot be enforced by the international cOIr~'Uurlity. Sirrilarly, the 
protection rights mld their right to retLml to their homes and livelihoods m"e 
guara.llteed in va.rious lJN resolutions. However the Upited Nations cannot enforce 
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these guarantees. The situation for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is extremely 
insecure, sometping that is a result of the lack of basic human needs. Tpis state of 
affairs has been such for over fifty years. 
The themes that can be drawn from this chapter are political oppression, lack of 
hu..rnan and civil rights, alienation, and devastating socio-economic conditions, all of 
WhiCh are intpr_lm· lK' ed m· some sense Tn tPrrrls Of' pOl l·ti cal OppreSSiOn thp 
.L.JJ. .L..l. ... "'''''.1- .L .L.L.L.L.L .. .Ll..L .......... ..L.J...L.L .L ~ .I. "... .I. ~ _ .I. .I.. ..L.I.., L.I. '"" 
Palestinians are aware that their political groups are, in a sense, paralysed. UnlLke 
the years du..ri.ng the Cairo Agreement, the Palestipia.Tls now face a different reality. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s when refugee affairs were governed by the 
Deuxieme Bureau, there was also political oppression. However, during those years 
" 1 1" P" .. 1 -,.. .. .,., 73,......,1 1 1 f h tnere was notmng russian or systematlc aDout tnelr oppreSSIOn. 1 ne neaa 0 Le 
Deuxieme Bureau was strict however, and during this time there were no orgarised 
political groups; the PLO and the various other political groups within the 
Palestinian Resistance had not yet come into existence. "The methods used by the 
Lebanese authorities in t..~eir str .... lggle to control the Palestirians give insights into 
traditional and neo-colonial Arab political behaviour. Although outright violence 
was not avoided, subtler techniques of persuasion and manipulation were also 
used".74 Sayigh cites an exa..'llple of when the head of the Deuxieme Bureau visited a 
camp and gave a speech in front of a crowd of Palestinians. The older residents 
knew not to question a.Tlytping he said; however, a you..Tlg man did ask pim some 
questions. He was later sUIIl.'lloned to the Deu,'{ieme Bureau, but never went. A few 
years later when he wanted to visit Syria he was refused papers a.lld a permit. Today, 
the situation is different. lnere are more concrete laws that govern what the 
73 Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., p. 131 
74 roid. p. 132 
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Palestinians can and Callnot do. Thjs regards political groups as well. They are lllder 
tight control over what they can a..lld CaP.llot do. Tne groups ca..1lllot pa..rticipate in 
their main goal of struggle: to fight for Palestine. Potential members face 
smveillance. Thjs ca.n act as a suppressant of mobilisation. However, for the time 
being it is difficult to say whether or not this constrains mobiiisation, as there needs 
to be firrther exa..Tination of the political groups and the people who join them. 
The next three themes aloe closely interlinked; they are the lack of hllllan rights, 
leading to appalling socio-economic conditions a..lld alienation. These tp..ree themes 
arise from the lack of basic hUlnan needs resulting from inadequate protection of the 
lives and livelihoods of the refugees. Their legal situation is precarious, protection 
offered by the UN"':t-:ICR is unavailable and u'NRWA opjy heips in 'reiief and works'. 
This leaves them in a situation where as non-citizens of Lebanon, they are 
completely reliant upon outside agencies and the international COlllJmmity for their 
continued existence. In this case it would seem that prima..ry groups as well as social 
and political groups (identity groups) would be ilnport..ant in general social contact 
and some sort of emancipation. Furthermore, according to htllla11 needs theory 
• • " 1_ .r..' 1 1 r- ,. 1 b 1 1 • .,.,75 
socIeties tnat iall to meet tne neeas OI tnerr memoers ecome unstaole over time 
implying that the refugees may mobilise for change. However, the refugees are not 
considered fully-fledged members of Lebanese society. They are marginalised, 
alienated a..'1d live in appalling conditions. 
All in all, what seems clear after exa.minillg the structmal context is that the degree 
I' • 1 1 T 1 ,. 1 ,. 1 eh 1 1 1- _. 1 
OI coercIOn oy tne Leoa..TleSe government regarmng tne llvell~ ooas ana pO~ltICal 
activity of the Palestinia..'1 refhgees suggests that political mobilisation is highly 
75 Carroll David J et al "HUtllan Needs Realism: A Critical Assessment of the Power of Human 
Needs in World Society" in Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel The Power of Human Needs in World 
Society (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1988) p. 261 
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constrained by outside forces.76 In addition, ma..'1Y of the groups are sponsored by 
SYl~a who does not want to see tunnoil in Lebal10n yet again. WhetJ~eT or not these 
constraints lead to mobilisation is difficult to exa..rnine at this level of analysis. There 
needs be an exa.mination of what the refugees, as well as what the political groups, 
see as viable and possible. The structural constraints and the societal context show 
us a picture where the refugees lack civil rights and are constrained from political 
activity by the Lebanese authorities. On the other hand, by being repressed, 
alienated a..'1d lacking in civil rights, it could also be assll..TIled that jowing identity 
and political groups would help in other ways, for exa..1Jlple social contact a..'1d 
emancipation. The next two chapters will examine the political groups that are 
active within the camps as well as refugees' perceptions of these groups and their 
willingness to engage in political activity and join the political groups. 
76 Corresponding to Tilly's argument on the degree of opportunity. Tilly, Charles 1979 op. cit., 
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Introduction 
r" f S· "L--naDa.er IX 
The Organisations and Recruitment 
TIns chapter will eXaJIline the political groups within the refugee camps aJld their 
role in the mobilisation process. Therefore the main question for tpis chapter is what 
the political groups do, if anyti>.ing, to mobilise the population hll the ca..'1lps. TP..is 
question requires an exa!l1ination of recruitment methods. The framework used will 
1 1 .... 1 ' .. 1 1 1 1\,6 c· 1 Z 11 i .. oe tne organlsatlOnal-entrepreneu..rIal approacn oy lvlC arty ana am, recrultment 
as dealt \vith within new social movement theory, including Touraine's principles of 
what is needed for successful social movements,2 fu"1d recruitment as dealt Vv1.th 
within social construction literature, including networks fuld relationships and 
solidarity. 
TIns chapter will be split into the following sections, each one focusing on a 
different area of recruitment. The first section focuses on the function of the groups 
within the ca..'1lpS as an incentive hll, and of, itself to join. What do the political 
groups do within the camps that motivates people to join them? TIns section 
includes the themes of resources and social functions. The second section exa..1Jlmes 
t.he role of the faJnily in the mobilisation process. How far does the faJnily decide 
whether or not you are politically active and which particular group you join? The 
I McCarthy, J and Zald, Mayer "Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" 
American Journal of Sociology (VoL 28, 1977) For more explanatory detail see Chapter One. Their 
approach is part of t.h.e resource mobilisation t.h.eories. 
2 Touraine, Alain The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981). Again see 
Chapter One. He is a new social movement theorist focusing on identity, opposition and totality. 
228 
third section focuses on solidarity and the belief in the COIllmon good as a reason for 
joining. The concluding section of tpis chapter will look at what the field research 
found \vas the most C0111.L'TIOn theme of recrtdtment: 'no strategy needed' . 
The political groups that I interviewed include: Fatah, Palestinian Popular Stmggle 
T"' (PPST""\. pl·· T ·1 • T" _ (pr r"'\ ~ 1 T"" r.1 T·1 .• 
.rront ~ .r), ~ alestmlan LlOeratlOn .rront \~ L.r ), yopmar .rront ror tne LlOeratlOn 
of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 
Palestinian Conlmlmist Pa..rty, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
COJI1~1Jland (PFLP-GC), Saiqa, and Fatah Intifada. All of these groups reject the Oslo 
accords and the cu..rrent Peace Process, apa..rt from Fatah and sections of both the 
PPSF and the PLF. The rest of the groups represent the forces in the Palestinian 
resistance that form what is ~T}own as the Aliiance of Palestinian Forces (MF) that 
act as a lln;ted -front l'nAnm as 'thP rp;pct;On;StS' 3 ThPse grOllns are basp~ ar~ ... \,A..L.LI......L.l. .J...l.... Kl.l.V Vl'.L.J.. ... .L..l."" ""J..... '-... .L.L.I.... • .L .I..l.'Iro.I .1. ...... 1-' ""....,. .I.'I'A_ 
sponsored by Syria. Two groups are no longer fonnal members, the PFLP and the 
DT"'T P 1 l' l' 1 • 1 1 P 1 " A· 1 • (n-A)' 1 ""9 4 I .r L~ , as tney engagea m malOgue witn tne ~ alestmian utnonty y m 1 'j'j . 
The following two charts provide an overview of the Palestinian groups. The first 
chart outlines the groups that are p~rt of the Alli~T}ce of Palestipian Forces (APF), 
otherwise known as the Da..'Ilascus 10. The second chart shows the groups that 
support the Oslo process a..nd a two-state solution. 
3 For more information on the specifics of the rejection groups see Str'111dberg, Anders "The 
Damascus-Based Alliance of Palest ill ian Forces: A Primer" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. XXIX, 
No.3, Spring 2000, Issue 115). 
4 More explanation on their formation and previous alliances available in Chapter Four. The PFLP is 
closer to the Damascus 10 than the DFLP. 
229 
Chart 1: Palestinian Groups in Lebanon Opposing the Oslo Process 
N .. A.l'-1:E 
IPFLP 
I 
I 
I rFLP-GC 
I 
DFLP 
I PALl ..." ST~l\.TTA1l\.T I ... Ji, ... 11"O.L 1, 
I :REVOLUTIONARY 
I COMMUNIST 
I PARTY 
SAIQA 
Established by George 
Habash (a<; well as 
Hani Hindi and Wadi 
Haddad) in 1967 in the 
wake of the 1967 War. 
iCURRENT 
I T ""AD"'-"R S\ I LE E.... , 
succeeded by 
Mustafa Ali 
Qasim Zabiri 
(Abu Ali 
Mustafa). 
-Zabiri was 
assassinated in his 
office in 2001 and 
was succeeded by 
Saadat iii 2002. 
-Saadat was 
I detained in 2002 
Split from PFLP 
I by the PA. 
in I -SecretaIY-I . 
1968 headed 
Ahmad Jibrii 
by I General Ahmad 
I Jibrii. 
I -Deputy 
I 
Secretary-General 
Talal Naji 
Split from PFLP in i -Nayef 
1969 with Nayef I Hawatamah 
Hawatamah in the I 
I lead, forming the 
I PDFLP. Changed its 
i name to DFLP in 1974 
I 
i Formed m 1982 by i-Arabi Awwarl 
I Arabi A wwad I 
I I 
I 
Formed in 1968 to rival 
Fatah. Original 
leadership consisted of 
-Secreta.ry-
General since 
1979 issam ai-
Qadi 
-Smni al-Atari and 
I Dan .Taman!, Youssef I 
I Zuarlrlin mId I 
I Mahmoud ai-Maayaia, Majjid Mu.l}sin are 
I b "b' , " I ut were replacea y !eaaers lOr 
I Zunair Munsin after Leba.T!on. 
I 1970 coup LT! Syria 
1 
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I ADDITIONAL 
II TJ\.TJ?ODl\Jf.t. TT1(\N i..l~.... ..L'-.l"~"" ,-,.J.." 
-When the PFLP's deputy I 
secretaly-general met I 
with Arafat in Cairo in I 
1999, they were I 
!;~~~;!£~;:~:~::~e~f II 
'dialogue does not always 
mean agreement' . 
-Saadat opposes Oslo I 
I 
-Joined APF to oppose 
the Oslo process and the 
Declaration of Principles 
in 1993. 
-Reconciled with Fatah in 
1999 - thus considered to 
be out of alliance at 
present 
-In 2000 the DFLP sent a 
delegate to Camp David, 
but withdrew before they 
concluded. 
-Although not very large, 
it is a 'veteran' of 
PalestLT!ian politics as it 
has its begirl..nings already 
in the 1920's. It emerged 
out of the traditional 
communist party in 1982. 
-JoLT!ed APF in 1993 
I A ' ~'PI 0 
I 
PLF 
PPSF 
FATAH L~TIFADA 
Fonned ill 1977 by 
Muhammad Zaydan 
(j\bu Abbas) and other 
dissenters from the 
PFLP-GC. 
II Establised July 1967 by 
I Dr. Samir Ghosheh 
I a.'1d Bahjat Abu 
i Gharbieh 
I 
I Fonned in May 1983 by 
I Abu Musa (Sa'id Musa 
I Murg.i}a). 
I 
Formed in 1988. 
Emerged from the 
Muslim Brotherhood iII 
response to the outbreak 
of the intifada. 
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-Opposition led by 
Abu Nida! a!-
III Ashqar 
-PLO faction led I by Omar Shib!i 
I (Abu Ahmad I _ I Halab) 
I 
-Pro-Oslo led by 
Dr. Ghosheh 
-Pro-Damascus 
led by Kbaied 
Abd at Majid. 
Leader today 
Abu Khaled 
Umla 
al-
-Sheikh 
Yasin, 
Ahmad 
assassi..~ated in 
March 2004 by I 
the IDF. - Abd al- I 
Aziz al-Rantisi I 
also assassh'1ated II1II 
In April 2004. 
P.AMAS is not 
announch'1g its 
- d . r I new lea er ill rear I 
of further I 
assassinations. I 
I 
I 
-This groups suffered 
many splits. 
-Today opposition is led 
by Ya'coub and Abd al-
Fata.i} Ghanim with head 
office in Damascus. 
-There used to be three 
factions to this group: 
I) Led by Tal-at Ya'coub 
(who died in 1988 of a 
hea.rt att.ack- Abu Nidal 
al-ll..shqar took over) and 
2) Led by Abd Fatt.ah 
Ghanim - (pro-Damascus 
and now allied with 
Ya'coub faction) and 
3) Led by Mohammad 
Zaydan (Abu Abbas) who 
merged with Ya'coub's 
faction in 1989. He 
stayed in Baghdad since 
1995 and was arrested by 
the US in 2003 and died 
in US custody in 2004. 
-ALrrlOst no presence in 
the Occupied Territories, 
but has support in 
Lebanon. 
-Joil'1ed Damascus 10 hy} 
1991. 
-However not based in 
Da..-rnascus., but Gaza. 
-Main activity in 
Occupied Territories., 
however, have I 
representatives and I 
supporters in Lebanon as I 
I 
all. 
I 
PU Formed In 1979 by Shiqaqi I -Group operates mainly 
I
I Fathi Shiqaqi and other I assassinated in in the Occupied 
Palestitlians in Egypt., Malta by Israelis I Territories, however has 
Expelled from Egypt in I in 1995 and was I representatives and a 
I 1981 . and Shiqaqi I succeeded by Dr. I fol~?wing in Lebatl0n as 
I
I retU .• '1led to Gaza to form I Ramadan Abd I welL 
 the PIJ. I A~l~h ~haUah, I 
I I WIth headquarters I 
I I 1 I I ill Damascus. I 
Chart 2: Palestinian Groups in Lebanon supporting the Oslo Process 
NAME I ESTABLISHED 
Fatah 1959 
PLF 1977 
I Head of Fatall is The leaders of this 
I Farouq Quadoumi. I group were the main 
I Other prominent I actors in the Oslo 
Ii
i leaders are Yassir I Accords and the 
Arafat (late-President I 'peace process'. 
of the P A) and the I 
I I current President of I 
I ~~bas: A Mahi110ud I 
I Mohammad Zaydan I This group is split I 
I (Abu Abbas) died in I between supporters I 
I 2004. Omar Shibli I and non-supporters of I 
I (Abu Ahmad Raiab) 1 the Peace Process I 
I replaced him. I (See chrut above). I 
I ......... 
1
1967 I Dr. Gilosileil I !his group is splil I 
I I oetween supporters I 
I 
I I II' I and non-supporters of I I t' ~ P I I ne reace . rocess. I 
As the charts indicate, some of these groups have split into pro- and anti-Oslo 
factions. In addition some of the groups are almost solely based in Syria and 
Lebanon, such as the sections of the PPSF, Saiqa, Fatah Intifada, sections of the 
PLF, the Palesti..nian Revolutiona..ry Commlll1ist Party, and the PFLP-GC (although it 
does have presence in Occupied Territories, it is more popular in Lebanon and 
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Syria). One could potentially split the chart and the groups into four more sub-
sections in order to ma.1(e their allegiances clearer: 
1) Fatah and PLO groups: Including the pro-Oslo offshoots of the PPSF and the 
PLF. These groups believe that the realistic solution to the ClUTent Arab-Israeli 
cop.i1ict is based upon lJN Resolutions 194 a.lld 242. This i.rnplies that there will be 
1'1'Yll·tprl ,f" ary nght of" TPf1'Tn f"r.T TeflugpPs They do have a f"r.ll0ur1ng thTr.llghr.llt ~~.l..L.L "' ......... ,.l...L ..l.,..L.l. .I..I.\. ..L .l.""',,\,..I...L.L.L .LV..L .L..L "",,",...L.I...l. .1..1. ..LV.I..1. "" .1..1..1. ... ..l..LLv...... .1.'-' .......... 
Lebanon, however, the most substantial following is in the south. 
As win be shmvn below, different groups within the Resistance Movement have 
prominence in the va..-rious ca..rnps depending on geography. In other words, Fatah 
and other PLO groups have promi.nence in some camps whereas in most of t..he other 
ca.rnps the opposition groups have proIPinence. Tbis has to do with the Lebanese 
Civil War, where in some cases Fatah was the strongest force a..'1d in other cases the 
Palestinian groups having their support from Syria were the strongest force. 
2) The Opposition groups: Including the PFLP-GC, the Palestipian Revolutionary 
C01'Yl1'Yllln,st Parm, Sa,na, Hat.,h Tnt,f:arla ard the Damasclls lprl sect'ons r.f" the PPSH .I..l...LL.I..I.Y.J..L.l. ... ..L i ... ), .1.'1 _..L i.U..i..I...L ... .l...l......... ..1. ... .1..1. .1..1....... .1............... ....I..I..&. V.L ... .l..1. ..L..L ..l. 
and the PLF. These groups consider armed struggle the best means to liberate 
Palestine, however, they are not carrying out any military raids at the moment. They 
are against the Oslo process as they believe that 1) It does not represent the 
Palestinian people and 2) It is a surrender to the Israelis. These groups are for the 
most pa.rt based in Syria and Lebanon and tbis is where their support base comes 
from (save the PFLP-GC who has support a..'1d conducts activities within the 
Occupied Territories). TIns suppOli is not surprising as it is the Palestinian refugees 
who have been the most neglected within the peace process. 
3) The Religious groups: Including F..ALVlAS a..'1d the PH who have representatives 
and followers in the CaLl1pS in Lebanon, however, their main activity is focused in 
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the Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, they do have support and a following 3-nd 
t]1is is due to the sa.rne reasons as the above. Th.ese groups reject the Osio process 
and bel,pvp that l"Derat'ng Palest,np 's a precnnrl,t,nn tn nn,t" o-fthe Tsl" ...... 'c wnr1d ~ .l..1.V v .... ..&-.l. .... ..1-.1. .1..1..1. .I. A.A."'''''''' .1. __ V.1..l.~.L"".l.'-'.l..l. .. v UJ...Lt.. .... ; ..L ... .1...1. ..L .l.(..i..i.i.il V.l..l.. 
4) The PFLP and the DFLP. The fact that the PFLP entered into dialogue with the 
P A does not necessa.riiy mea.Tl that they agree with them or a two-state soiution. It is 
seen ...... ore as a necpss,t" bpcanse n-f the current rpa1,t'es on t'ne gronnd Tn nther .1. A.A..&. .1. ..L.l. '" .1.") v \,..I. V..L .... .1..1. .I..L .l..I. .... ..LV .1...1. .... .1. .1..1. .... ,1.. .L~.I. ..... .l..1. '-' ... .1..1. .I. 
words, although they are committed to liberating all of Palestine, they believe that it 
is wise to be adaptabie as weE as being invoived in the decisions being made. The 
DFLP, however, has a more pragmatic outlook, calling for a solution based on UN 
Resolution 242. 
Incentives? The function of the political groups In the refugee 
camps 
Today the PLO has left Lebanon; the Cairo Agreement no longer exists to allow 
1 ," 'T'1 S . 1 1 1 • -fi 1 1 •• wn corrmlanao aCnVlty. 1 ne OVlet OlOC no ~onger eXIsts to ..:una tne orgaIllsatIons. nat 
exactly do these orgarisations do? The evidence that I found witl,in Shatila ca..1JlP 
did not correspond to that from earlier phases of their existence in Leb3-non. 
The organisations only really exist h' the camp ,md the organisations are 
providing protection in the camp ... Because there is no Palestinian authority in 
the camp, [the residents] see the org,misations as a small authority that [they] 
should be under to get protection. This condition in Lebanon is completely 
different to the conditions h' Syria and Jordan. In Lebanon, all the Palestinian 
people are organised. But the people h' Syria and Jordan, although they are 
politicised h' the Palesth,ian case, they are not organised in the Palestinian 
organisations. [This is] because they have better living conditions and more 
rights than the Palestinians here; they can work and do their jobs like any other 
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citizens. But here it is not like that. But [no matter where Palestinians live] they 
are with Palestine and the Palestinian cause5 
The political organisations in Lebanon can, therefore, be seen as small authorities 
that ta..1(e care of day-to-day issues. Tbis leads to the first major function of the 
political groups: popular corr~T..ittees. 
Popular CO!Yl .. mittees 
As the Lebanese authorities do not involve themselves directly in refugee ca.1JlP 
aITairs. thp.re is a nO~1l1ar committep. ar~ a sPf'lun·ty f'Arnrnl·ttee that con s1sts of" ~~ ~~ .. _ ~_~ ~ -'" -'" __ _ ___ .. __ _ ....... ~~.... ~v................... ........ .......... ... 
members and leaders of each political pa..rty that organises life to a certain extent 
witbin the camp. The vanous political groups "listen to people, and bring up 
importa...'1t issues,,6 to the popular corrunittee. There is no Other allthon'tv 1n t'ne I,....l..L.L ...... .L.t. "J ..L.L..I. II..L 
camps. The political groups therefore provide help and protection, and are thus part 
of the establisn.1Jlent witbin the ca.1Jlps. 
The political groups, individually and as part of the popular committees, negotiate 
with Lm"KWA in order to help needy people with housing and so forth, even though 
they may not aiways be as ur,ited on the popular COIl".lllittee as people \vouid like 
them to be. People do also negotiate with UNRWA themselves. 
5 Interview with the leader ofPPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed office in Shatila 
camp, 1011 0/02 
6 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Communist Party in Shatila Cfu-np. Interview held in his 
office in Shatila canlp 0911 0/02 
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The situation and effectiveness of the popular cOlmruttees vary from camp to camp 
1· • T p. 1 TT'" 1 ., 1 n • 1 (S· 1 '\ /"" anu reglOn to regIon . ..n ~m el nelwen, a ca.rnp sltuateu Close to ~alQa luon, lOr 
instance, there are several popular cOIr.uTittees competing with each other. The 
official popular cmmruttee IS nm by opposition groups, 'in particular Saiqa', and 
PLO loyalists have set up their own popular cOJTI~tylitlee, as well as the PFLP 
together with the DFLP. According to Suleiman the other ca..'TIpS in the South, BOli<1 
el Shemali and Rashidiyeh are nm by PLO popular COllL111ittees. They do not suffer 
from the multiple popular committees of Ein el Helweh ca.rnp as they 'never fell 
under Syria..'1 control,.7 Witt-in the northern ca..'TIPS, there is hardly any PLO presence 
ruid the popular cOlTh'nittees are run by opposition groups.8 Tt.ds also has to do with 
tt,e historical context. It was in the nor'"u,em CfullPS, specifically the ones in fuld 
around Tripoli, that the discussions between Arafat and Abu Musa took place during 
1983, causing a split wi~1Un Fatru~.9 In the Beirut Crul1PS, where most of the field 
research was done for this tt,esis, the popular committees seemed to be all-
encompassing. Both the opposition groups and Fatah work together on the popular 
committee. However, Fatah was not considered to be one of the bigger groups in 
Beirut. Suleiman explains that in the Bei.rut camps "Fata.h does maintain low-profile 
Offi nd indi '·dna1 sn .... p rt"'TS" iO Th", t1iff"'Tences b"'tw"'en th'" egl·ons are that in ...L...L.J..ces at.... ..L..L..L.J.. '\ 1 \..I...L """1:-' ~ O..L .... ""'.1.. • ...L ..L...L'" "-I..I....L...LV.l. .1...1. V V..l..l. IL...L.l."" r .L..L L.l...l. .l..L..L 
Ein el Helweh, the largest of the camps, there are competing committees. In the 
south the popular cOJTI~rnittees are PLO-controlled, wpile in the north, the opposition 
are in control, and in BeLt'ut the popular cOIr.u'TIittees have most groups together on 
7 Suleiman, Jaber "Report from Leb<illon: The Cllilent Political, Organisational and Security 
Situation in u'le Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon" Journal of Palestine Studies (xxix, No 1, 
Autumn 1999) p. 76 
8 Suleiman, Jaber op. cit.~ p. 77 
9 See Chapter Four. 
iO Suleiman, Jaber op. cit., p. 77 This may well be the case. From my interviews, Fatah did not seem 
to be the most popular of the groups. But I found that most of all of the other offices were also rather 
low-profile, Fatah not being any more low-profile than <illy others. It was just not the most popular 
group. I just wanted to point this out in case there was a peiception of Fatah being intimidated by the 
othei groups, as that was not my inteipietation. 
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one popular committee. This shows how the groups compete against each other in 
order to represent the PalestiPian refugees in the ca.rnps. 
This competition can cause problems for the inhabitants, especially where there are 
multiple popular cOIP~rnittees. The differences in popular cOIP~Tflittees tp..Toughout the 
calnps h'1 Leba..'1on raise an h1Jlportant question: who is the legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people, and of the PalestiIlian refugees in Lebanon? This question 
will have wider connotations when the PalestiPian refugee issue is finally brought to 
the negotiating table. 
There is also a security committee that is supposed to help sort out various issues 
witpin the ca.rnp such as theft, fights and so forth. Du.ring my fieldwork, I noticed 
that ti>is corr~1Jlittee was not :bighly regarded, with answers such as 'if you know the 
people, if they are yom friends, or if you are a member of the group that has the 
, ., . . , , 'f. ." 11 12 people m tne secu.TJ.ty COmfll..lttee you Ca.l1 ao as you please ana so ..:ortn, . 
Whether or not the popular committees being the quasi-political authority within the 
camps was enough for people to join political groups, remains to be seen. However 
this is an import..ant function of the political groups \\rithin the ca..1Jlp. However, the 
question still remains as to what else the groups provide that could make people 
Wa.l1t to join. 
11 This is from various informal interviews as well as conversations recorded iil diary. 
12 Dur'mg my stay in the autumn. of2002 ti'1ere was a murder dur'mg the night iii Shatila camp. The 
next mornitlg there was blood all over the street. When I tried to fmd out what the security committee 
was doing about it I was told that they were doing nothing. The one who had killed the other one was 
a friend of the people on the committee and therefore nothing was done about it. 
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Activities 
The groups were able to do a lot more In the years prior to and even du..ri.ng the 
Leba..'1ese civil war due to more ftL1J.ding a..qd the Cairo Agreement that gave the 
Palestinians more rightS. 13 Today the situation IS different. With reference to the 
political groups, L~ey no longer have L~e right to Cat!)' mms atJd Cat!)' out their 
revolution on Lebanese soil. From the interviews I had, it seemed that the political 
groups did respect this fact and had come to the conclusion that, militarily, they 
could no longer act from Lebanon. But they could act with regard to social issues. 
Regarding what activities the organisations have that may make people want to join, 
the political leaders told me that they still do have certain activities for members, 
and help their members as much as they can: 
The Democratic Front comprises of many groups; for eXfullple the women's 
group and the youth organisation. Each orgfulisation has its own programme. 
The [yout.~ orgfulisation for instance] tries to see what the youth's problems are 
and try to change them. They have some classes for the youth The youth, 
they need something like this. 14 
We it'1 the PFLP, study the situation of the camp and the poor living conditions 
in the camp and give descriptions of it outside the camp to try fu'1d raise money . 
... [We also] have a big hall here in the camplS for the youth. The hall has table 
termis and games, and we give [ e)..1:ra] lessons to the children because the 
schools are so crowded. There are problems with the schools fu'1d therefore we 
give them eA1:ra lessons .. If someone ,",'ants to have a wedding in the hall, the hall 
costs $50. It can also be used for f,merals. When the children fillish school we 
bring in teachers and friends of the PFLP to help them. We have lectures and 
political demonstrations to explain to the youth the sitolation in Palestine, about 
the Zionists and about the right ofretilill16~ 
We have some social activities in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. We have 
some ... clubs, we have representatives in the Popular Committees in that 
13 For more information on Palesti!lia.ll groups and politics in exile foiloWLllg the 1967 War up to the 
mid-1980's see for Lllstance Sayigh, Yezid "The Politics of Palestinian Exile" Third World Quarterly 
Vol. 9, No.1, Ja.llUa.ry 1987 
14 Tnterview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, the leader of the DFLP for Lebanon. Interview held in his home in 
Shatila camp, 07/l 0/02 
15 This was the only such hal! in Shatila camp that was used for aLll10st every political activity, not 
necessarily by the PFLP. 
16 Interview with Naji Dawali leader of the PFLP in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in 
Shatila camp 09ilOl02 
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camps that deal with issues of cleaning, unemployment fuid so forth. We have 
some teachers that help the small children. We help with some health care in the 
hospitals 17 
In the souL~, our organisation defends the people inside the CfullP ... in the south 
we have some military work, but in all the other camps we have media work, 
we have lectures, concerts. Vie also have social work18 
The latter of these statements confirms the research done by Professor Khasen/9 
who has been researching t,e mobilisation of potential suicide bombers from 
Raspidiyeh camp, a refugee camp very close to the Israeli border. He shows how the 
living conditions are very different in Rashidiyeh camp in comparison to the other 
ca.rnps in Leba.l1on: the conditions there are much worse. He calis the refugee ca.rnps 
'breeding grounds' for producing suicide bombers. The conditions in the camps in 
the south, in pa.rticular Rashidiyeh ca..11lP, are worse than other camps in Lebanon 
where "because of their proximity to Israei, the Leba.l1ese a.r:my literaily puts them 
under siege".2o There is a checkpoint at the entrance gate and Palestinians witness 
mass delays in their movements because of this. In Raspidiyeh camp the Lebanese 
authorities are so strict with them that they "do not ailow the Palestipians to repair 
their residential qua..rters and to perform basic maintenance tasks. For example, the 
govemment restrictions do not allow Palestinians to even bring nails and hammers 
• 1 1 1 T ,. b 1 .,., 21 T'· 1 1 r . _. . 1 1 
mto tne ca.rnps ClOse to tne Israen oruer. ~ms level OI seventy IS pa.rilcUlar omy 
to ca..'TIpS close to the Israeli border,22 while the other ca..'TIpS where I conducted my 
research had different circmnstances. The Beimt camps, Shatila, Bourj el Barajneh 
i7Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed's office 
10110/02 
18 Interview with Mohammad Ann, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home in 
Shatila camp, 15/10/02 
19 See for example K.t~ashan, Hilal "Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings" Third 
World Quarterlv (Vol. 24, No 6, 2003) 
20 K.t1.mshan, Hilal 2003 op. cit., p. 1056 
21 Ibid. p. 1056 
22 The camps situated in the south include Ein el Helweh, Rashidiyeh, Bolllj el Shemali, Al Buss. 
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and Mar Elias were all open with no checkpoints. Ein el Helweh was more severe, 
with checkpoints at the entrance. 
What Khashan found, however, in Rashidiyeh camp was that people were willing to 
become suicide bombers inside Israel for reasons of frustration. Tue issue of 
deprivation was discussed in the previous chapter in the human needs section. TIle 
next chapter will exa..11line the potential for frustration wit..llln the Palestinian 
nonlllat'on Nevpr/-heless Kl as'nar's f1nd'ngs T he1'eve to 'De par/-'cn1 ar to Y 1:-''''".1. \'..L .l..l.. '-'..LIL..l..l. ,.L.l. .I. .L.L.L..I..L.l. ...L V..LA. ... ~ .L .. .l. '-4-.1. " 
Rashidiyeh camp, and most Palestinian milita..ry activity has been mainly confIned to 
Palestine at tpis moment in time.23 
Retuming to the quotations above by some of the political leaders, what they show 
is that the political groups try as best they Ca..ll to help the conditions in the ca..11lps. 
These conditions are outlined in the previous chapter in more detail, and include 
problems relating to the UNRWA schools and problems with healthcare. In raising 
these issues and trying to combat the problems the groups are creating collective 
incentives for joining their orgarisation.24 The collective incentives for joining one 
of these groups are many, including receiving help with school work and education 
through youth clubs, women's groups, help with fInancial issues wherever possible, 
incentives through an ideology that one believes in, and also the incentive to be an 
active member of the cOl11..IDmuty. As indicated above, for many of the people 111 
23 I did meet with Professor Khashan at the AVE and he confirmed that he had only studied this camp 
with respect to this issue and he too believed the situation to be different within. other camps in 
Lebanon. His conclusions will be examined fh.rt.her within the next chapter and more fully within the 
conclusion. However one import.ant point to note is the difference between actual pa.rticipation and 
endorsement. From my research, most refugees do support suicide bombings, not only in Rashidiyeh 
Cfuilp. This has to do with identity fuid perception of the situation which will be looked at in the next 
chaDter. 
24 Collective incentives are fully explained in Chapter 1. It is about incentives for the entire collective 
to jOhi the groups as opposed to selective incentives. Based on Olson, MfuiCur The Logic of 
Collective Action (Hfu-vard University Press, Cambridge, 1965 and 1968) 
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Shatila, who ca..llnot (even illegally) work, they have nothing to do but wait for their 
return to Palesti.Tle. Jowing an orgapisation helps them acpieve at least some 
irnmediate satisfaction. They learn more about Palestine, about the Lebanese 
govemment, and about their OW11 state of affairs. 
Parents ta..1ce advantage of t.he extra teachers and send t.heir children to the youth 
clubs where the extra school teachers are provided by the political orgapisations. 
T],p sf"'lc'o-econf"'lTYl'c henp-hts Ao prov'de l·ncent'''es C'f"'Ir ,o,n,ng 'lTt..y 'na"v'dua1s 
..L .1...1..'-' V..L .1. V.l.. .... .l...L IV .l..I. ....... ..L.l.\.. '-I. .I..L .1..1. .I..u .. .1. Y Iv.l. J .. U . .L..I...L.I. • '.IV 11 .I..I..L..L .I. 
decide to join or not join groups is the focus of the next chapter however in regard to 
1 .. .. 1 1 1 1 1 1'"" 11 .. 1 1 1 tnese mcentlVes, tne people wno were alreaay po.ltlcallY actIve ana alreaay 
mobilised were positive and recognised the benefits available to them tr..rough some 
of the social work done by the organisations, whereas the people who were not 
members of political groups, pa.rticularly among many of the youth, did not believe 
that that was enough reason for joiring. Tris aspect will be looked into more closely 
below. 
Regarding social work done by the political groups in the camps, I noticed that the 
two religious groups, HA ... VlAS and the PIJ, were also providing assistance to needy 
people. Their social work, as with the secular groups, did provide incentives for 
joining. Another religious group that is active in social work in the refugee camps is 
the Lebanese group, Hizb' Allah. Tpis group provided on numerous occasions during 
my stay clothing, shoes, and food for the refhgees. Tris group, however, did not 
distinguish between members and non-members. Anyone who was needy was able 
to benefit from their charity. For exa.Tfiple, du..ri.ng one of my stays in Shatila ca.TfiP, 
Hizb' Allah donated shoes to everyone in need, not necessarily Hizb' Allah 
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followers. A young womCLll from one of the fCLlllilies I often visited had been given a 
,. b f' ., ,. t .', t·' 1· ,.. ., '·'d· TT"' 'A" , . DIg ag o~ snoes ~o Qls.nou~e .0 tne peop~e m llVl..ng m ner DUll mg . .t11Z0 Han IS 
very popular with Palestinian refhgees in Lebanon, not orJy because of the social 
work, but also in relation to 1) its role in the liberation of Southem Lebanon (where 
P ' .. .. ') d "', . 'T , " P' .. many ~ alestlmans .lomea an L) ItS stance towaras Israel ana tne alestmla1}~ 
reh'geps (meaning its SUpnorlive stance touTards thP reh'geps and their right to rehurn 
.l..L\,..I. "'" .1..1. U,i..J,....LJ...l. ... 1. ~ P .1.. ... .1. "UJ...l. .. VV(..i.i. '-..'-.1.'-".1...1.\,..1. ....... .l. ......... .J....L.J...1. .1..1..... .I. .. .1..1. 
to their homes). 
The political groups also help in sustaiping the PalestiPian identity. The question of 
hOw f'<>r the poll·tical gro"ns have a role in f'reating Palestini<>n irlpntity and houT f'<>r 
.1..1. ..LUi. .. .1. ~ .I..I...Ie U-p.l..1. .I. .I. .l..l..1. ""... '-.L.A..I. .l..1. .1..1. .l.(..i.i..l. .I.u. ..... ..L.I.......... ") u.i..l. .I. \''I''.LUi.. 
it is a result of the structmal context, will be looked at in the next chapter where the 
focus is on identity. However the political groups re-affirm PalestiPian identity by 
way of reinforcing and cOl1'.u.'11emorating local J:-.,istories in terms of J:-.,istories from 
Palestine, and more recent (usually negative) llistories for the Palestillians in 
Lebanon as well as celebrating Palestipian holidays?5 
The immediate goals of the groups lie ill their everyday n.ll1ctions. Awdah (retum) 
and Tahrir (liberation) are still the uitLlTIate goals, but the political groups realise 
that from Lebanon they <>re unablp to f':acl·litatp this goal This is rlllP to the strllC'-'lr<>l 
.. .....LL.I...L (..i.i.,L .1..1., l..I..1. Ui .I.""".l. .I..I.\..U",""'" 1..1..&..1. .I. • ..L.I..LL .I. u.\,..I."".. ".1..1. .... ..1. \,..I. lw ...... .l. 
constraints, including their base in Lebanon where govennnental policies are not in 
their favour, as weli as lack of funding. 
Because of these nvo issues the priority for their lirrited rJ11ds is in helping the 
people ill the ren.lgee camps cope with their lives in these difficult conditions. It can 
be argued, therefore, that the functions of the political groups do act as collective 
25 For example in Shatila camp, there is always a commemoration for the Massacre. The different 
groups hold meetings a..nd ma..T!Y foreign visitors are invited from various embassies and NGO's. 
Ot.h.er holidays are also Lrnportant. During the Eid, after Ramadan, most groups go to their members 
with small gifts. This is also part of Arab tradition. 
incentives for joining them. However, there are other dynamics to mobilisation that 
are LTIlportant too. Thus the function of groups 8Ild collective incentives do not show 
the whole picture. 
F "' ~ amllY 
Within social construction literatme Gamson tells us t.hat organisations use "pre-
.... 1· 1·.,., 1" ~ • ,.. r" 1 1 r ., 26 T 
eXIstmg relatlOnsmps as a oaSIS :.:or recrUItment, tnrougn rnenas ana ramlly. IS 
tbis t.he case L'l Lebanon and how far do people within the sa..'lle family urit join the 
same groups? 
Indeed in many cases joining groups seemed to be a fa.rnily affair. In other words, 
people joined groups because their family were members. Nevertheless, although 
family ties to formal memberspip witpin orgapisations seemed to be rather pigh, 
there were more cases than expected where fa..'llily members belonged to different 
groups. Looking back to the early 1980s Peteet, in her work on women in t.he camps, 
found that 
Mobilisers often say that the easiest girls to mobilise are those who have active 
male family members and those who are employed27 in the Resistance offices or 
institutions ... 
Living in a family where brothers (or sisters) are active may draw women into 
the resistat .. ce ... 
Kin ties can be endowed with more direct significance. When Rima, a seventeen 
year-old student, wanted to attend meetings, her faL~er opposed it on the 
26 Gamson, William "The Social Psychology of Collective Action" in Morris and Mueller Frontiers 
in Social Movement Theorv (Yale University Press, New I-Iaven 1992) 
27 NB! Her research was done before the PLO left Lebanon. Before 1982, the PLO in Lebanon was 
well fLlilded ,md provided employment for PalestLt .. ians within their offices and various institutions. 
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grounds that politics are not a girl's concern. Her elder, activist broLher8 
mediated with their father, convincing him that her attendance would not be 
ha.rmful and emphasising his own support for her actions. Eventually her father 
conceded and she became a member9 
However, having said this, she noticed that while the fatuily can be encouraging and 
bring about female involvement in political groups, the fanrily can also hinder it. 
The family has a double-edged role iil mobilisin.g women; it is crucial in both 
facilitating and obstructing it. The family is the primary social institution 
entrusted with the task of enforch,g society's normative order on women ... 
Accordingly, seldom do women join the Resistance without arousing family 
opposition. Few families readily confer approval on a kinswoman's decision to 
engage in political activism. In many cases they are effectively able to hinder 
women's actions; h' other cases women engage h' protracted and occasionally 
volatile conflicts with their parents for permission to participate30 
Peteet emphasises the role of the family. Fa..lllily ties, or kin ties, as she calls them, 
play a two-sided role. On the one hand, fa.T!1ilies may encourage women to join 
resistance groups (political groups) and on the other hand they can obstruct it. The 
family hinders women in joining for many reasons, the main reasons being the role 
f 1 .. 1· .. 1" 1 h r- 1 1 1" 1.... .. 1 .. o~ tne woman m tramtlOnal SOCIety ana ~ear or scanaal as a mnaenng raetor wItmn 
the calnp. 
However, regarding Peteet's research, it IS important to emphasise the time and 
context within wbich she was doing her research on women and the Palestipian 
resistallce movement. Her research took place from September 1980 to Ju...'1e 1982. 
TIns places the time of her research during the time of the Lebanese civil war, wInch 
has a bearing on her results. In addition, during these years, the Palestipian 
28 .,...1· 1 1 f: ~1 1 • 11 1 1 1 1 • 1" 
! ms snows now .aml!y memDers, eSpeCIa.IY Drotners, can De extremelY Lmportant wnen It comes to 
mobilisation of themselves as well as other family members. 
29 Peteet, Julie Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1991) p. 119 
30 Ibid. p. 135 
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revolution was in its hey-day. The PLO was still in Lebanon, CLlld they had various 
offices and institutions where Palestipians could seek employment as well as receive 
help. Tpis probably had an iI'Jluence on the mobilisation process, especially 
regarding women. Peteet in her explanations on mobilising women refers to women, 
for instance, who were employed by the Resistance institutions and offices, and how 
easily they were mobilised. At tpis time as well, there was money a..'ld education 
available through the PLO, which could also be a mobilising factor. Peteet for 
1 .. .. .... .. .. f 1 1 1" 1 .,. ... 31"" 
exa.rnple mentIOns SOCIal mstltutIOns as one o~ tne cnannels to mOOlllsatIOn. lnese 
social institutions were built and p.l...'lded by the PLO and were closely liI'~1ced to the 
Palestinian political groups. She looks at how the "step from employment to 
affiliation or membership [was] fairly easy and widely encouraged by the 
rpsponsib1es in the workpla£>p" 32 Vet thesp instihutions either do not exist torlav or 
.1.-_ _ .I..I..I..J.. .1..1.-.1. &..1.- ..L.I. _ """"".. .I. .. "'.I. ""-' .1..1.-.1. .. .I... .1...1...1. .I.-...l. ..L.l.... ~.l."'" '-'I. '.], .l. 
if they do, they exist with hardly any ftmding and employment. 
Similarly, because t..lJ.e time fra.rne of her research was during the civil war, t..lJ.ere are 
other considerations to be ta..1cen into account as well. In ti.'Iles of crisis, people, men 
and women, are needed in political groups in order to organise and secure the camp. 
Thus that period was also one when it would be expected that people should 
mobilise a..'ld join political groups. 
In relation to women in particular, I attended a DFLP women's meeting in Shatila 
ca.rnp. The theme of the meeting was women and mothers of the massacre. I had 
accompaI'ied a young woman to the meeting who was giving one of the speeches. In 
this instance, the young woman had strong support from her mother in going to this 
meeting and ma.1dng the speech, thereby eliminating any issue of going against the 
3i Peteet's channels to mobilisation of women include; university student, self-critique, mass work, 
kin ties, and social institutions, 
32 Peteet, Julie op. cit., p. 120 
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family. The yOlmg woman, however, was not a member of the DFLP and when 
interviewed at a later date, she considered herself to be non-political in the sense of 
not belonging to a political group. 
I thiiJ.k all the groups are for Palesf.ne, so it is not necessary to be in a group. I 
mil for Palestine.33 
I..ll other words, you do not need to be a member of a group in order to share the 
ideals of the COIlLTIlOn good.34 On the other hand, there was more to tpis yOlLl1g 
woman's reasons for not joir,ing. 
The groups need to be in one hand a.TJ.d not fight each other35 
What this yOlmg woman has said raIses three related points: first, "the cmmnon 
good' which IS held by all of the political groups as well as people who are not 
members of groups, i.e., retu ... rp,ing to Palestine; second, disu...n,ity between the groups; 
third, being very politicised although not a member of a group, all aspect due to the 
very nature of the refugee ca.TIlPS, knowing from birth that you are a Palestinian 
refugee with no rights automatically ma...1(es you politicised. You are, in a sense, 
politicised by birLtll in this situation. 
Is family as importaIlt in the mobilisation process as Peteet tells us? Is faInily 
important to the involvement in political activity and membership of the resistance 
groups today? As I briefly pointed out earlier, I found cor.J1icting evidence as to 
33 Interview with Abeer, Palestiniml living in Shatila camp. Interview held in her house, Shatila 
Camp, 27/11103 
34 The comnlon good refers to a two-fold issue; first the common good within the camp situations, 
making life as bearable as possible and; second, the common good in supporting the Palestinians 
inside Palestine in their struggle against dominance and occupation as well as their struggle for 
realising statehood. 
35 Interview with Abeer, In her house, Shatila Camp, 27111/03 
exactly how big a role the family plays in this issue. For Peteet and her women, the 
fanlily played an important roie, pa..rticularly because of her focus on women. 
Although Peteet's ~qalysis had a different emphasis, her findings are revealing in 
that she too fOlmd multiple channels for mobilisation, including self-mobilisation, 
ki.Tl ties, social institutions, mass work, Ufliversity students and self-critique. In other 
words~ f~Tjly and kin ties are not the only existing mobilising factor. Although my 
focus is different and the time and setting have changed, I would agree with her that 
there are multiple channels of mobilisation. With my focus on why Palestiflian 
refugees join the Resista..'1ce in general as well as pa..rticular groups, the evidence 
regarding family ties was ambiguous. On the one hand there was evidence pointing 
to the LTl1portance of fa..rnily Uflity when joifling groups, but on the other hand there 
was evidence pointing to people ma..1dng their own decisions and in some cases 
members of the same family having joined groups that are politically opposed. 
However, what I did fInd was that having a politically-active family member does 
produce a social politicisation, wpich comes from family members being exposed to 
PA11tl·ca1 d'SC"SSl·ons "'nd the act'vl·tl·es of'the pOll·t'callv-act've f:am11v n-IPn-I her ThlS ~ V..L.LI. .I. ..&. \A. .LA.~.L "'.1. .... .1.. ..L 1,..L.l. _ .I. .l..l.J ..... ..L ..L.L.I..I.J .I..I..I.""'.I...L.LlJ .I. • ..l..I..l...I. 
social politicisation has an impact on the type of political action and the political 
group people chose to belong to. 
For members of the PFLP-GC, the whole family should be in the group. If this 
leader, or that member, couldn't convince his own family, then there is a 
problem36 
In Abu A..kram's opinion all family members should be members of the same group. 
Tpis creates social cohesion witpin the group. 
36 Interview with Abu Akram, political leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, Mar Elias Camp, 
10/10/02 
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On the other hand, while the fanuly may play an important role in raising political 
consciousness, the choice of which group to join can also be of the person's own 
ma..1dng. 
It is open to everyone. I am from Fateh Intifada. It allows MusliillS, Christians, 
intellectuals, you name it. You don't need to be anything in particular to join the 
gmup. About the question of family being members of the same group; it 
happens. I grew up with Fateh Intifada, but there are splits in families. My 
mother did not follow my father for instance37 
Sobheye's choice of political group was Fatah Intifada. Her father also belongs to 
tpis group, although her mother beiongs to another group. Her uncle, her father's 
brother, is the Ambassador for Palestine in Italy and belongs to Arafafs Fatah, a 
clear contrast to the Fatah 1'1tifada that arose out of opposition to Fatfu~.38 Sobheye's 
statement indicates u;at some people \)viu;in the S3.l11e family can join whatever 
group they prefer, in this case groups that opeIlly oppose each other. Although, 
having said tlus, it is still important to remember that the family may have a bearing 
to a certain extent on wpich group one Joms, as one usually grows up witpin a 
fa.tTIily u..njt. 
Dming my research I found that the issue of whether or not whole families joined 
• 1 h 1 f·' ,.. 1 ,. ~ ,.. 1 
one partlcUlar group, or w~~etner ':~TP~lly memoers .lomea GlIierent pontlcal groups, 
va..ried, thus making generalisation impossible. As explained above, fa..T..ily ties with 
political groups and political activity defilutely had an impact upon political 
. W· h 1 C 1 1 'I 1 1 T· • 1 C· 1 1 f consclOusneSS .. lL tne olGer, memoers tnat 1 mtervlewea l.e. tnose wno were 0': 
agp dl1r1ng the revohltion ant1 thp f'ivi1 "Tar' -f.armily rnembershu·p Of the sarrnp political 110.1 UJ....L..L.L ... .I...L .l.""'.......I..l. ..... -. L .I.V ""'.I. .1...1.. "'l' J..L ...LL.l. ..L.l..l..l...L .1..1. ~ ...L "'.1..1. ..L..L_ _ .I..I...L ..L 
groups seemed to matter more th~n to the younger generation (who were very young 
37 Interview with Sobheye, member of Fateh Intifada, in her home in Shatila camp, 23110/02 
38 See Chapter Four 
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during the civil war).39 Nevertheless, there is always more thlli~ one reason why 
people decide to join political groups. In addition there is 1:t;e question of why some 
of the youth oftoday, who had politically active parents, are deciding not to join the 
political groups. There are indications here of clear contrasts between the 
generations, between the generation that was active du..ring the Palestipjan 
Revolution and the Civil War, and the youth of today. This "vill be fu..rther explored 
in the next chapter. 
The common good 
Solidlli"ity is also a reason for joining the political groupS.40 Although most people 
realise that 1:t;ey cannot do much for 1:t;eir quest to retwll to their homes while in the 
context of living in Lebanon, some of the groups saw solidarity with Palestipians 
inside Palestine as a reason for joining a political group. Mobilising for solidarity is 
viewed as mobilising for the com.TIlon good. The groups and the people agree on 
what the common good is - reto..,h·11ing to Palestine, and wp..ile in Lebanon, ma..1dng 
life as bearable as possible. TIllS is the same vision within each of the groups. In that 
sense there is not always a need for incentives, as the process is in a sense 'natural'. 
39 Post-active members that I interviewed had for the most part wives who were members of the same 
political group. 
40 For more on this see Chapter One, particularly social construction literature by Gamson, William 
1992 op. cit., 
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It is natural that any people are agait.st tyrarmy ... And what is going on it. 
Palestine, with the Israelis killit.g the Palestinians, the Palestini,Uls [here it. 
Lebanon] feel that they need to joit. these groups to fight ti'liS.41 
This issue of 'what is going on in Palestine' was one that is repeated often. 
The situation of the Palestitlians it. Lebanon IS it. second place to the 
Palestinians inside Palestine.42 
The conlmon good in this sense is related to solidarity in Palestine. Palestine, as will 
be further exa..rnined in the next chapter, is the core of the refugee's life, identity, and 
·Flltnrp The refugees see w'nat ;s happen;ng ;n Pa1est;ne throug'n the mea';a 
............ ,,""-1."'. ...L.&..1. ..l....L .L ".1.. .l..L _ _ .l..LL.L.l. .l. ...L.I. \'.1..1., .... ..l...L.I. .I. \'.l...L .l. ..I., 
television and newspapers, but also th . rough family members who may be there, as 
well as tp..Iough the political groups. As mentioned earlier, one of the functions of 
the political groups is to hold ristorical events in memory of Palestine, but also to be 
concemed with what is happening today. There are gatherings and speeches and, 
unbelievably, fundraising for Palestipjans in Palestine, whom the refugees in 
Lebanon consider worse off than they themselves are at the moment. 
Regarding 'what is happe11111g inside Palestine', the religious groups (pn and 
F..AL\tiAS) seem to be gaipjng more support and credibility in Lebanon. 1PjS is 
noticeable as most of the Palestirian political groups that have support, and that 
were actually established in Lebanon, have been secular. Support for these religious 
• 1 1 f ... .. 1 , 1 1 ... ( ..,. 1 ,. '\ 1 groups IS not omy oecause 0": tne SOCial worK tnat tney ao as mmcatea earner) out 
also because of their political action inside Palestine. They are regarded as the 
41 Interview with Mohammad Ann, Fatah leader in Shatila, interview held at his home in Shatila 
camp 15/1 0102 
42 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, PLF leader for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in 
Shatila camp; 1611 0102 
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groups who are actively 'doing something' for the Palestinian cause, by way of 
interacting in the political process inside Palestine as well as martyr and self-
sacrifice operations. Tl>,is seemed to be the case from participant-observation 
particularly in the Beirut camps of Shatila and Bourj. One man explained why he 
believed that the religious groups had found foHowing in Lebanon: 
The religious groups are getting more popular, more convincing, because of 
Hizb' Alllli~. People saw that Hizb' Alllli~ was religious but was able to take 
action lliid help the situation in the south as well as here in the CllillpS for us. I 
think this is why people are trusting and SUppOrfillg the religious groups now. 43 
Whatever the reason, the religious groups seem to have the same function in the 
camps as the secular groups LTl terms of' solida.rity with Palestine' and 'social work'. 
F or all of the political groups what can be understood is that at the same time as the 
issue of what is happenLTlg in Palestine is important, as seen above, the political 
groups try to m~ke the conditions in the C~l11P as bearable as they can by helping 
their members with their problems, either by themselves or tp.Iough lJNR W A where 
possible. 
43 Diary 16/11/03 
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No strategy needed? 
The Palestinia..n resistance groups within the refugee camps are still very much alive. 
However, the level to which there was recruitment and mobilisation of the masses 
did not seem to me to be as high as would be expected in these circumstances. There 
did not seem to be any formal recruitment strategy: 
... L'lere is no strategy because the person who joins the group [does so] 
according to the conviction of his ideas.44 
Most of the leadership and the refugees, members and non-members, seemed to be 
of the opinion that people could choose for themselves wpich groups they wanted to 
, 1 n t 45 De.oug .0. It was clear to me that the people who joined understood and 
comprehended what they were doing and why. A motivating factor that was not a 
result of a direct recruitment strategy, was that the political nature of their situation 
by itself could be enough to ma.~e them join: 
Each Palesti.!lian has a belonging46 to a group .... People who see Lile news and 
see what is happening in Palestine, this will make them want to join.47 
This relates to what I mentioned earlier. Palestinian refugees are in a sense 
politicised and mobilised by birth. According to many of the political leaders, they 
believe that 'the situation' and their circumstances are such that the people need to 
join a group. The statement above implies that every Palestinian who is politically 
44 Intervie\v with Abu Hasan, political leader ofSaiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in his office in 
Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02 
45 To \vilat extent this is the case is al\vays in question: other reasons and motivations for joining are 
looked at below under incentives, family ties, the common good. 
46 As I understood it 'belonging' in this case refers to a natural bond with t.1-:e political groups. 
47 Intervie\v with Raj Salem, leader for Fa~~ Intifada L~ Shatila camp. L~tervie\v held L.~ his home 1....'1 
Shatila camp, 07/10/02 
conscious will have the motivation to join a group. This, however, does not explain 
why people do not join groups even though they are politically conscious. As 
mentioned above, many of the political leaders believed that people would join 
because of their specific beliefs, strategies and ideology. 
You Crul't just bdng people from the street ... They need to lli"ldersta."ld what the 
COillillllilists need and want.48 
In this sense there is no direct recruiting of people from the alleyways in the camps. 
People need to lea..rn about the orgapisation and understand and agree with their 
specific beliefs and strategies. Some groups rely on knowledge of the group history 
to ma.ke potential members want to join, remembering the popularity of the 
resistance du..ri.ng the PalestiPian Revolution, the hey-day of the nationalist 
1'l'1ovement They also rply on tb p othPr f:actnrs nlltl'ned abov"" f:aTYI,ly t,ps ard bel,p-t 
.L.a..l. .J.. ..L.a.......1..1. ..I. ",,,....1. .1..1. ... ..l."" .. .I..I.V.I...L """'.I. V\A- .1..1. v • .l. .1..1..1..1..1. .... .LV .I. .I..l.V..L 
in the common good. 
The people know that the Front [Palestine Liberation Front] has fought to 
protect the camp, has responsibilities in the camp. '" [This knowledge will help 
people decide] if they want to join the groUp.49 
Tlus statement emphasises what the group did in the past, as well as the 
., .,. • 1 • 1 . 1 T 1 1 .. 1 • 1 1 • C.1 h 
reSpOnSlOll1!les tnat It nas toaay. m otner woras, !nese mClUae memones 01 lne ~~ey-
Aav "'nd thP Pa1est,n'ar Revolllt,nn as well as the -tnnct'ons arnd rpspons'h,ll't'es the 
"-'I. '.] \.4L.l. \...l..l.V .l. '-..LI...LI. .l...L .l.\,.I. ... .l.v.&. ., .L.L ..L1l,A..L.l. ... .1. .l...L .&.'-" ~ .1..1. .l.V.I..1. \..l. '-.1..1. 
group has today witlun the refugee camps. These memories include the organisation 
of the camps following the Cairo Agreement when the political groups created 
popular committees, youth groups, women's groups, medical services and military 
48 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the CommUt1ist Party in Shatila camp. Interview held in 
his office in Shatila camn 0911 0/02 
49 L"lterview with Moha~mad Yassin leader of tt'1e PLF for Lebanon. Interview in the PLF office in 
Shatila camp, 16/1 0/02 
training. The a.u~val of the fedayeen50 and the basing of the political groups ill 
Lebatlon are remembered fondly. As a matl from Tal a1 Zaatar put it in ] 978: 
I saw the Palestiniail flag in.stead of the Lebanese flag, and a group of 
Palesfillians in fedayeen clothes instead of the Lebanese police. As I moved 
through the ca..llP I saw happiness on people's faces... The sheikh in the 
mosque now spoke clearly about the homeland - in the past he couldn't do 
this ... In the homes the mothers spoke clearly with their children about 
Palesti."le - before this was only done in a whisper... Before the Revolution, 
meeti."lgs in the camps were limited to social problems; after it, discussion 
became political- the land, the nation, the Revolution.51 
A fedayeen in BOUlj el Barajneh described the situation from another point of view 
thus: 
The people didn't sleep for weeks afterwards, from happi."less at seeing their 
[people] carrying arms to liberate the homeland. They were i."l total support of 
the fedayeen, and showed this by bringi."lg them food, tea, coffee.52 
Sayigh calls the hey-day the 'people's new consciousness'. It was indeed, and the 
~ 1 , • • 1· ., 53 .,....1 1·· 1 1 1 • 1 1 
reaayeen were seen as quaSI-mystICal Icons. 1 ne pontlcal groups naa WlUespreaa 
support during tl-,is era. I would argue that they still do have tl-,is support, and people 
do remember tins age. However, tile situation today is different to the mass 
mobilisation that took place during the ralestipian Revolution and the Lebanese 
Civil War. This is because of reasons listed above, for exalnple there is no need for 
50 Fedayeen is an impor..a:nt term. It is the plural offida'i, having its roots (f-d-y) meaning to sacrifice 
or redeem somethitig. Within the Palestinia..i Resistance it is a sacred symbol representitig Palestinian 
nationalism and Palestinian aspirations. It is most commonly used to represent a fighter for the 
Palestinian revolution, however, although less frequently, it can also be used to represent a fighter 
who fights for Palesfille in the jihad, making a fida'i and a moujahed (same roots as jit'1ad, a fighter in 
a holy war, in Palestitiian parlance more connected to fighters dUiing the Arab Revolt in 1936 a.."ld 
those fif;1'1ting in 1948) For more information on this see for example Johnson, Nels "Palesti."lia..i 
Refugee Ideology: An Enqui.-y into Key Metaphors" Journal of Anthropological Research and 
O'Balance, Edgar Arab Guerrilla Power (Faber, London, 1974) 
51 Sayigh, Rosemary Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (Zed Books, London, 1979) p. 
164-165 
52 Ibid. P. 165 
53 Ki.ll~erli."lg, Ba..-uch and Migdal, Joel Palestinians: The Making of a People (Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 1994) p. 233 
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immediate mass mobilisation as there is no longer an immediate fear for one's life 
as there was during the civil war. Si.TIlilarly mass mobilisation as was possible 
tr..Tough vanous PLO institutions is no longer available. However, the political 
groups in Lebanon have already been through tilis mass mobilisation process and 
that may be one of the reasons why most of the refugees beiong to the groups. In 
other words, most refhgees who are parents and grandparents are, or have been, 
members of the various political groups and through 'fanlily ties', their cllildren and 
grandcPildren are recruited. On the other hand, where 'family ties' may not prove 
viable, the political groups do still rely on 'no strategy needed'; this is not orJy 
because of ti1eir reputations and their social TImctions, but also because there is the 
asslLTIlption that every Palestipian is naturally political and in a sense born into the 
p~rt of the Resistance. 
'No strategy needed' also refened to people joliling on their OW11 accord, because of 
the above notion of being naturally political. There was also a sense that people 
joined whichever group because of their own political or ideological convictions. 
Some orgrulisations m~ke the potential member go through various tests and ensure 
that he or she fully lL'1derstands and agrees with their progra.lJLTIle before joiping. 
llis c~'1 occur even if the potential member was a member of the youth group. 
Every Palestinian '" is most welcome to join the PFLP, wider certain 
conditions. Conditions including that he [or she J must be above eiy1.teen, he 
should continue his studies, he should lmow [about the ideology of} the PFLP, 
and he should have a positive hllage in the community. . .. There are tests; hi 
relation to his comrades in the PFLP, in relation to the people hi the camp, and 
whether or not he is [enthusiastic enough ] about bein.g in the PFLP ... He should 
be convinced of the opinion of the PFLP.54 
54 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader ofu1.e PFLP in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in 
Shatila camp 09110/02 
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There are some conditions for someone who joins the group. First t.~e one who 
is joining the group should have fait.~ in the group and in the efforts of the 
group. Second ... to be a member, he should be ready at all tiiDes to do what the 
organisation needs him to do; according to what is good for Palestinian 
hiterests.55 
What this indicates is that the political groups want to have members who care about 
their beliefs and ideology and are willing to help in the orgaPisation. SiIflilarly, as 
shOvvTI above, the organisations help their members. 56 As shown by Raj Salem 
above when he says that every 'Palestiniful has a belonging to a group', it shows that 
the political groups rely on their reputations, their history and the 'situation' when 
understa.nding why people want to join. It is this political, unjust, a.nd poverty-ridden 
situation that make the Palestinia.lls politically conscious. Because oftne situation in 
wpich the reiilgees are living it does not seem necessa.ry to recruit members, as the 
refugees are in a sense members of the resistance from their birth. 
Themes of Recruitment 
The Palestinian political groups do still exist in the refugee camps. They have 
certain functions ranging from managmg day-to-day affairs in the popular 
cOIT'.u.'11ittees, and arranging vanous activities for cpildren, women and the poor. 
Their resources are at an all-time low, and their abilities have dwindled 111 
55 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebfuion. Interview held in t.1.e PLF 
office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02 
56 The Palestinian political groups in Lebanon however, have fewer resources than they used to and 
Cfui not help as much as they used to. For example, a family who are supporters of the PFLP I visited 
and interviewed have a son with a birth defect. When he was small (early 1980s) the PFLP sent them 
to GermfuiY for an operation. EA'Pensive trips like this are no longer available. However, as we have 
seen in the section on the functions of the political groups, t.1.ey try to help through the popular 
committee, through the various associations that they have, and tr.rough their (limited) funds. 
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comparison to the situation during the Palestinian Revolution during the hey-day in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheiess, the functions of the political groups, although 
diminished in compa.rison to what they were, are important and still include social 
and political activities and in some instances protection, and serve as collective 
incentives for people joining and being active ~.rithLll their groups. 
Are the political groups in the refugee camps the 'glue of social relations' as 
".... • 1 ,. l' 1 1 1 1 ("\57., Tt' , l' 1 l' tll lourame oeneves ~ney snoma oe { 1'ill .nermore, ao ~ne groups nave ~ne . ..ree 
necessa.ry ingredients for sU.1-vival: identity, opposition a.'ld totality?58 The flrst two 
of these, identity and opposition, refers to whom the groups represent, their 
collective identity, and who the 'opposition' is. The groups manage to fulfil these 
requirements as the political groups themselves were pa.rt of the Palestinian identity 
during the hey-day and still are to a certain extent. Problems arise as to how much 
they are actually able to do. wno and what the opposition is, is also obvious. This 
was made clear in the previous chapter. The Leba.'lese government is obstructing 
and ma.k.ing life extremely difficult for the refugees. However, the biggest 
opposition is Israei and the international COIIllTIUpity. The former still occupies land 
and uses force toward Palestinians witrin the territories, and the latter seems unable 
or lU1willing to help the Palestinian cause. Touraine's tbird ingredient of 'totality' 
refers to the grounds on wpich people decide to mobilise and what the 'stakes' of 
mobilisation are. Tris will become clearer witrin the next chapter; however, at the 
moment, there are certain issues that we ca.ll draw from both this chapter and the 
previous chapter. Grounds for mobilising exist Lll the view of the opposition, views 
57 Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., (foreword by Richard Sennet p. x) 
58 Ibid. 
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of the 'others', issues related to socio-econoITlic conditions and having a voice in 
what happens witb1ll the ca..TIlps. In other words, the functions of the political groups. 
Regarding the recmitment methods used by the political groups, there was no clear 
strategy. Most groups relied on their reputation from the hey-day du..n.ng the 
Palestiria..'1 Revolution as well as their day-to-day functions witl,in the refhgee 
camps. Solidarity with the Palestinian Resistance as a whole seemed to be assumed, 
and therefore no strategy was or is needed. In this case solida..rity relates to the image 
of the Resistance from the hey-day, their identity, the problems in the ca..>np, as well 
as solidarity with Palestinians inside Palestine. Family ties can be related to which 
particular group people decide to join. In most instances fa..Tily members were 
members of the same political group; nevertheless, there were also cases where 
family members chose different political groups. What the family contributes to 
1 ·1· • • 1· •• .• (1 1 h 1· • 1 1 1 1 1 1 11) 
mODlllsatlOn IS POlltlclsatlOn \ altnoug .• tillS IS Gone tnrougn otner cnannels as well 
anA S"p ..... Orl -t.or 'A,n,ng grollps parrt'cular1v l"egal"AI·ng wAn'len ""-'-I. \..I._..P .I.. '" .L J'-'.LI...i..i....i...i. .I.. \..1._ ,_.I.. ..LJ ..L .1.\0,1. .1...1.. V.1..L.I.. .1....1.. 
The general fLmction of the political groups, family ties, solidarity, and issues 
related to the common good were thus the mam mobilising forces. From the 
orgarisations' point of view there did not seem be a need for a clear strategy of 
recruitment. The Palestinia..ns are recmited to the PalestiDian cause in a sense at 
birth, but does tbis necessa..rily mean they will join a group? The search for and the 
acquisition of one's identity, wrich is the focus of the next chapter, can be achieved 
by joining a group. However, by living in the camps, by being forbidden to have 
civil rights Lll Lebanon, by havLllg fa..TIlily members scattered in different camps, in 
different countries as well as witr..in Palestine, tris all reaffirms their Palestinian-
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ness without their necessarily being a member of a political group. At the same time, 
however, because of the pistory of the Palestipia.Tl Resistance, pa.rticularly in 
Lebanon du.-ring the hey-day, they are indeed pa...rt of every-day life, and thereby a 
part of their identity whether or not they are fonnally a member. In a sense the 
acquisition of identity is enforced upon the Palestinians by the structural context in a 
negative way, instead of a positive one. Today, the political groups exist in the 
camps to help alleviate some of the harsh living conditions. The next chapter will 
focus on what people have to say about their situation, their identity and the political 
groups. 
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Chanter Seven 
Identity of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
Our objective nllillber one is to smvive as a people, united, maintaining our 
identity. The objective set by the enemy is to end our identit/ 
Introduction: Framing of the situation 
This chapter eXalIll11eS the Palestinian reihgees' interpretation of their situation alld 
of the poEtical groups. It looks at collective identity and interpretation of the 
'other( s)'. Social construction literature is used as a framework with emphasis on 
how situations aloe framed. How do the Palestinia.ll refugees in the refugee calnps 
fra..rne t.1}eir situation? The concept of 'frame' refers to: 
an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, 
and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment. In 
Goffinan's words, frames allow individuals 'to locate, perceive, identifY, and 
label' events within their life space or L~e world at large.2 
Following on from this are collective action fralnes, split into three parts, diagnostic, 
t· 1 .. 1"' 1 f'" .. 3 ~1 .. _r 1 1" 1· .. 1 1 -t::.. 11 prognos.lC a..1}Q motlva~lOnal rrammg. 1 rus refers to ootn illmVIQUal lramlng as well 
as group framing. Ti:lis in tu...rn relates to how people and the political groups "assign 
I Sallli~ Ta'llillari speaking in Lynd, Staughton, Blli~our, Sam, and Lynd, Alice Homeland: Oral 
Histories of Palestine lli"1d Palestinians (Olive Branch Press, New York, 1994) p. 145 
2 Snow and Benford "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest" in Moms and Mueller ed Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theorv (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992) p. 137 
3 Benford, Robert "You could be the hundredth monkey" The Sociological Quarterlv (VoL 34, No 2, 
1993). See Chapter One for more detaiL 
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mea..'1mg to and interpret relevant events and conditions,,4 which can be seen as 
mobilising :factors. 
When fralllillg a situation, questions arise such as who am I, who al'e we and who 
are the oL1}ers that are different from us? With these questions we are moving on to 
questions of the self and of the other. The concepts of self and other are import..ant to 
identity const..rnction as they represent Si111ila..rity alId difference. The self is 
organised aroll..Tld these questions that identify the ideas we have about ourseives and 
our s1hTfoundings. Mead's early notion of identity was based on the notion of 'the 
self' (he did not use the word identity).5 There exists the self as, for eXfu'TIple, 
mott,er and teacher. This notion of self is based upon individual identity which can 
be made up of a variety of'selfs' ma..1dng multiple identities. However, there is also 
the notion of identity as being a social identity, in other words, identifying oneself as 
{" h' 'f .., 6 no,' • , part or a group as s~ own In sel-categonsatlOn tneory, as a ralestInlan ~TlQ as a 
refugee. Also, Cooiey's7 classical notion of the 'looking glass self is h'Ilport..ant to 
how one identifies the self. This refers to how people believe other people view 
j' ( 'j' " 1'("' t" 'f t' l' ~nem al~nougn one s percep~Ion OI now 0 ners VIew onesel~ may, or may no· oe, ~ne 
actual case). All oftms is pa..rt of the (subjective) 1h'1dersta..'1ding of the self. 
Fmthermore, the perception of the 'other' is also inIporta..llt to collective identity. As 
Giddens tens us "the constitution of the 'I' is acknowledged to come about oPJy 
4 Benford, Robert op. cit., p. 200 
5 Mead, George Herbert, Mind. Self and Society from the Standooint of a Social Behaviourist 
(University of Chicago Press, London, 1967) 
6 Tmner, John C and Hogg, Michael A ed Rediscovering the Social Groun: Self Catellorisation 
Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) 
7 Cooley, Charles Horton Life and the student: Roadside notes on hUtllan nature, society· and letter 
(Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1927) 
tt-ilough the discourse of the 'other"'. 8 I found that the refugees' understa..'1dings of 
all of t"'1ese questions on t"'1e self and t"'1e ot"'1ers, alt"'1ough they varied, corresponded 
to the various viewpoLnts of the political groups. 
TIns chapter on identity will be split up into the following sections: fIrst there is a 
section on the Palestinian refugees' interpretation of 'the self. Tpis includes themes 
involving al-nakba, socio-economic conditions, foreigner status, a.'ld the future. The 
second section deals with 'the other'; who 'the other' is and how they are 
interpreted. The third section deals with people's perception of the political groups. 
ThP {'{"\nclusion u~l1 try aI'..-1 incorporate the m' -f.Ormation given l'n th11'S Chapt",r on t'ne 
..I. ..l...LV _V..I..1. .l...L..L VV i.l..l...L .I."-&. LL..I. ..I. ~ .l. .., ........ ..1. L.L.I..I..I..I..I..I-.J. .J...l. .1...1. .1...1. _ V.I. .1..1. .J.. 
self and the other into collective action frames for mobilisation. 
The CoUective Self 
The situation in wInch t..he refi.tgees live is an interpretation of the 'self'. TIns section 
focuses on 'the self, looking at questions dealing with: who am I? • 1 1 1\..'1Q WilO are 
we? The answers to these questions gIve an insight into what the refugees' 
interpretation of their situation within the camp is, as well as their interpretation of 
their situation as PalestiPian refugees and their experience with both of these issues. 
It is also an interpretive fra..'1le that the organisations use. From the va.'"lous 
interviews I conducted with people living in the refugee canlps as well as with 
political leaders from the refugee ca.'TIPS, I recogpised that suffering and endurance 
were major themes of people's lives. 
8 Giddens, Anthony Central Problems itl. Social Theorv: Action, Structure. and Contradiction in 
Social Amlvsis (Macmillan Press, London, 1979) p. 
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Who am I and who are we? 'We are Palestinians first of all' 
During the field research, I found that being PalestiIlian comes before any-thing else: 
My identity is Palestinian. My political belonging is the Democratic Front.9 
I am Pa!esti.nian. I was born in Lebanon but my identity is Palestinian. I am 
from Acre. I feel bonded to the land that I come from ... I was born in Lebanon 
by force. I wish to be back in Palestine with my people.10 
Palestine and being Palestinian come before every-thing else. This aspect has been so 
for a number of years. 11 
The Palestinian accell.i is another distinguishing feature the refugees have in 
Lebanon. The people in the camp have kept their accents. The reason for this is two-
f:0 1A· first as they are l
'
v,ng 1n the car1'Y'lp U,lth othPT Pa1est1nu·aI'S 't 1S nanural to kppp 
.L ~"'" • .L.L ... , .. ~ .1. .1..1..1. .L.L.l. .. .1. -"-.l.~ VV.iIl..I..1. \'.I.-"-'-'.l....L .I. \'.1..1. ..I..,.a..l..I..I... ..a: ..... '"'~ 
the accent, CLnd second, it is a way of maintaining one's identity. Some of the youth 
were discussing this issue during my stay in Shatila. Refugees iiVLTlg in Shatiia are 
exposed to other nationalities living witPin the camp, such as Lebanese, Kurds and 
some Egyptians.12 Nevertheless, although there are other nationalities iiving withh'1 
the camp, ttl-Ie Palestinian identity remains overwhelming. For example, Aymful, one 
9 Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, DFLP leader for Lebanon, interview held at his home in Shatila 
camp, 07/10/02 
10 Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, DFLP leader for Lebanon, interview held at bis home in Shatila 
camp, 07/1 0/02 
II There is a widespread view that Palestinian consciousness and Palestinian identity arrived with the 
Palestinian Revolution. Indeed duri.ng the Revolution there was a Palestinian reawakening, however, 
how far the Palesti.nian identity sttLrted in the 1960s is challenged by Rashid Khalidi in his work. He 
puts particular emphasis on Jerusalem (where his family comes from) and challenges this myth by 
poi"ting to identity formation ,illd consciousness in Palestine from the Ottoman Period and onwards. 
He points, however, to two critical periods ofthlle L,.at were very imPOrtant in shaping the re-
emergence of Palestinian identity; the years of the British Mandate (p. 177) ,illd what he calls the 
'lost years' between al-nakba and the formation of the PLO (p. 178). Nevertheless, the construction 
ofPalesti"ian identity had already sta.'1:ed prior to this time. Khalidi, Rashid Palestinian Identity: The 
construction of Modem National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, New York, 1997) 
12 This 'multiculturalism' is peculiar to Shatila CfullP, although the majority of residents are 
Palestinian. The other CfullpS remain Palestinian. 
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of the young Palestinian men at the youth centre in Shatila, was being picked on for 
Cha.llgL.llg his Palestinian accent to a Leba.llese accent when he was outside the ca.1Jlp. 
The reason for tris. he explained. was because it made life easier. Later on when I 
spoke to him about it he told me that the people at school13 were making fun of lllili 
for being Palestinian. 
They called me Abu A.llmar [Arafat). Even though I don't like him, they were 
calling me that. 14 
Therefore, he changed his accent at school and when he was out of the camp. The 
argument he had with the other youth at the centTe was about him not being proud of 
bei..'1g Palestirian and that he somehow was embarrassed about it. It was interpreted 
as some sort of betrayal. However, for Ayman it was not about being embarrassed 
but inconvenience. 
The accent keeps the identity. i prefer to spea.l( Paiestinian. 15 
Ayman seemed to be one of a few people who changed their accent. Most of the 
people, the ones who do leave the camp, do not always change t..heir accent. Identity 
is then reinforced by the Palestirian accent when outside the camp. Regarding this 
issue, there is also the infamous example of 'banadura', during the civil war. TIns 
exa.1Jlple is widely k.llOwn and often repeated: 
I think it was 1974. There was a bus that came from Tal al Zaatar, a camp. It 
was in an area where most of the people were Palestinian. Suddenly the bus 
stopped at a bus stop. Several men came into the bus. One man was Carryhlg a 
13 He was attending a Lebanese school funded by the youth centre tri.at I was volunteerllig at. 
14 Interview with Ayman, at his home in Shatila camp, 18th November 2003 
15 Ibid. 
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tomato and he started asking each one of the people on the bus, 'What is this?' 
Palesfilliat"ls say 'Bandura'. Anybody who was Lebat"lese would say 
'Banadw(iIG,. The man would tell him, 'Get out of the bus'. Of course nobody 
knew why they were saying that. After they took all the Lebanese off the bus, 
they sta.-ted shoofillg everybody in the bus with machine guns. Forty people in 
that bus were killed and all ofu~em were Palestinians. 17 
The accent defines and reinforces the Palestinian identity, for both good and bad. 
This exa.rnple re-affIrms what was said at the start of tpis chapter by Salah Taman: 
that the rrlost ;rrlportr-:,nt ob;ect;vp ;s to mam· t",;n thP Pa1est ;n;an ;a'ent;ty Th;S 
" "" .L .l..L.L ".L.L.l..l. t...U.i. ..... 1. :J " .... V.l. .. .....L .... \..a.l. ............ ..1..1. ...... ..L .I. \'..L.I...L.L .1..1. .l..I.......L.I...L.L 
remains the objective, no matter what happens, as it is a way to su-rvive as a people. 
Poverty, suffering, and endurance: self within the future 
Another part of refugee identity has to do with the socio-econolYlic conditions and 
Arab and Lebanese policies towards the PaiestiPian refugees. 
The meaning of refugee [for me] is that my family and I were kicked out of our 
country. We [the Palestinians] went to different countries, like Syria" Jorda."l, 
Egypt at"ld Lebat"lon ... We had a miserable childhood. We missed all the 
comforts of being a child. There were some camps [but] there were no 
buildings, just tents ... What can define more that"l a refugee, that"l we as 
refugees who have seen everything of poverty and tyranny? You have seen for 
yourself in Shatila, Bomj, and here in Mar Elias, how the conditions are. IS 
As a refugee there is nothing stable here in Lebanon, not for me and not for my 
children. Livitlg here as a refugee is obligatory. I am obliged to be a refugee 
here ... We are suffering compared to other people who have all their rights: 
civil and political rights. 19 
16 The difference in English is something resembling, 'tomeyto' and 'tomahto'. 
17 Urn Sa'ad, Palestinian Refugee who used to live in Lebanon. In Lynd, S, Lynd A atld Bat~our,S ed 
of. cit. , p. 101 
1 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader for Saiqa for Lebatlon, interview held in his office, Mar Elias 
Camp, 12/10/02 
19 Interview with Abu Akram, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, interview held in his office, Mar 
Elias camp, 1011 0/02 
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[By livii1g itl Lebanon my Palestinian identity is stronger] because I llill 
forbidden from many t.~ings, it makes me stronger.20 
There seems to be a strong Palestinian identity stemming from how the refugees are 
livLTlg and how they are treated LTl Leba..TlOn. This has many factors: fIrst, not havLTlg 
any civil rights, like the right to work, ma...~es the Palestinian refugees k.'lOW that they 
are not Lebanese but Palestinian refugees seen as outsiders, foreigners. Their poor 
living conditions, being forced to stay a..Tld live in ca..rnps, reinforces that they are 
foreigners a...'ld not wanted. Second because of the lack of political rights, the 
Palestinian refugees have been lLllable to pa..rticipate in the political process, either in 
the govefI1~rnent or by having the right to vote. Tpis ma..1(es them aware, again, that 
they are not Lebanese, but Palestinian. Third, remembering where one is from, being 
brought up in households where the families talk of their fomler homes, villages and 
towns in PalestLTle, being brought up in schools that educate the children on 
Pt· Th· r . -F. h p t t·· ·d t· 
'- a~estme. H..lS a~l reln~orces t ~e '- a~es.lll1an 1 en.lty. 
A lot of this reiD.forced Palestinian identity also has to do wit..h Palestinian recent 
history in Lebanon. Du..ring the civil war, the Palestinians were often singled out for 
va...rious attacks. The attacks on va...rious refhgee ca...'1lpS are a...'l exa...'1lple. Many of the 
people I spoke to had previously lived in Tal al Zaatar camp, witnessed the siege 
there, then moved to Shatila and witnessed the siege there too, although were lucky 
enough to stay alive. Many had then moved out of the ca...'1lpS and occupied va...rious 
empty buildings in and arOlmd Beimt, before moving back to the camps in and 
around BeLrut. One fa..rnily, for example, told me that since their a..rrival in Lebanon 
they had been forced to move several times: 
20 Interview with leader of the PPSF for Lebllilon, interview held itl Abu Moujahed's office, Shatila 
camp, 1011 0102 
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First in 1948 we moved to Baalbek. Then in 1960 we moved to Tal al-Zaatar. 
When it was destroyed in 1975 we moved to Dfu1l0ur. There were problems 
there too. Then in 1982 we moved to Shatila rig.~t before t.~e massacre. After the 
massacre we moved to Rouche. Then we moved back here. Every time we tried 
to make a home for ourselves, it was destroyed fu"1d we were forced to move.21 
The identity image of the concept of 'suffering', apart from the L111plications made 
above, is also included witPin the context of the poor socio-economic conditions?2 
'Slli-'fering' is also seen within the context of the Palestil1ian stmggle for Palestine. 
M C' .,. 1 23 1 1 ,. 1 11th T 1 ... , B I la..llY Ia..TfI..llleS nave martyrs ana nave Hvea tPJougn . e Leoanese CIVIl war. ut, 
when asked about this, there was always reference to Palestine, and what the 
Palestinians within Palestine were facing too. Although the refugees in Lebanon 
suffered greatly in the past, they believe the Palestipians inside Palestine are 
suffering more than they are. There is a shared image of Palestinians in the diaspora 
as people who suffer and are waiting to return. The concepts of 'waiting' and 
'patience' were COJIl~T!lon both among people who were not members of political 
groups as well as people who were. Waiting and patience seemed to be key points in 
the refugees' lives and identity. 
We can wait another fifty years.24 
We will get Palesti~'le back by ti.me not by strength. Tn time we will able to go 
back.25 
21 L'lterview with Abu Sa.lJler, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 28/11/03 
22 See previous sections of this thesis for more on socio-economic conditions. Tnere are many articles 
on this subject. See for example Abbas, Mab.moud, Shaaba.'l, Hussein, et al "The Socio-economic 
Conditions ofPa!estinians in Lebanon" Journal of Refugee Studies (Vol. 10, No 3, September 1997) 
and Ugland, Ole. Fr. Difficult Past, Uncert~in Future: Livi'lg Conditions Among the Palestinian 
Refugees in Ca.lJlPS and Gatherings in Leb~non FAFO (Report 409, Centraltrykkeriet, Norway, 2003) 
and Hajjaj, Nasri Saleh Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Until Wnen? (Shaml Publications, 
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre, July 2000, 
( www.sha.rnLorg/publications/monos/mono_refugees_in_Lebanon.htm) 
23 Not necessa.rily what Westerners tend to !hi.11k of Martyrs (i.e. a suicide bomber, terrorist or 
someone fighting for Jihad), but in this case it refers to someone who died in t.~e Palestinian 
Resistance. It could be refellillg to casualties from fighting dlli-'lllg the Civil War for instance. 
24 Interview with Abeer, in her home in Shatila camp, 2711l/03 
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The Palestinian Resistance has existed since 1917, 1919, 1936, 1948, 1956, 
1967, 1974 and still exists. We will have victory even though it may take many 
more generations.2G 
Our rights [of returning to Palestine] will not come back to us in two or three 
years. We have to work for many, many years27. 
These statements show the high degree of patience in their wish and stmggle to 
retu.rn to Palestine. Nevertheiess, it should not be confused with giving up the 
struggle of reV..hrrl to Palestine. It was more of a fatalistic attivJde. Schultz too, in her 
work done in the West Ban .. 1c and Gaza came across these important concepts. She 
. -h t t' ~, j" 1" ,., '{'{'. , • f1 ,28 S' , . wntes t a .fie rales.lman s~ruggle IS aoout sUIIenng a.T}Q sacn~lce . fie exptams 
that: 
A Palestinian 'is' someone who resists, either with a KalashIlikov or an RPG h. 
the squalid refugee camps of Lebanon, or with stones and Molotov cock-tails in 
Gaza andlor someone who suffers because of disDossession. longing. iniustice. 
and death?9 > - - --" -
The i..lllage of the Palestinian resisting in t.he refugee camps in Lebanon is very 
different today. However, Schultz is not very wrong in mentioning it, as it is a 
widely popular L.'1lage, albeit outdated, especially when consider1~T}g what I found to 
be the case in the camps. This image, however, is a symbol of the courage and the 
struggle of L1}e Palestinian refhgees in Lebanon, particularly during the Palestipia.T} 
revolution and the Lebanese civil war. Nevertheless, she has a point. In Palestine, 
the PalestiDians are resisti..ng Israeli occupation and force. They are suffering greatly 
from dispossession, injustice, and death. Tpis view of the suffering of Palestinians 
25 Interview \vith Tarek, in i'.is shop in Shatiia camp, 11/12/02 (NS! He impiied throughout our 
conversation that God was involved in being able to return to Palestine) 
26 L'lterview with the leader for Lebanon of the PPSF, in Abu Mouia.l-ted's office, 1OilO/02 
27 Interview with Haj Salem, leader for Fata.1:t Intifada in Shatila c~mp. Interview held in his home in 
Sabra, 07/10102 
28 Schultz, Helena Lind.lJ.olm Tne Reconstruction ofPalestin.ia..l1 Nationalism: Between Revolution 
and Statehood (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) p. 123 
29 fbid. p. 124 
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as being part of their identity is certainly so, and was perceived as such by the 
refugees. Th.e waiting and patience that is implied wiiPin the statements above are 
also connected to this notion of suffering. It is about believing and hoping that one 
day they will retlllTI to Palestine, as well as having patience and endurance to wait as 
long as they can, that makes the suffering possible. 
One major difference to Schulz's work in the West Ball.1( and Gaza was with regard 
to the notion of 'struggle'. Tbis means that the Palestinians are struggling precisely 
because they are Palestinians. Schultz fOUo.'1d that in the West Bank and Gaza more 
recently, struggling is cOlmected to political and Inilitary action and to the intifada. 
In the Occupied Territories the notion of struggle is to "not shy away from militant 
struggle a..'1d to be sensitive to what it may cause".30 Yet, the Paiestiria..'1s in Lebanon 
do not seem to be involved h'1 a rr..ilitant struggle?l But tllis does not necessarily 
mean that they do not interpret themselves as struggling and suffering. 
Shatila is at. example of sufferillg. Even thoug..'1 the situation now is much 
better, some years ago the situation was very, very bad. Now you can see water 
in some houses .... This is the suffering part of the camp, but the enlig..'1tening 
part is that the Palestinian people still have the will to continue their lives.32 
Tb.e Palesti..rlians are suffering but they have endurance. Their struggle today is in 
their daily iives. The ansv/er to tb...is daily stru~ggle is to retlL.T"I1 to Palestine. 
30 Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 124 ('sensitive to what it may cause' is referring to death) 
31 Although Khashan, Hilal "Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings" Third World 
Quarterly (VoL 24, No 6, 2003) mentioned in the previous chapter found militancy to be high in 
Rashidiyeh camp in Southern Lebanon. I would argue, and indeed lG.'1ashan agreed with me, that this 
is something specific to Rashidiyeh camp. 
32 Interview with Mohaminad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF 
office in Shatila camp, 1611 0/02 
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One of the main themes expressed by both political groups and refugees was a belief 
that everything would be better in the future when they retu..rn to Palestine. 
Retu .. rr..ing to Palestine is the orJy solution to all of their problems. There was a view 
of the self by visualising a future return to Palestine. 
The situation here is gettii1g worse .... The only solution is to go back to our 
country.33 
Every Palestinian here, it, Syria, and elsewhere, looks forward to returning to 
Palestine. All their thoughts and struggles [are J for the right of return.34 
A person without land is nothing. [Land] is his life; it is his grandfather's life. I 
t.l:iink a person without his land must have dignity.35 I live for Palestine 24 hours 
36 
All of these statements refer to the question of 'who am l' thJough lenses of what 
one used to have, what one does not have today, and what one will hopefully have 
one day in the future. They are in a country where they do not belong, and wish to 
be back in Palestine. 
For me Palestine is life. It is the air I breat.l:ie. If it wasn't. I would not be in the 
Palestinian Resistance from 1973 until now.37 -
Realising this future goal involves struggle, suffering, patience and endurance. The 
self, both the individual and the collective, is someone who has suffered injustice 
33 Tnterview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinia!l Corrununist party in Shatila ca.'11P, 
interview held in the communist office in Shatila camp 09/1 0/02 
34 Interview with Abu A..1mun, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, interview held Lll his office in 
Mar Elias camp, 1011 0/02 
35 My understanding of dignity in this context is oft.he necessity for the Palestinians to have dignity, 
and be dignified, even thoug.h t.hey are living outside their homeland and unable to retu.'TI. In other 
words, just because they are refugees and, for the moment at least, have lost their homeland, their 
homes, and their livelihoods, does not mea.ll that they should not be dignified and proud of who they 
are. 
36 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader oft.he PLF in Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office 
in Shatila camp, 16/10/02 
37 L,terview 'With Mohauunad Afifi, leader ofFata..l:i in Shatila CfuliP, interview held at his home in 
Shatila camp, 15110/02 
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but who will one day receIve what is their right. Again the return to a fatalistic 
approach. Tpis fatalistic view was not necessarily pessimistic but rather, the 
opposite, optimistic. Fatalistic in this sense seemed to refer to their reV..hrn to 
Palestine as being inevitable in the future. TIns had to do with their sense of their 
situation as being unjust and therefore in time, they would be able to achieve their 
rights. Many of the refhgees viewed God as havi..'1g pre-determined their retu.rn. 
There is also somethl l1g else that is very important witinn these statements: the 
refugees somehow identifyi.l1g t.hemselves with the land of Palestine; the actual soil 
and the use of their senses. Tl>Js is something that is strongly part of the Palestinian 
identity and is a constant theme in much Palestinian poetry. Darwish, considered 
national poet of the PalestiPians, for instance, in one of his poems tens us that: 
One's land is inherited as one's language.38 
This repeated line throughout the poem is revealing about the closeness between the 
Palestipian identity and the actual land of Palestine: they are one, u..11ified. Another 
poem from his years in Beirut, written in 1977, serves as an example of how much 
Palestine and its soil is important. In tins case Palestine and its land is a part of, and 
an extension of, himseif: 
I can1i~e soil an extension of my soul 
I call my hands the walk.rway of wounds 
I call the pebbles wings 
I call the birds ahllonds and figs 
I call my ribs trees 
fu"1d I pluck a fig branch from my chest 
And throw it as a stone 
38 Darwish, Mahmoud "The Tragedy of Narcissus and the Comedy of Silver" -'Ma'sat al-NaJjis wa 
Mallmt al-Fidda' (Riad EI-Rayyes Books, London, 1989) also see Issa] Boullata "Mahmud Darwish: 
Identity and Change" in Abdel-Malek, Kamal et al Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and 
Literature (Macmillan Press, 1999) 
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A.'1d blow up the conquerors tap~1(39 
TIus bond with the land in Palestine is very strong. It is part of the Palestinian 
identity, by nature of being what the Palesti.Tlians are deprived of and long for. The 
Palestinians in Lebanon, even the ones too young to remember Palestine, feel this 
bond. 
Foreigners- Self through looking glass 
Being a foreigner in a cOlmtry does inflict a certain identity upon people, especially 
if they are ll.1Jable or unwilli.1Jg to integrate. 
I feel like I am nothing here in Lebanon. I don't feel like I am livit"lg. I can't 
work. Even if you are luck.y enough to get a job outside the camp, it will be a 
bad one.40 
The Lebanese government is not prepared to give ciftZenship to Palestinians in 
Lebanon... The Lebanese govermnent is afraid [of allowing the Palesti."lians to 
become citizens because] they represent a social sect, we are all Muslit-ns almost 
... Lebanon has sect problems, the Muslims have become more than the 
Cb.-istians.41 
Tne proof is in the recent decisions about the university and the property rights. 
The Palestinia.'1s ca.'1 no longer go to the university like t.lJ.e Leba.'1ese a.'1d they 
ca.'1 not own houses. 
Within the Lebanese constitution, the Palestinians are deprived from working in 
77 or 78 jobs. They can't have a passport, they can't work, as doctors, teachers, 
lawyers, and even the employee42 is not allowed to work. And the police, if they 
catch a Palestinian working, they will put hit-n it"l jail, because they are not 
allowed to work. While Lebanon has the market for people from Sri Lanka, 
Kurdish people, people from everywhere, but not for Palestinians.43 
39 Darwish, Mahmoud "Ode of the Land" iti "Diwan Mahmoud Darwish" translated by Boullata, Issa 
op. cit., 
40 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party, interview held in the 
Communist Party office in Shatila Cfu-np, 09/10/02 
41 Interview with Muhammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF 
office in Shatila camp, 1611 0/02 
42 By employee the leader oft.'1e PPSF means other non-professional worker such as blue collar 
workers, secretaries and ot.'1er workers. 
43 Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebfuion, interview held in Abu Moujfu'1ed's office, 
Shatila camp, 10/10/02 
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T1ns was confinned by various other people in "Lhe camp as well. For example, Abu 
Sa.TIler, who is head of a large fa.rpily, works as a guard at a school. He helps 
cr..ildren cross the street, and ma..1ces sure they do not leave before school ends. Even 
this job, he explained, was insecure. Ifthe police found out that he was working they 
would put}lim injail. 
In other words: 
I tell you ... I don't [even] have anhual rights, so it is not correct to call me a 
refugee.44 
How did the refugees thl1Lk that "Lhey were perceived by 'others'? Many were 
concerned about their image of being looked upon by the international COIP.murnty 
(West) as terrorists, people who are somehow different from other people in the 
world. 
The media hi Europe is giving a bad image of the Palestinian people. They think 
that the Palestinian people are bad and killing the Israelis, when it's the 
CO-pl + 0 os;+e 45 lil. le.e pp lL. 
The world is totally against L~e Palesthiians and for the Israelis ... Weare 
decent people who love to live in peace and love our children ... Weare the orJy 
people who are still outside our country and Cailiiot retmn to it, even though it 
still exists ... We are people, we should have rights, and the world should stand 
with us, not against us. We are not enemies of anyone. We are not occupying 
any land, fuid killing is not our hobby. But we are being killed everyday since 
1948. No one is supporting us fuid tellhig the world that we have rig.~tS.46 
The image of bei..ng viewed as telTorists and killers is frustrating for the Palesti1nan 
fi .. -1 rrl / ".) .. • 1 1 P 1 .... 1 1 re..:ugees m tne camps. 1 ne ~ symoollc mteractIOn oetween tne alestJl1.la.l1S ana tne 
44 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, i11terview held at his home in 
Shatila camp, 15110/02 
45 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party for Shatila camp, 
interview held ii1 the Communist Party office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02 
46 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office Mar Elias 
camp, 12/10/02 
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rest of the world seems in their view to have gone horribly wTong, although many 
refugees do believe that tbis is slowly changing in Europe. wny though, do the 
refhgees when gazing though the looking-glass, have tr.is conception? The answer 
seems to be that the intemational cOlTl ..munity is not helping their situation regarding 
their rights to ret1l..rrl to their country, nor are they helping them receive civil rights. 
This lack of action on the part of the international cormnu..'1ity is viewed as 
COnfll111ation that the Lntemational community sees them t.hus. The inlage in the 
1 ,. 1 1 _ T 1 1 r 1 ~ 1 •• r- , •• lOoKIng g~ass may not oe correct. illaeea, ror tne yalest!man remgees, t111S Image 
that they see 'others' perceiving is not correct. It is not correct in the sense that the 
'others' do not understand the injustice done to the Palestinians. This perception can 
1 1 1 1 1 '.. S·t'.. t l" j 1,47 C t 1 l' S't 1 h 1 oe re1a~ea oacK.o I e s concep. or conxol. on TOI, lOr I.es ana uman neeas 
literature, refers to beh'lg able to control, understand and predict one's environment 
and society. For Sites this is the priority of all ofthe huma.n needs, and is needed in 
order to fulfil all of the other needs - security, welfare, identity and freedom needs. 
How far can the refugees predict the behaviour of the outside world? In a world 
dominated by the West, this has an important bearing, as the West includes the 
powerIl.il ones who can, if they wish, change their situation. By perceiving the 
l'nternatlonal COTnTnllnlty as not c<>nng abollt thp1r Slhuatlrm they "re lpfi. urit], the '" ~~"''''.l....I..J.. .l..&...LL.l..l.Y.L.Ll. ..l....L" u.i...I...1. ..... " .J. "'..L.I.. .... '- '-.1.'-'.1...1.,." .I. UJ.. ""'''''..1-" y~ .l.IL..l..l. '-... 
Ll11pression that they are destined, at least for the time being, to be refugees - not 
b .. 11 - 1 .. 1 .,...... • .• f 1 r- • .. 1 emg aOle to return to tneir nomes. 1111S perceptIOn 0': the remgee communIty m tne 
ca..'IlpS can lead to the 'outside' perception of the Palestinian refugees being 
frustrated; leading perhaps to what Glli'- tenns 'frustration-aggression' .48 There is an 
obvious perceived injustice, yet there is no aggression. Similarly although there is 
mobilisation, there are a growLng nU111ber of youths who are not Lllterested injoiflillg 
4i Sites, Paul "Needs as Analogues of Emotions" ii1 Burton, John ed Conflict: Human Needs Theorv 
(Macmillan, London, 1990) 
48 GUIT, Ted Robert Whv Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970) 
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groups. This puzzle should become more apparent Ln the section on perception of 
groups. 
Framing of the other: Why are we here? 
... the constitution of the 1 is acknowledged only to come about through the discourse of the 
'other,.49 
This section focuses on the following questions: why are the Palestinians where they 
are? 'vVho is responsibie for al-nakba? Tnese questions are LTlvoived with the 
construction of the 'self' that can be contrasted to the 'other(s)'. 
Because of al-nakba, 
The people who were born here do not [know or remember their] la."ld. But if 
you ask the older ones, they can give you another concept. When you see 
someone else havh"lg your country it feels very sad. My land [COlli"ltry] Palestine 
is being occupied by foreign people.5o 
This statement is related to the perception of the self through the framing of the 
situation. In other words the fra.T!ling of the situation of being a refugee in tpis 
instance is done tp..rough the concept of al-nakba and occupation. The understanding 
of the self comes about because of al-nakba. He is a refugee whose land is being 
49 Giddens, Anthony Central Problems in Social Theorv: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in 
Social Analvsis Macmillan Press, London, 1979, p. 38 
50 Haj Salem, leader ofFata.'1 Intifada in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Sabra, 07/10/02 
(although some of the youths and others who do not remember Palestine may disagree with li'1e first 
part ofms quote) 
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occupied by other people; this is who he is. He seems to feel that he is being held 
captive somewhere he does not belong, while other people occupy pis home and 
homeland. 
Related to tins is the situation in wInch the Palestinians are living within the camp, 
which to many refugees is interpreted as a situation wpich is forced upon them, 
sometr.ing that is out of their control: 
I am livin.g here it, Shatila camp because I am forced to live here. [Because] I 
am Palesti.'1.ian.51 
TIns statement again relates back to hu..rnan needs: there is a lack of control of 
destiny for the Palestinian reftlgees, precisely because of their being Palestipian. 
But by whom are they forced to live in tIns condition? Who is Lhe other? The 'other' 
includes the LebaIlese govefI1~1TIent, the Arab World, Israel, Europe, the Upited 
States and the UN. 
The answer to the question of who is responsible for the current state of affairs 
regarding both the refugee situation a..Tld the Peace Process va..tied from Israel, the 
Arab states, to the international corrmmr.ity. Ta..~Tlg each of these in tUA'TI, how do 
Lhe Palestinians view Israel as an 'other'? Here I am going to tu..rn one of the 
t t 1 1 l' l' ,,. . t t 1 t" t
' 
"th 1 A 1 s.atements quo.ea aoove, regaramg .ne sen, m 0 a Sill.emen. or ne 0 ~~er, wnen f\OU 
Hasan explains that the Palestir.ians are 
not occupying any land, and killing is not our hobby.52 
5! Interview with Abeer, Shatila camp, in her home, 27/11103 
52 Intervie\v \vith Abu Has~ leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, intervie\v held in his office in Mar Elias 
camp, 12/10/02 
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This statement carries two issues: 1) it is a description of what the Israelis are doing 
to the PalestiPians. It is the Israelis who are occupying land and killing Palestipians. 
2) It is also an interpretation of 'the self through the looking glass'. In other words, 
it is how the Palestinians believe the rest of the world views them; as killers and 
terrorists. 
Furthennore the Palestinian refugees view Israel as a responsible other, responsible 
in the sense of the ones who created a.Tld now sustain their situation as refugees: 
~, 'fUN' .. b ~ l' f. 11' f ' ,;, Inere are a lot o. aeclSlOns, ut Israe. IS .oooowmg none o. Li1em.--
We are people who adore peace but we were deprived from peace [by the 
Israelis]. We used to live with Jews ... we are not enemies [with the Jewish 
people we used to live with] ... But the [Israeli] Jews who came from other 
countries and occupied our land. 54 
There are two issues regarding the Israelis. First, that they occupied the refugees' 
land a.Tld homes a.Tld forced them to become refugees, and second, that they are not 
following UN General Assembly Resolutions that would allow Palestinians to 
retum. However, there was a strong sense that there is not a problem between Arab 
Cp.nstia.Tls and Muslims versus Jews. It was made clear to me that they used to live 
together and in some cases that there would be no problem living together again. 
The emphasis was that it was the Israeli ideology that was the problem: Zionism. 
Shultz, too, in her work in t.he Occupied Territories came across similar views where 
Palestinians made a distinction between Jews and Israelis (Zionists).55 Opi...'lion on 
the 'Peace Process - on whether or not there should be a two-state solution - is also 
53 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinia.'1 Conununist Party in Shatila camp. 
Interview held at the Communist party office in Shatila camp 0911 0/02 
54 i'1terview with Haj Salem, leader ofFatah Intifada in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in 
Sabra 071 0/02 
55 Shultz, Helena LindhoLlTI op. cit., p. 152 
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related to Lhis discussion. The discussion in my case related to the majority of 
refugees wanting to return to their original homes - most of which were around the 
Acre region inside what today constitutes Israel proper. Many were willing to live 
with Jews but not Israelis or Zionists. In other words, if Lhere is to be one Palestine 
comprising all of the land, ma.TlY said that they could live with the jews (now 
TSrael'S) as long as the Tsrael, state that sl1bArd'nates the Palpst,n'ars 'n ,ts prespnt 
..L..L ..1....1.. I..L .1..1. ..I....L..L..I. '-.,..1...1.......... "'..L ..L..L '" "'..L..I...L..L""" "'..LL.LL ..L ..L .l.'" ~..L 1Io.I.I...I.\" 
fonn, would be disma.ntled. They would then have a democratic state where 
everyone was free. 
Views on the Oslo Agreement and the Peace Process were thus usually negative, 
with common views being the following: 
I would like to ask Sharon about Oslo. First of all, the Oslo Agreement and the 
following agreements gave nothing to the Palestinians. We were against it from 
the begin.'ing ... \-Vhat did it give the Palestini.m people? Nothing! No state, no 
borders, no authority. Gaza and the West Bank have no link ... even Arafat 
cannot move between the two or even within one. He needs to ask for special 
permission. . .. There are no positive sides to Oslo, and in the end, Sharon has 
~tlined it56• 
Oslo is a shame for the Palesth,ian people. It is a bigger shame for the people 
who signed it. It gave away L~e rights of the Palestinian people.57 
I do not believe Palestine should be divided. My comrades and I are from Acre, 
and more than five million refi..lgees are from what the Oslo Agreement 
considers to be Israel, more tna.'} sixty percent oftne refhgees.58 
Weare suffering because of Oslo. After the Oslo agreement the Palestinians 
divided into two camps - one with the agreement and L~e other against the 
agreement ... The Oslo agreement was a catastrophe for the Palestinians, it did 
not give us our own land. Now it is history anyway because Sharon has 
neglected if9 
56 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa in Lebanon, :ltlterview held in his office in 
Mar Elias Camp 12110/02 
57 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader for the COffiinunist Party in Shatila Camp, interview held in 
his office 09/10/02 
58 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader for the PLF in Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office 
in Shatila camp. 16/1 0/02 
59 Interview with Haj Salem, leader ofFatah Intifada for Shatila camp, interview held in his home. 
07110/02 
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I do not believe h. the Peace Process, because every time they do a peace 
agreement, there is still killing and they {the Israelis} conth.ue to shoot people 
in t.~eir homes. The lives of the Palestinians is the same, with or without it.GO 
When asked why they believed the Oslo Agreement was signed in the first place 
cOIn...TIlon opinion and statements were the folloWLTlg: 
You have to ask the people who signed it. ... I thhik Arafat thought he could do 
something wit.~ this process61 
The reason why the Oslo Agreement was sig.'1ed is part of the Palestinian-
Palestinia.'1 conflict which still exists today ... The people who signed it, they 
sold the Palestinian case. War is not our hobby but it is our rig.lIt to fight for 
Palestine62 
\\tho signed Oslo? Just a few people, Abu Mazen and so forth and the Israeli 
government. The Palestinians were not in this agreement, Nobody asked the 
Palestinian people what they wanted. Many Palestinian people thought that after 
the agreement there would be a Palestinian state. This was Arafat's delusion. He 
thought that he was going to have a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its 
capital. He got out his red cat-pets at.d his body-guards. They were all killed at.d 
now he CatlIlot move out of his small square63 
Fatah, the PFLP's and the DFLP's views were the only ones that had some sort of 
I' 1 0 1 1 1 .. 1 ,. .. d ,...,1· 
support lOr tne SlO process, nowever even tillS support seemea lLlJllte . 1 illS 
support did not necessarily mean that they believed the peace process would work, 
but more i..n the sense ofbelievi..ng that the basis of the peace process, i.e. a two-state 
solution, was correct or at least the only option at present. All in all, there was a 
sense that the peace process was not going where it should have been going. 
We have been working with the Israelis on this agreement for many years ... 
We gave them many years of peace but they didn't accept it. They gave me 
60 Interview with Abeer, in her home in Shatila Camp. (27/11/03) 
61 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa in Lebanon, interview held h. his office h. 
Mar Elias Camp, 12/10/02 
62 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader for the PLF in Lebat.on, interview held in the PLF office 
in Shatila camp. 1611 0/02 
63 Interview with Haj Salem, leader ofFatru~ Intifada for Shatila Camp, interview held h. his home h. 
Shatila camp. 07/l 0/02 
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shame because there was supposed to be a Palestiniatl state, a solution for the 
refugees and Jerusalem, but. .. 64 
Oslo is dead because of the tanks of Sharon. He is L~e one who opposes it. They 
did..l't give us L~e West Batik or Gaza - only pieces ofL~em. Oslo is what you 
are seeiIlg on TV ... The PLO believed that in this agreement they would find 
peace and a Palestiniatl state, but they were wrong. 65 
I am against the Oslo agreement but for the UN decisions for the Palestinians. 
Because of the forced (im)balatlce of relations, the only solution is a two state 
solution. 66 
This difference in Op11110n, l.e. pro- and anti- two-state solution, is particularly 
interesting In Lebanon, where most of the refugees come from what would be 
considered Israel proper, under such a solution. I would argue from my pa.
'
i:icipant-
observation research that most of the refugees would agree with retuming to their 
previous homes, within the whole of Palestine. Nevertheless, some (not most), did 
not see w.is wish to retu ... '11 to the whole of Palestine as realistic, and that was why 
they would support groups that believed in a two-state solution. However, it must be 
remembered that the camps in the south are the ones that are, for the most part, 
Fatah controlled. Although I saw some of wis dyna..-rnic in Ein el-Hel\veh., most of 
my research was based in and arOlmd BeLrut. From my observations in the south, the 
support for Fatah did not necessarily have to do with the Oslo process - but more 
about their r..istory in the ca,1np and what they are able to do in the ca,1nps today. 
Alt..hough the peace process and 'what is going on in Palestine' is important, the 
refugees have other pressing concerns as well. Suleiman had similar observations on 
the differences between the political groups and their changing views: "In general, 
64 Interview with Mohanunad AfIfI, leader ofFatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home hI 
Shatila camD. 1511 0/02 
65 Interview' with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, leader for the DFLP for Lebanon, interview held in his home in 
Shatila camp. 07/10/02 
66 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader for the PFLP in Shatila camp, hlterview held in his office hI 
Shatila camp, 09/10/02 
280 
however, it should be noted that the realignments and political machinations have 
little effect on ordinary camp residents' lives, the political groups by and large 
re""a1n1ng Al·st"~nt fro"" thPlr concerns" 67 
...L ..L...L..LL.Jc~"" '-'&. I,.U..L .. ...L ..L.L...L ...... ...L ..... .L...L ...L...L .l....L..L • 
ReturIling to the issue of 'others' and responsibility, the blame for al-nakba does not 
necessarily always rest on Israel, but it is also apportioned to the European 
COnl.l.~Ufljty and ill some instan.ces t.~e Arab com..rnur..ity for not helping more t..1].an 
they did. 
The International community, especially tt,e Europeat"l COillillunity should feel 
guilty about what happened to us. Israel is still asking the European community 
to give them compensation for the holocaust. The Europeat"ls are still doing this 
and paying for their weapons. As a Palestinian, they are responsible for what 
happened to me. You have democracy in Europe, at"ld we dreatll that some day 
that democracy will help change the opinion of the Europeans, but so far we 
have seen nothing.68 
However, on the other hand, precisely because of this European responsibility for 
the creation of Israel, there were some who viewed the Europeans as their new 
'hope'. 
I thhtk tt,at the Europeat"l commUt"lity, not tt,e International community, Cat"l help 
the Palestinian case. The Europeans are feelh"lg guilt"f because they facilitated 
Jewish immigration to Palestine. And what is going on in Belgium, wanting to 
put Sharon to the court, this has made many demonstrations in Belgium, France 
at"ld Italy for tt,e Palestinian case. These demonstrations, tt,ey pressure the 
European system to make decisions against the IsraelisG9•70 
67 Suleiman, Jaber "Report from Lebatlon: The Current Political, Organisational, and Security 
Situation in the Palestiniful Refugee Camps of Lebanon" Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxix, No. 
1, Autumn 1999) p. 73 
68 Interview with Mohammad Ann, leader ofFatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in 
Shatila CfullP, 15/1 0/02 
69 Llterview with Abu Akram, Leader ofthe PFLP-GC for Lebanon, Mar Elias Camp, 10/10/02 
70 He is referring here to the concern raised about the Sabra and Shatila massacre to the Belgian 
Prosecutors Office. A formal complaint was made which charged Sharon with War Crimes, Crimes 
against HUtuatlity and Genocide. The Belgian Supreme Court, however, ruled on the 24th of 
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The Arab conlllllmity and their leaders had a varying impact on the Palestinians' 
forced situation as refugees, depending on whom I spoke to. The interpretation of 
the Arab go,rernments rangpd -from he1ng -h111y s"pport1,re of the Palestlnlaf' cause fo..A..l. .l..l..u.. ... .l. .I. .l..l........l..l. .l..l....L V .l..l..J.. L\A..I..1. \A-_ _ .l..1. ".1.....1. .l. ... .L.£-LL .I. 
(although very few thought tins), being pamlysed because of the West, to the 
opposite view of solely paying lip service to the Palestinian cause and being more 
concerned with themselves. 
Some believed the Arab goverl1lllent to be non-supportive in the sense that they are 
not physically capable of being supportive. 
The Arab COlllillunity, because of the development project, has no time to give 
or to defend Palesfille. He is just defending himself against imperialism.71 
Ln other words, tile Arab commmnty lS paralysed because of Westem (US) 
hegemony. There is only so much they are able to do in a world dO!Ilinated by the 
West. However, some believed that the Arab govem .. 11lents were not being 
supportive at all and were only paying lip-service so to spea.1<. to the Palestinian 
cause: 
The Arab regimes give nothing to the Palestinian cause except talk. They are 
obliged to help the American system [imperialism - hegemony] to stay in 
authority (power). We can not count on Arab leaders [but the Arab people 
support us]. Unfortunately they do not have democracy, so they can do nothing 
... Any political movement will be threatening to t.~e Arab leaders.72 
September 2003, u~at they no longer had any jurisdiction to investigate fuld prosecute the massacre. 
For more on why this investigation and prosecution failed to materialise see Walleyn, Luc The Sabra 
and Shatila Massacre and the Belgian Universal Jurisdiction 
71 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila, interview held in the PFLP office in 
Shatila camp, 09110/02 
72 Interview with the leader oft.~e PPSF for LebCitlon, interview held in Abu l'v10ujCit~ed's office, 
10/10/02 
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ALllOst all L1.e At-ab leaders are not supporting the Palestinian cause, but they 
are hitt.ng it in the back. And what's going on in Palestine, the massacres, 
killings, it shows us what the Arab leaders are not doiIlg. . .. We witnessed 
demonstrations in Europe and even America, supporting the Palestinian case 
and denyiIlg73 what is going on in Palestine. But on the contrilly, iII the At-ab 
COilullunity, some leaders prevented their people from making demonstrations.74 
We don't count on the Arab leaders, because they are having the Palestinian 
cause in order to gain their own interests 75. 
If you want to go back to 'the catastrophe', al-nakba, the conspiracy was that 
L1.e Arab leaders, they knew about it/6.77 
These statements raise a number of issues: the major theme of Arab govemments' 
inability to help the Palestinian cause is seen as being because of Western (TJS) 
hegemony. There is power politics involved here, where the hegemopJc power can 
do as it pleases in the region. It does not need to listen to grievances in the region. 
The Arab leaders know who the hegemon and super power is and realise that, if they 
are to stay in power and realise cert.ain of their goals, they cannot deviate too far 
from the line set by the hegemon. The second issue is a lack of democracy in the 
region. Tne interpretation here is that if there was democracy and if the Arab leaders 
ll·stenpd to the;"- ppoplp they u'ould be f':o"-ced to hpl .... thP Palest;n;",n ca"se F;nallv 
.I. '" .I. .... "" '" "'.l..I.'" _ V _ ..LV, \"..L.l. "-,, ..L. .&. "..L V.I.!" .... ..L.I."'.L L \..I...l..Ll..\,.I...L.I. \..I. • .l...l...L .... .I..J' 
the Arab states are interpreted as being responsible for the Palesti11ian dispossession, 
as seen LTl the last statement - 'the conspiracy was that the A.rab leaders k.T1ew about 
it'. The L.'1lpiication of tl>Js is that the Arab states do not care about the PalestipJa,-'ls; 
they even k.new about the nakba and did nothing to stop it. Whatever reliance was 
73 In this context denying refers to being against what is being done to the Palestinians by the Israelis. 
74 Interview with Abu Akram, Leader ofL1.e PFLP-GC for Leb<mon, Mar Elias Canm 10/10/02 
75 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held ~t his home in 
Shatila 15/10/02, 
76 Meaning that the Arab leaders are in the hands of the West who want to redraw maps and have 
control over petrolellill 
77 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held at the PLF office 
in Shatila camp, 16/10/02 
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ever put upon the Arab governments, is now different. The Palestinians have 
realised that in order for change to occur, they must act by themselves.78 
Why were t.hese perceptions so and why did they differ from people living in the 
sa.Tfie situation? Tne most obvious answer in this case, is that it depends on what 
political group the people were a member of, if any. By this I mean that some of the 
D - .• ·11 - b . AI - . 79 H h· 
.L aiestL.'1lan groups are Stiu supported y varIOUS ~ab regmles. .L owever, t .LIS 
perception also comes from years of disappointment in the Arab regimes 
maPipulating the Palestinia.ll cause, someti mes supporting them and someti..rnes 
neglecting them. 
A distinct Palestinian identity was formed as a result of this; in other words from a 
more pa.Tl-Arab identity to a Palestinian identity. The inconsistent Arab support has 
mea.'1t that the Palesti..'1ian movement has had to be able to rely on itself. It was also 
this history of inconsistent Arab support that helped the (re )development and 
emphasis of a distinct Palestipjan identity. At this point remembering some of the 
events outlined in the 1:>istory chapter can help in understandi..'1g why t1:>is is the case. 
The defeat of the Arab aTI11ies in the 1967 War and the subsequent instability for 
Palestinians within the Arab host states forced the Palestinian Resistance to 
emphasise their 'Palestinian identity' precisely because of what they saw as a lack 
of co!p~Tflitment by the Arab states. This emphasis on Palestinian identity was also 
import..ant because there was a complicit lack of recognition of the Palestirians as a 
distinct 'people'. The UN Security Council Resolution 242 that addressed the 1967 
W 1 • d.J· -C" 1 pl·'" 1 1 ar anCllts consequences, ma e no mennon 01 tne ~ alestImans as a people, omy 
78 This is in clear contrast to some of the groups believing in pan-Arabism during the 1960s. See 
Chapter Four 
79 See Chapter Four 
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as refugees. The Arab states were asked to accept this resolution: Egypt and Jordan 
did, Syria did not. The PalestiPians were not asked whether or not they accepted it. 
Tris was a strong message to the Palestir...ians that they were not recogrised as a 
people - thus the need to emphasise and maintain their identity. This lack of 
recogpition was fprther emphasised by Golda Meir in 1969 Lll the infamous article to 
the Sunday Times: "It was not as though there was a Palestirian people in PalestL.'1e 
considering itself as Palestinian people and we came and th..rew them out and took 
their country away from them".8o 
Nevertheless, at the same time as there is a distinct Palesti11ian identity, both with 
regards to the notion of identity itself, as well as with regards to the theoretical 
implications of identity, it should be remembered that people can have overlapping 
a.l1d multiple identities. Although there exists a distinct Palestinian identity, t..his does 
not mea.ll that Ll}e PalestiPians do not consider themselves to be Arabs, for exa.TIlple. 
Indeed tris is also an import..ant pa...rt of their identity. Tris Arab identity is closely 
linked to what was outlined earlier; including the refugees' views on what they 
perceived as support and solidarity by the Arab people as opposed to ma.llY of the 
A.rab leaders. 
80 S d 'T" 1 5th T. '969 un ay lImes, 1 June 1 . 
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Retu...f1l111g to view of 'the other', the Arab states were not considered the onJy guilty 
party. The international COITLT!lU.Tlity too, was seen as responsible for their situation 
today. 
The international community should ta.l(e most of the blame.s, 
However, the intemational C0l11lllUnity is also believed to be the most capable of 
doiIlg something to help their situation. Wh.en asked about how the refugees could 
retu ... rrl to Palestine, the answer was, 
The strategy is for the international comnmnity to wake up atId know that we 
exist. To be convinced of the wrong the Israelis have done to us and realise that 
we should go back. As Paiestiniatl refugees we have the right to ret-LiLli to our 
land like any other people. Weare not asking for more than our human rightS.82 
Regarding the perception of the Lebanese as 'others', most did see a difference 
between the Lebanese government and the Leba.T1ese people. There was also the 
understanding that there were differences within the Lebanese population. 
We have shared sometimes L'le bread atId the blood with the Lebanese people, 
especially against the occupation and the people who help the occupation. There 
are some of the Lebanese who have killed us ... 83 
This statement is related to the civil war in Lebanon, but nevertheless is also about 
today. The perception is that Ll-tere are people in Lebanon who do support and care 
about the Palestirian cause, but there are also those who do not do so, and who have 
ta.ken drastic measures to ma.ke their opinion clear. In other words, there are 
81 Interview with Abu Satller, interview held at his home in Shatila CatllP 
82 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebat"1on, interview held at his office in Mar Elias 
camp. 12/10/02 
83 Int~rview with Haj Salem, leader ofFatah Intifada in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home it"1 
Sabra, 07 II 0/02 
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differences between Lebanese people, a.nd as we saw in the history of the camps 
section in Chapter Four, there have been events that have made this perception 
pa..rticularly strong. The Lebanese political group that Palestir.ians most approved of 
was Hizb'allah, as it was seen as being pa.rticularly supportive a.nd helpful to the 
P 1 t·· 84 ...... ,.. S' ··t 1 • 1 h . . t
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h 1 1 ~ rues.lma.lls. 1 HIS IS a Hu.e group, WHICH . as prorm.llence ill .He sout DUt a.so 
witb.in the refugee ca..'IlpS in Beirut, pa..rticularly Shatila camp wp.ich has Lebanese 
Shiite inhabitants, and in BOUlj el Barajneh where the population is Palestinian but 
the ca.1TIP itself is situated in a Shiite area. 
Incentives or Disincentives? People's perception of the political 
grouDs 
In relation to the previous chapter on orgaIlisations, as well as the sections exa.rnined 
in t],js chapter on the perception of the self and the other, this section will look at 
peoples perceptions of the political groups. Are there incentives or disincentives to 
joining political groups? Do people feel that the political groups can give them what 
they need? W:'1en speaking to and interviewing people in the refugee camps what 
would at fIrst glance seem to be the biggest disincentive of the political groups, their 
paralysis today in compa.rison to the hey-day, was not necessalily seen as such. The 
methods of recruitment - family ties, COll.1TIon good, reputation and 'no strategy 
84 Tnis was a general impression as well as results from interviews. Hizb'ailah gives clothes and 
sometimes medical services to the refugees. For example, Sobheye, member ofFatah Intifada said 
that the people in Lebailon who are good to the Palestinians are Hizb'allah (Interview 23/10/02). 
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needed' - as outlined in Chapter Six, as well as the political groups' general 
functions of improving the socio-economic conditions within the ca.TIlpS proved to 
be enough to ma..1(e most reiilgees either stay with, or join, the political groups. 
Most people are members of the political groups because there is nothing else to 
do with their time and their lives. The political groups provide services and 
make people feel alive.85 
Nevertheless, there was a diversion from tlns general attitude displayed by many 
youth who complained of the diswity between t.1}e groups. However tbis complaint 
about disurjty contradicts what was shown in the previous chapter with regard to 
both tlle functions and aims of the groups: all groups seemed to be in agreement. 
The wity between the groups stems from the perception that the groups and 
residents in the ca..'llP know that the C01T'~'llon good (wpjch is retu ... rrjng to Palestine 
and, w1nIe in Lebanon, ma.lcing life as bearable as possible) is the same vision held 
by each of the political groups. We saw in Chapter Six how the view of the 
'co1T'~'llon good' is a widely-held view and a potential recruiting factor. Sin'jlarly, 
all the groups are fightLng the same battles. The battle against the poor living 
conditions in the camp, the battle against poor education, and the battle for their 
right to retth'TI to their country. The political groups hope to alleviate, as far as they 
can, the pressures of the bad socio-eCOnOll1ic conditions, as well as supporting tlle 
Palestipia.T1 cause. There are fond memories of the hey-day where the groups were 
able to do much more than they are capable of today. Nevertheless, today most of 
Lhe political groups have a representative on the popular committee wInch tries to 
deal with va.rious issues wit.lUn the ca.mp such as social issues relating to water 
distribution a.nd electricity. They commUlncate with lJNRWA, a.nd when possible 
85 Ii1.terview with Abeer, in her home, Shatila Camp, 27/11103 
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and necessary, with the Lebanese authorities. As we saw earlier, different camps in 
Leba.t}on have different problems with the popular committees themselves, 
depending on where they are situated and which groups are on the cOIn'T'Littee. 
However in the Beimt camps and in the Shatila ca.mp, for instance, most of the 
, ·t· 1 ' 86 T T , th b' t ' . "ta' , pOlllca groups are memoers. now mucn . ey are a leo ao IS aeoa Ole. 
However they do in some sense have the role of being the representatives of the 
refugee camps. These fiUlctions, as well as issues of family ties and solidarity 
outlined earlier, do ma.lee people join these groups. Aduits remain members and 
most send their children to their particular groups' youth orgarrisations, where they 
receive help with homework a.nd recreational activities. Most children who have 
grown up witPin these youth orgapisations move on to jowing the politicai groups 
when they grow up. Nevertheless, some of the youth were not convinced by the 
work that the political groups do, pointing to the dismlity a.mong the groups. 
Ullity of political groups is very important to a Resistance and Revolutiona.ry 
Movement. The importance of the unity of the groups can be seen as far back as the 
civil war when upity was a vital factor. Dr Giannou, in his book about his time h'1 
Shatila during the A..M..AL sieges, explains t..h.at in this situation, the political groups 
cooperated out of necessity. Dr Giap~t}ou explains that during one of the sieges of 
Shatila carnp, the Syrians gave food for the groups within the National Salvation 
Front (NSF).87 This could be dangerous, as it could have led to internal fighting 
within the Palestinian groups in Shatila during the siege, weakening their protection 
86 The PFLP is not on the popular conllnittee "because of some arglL.l!lents and problems". - see 
section on the function of the political groups, above. 
87 Wnat Giannou refers to as the NSF, more specificaiIy t.l}e Palesti~llia.ll National Salvation Front 
(PNSF), is the group ofrejectionist political groups that had close links to Syria. The PNSF is the 
pre-runner to the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (A.PF), although the PNSF still exists and it is 
represented withi.ll the APF. 
289 
and defence of the camp. Thus the various leaders of the groups within the NSF in 
Shatila decided that this was against their common good. 
Omar restored order. 'The camp is still under siege, the battle conthiues. As far 
as I'm concerned, there is no question of applying political pressure on anyone 
until the end of hostilities'. He spoke for all of those present. 'Atid we will not 
be part of this campaign. We refuse our quota of the NSF supplies. All 
foodstuffs should have been given over to the popular cOillillittee for 
distribution, equally to everyone in the camp88 
Whatever their differences with the Fatah Arafat leadership, t..'lese men knew 
that negotiations taking place in Algeria would probably result in Palestinian 
reconciliation, and that the Fatah people in Shatila were every bit as patriotic as 
they, had sacrificed and bled and died, were the essential pillar, in numbers, 
finance, and means, of the resistance of the camp89 
The leaders of the three 'democratic' factions of the National Salvation Front ... 
told their ... Syrian allies that they had been eating from Fatah stores for weeks 
on end, and that the ammunition they had to defend the camp also came from 
Fatah. Either all of the supplies that had been delivered on the two trucks would 
be distributed to everyone in the camp on an equal basis, or they and their men 
would refuse t..'leir portion of the NSF supplies90 
Cooperation in times of war, where there are questions of life and death, is vital. 
During the civil war the disupity of the groups only went so far. When the situation 
beca..'1le Uo.'1bearably harsh the groups tu .. rned to each other and realised that they had 
to stick together. As tiris case shows, the groups witlrin the canlps looked beyond 
their politics - internal and regional - in a time of war when the situation was so 
grave that it was a fight for survival. Had the internal feuding prevailed dur1~'1g tl-,1S 
time, it could have had disastrous consequences for the inhabitants of Shatila, as 
their defence and resistance to AlY.1AL would weaken. l]:lis, however, was a 
localised Shatila issue that did not impact upon the actual disagreements and 
differences in alliance that the political groups formally had. 
88 Giannou, Dr. Chris, Besieged: A Doctor's StorY of Life and Death in Beirut (Olive Branch Press, 
1990) p. 168 
89 Ibid. p. 170 
90 Ibid. p. 170 
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TIlls exa.lllple is from the Civil War, which is now over. The political climate in 
T b .. 1" 1 b' I"T'"Il ~ .. f" 1 1·" 1 1 1 1 >"'T"Il Le anon IS relatlvelY sta Ie. lne lUllctlon or tne pO~ltlcal groups nas cnangea. lney 
no longer have to defend the camp as in war times. Today, the groups have a 
different role: trying to ma.ke life in the camps as bearable as possible, as well as 
keeping the idea of returning to Palestine alive (although this is not really necessary: 
it is perhaps more a rerninder of the revolutiona..ry hey-day). Although the previous· 
chapter on orgaIlisations outlines the political groups' COl1HnOn goals, disagreements 
between them stiH exist. For example those groups that favour the Oslo process and 
those that do not, but tris did not seem to be the aggravati..'1g factor of the perceived 
disUlllty of the political groups. 
A.ll example of the aggravation of the disUlllty of the political groups came from a 
resident of Ein el Helweh who complained about t.1}e worker's unions. He is a 
pha..rmacist and had been trying to ma..~e a u..'1ified 'doctors-nurses-pharmacists' 
union. However, he became very dismayed when he found that all the different 
political groups preferred to have their own such wions instead of u.1liting to ma.1(e 
one u..'1ion for doctors, nurses and pha..rmacists, no matter which political group one 
belonged to. For hilll, tllls would have been the most practical a.nd effective solution 
to the worker's wion. However, he felt that the different groups somehow became 
possessive of their unions, thus miring the cha..'1ce of a..'1 effective UI'ion representing 
everyone of all political shades and colourS.91 This u..-llort'unate example shows the 
problems that disunity of the political groups has on refugees in the camps. The 
'disUJ1ity' issue of the political groups was the main complaint mostly from the 
youths who did not wa.nt to join the groups. Disunity among the political groups can, 
91 Diary, 02111102 
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therefore, be seen as a disincentive for people joining t..he groups. Another example. 
is the young woman whom I accompanied to the DFLP meeting.92 She told me that 
she did not want to join any of the groups, because the groups were not u..'1ited 
enoug.~ - 'the groups need to be one and not fight with each other' .93 SirrJlarly, 
another young mall told me that he saw t,'1e political groups as 'silly', explaining that 
whenever there was a com.rnemoration day, all the political groups stand there with 
their little identifying flags safrng 'here I am!,.94 Apart from the pharmacist, most of 
t."ese perceptions were from yout."s, ranging from mid-teens to late twenties. 
The 'age factor', or the generational shift, may have something to do with tIns issue 
f' 'd .,. ( , . , ) b (' , , o~ tne 01 er generatIOn oemg or navmg oeen mem ers or groups oecause tney 
were of age du..ring the revolution a..'1d civil war. Some of the younger generation 
today seemed more sceptical. For example, a head of a family who was previously a 
politically active member of the PFLP told me first pis reasons for memberspip: 
I chose the PFLP because it had the clearest strategy. They were a serious group 
committed to its ideology and cause .... The PFLP was very hidependent. It did 
not take help or supplies from other Ai-ab goveiThl1ents, but rather from NGO's 
and so forth. If the PFLP had taken funding from the other Arab countries, it 
would mean that they would have to follow their lines and rules. Because the 
PFLP did not do th.is, they were able to stay independent95 . 
Then followLllg the civil war, he stopped being a member of the PFLP, although he 
had obvious adIPiration and respect for the p~rty: 
Now I feel like I am too old to join the group again ... Now it is very hard to 
join groups. If you join you must be careful not to register, because if you do 
92 See Chapter Six - family ties 
93 Literview with Abeer, in her house, Shatila Camp, 27/11/03 
94 Diary, 2001-2003 
95 Interview with Abu Samer interview held in his home 28/11103 
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you will be uilder observation, even the young people who have never been 
Pfu-tS of groups before.96 
The implication here is that there is an issue of da.nger injoiD..ing the political groups 
today, even for the younger generation who have no previous record.97 Wnen 
spea.1Gng to his son about joining political groups he had t.lris to say: 
I don't think the political groups are doi,lg fulythi.lg ... Maybe they used to do 
something during the war in Lebanon fuld in the south, but now they are doing 
nothing ... They don't have the means to do fulything from here. They are doing 
some things, but not from here, from Palestine ... I don't like the groups. They 
are worki,lg for Palestine but at the same time they are just showi,lg off and 
trying to compete with each other.98 
Several of the key issues are involved here regarding both the father's and son's 
statements. First is the 'da..Tlger' issue of being under observation because of the 
Leba.'1ese strict policies towards Paiestirian political groups and action. The second 
is the disillusionment with the groups due to two factors: a) their inability to do 
anytplTlg from Lebanon due to both lack of funding and, again, the Lebanese 
policies towards them. And b), again reiterating the youth being disillusioned by the 
competition and dislUuty between the political groups. The tIilld issue relates to a 
theme looked at in the previous chapter: fa..lTIily. In this case, the son has not joined 
the group that his father belonged to. Tris is not due to the son \visping to join 
another group but for tile reasons just outlined. The fourth issue is again related to 
the age factor, the generational shift. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The older generation may have more of a danger factor involved in joining political groups again 
as they were most likely to have been involved in the war, and had to give up their guns with the 
ending of the Cairo agreement. 
98 Interview with Ayman. Palestinian living in Shatila camp. Interviewed at his home 07111103 
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On the other hand was there mobilisation without groups? In other words, do some 
of these youths who are not members of the political groups act politically, even 
without being members of political groups? The answer is yes, as is L.'1lplied from 
some of the statements above, as well as the notion of being 'politicised by birth': 
the youth do go on protests, have discussions, celebrate and CO!!Llllemorate certain 
days related to the pistory of Palestine pre-nakba, as well as dates important to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, without necessarily being members of political groups. These 
activities, by their nature of being caused by t.he injustice done to the Palestinians, 
are political. How far are t..lJ.ese activities political mobilisation or just political 
consciousness? Does political activity necessarily mean that one is a member of a 
group? Or ca..'1 mobilisation also relate to political activity outside a group? 
Political consciousness refers to 
First .... an awareness of one's position, as an individual or as a collectivity, in 
the prevailing global or local power structure and an understanding of the 
actions neCeSSfuy to transform t.~em. Second, it refers to a sense of cOlThliunal 
solidarity. Last, political consciousness should logically lead to and inform 
social practice; otherwise it remains unactivated, u.'lcommitted, and thus 
underdeveloped.99 
This mea..ns Lhat, in order for mobilisation to occur, there must exist a politically 
conSCIOUS commupity, or political consciousness witPin the people who join 
particular groups. Peteet's statement indicates that political consciousness IS the 
awareness of one's identity, regarding the self, the community, and the other. TIns is 
where mobilisation actually starts, making people aware of who they are, why they 
are in the present condition and who are the people or mechanisms responsible for 
them being in Lheir present condition. Once this is realised and a programme 
99 Peteet, Julie Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1991) p. 68 
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established, which is understood, believed and followed, t.hen the action can start. In 
this case it is the politics of the PalestiPian Resistance as well as t..l}e politics of the 
refugees' specific rig.."lJ.ts such as right of retu .. rn and compensation. Peteet argues: 
Beiilg well versed in political theory and using political discourse to 
conceptualise and make sense of the world is evidence. It refers to someone 
who keeps abreast of developments in the regional and international political 
arena; it indicates a clear knowledge of who is the enemy and why and what is 
the nature of the struggle, both politically and militarily, to create a new power 
order, (hId it should include a social practice that confirms ones ideology. 
Knowledge of one's society, its social composition. particular~v the distribution 
and meaning of power, the cultural system, and how the particular formations 
affects the course of national liberation is indeed the high mark of political 
consciousness.(italics are mine ).100 
As this chapter has shown, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do have a clear idea 
about their collective identity. They understa.T1d who 'they' are and also who the 
'other( s)' are. Fmthermore, they understa.'1d what the nature of their situation is. 
There was political activity among people who did not want to join any of the 
political groups. They join demonstrations, listen to talks, and pa..rticipate in 
activities t.."lJ.at are Palestinian. For example, on cOIIh'TIemoration day for the 
massacres in Sabra and Shatila, all of the political groups have speeches and so 
forth. Even people who are not members go and listen to these speeches. This is 
precisely because of what we saw above, the concepts of solidarity and the 
'c0111...mon good'. As we saw Lll t.he previous chapter in the section on family, for 
insta.T1ce, the young woman who made a speech at the DFLP woman's meeting did 
not consider herself to be political: this is not always considered to be political 
activity. Their definition of political action is related more to membership of 
pa..rticular groups a..T1d activities therein. However, ma..1G.ng political speeches, joining 
100 Ibid. p. 68 
protests, and so forLul are more pa.rt of the enforced (because the situation is not their 
fault), politicised nature of the Palestinian refugees' lives. 
At this point looking at resource mobilisation theory regarding supply and demand 
raises some important questions. Essentially resource mobilisation theory tells us 
that where there is a supply of social movements and orgarisations, there will exist a 
demand. There are certainly political organisations in supply within the camps, and 
the demand also exists, but to a certain extent the groups are paralysed from beiIlg 
able to solve the people's aggravations and problems. Are there too many 'non-
lUlified' groups that have the same goal? And is it because t.l}ere is such a high 
supply of groups and not enough action that people to become disillusioned with 
them? These questions are import..ant precisely because of some of the youths' 
perceptions. Although the majority of refugees are still members or a part of the 
politicai groups, the concerns raised by t..1:le youth did seem to be genUL1J.e. Although 
for the time being the political groups have popular support for what they are able to 
do in Lebanon, the complaints by the youth does, at the same time, raise important 
questions if the trend remains and grows. 
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Conclusion: Do collective action frames and identity encourage 
mobiiisation? 
Tlus chapter has ShOW11 the mam themes of Palestiluan collective identity. Key 
themes include LTlsecuriiy, poverty, self as victims of 'others', struggle and 
endurance. The stringent a..'1d harsh policies of the Lebanese goverr.u'Uent reinforce 
their Palestiluan-ness. Throug..h the looking-glass, the Palesfuuan refugee sees him 
or herself as a foreigner, inferior, in a country where they are not wanted but also in 
a country where L~ey themselves do not wish to be. They wish to be back in their 
own cOlmtry: Palestine. The responsible 'others' include Israelis, Europeans, Arab 
leaders and the LTltemational COffi...TIlumiy. Their situation is not only a harsh one 
where the Palestinian refhgees lack fulfilment of their basic human needs, but also 
one of£rustration. However, at the moment, tills lack ofhmnan needs and frustration 
over their situation has not led to violent or militant activity. Tnere exists 
international resolutions that would a) facilitate their retuL'TI and b) give them human 
rights in Lebanon, neither of which are being implemented. All of these issues 
within the Palestinia.Tl refugees' collective identity would seem to be enough to 
preslL.'Ue that L~e refhgees would be mobilising and trying their best to achieve these 
rights. TIus was not necessarily the case. Collective action frames may help in 
li..Tlderstanding why. 
The three main tasks of collective action fran1es are: diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivationaL For Kla.Tlderma.Tls/O l the fIrst two are a pa.rt of consensus mobilisation 
101 Klandermans, Bert "The Social Construction of Protest llild Multiorganisational Fields" in Morris 
and Mueller ed, Frontiers in Social Movement Theorv (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992) 
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whereas the last one is action mobilisation. The flrst two are necessary for Lhe last 
one. 
What were the diagnostic fra.mes of the situation? In other words, what IS the 
problem a.lld the reason for the problem? From the frames above, we can see that the 
problem is the continued situation of people being refhgees, and Israeli occupation. 
Within the context of the refugee camps, both of these issues dominate, however 
with emphasis on the poor living situation in the camps, but also soiida.rity with the 
Palestinia..'ls inside Palestine. 
What were the prognostic fra.mes of the situation? In other words how can Lhls 
situation change? As we have seen within the different frames above regarding the 
self and the other, the prognostic frames differ. What people can do to help their 
situation in the refugee camps seemed rather limited. The prognostic fi·ames were 
therefore LTIlpractical, in t..1}e sense that there was a fatalistic approach to them. There 
was a strong belief in a..rmed struggle inside Palestine; however, revolutionary action 
within the camps suffered from paralysis caused by sLructural constraints and lack of 
resources of the groups. The main aLTIl remains as it has always been: 
We have one main aim, and that is to liberate all of Palesti.ne. 102 
Nevertheless, bOLh the political groups and the refugees understand their limitations 
in achieving t],js goal from Lebanon. 'LTIlproving socio-economic conditions' as 
well as 'solida..rity' did seem to be the major mOTIvational fra..'1le for joining groups. 
Tlns is because of the themes outlined within this chapter, but also in chapters Five 
102 Interview wit.~ Abu Hasa.'1, leader of Saiqa for Leba.'1on, h'1terview held in his office in Mar Elias 
camp 12110/02 
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and Six. The themes include sufferl-.l1g, alienation, and disillusionment with Lhe 
political groups but also with the world. There was a strong solidarity with 
Palestinians inside Palestine, frustration with their situation as refugees (though not 
necessarily aggression), and a lack of human needs. These themes would seem to 
represent issues both ,vitpin motivational frames a.TJ.d mobilising factors, as they are 
seen by various scholars as the building blocks of collective action. Suffering and 
alienation as well as a lack of huma..ll needs could bring people to mobilisation. 
Li.TJ.king tPis with frustration, the likeiihood would be even higher. Solida.rity inside 
Palestine, with notP,i'lg to lose in Lebanon, could also be seen as a mobilising factor. 
Khashan/o3 for instance, saw L~ese factors as contributing to the endorsement and 
indeed willingness of youth to participate in suicide bombings in Rashidiyeh Cfu-np 
close to the Israeli border. Wf'lat was different in the Beirut camps? 
There was disillusionment on the pali of both the refugees and the political groups 
regarding their situation, where, at least for the foreseeable future, notping could be 
done. h'1ere was also disillusionment among ma..'lY refugees regarding the political 
groups and their capabilities, although this did not necessarily dissuade them from 
joiping. Solida.rity, as well as the help, althoug..lI limited, supplied by the political 
groups was enough for the refu.gees to want to join. There was, however, evidence 
of people, particularly among Lhe youth, not wanting to mobilise and join the 
political groups. Although they did not always consider their behaviour as political, 
people were mobilised into protesting, marching, celebrating holidays and so forth. 
Nevertheless, although mobilisation into the political groups was for the most pali 
as would be expected, there was a deviation from this trend by many youths. 
103 KhashaTl, Hilal 2003 op. cit., 
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Regarding the state of affairs of those youth who, at least more of them than would 
be expected in tpis situation, did not seem to be willing to join political groups, 
what may be disillusioning them may be explained by New Social Movement 
theories. Lll other words, today there exist new issues, new values, and perhaps a 
change in identity. They are a challenge to the popular image, cited earlier quoting 
Schultz, of the Palestir...ian refugee "who is someone who resists, either with a 
Kalashnikov or fu"l RPG in the squalid refugee Cfu'TIpS of Lebfu"lOn",104 although this 
new image of tt~e non-party-fu-Cfiliated, non-militant Palestiniail may not be one that 
they wish to portray. Indeed they do wish that they were able to do something about 
their situation, but they, as the political groups, are paralysed from action. In other 
words, they do not wa.llt be seen as being compliant with the situation; however, 
they do not see any other choice. Joining one of the political groups, in their rr...inds, 
seemed to mean that Lhey were not able to do anything more for Palestine than if 
they were not a member. Tne new issues therefore relate to how they are living in a 
post-war condition, and the how Lebanese government is constraining them. The 
new values could imply that no one is willing to pay the price for participation. T1ns 
leads us back to cost a.llaiysis. Do the costs of participation outweigh the benefits? 
Today the costs of involvement in the political groups i..'1 Lebanon do not necessa..rily 
involve physical fighting and potentially dying for the cause. However, the cost is 
related to the 'fear' factor of being watched and bullied by the Lebanese authorities. 
In other words, there are too many costs in joir...i...'1g one of the political groups that do 
not even have as many nmctions as they used to. But is this what is stopping mallY 
youths from joining groups? The answer is not necessa.riiy. It is related to, as 
104 Schultz, Helena Li,11dhoLrn op. cit., p. 123-124 
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mentioned, new issues. The previous generation had access to good education and 
du..ring Cairo, were able to work. Similarly, during the Civil War, most refugees 
UTere act;ve unthin' the;" nol;t;f'a1 grAl1pS f1ght;ng the enemy Today the Vr\llth do not V'f .J.. ..l. v .... .i.L.J.. IL..L.l. II ¥ .J...&.\,..&.'-'.L V"'"_ .1....1. .J....L ... .J....L ... ..l. .1..I..1..I. • .L ,\,..J V \A- .1..1. ..1..1. l. 
have the access to the education that their parents had, the political groups are poor 
and their hey-day is over. Disillusionment with both the situation a.l1d the political 
groups has developed. i05 This situation would very often suggest a potential resort 
to violence but this has not happened. It would seem that the Lebanese 
government's stringent policies and pupisPJIlents, as well as PalestiPia.l1S having 
been L.'1volved in and suffered in the long civil war, is keeping the rep..lgees from 
militant activity. There has also been a re-introduction of (lack of) issues related to 
, , Th' ." , t'" b 1 1 1 t " nu..lIlan neens. L~ese lssues Wlll De oUlmen elOW, as tney are relevan to all 
rep..lgees, although many of the issues are pa..rticularly relevant to the disillusior.ment 
suffered by the youth. 
A ...nother issue relating to the generational shift is that the groups are still led by the 
older generation who were active either during the Revolution or during the Civil 
War. There did not seem to be any 'yOll.'1g blood' willL.'1g to take over any of these 
political groups and perhaps change them to suit issues that are seen as more 
important to the youth. This is interlinked with the youth's general view of their 
situation as welL New problems have arrived L.'1 t..1J.e ca..'llP, again particular to t..1J.e 
youth. These problems include formerly taboo subjects such as alcohol, drugs and 
'A5 
lV DurLl1g my work at the youth centre and tp-fough discussions with many of the yout.h in general 
there were four main issues that they considered to be the main problems they were facLl1g; 1) 
unemployment; 2) educational problems (bad school, if you fail your exams you are out, hig.h drop-
out rate); 3) emotional problems (depression, nervousness, feeling tense); and 4) environmental 
problems (no trees, rubbish everywhere, rats ).105 These were the main problems regarding their 
situation in Lebanon and in the camps (Diary 5/1 0/02). I also attended a meeting at a youth 
organisation in Bou.tj el Ba.rajneh where these same issues were reiterated. Nevertheless, an 
interesting difference in Bou.tj el Barajneh was the different priorities that were attached to the same 
issues. There was much more focus on return and Palestine (Dia.ry 31/10/02). 
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prostitution. These new problems show the severity of the appalling socio-economic 
conditions and the lack of hu.TJlan needs available to the Palestinian refugees. These 
conditions lead to depression and apat.l-ty instead of mobilisation. Among many of 
the youth, depression was widespread. There were problems and pressures in the 
overcrowded homes, bad schooling and L1J. general no hope. Joiping a poiitical group 
and beL.'1g active could perhaps alleviate some of these pressures. Although tris was 
the choice of most youths, there were still many who were disillusioned with the 
disupity of the political groups, but also some saw them as old-faspioned a.'1d 
paralysed. There is another L.-rnpommt issue regarding the youth: errigration. Ma..'1Y 
of the youth see emigration as their only solution at the moment. This however, is a 
difficult and dangerous option because of their lack of identity papers a.1J.d travel 
documents, and also because of stringent imrrigration rules around the world. 
Emigration from Lebanon in the 1970s happened usually via East Berlin and into 
the Federal Republic of Germa.1J.Y where many were able to claim asylum and settle 
or move to other cOll<'1tries. During the Lebanese Civil War, especially during the 
1982 Israeli Invasion and during the War of the Camps, many managed to seek 
asylum.106 Today, however, emigration from Leba.1J.on is in the form of illegal 
migration. i07 This is pa..rticularly the case with the youth. Dorai in his work on 
ellligration of Palestiniw...8 from Leba.non mentions reasons for e!lligration as related 
t ',' . ,. t" l' . "f.." "1 . TT .f! 11 
.0 the ~nemes Wltp.lll ~rus ~nesls: poverty, sur..:enng, QISll uSlop.ment. ne specl lcallY 
refers to the end of the Civil War bringing about increased discrimination against 
the Palestinians, the Oslo agreement not giving a.ny solution to Lhe refugee situation, 
106 Dorai, Mohamed Kamel "Palestinian Emigration from Lebanon to Nort.hem Europe: refugees, 
networks and transnational practices" Refuge (Vol. 21, No.2, February 2003) 
107 For example, there were two broh\ers in their early twenties from Shatila who I knew well from 
my fieldwork iIi the aut-wiln of2002. When I returned in the autw-nn of2003 they were gone. They 
lived together and had sold their little flat in Shatila for a tiny amount of money, used this money to 
try to get to Greece illegally. They left two weeks prior to my fu-rival. They came back a week after 
my arrival. They were fomld fuld stopped in Turkey and sent back. Now they are in Shatila with no 
home. 
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the worsening economIC situation in Lebanon, and the lack of work available to 
P 1 t·· 108 ~ ales.lmans. 
Again we see how the lack of hlLman needs has a bearing on one's identity and 
psychological well-being. However, in contrast to what may be assumed - that 
people a..re willing to fight for their human needs - t1>.1s is increasingly not the case 
on two levels. The fIrst level is related to the people who do mobilise and are 
members of groups. They are not violating any of t..1}e rules imposed by the Lebanese 
goverr.rnent and are not seen as a threat. The second level is related to many of the 
youth who are not mobilising at all. They lack their human needs too, yet are still 
not willing to join any political groups. 
108 Dorai, Mohamed Kamel op. cit., 
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Conclusion 
Th DO. s."M b°l" to ~ AAe !lemmas 01 .~o I isa Ion 
Introduction 
By exa.11lining political mobilisation in the Palesti.nia.l1 refugee Ca.111pS in Lebanon 
this thesis has challenged the general assll.TIlption that they are automatically higply 
charged, rug.bJy aggressive, 'breeding grounds' for rnilitant activity, Tpis assumption 
was challenged by ethnographic and interview fieldwork i.11 some of the camps in 
L 1 'T'h 1 11 ' ,.. 11k t 1 t f 1 1 1 1'1' 1 eoa.TlOn, 1 ~ITougn ~ms nelUwor., .ne na.ure 0': now ana wny pOlucal g~oups 
mobilise and how and why people join political groups was explored, revealing a 
state of affairs that is very different to previous studies, most of which were 
conducted during the Lebanese Civil War or during the Palestipia.Tl Revolution, The 
nature and the functions of the political groups have cha...Tlged follow..ng the civil 
war, however the refugees remain highly mobilised and many are members of the 
va.rious political groups, 'Politically active' is used in the sense of being involved 
wit.~ and members of, the va...rious political groups in the ca...rnps, and applies to the 
majority of the refugees: adults, youth and children, Yet, although most people were 
1 ,. l' h ' 1" 1 T 1'1 fi 1 ' , 
memoers or actIve Wltnm Le vanous pOl1tIca~ groups, 1 Qlama one mterestmg 
deviation: there seemed to be a grow..ng number of youths who were not willing to 
join political groups, 
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How was mobilisation in the camps examined? 
The thesis began by developing a suitable theoretical framework in which to 
examine mobilisation. Mobilisation was defined on two levels: the organisational 
level and the collective - people - level. The former refers mostly to recruitment 
strategies, and the latter to actually joining and being active within the political 
groups. Much of the existLTlg literature on mobilisation, collective action and 
identity is found wa..'1ting in some way - usually focusing on one level of analysis at 
the expense of ot..her levels. Therefore, I decided to use a fra..mework that included 
many of the different theories in order to look at all levels of analysis. In looking at 
the overarching societal context - the structures - the political model by Tilly was 
especially helpful, 1 and in pa..--ticular, Tilly's notion of 'opportuJ.'1ities', referring to 
both societal constraints as well as opportwiities. Within the structures we could 
also examine hU-rna..1l needs - what needs are available and what needs are not. 
Regarding the organisational level of analysis, the resource mobilisation approach 
and recruitment methods were seen as useful in understanding mobilisation. For the 
collective - people - level there exists social construction literature relating to 
identity. As part three of tlns thesis, dealLllg with the field work, indicates, it was 
very importa.Tlt to look at all t.b.ree levels of analysis. If, for exa.rnple, only structures 
and organisations were studied mostly by interview methods, a..'1d the et1:1nographic 
research within t.h.e ca..mps was ignored, the results would have been considerably 
different. It would have indicated a population that is hig.bly political and mobilised 
into groups, as well as a population that is potentially aggressive a..'1d militant. Tris 
would have been misleading. 
I Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 
1978) 
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Context: legal, historical and overarching societal factors 
The next section of the t..hesis eXa!11ined context - legal and historical. The legal 
context showed how the Palestipian refugees in Lebanon lack many rights that they 
are indeed entitled to. Because of the creation oflJNRWA they are unable to receive 
protection from the UNHCR and the rights that come with that protection. 
According to UN General Assembly Resolutions they do have the right to retu..rn to 
their country as well as the right to compensation. However these resolutions are not 
binding resolutions; they are considered 'soft' intemationallaw. The Arab League 
has tried to fill some of the loopholes in the international law regime regarding 
Palestir...ian rerJgees; however, their agreements too, are non-binding. Most have not 
been implemented because of domestic circumstances wit..h.in many of the Arab 
states. In Lebanon, the Palestipian refugees remain stateless a..'1d have no basic civil 
~r }nUill<>n nghts They hav'" d1[ficnlt" m· acqnlnng travel doc11ments <>nd do not have 
'OJ.L..I..1.. .l..l.Ui..L..L..L .&..l.~ • ..L.L..L .L.I. ..... ..I..LA. \,..I."",,) ~ \A..L.L.I. ... .1. .I. \.4...L.I....1. Ui..L ..1...1. ".1..1.. 
the right to work or OWl..1 property and have no access to social a!ld health services. 
Chapter Three, which exa..tIlined the legal context smrounding the Paiestipian 
rerJgees, showed that they lack an adequate legal status on all the various levels, 
intemationally, regionally a!ld locally within Lebanon. 
The historical context also includes intemational, regional a!ld local dimensions. 
The historical context outlined the va..rious literatures on al-nakba. Much of the new 
literature challenges work that focuses on voluntary migration - stressing instead 
forced lPigration due to a va..riety of factors, including va..rious massacres and a direct 
or indirect policy to expel Palestinians from what was to become the state of Israel. 
The second part of the historical chapter focused on the 'Palestinia!l reawa.kening' in 
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the 1960s with the fonnation of the Palestinian Resistance. It also looked at the 1967 
War and the 1970 War in Jordan and its consequences for Palesti..Tlian refugees, as 
well as the Palestinian Resistance. The last section of t1>1s chapter exa.Tined 
Palestinian refugees in Leba..non with particular emphasis on events following the 
Cairo Agreement and the Leba.Tlese Civil War. The Cairo Agreement gave the 
Palestir1a.'ls the 'opportur.ity' for mass mobilisation a.'ld mass political activity, as it 
allowed Palestinians to manage their own affairs and carry out revolution. The Civil 
War changed tpis PalestiPian independence radically. In 1982 the PLO was forced 
to withdraw and the Palestinia.'l refugees who remained in Lebanon were subject to 
massacres and sieges of their refugee camps. It was during these periods that much 
of the literature regarding identity and political mobilisation was produced. Today 
the sittIation is very different for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Life for the 
PalestiDjan refugees following the end of the Civil War is now characterised by a 
1 1 ,. .. 1 1 1 f 1·" 1 .. .. "., 1·(, .. 
return to narsn conmtlOns ana a laCK o~ pontlcal opportumtles - SlIP.Har to lLe pnor 
to the Cairo Agreement.2 However, the difference today in compa.rison to that time, 
is that the Palestinian refugees now have a memory of the mobilisation a..nd activity 
during the hey-day of the Palestipian Revolution. Many of the refugees were a part 
of this revolution, thereby ma.1cing their lives very difficult when one considers that 
many of the rights that they were granted in the 1960s and 1970s have been taken 
away from them. 
The first chapter in Part Three relating to the field work also examined context. The 
structures focused on the overarcping societal context, specifically looking at 
2 RememberLTlg from the Chapter Four that the Deuxieme Bureau was in charge of the Palestinian 
refugees during the 1950s and early and mid 1960s. There were stringent policies regarding the 
refugees. Tnere were secu.rity posts in a.Tld around the camps. Du.ring this time PalestLTlians were also 
routinely questioned and were not free to travel, even within Lebanon. Brynen, Rex Sanctua.ry and 
Survival: Tne FLO in Lebanon (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) 
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Lebanese govemmental policies, the role that UNRWA plays and an examination of 
what hu.TIlC;!ll needs the Palestinian rep.lgees in Lebanon have, and wpich ones they 
do not have. What we saw in this chapter was that the Lebanese govern ... 'Ilent has 
created considerable constraints for the Palestinian refugee population as well as the 
political groups. Syria is involved both in Lebanon and with political groups 
belonging to the APF. Syria's role in Lebanon involves secu..rity, political and 
economic issues and therefore Syria is keen to keep Lebanon as stable as possible. 
Tpis means that the PalestiPian refugees and the political groups are constrained by 
Syrian needs in Lebanon. lJJ\TRWA is inadequate in its provision of services a...'1d the 
Palestinian refugees lack most of their human needs. This would indicate a 
population that is being coerced by outside forces and living in extremely harsh 
conditions. Regarding mobilisation in tbis situation, it could go either way: either 
people would try to act in order to chcmge their situation, or they might follow the 
rules that are given to them. Could Bourdieu be correct, then, when he tells us that 
'resistance can be alienating and submission can be liberating. Such is the paradox 
of the domin.ated and there is no way out of it'?3 Or is the opposite view correct? It 
would seem from L1.is L1.esis that Bourdieu is incorrect: incorrect in L1.e sense L1.at 
although the Palestinians may not be directly resisting both the Lebanese authorities 
and t.1.e occupation oft.1.eir country, this submission, ift.1.at is what it is,4 is certainly 
not liberating. 
Judging from t.h.e historical, legal and present context, the asslllllption of a highly-
charged refugee population is understandable. Indeed, a population wpich is lacking 
3 Taken from Bourdieu, Pierre "Choses dites" (Paris; Editions de Minuit, 1987). Translated in 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Wacqua.TJ.t, Loic J. D An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2002) p. 24 
4 Wnether or not it is 'submission' is discussed further below under 'conceptual problems?' 
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most of t.heir basic human needs is easily assumed to be patiicularly active. 
Nevertheless, the next two chapters in the section relating to the field work provided 
contradictory evidence. 
Dilemmas of Mobilisation 
Channels of Mobilisation 
Despite, or precisely because of, the harsh living conditions atld stringent policies 
issued by the Lebanese goveIT'~rnent relating to social, economic and political issues, 
the refugees witl>..in the ca..'1lpS are higl>Jy politicised. Their historical context, their 
legal context and their present conditions lead to a collective identity based on 
insecu..rity about their cmrent a.Tld futme status. Fmther key factors of tbis collective 
identity include poverty, victirnisation and struggle. The groups within the ca..'1lpS try 
and alleviate, as far as they Catl, some of the results of tins insecmity. As was seen in 
Chapter Six wbich focused on orga.Tlisations a.Tld recruitment methods, many of the 
fimctions of the groups act as incentives for joining and pa..rticipating in political 
groups. Most groups are members of popular committees that deal with issues 
related to the ca.rnps. These include, for exa.rnple, issues relating to housing, rubbish 
collection and negotiations with UNRWA. The groups have other fUIlctions too, that 
try to alleviate some of tile suffering of the refugee population in the CCLmps. They 
have youth groups, women's groups and sports clubs. Some political groups have 
school teachers that help children with their school work as the state of the UNRWA 
schools leaves much to be desired. The function of the political groups in the camps, 
therefore, seems to be more social than political. Ll1ere is no military activity from 
it1.e Cfu'TIPS.5 Apfu1: from the functions of the political groups as incentives to join. 
them, t.1.ere are also oL1.er chaililels of recruitment. These include 'faJnily ties', the 
, d' d ' tr "'" d d' "'"h 1 tt .c h· 1 tu 11 rt CO!l1 .. mon goo an no sualegy nee e ,Le 1a ler 01 w .. ..lcn was aCl auy some SO .. l 
of idea of recruitment. Regarding 'family ties' as a mobilising factor, for many of 
the refugees tPis was indeed the case, as would probably be expected. Nevertheless, 
there were also fa.Tilies where people of the sa.'11e fa.'11ily joined different groups. 
Joining a group was part of 'their own conviction of their own ideas,.6 The 
'coill1llon good' is related to two issues: t.1.at of solidarity and that relating to the 
fra..rning of the situation. The latter more specifically relates to understanding the 
situation as one where t..he Palestinian refugees are living in inhuman living 
conditions, a..'1d do not have any rights that they are entitled to. As one political 
leader put it~ 'it is natural for people to be against tyranny'. 7 Tris is a mobilisL.l1g 
factor. The fonner refers to both solida..rity with the Palestinian Resistance as a 
whole, and also to the PalestiPians suffering witbm the Occupied Territories. The 
last issue of recruitment was 'no strategy needed'. This relates to an issue that was 
brought up many times: that Palestinian refugees, by the very natme of their being 
deprived of many rights that they are entitled to, are in a sense mobilised and 
recruited from birth. All Palestirians, whether members of political groups or not, 
are considered to be part of the Palestinia..n Resistance, by t.heir very nature of being 
ralestiPia..'1 refugees outside their home. 
5 At least not within the camps where I conducted my research. However it seems doubtful that there 
would be much militant activity within the camps following the Civil War as well as potential acts 
against Israel as the Lebanese government has sealed off the border with Israel as far as they can, 
thereby diminishing the wrath that would come from Israel as revenge. 
6 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in. his office in 
Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02 
7 Interview with Mohmmad Afifi, Fatah leader in Shatila, interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 
15110/02 
Both the groups and refugees had a shared collective identity, which is also part of 
the issue of 'recruitment at birth', and wpich comes about because of their structural 
sunoundings. Their shared identity included an understanding of the self as first 
and foremost Palestinia.ll. There was also a view of themselves in the filture: that all 
of their problems will be solved when they return to Palestine. They saw themselves 
as people living in poverty who are 'suffering' but have 'endura.nce'. This relates to 
hu.1Ilan needs and its aspect relating to identity. In Lebanon, the PalestiPian identity 
is reinforced by their lack of integration. The Palestirian identity is reinforced i..'l a 
negative8 way h"1 the sense that the Palestinian refugee sees hhil or herseif as a 
foreigner, an outsider, someone who is not welcome. This reinforced (negative) 
identity could lead to the presumption that apa.rt from being higl1Jy mobilised, as the 
Palestinian refugees are, they are also milita.rised and suffering from Gun's concept 
of frustration-aggression. Indeed there was a high degree of perceived injustice 
regarding their situation, but not the Gu.rr-ian notion of aggression a.'ld violence. 
The conception of the 'others' was, again, more or less the same for the refugees 
and the political groups. The difference ca.1Ile about in discussions about who was 
more to bla..'1le for their situation; Israel, the Arab Corr..munity, Europe, the US or the 
Intemational Community. Nevertheless, all of these 'others' were included in 
constructing the 'self. 
Peteet's work can be used as a comparison to a certain extent of the issues raised in 
l' 1 • Sh 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (' 1 '1' • /.c: ). 1 tms tneSlS. e nas tom us tnat tne cnarme s ror mOOlllsatlOn vor women m tne 
1980s included uriversities, self-critique, mass work, ki..'l ties, and social 
8 Not to be confliSed with not being proud of being Palestiniful. 
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institutions.9 Today only one of these fully exists for the Palestinian refugees who 
live in ti~e refugee camps. The reasons why these chani1els have changed since ti~e 
ti-me of Peteet's analysis is due to the legal, historical and structural context of 
today, as outlined earlier. During the 1980s the Civil War was raging and there was 
mass work to be done. Tne mass work was of an urgep:[ nature to help the survival 
of the camps. Silnilarly, during a..'1d also prior to tr.is th'1le, the PLO a..'1d t..~e other 
groups were well hl11ded. They paid for Palestinians to go to universities and they 
had several institutions where the refi..lgees could find employment. Thus, during the 
1980s, Tilly's notion of opportur.ity was very much the case. Sh'1lilarly, Touraine's 
notion of social movements being the result of the collective will was also very 
much the case du.";.ng this tLTIle. 1O His notions of identity, opposition and totality 
were all present, and the political groups could, therefore, following his 
terminology, be considered to be part of a 'tme' social movement. In other words, 
there was a clear view of the collective identity, a clear view of who the opposition 
was, a..'1d therefore a clear understanding of on what grounds the struggle with the 
opposition was based. Today as well, these notions of identity, opposition and 
totality are present; nevertheless, the groups remain rather paralysed from actLTlg on 
tr.is identity. Fu..rthermore, the channels for mobilisation are fewer. Tr.is does not 
mean, however, that the population is not highly political and hjghly mobilised: 
indeed they are. Nevertheless, this issue raises the importance of the concept of 
social movement and its relevance to tr.is case, sometr.ing that is further discussed 
below. 
9 Peteet, Julie Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1991) 
10 Touraine, Alain The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) 
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The Generational Shift 
The generational shift in attitude among some of the youths towards the political 
groups was an issue that stood out, particularly since mobilisation a.l1d being part of 
one of the political groups was so much pa...rt of the daily lives of most other re:fhgees 
in the camp. There was disillusionment among some of Lhe youths regarding the 
political groups, and wis was seen as the main reason for not joining them. The 
youth of today seem to have different worries in comparison to their previously 
politically-active parents when Lhey were their age. In other words, there is no 'mass 
mobilisation' as there was during the Palestipian Revolution and the Lebanese Civil 
war. The youth of today have grown up in a post-civil war country. They are 
growing up duri ..ng a period of time when the Palestinian political groups do not 
have the same a.T!lount of finances and power to fU..11 Paiestipians' own affairs as they 
used to. Depression and apathy are key issues involved h'1 the general 
disillusionment of the youth of the political groups and for their lives in general. 
But where was tills disillusionment coming from? Is it due to new issues and values 
that have changed? Tnese are sets of questions that I can oPJy attempt to answer. 
Regarding new issues and values oftoday's youth, tJ:..,is can be related to New Social 
Movement theory, but only to a ce11ain extent, remembering that New Social 
Movement theory arrived on the scene du..r1Jlg the time that the youth's parents were 
active. However, understa..'1ding that issues and values change through the 
generations is useful in attempting to lmderstand the youth of today. Their changed 
values perhaps ca.T!le about because of the cha.l1ge in situation in comparison to the 
Cairo years. In addition, du.."';..ng the Lebanese Civil War, there were direct physical 
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threats towards the PalestiDian refugees in the camps, thus mobilisation and 
protection of the ca.'1lpS were vital. Tbis situation has changed today. The youth 
have no direct enemy to fight. Similarly, they realise the desperation of their 
situation: t.hey ca.l1not work, they cannot leave Lebanon (except illegally) and they 
know that the refugee question has been sidelined in the Peace Process. Tney do not 
see any bright i.111mediate future. Additionally they are fhlly aware that the political 
groups, although active inside Palestine, are unable to change their situation in 
T 1 Leaanon. 
Conceptual Problems? 
The definitions used for mobilisation within the introduction to this thesis were two-
fold: the fIrst related to orgaPisations and how political groups managed to recruit 
members, and the second related to the Palestinia.l1 refugees, looking at what it is 
that makes them either join or not join orgaPisations. Because of my defl.-rlltion, in 
answeri~'1g the question whether or not the Palestiria.'1 refugees mobilise into groups, 
the answer would be yes, certainly there is mobilisation into groups, although how 
much these groups are able of doing to change the status quo is questioned. 
Looking at the concept of social movements we can refer to the discussion above 
about Touraine and 'true social movements'. In light of the results found in the 
fieldwork, tris thesis has raised problems with the traditional definitions of 'social 
movement' given in the introduction. First it was claimed t.hat social movements are 
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"the expression of the collective will".ll In relation to the Palestinian Resista.'1ce in 
Lebanon, L'lis claim is more or less true: the political groups within the Resistance 
and the refugees stand united in relation to the ultimate goal: to return to their homes 
- it is the means by which the 'collective will' can be achieved that is made difficult 
by the politicai groups' lack of funding. It is aiso a function of Lebanon's harsh 
policies, of Syrian needs in Lebanon wp..ich necessarily creates constraints on 
Palestinians, but first a.nd foremost of Israel. It is Israel that is preventing them from 
retulT'ing to their homes. In other words, the PalestiPian refugees in Lebanon can not 
retu..rn and they can not 'act' on their wish to return for all of these reasons. 
However more problems arise when Wilkinson tells us: 
1) A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change iil 
any direction and by any merulS, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or 
withdrawal into 'utopian' corrmmnity. 
2) A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organisation, though 
this may range from a loose informal or partial level of organisation to the 
highly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and the corporate group. 
3) A social movement's commitment to change and L~e raison d'etre of its 
organisation are founded upon the conscious volition, normative COilltllitment to 
the movement's aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the 
'7 followers or members .• -
From reading the various chapters in this thesis, one can see how problematic this 
defipition is: or is it that the Palestipian political groups in Lebanon no longer 
qualify as a social movement? The Palestinian Resistatlce as a whole is L.'1deed a 
social movement, its representatives in the West BaIlJc and Gaza strip are indeed 
follow1~T1g the first part ofWiLlGnson's definition: tryLT1g to actively promote change. 
Nevertheless, the resistance groups in Leba.'1on, although previously active, are not 
what would be presmned to be 'actively' seeking to promote change. They are 
il Touraine, Alain op. cit., p. 29 
i2 Wilkinson, Paul Social Movement (Macmillan Press, London, 1971) 
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trying to survive by bettering their socio-economic conditions, although obviously 
there is solida.rity with the rest of the movement, pa.rticularly in the West Bw..k and 
Gaza. Nevertheless, having said t1>is, the view that the Palestirian Resistance in 
Lebanon is not seeking to promote change is misleading. Throughout its existence 
the Resista.l}ce has indeed been based in different locations, with its strategy to 
promote change VaryiIlg from country to country, depending on where they had 
'sanctuary'. In other words, the Palestinian Resistance has existed in various 
countries at the sa.rne time since its inception; however, direct military or political 
action may only have taken place from one pa..rticular country at a time. Does this 
necessarily mean that the Palestinian Resistance based in a country that, for a period 
of time, is not involved in direct action gets ruled out from being a part of the 
Movement? I would hesitate to agree with t1>is. As Chapter Six suggests, the 
Palestinian refugees a.nd the political groups still consider themselves as 'resisting' 
the situation - a concept that is part of their identity and also, importa.l}tly, pa.rt of 
the movement's identity. (llis issue is pJ...rther discussed below.) 
Wilkinson's second and third points regardLllg what constitutes a social movement 
do not pose the same sorts of problems as the first. Regarding t..1}e second point of 
having a degree of orga"lisation, the political groups in Lebanon do have a level of 
organisation. Events are organised, the popular committees are (for the most part) 
. d 1 h· 1 1 ,.. 1 . T 1 1 orgw..lse ana t .ere IS corresponaence a.rnong tne pontlca. groups 111 Leoanon, tne 
political groups in other Arab countries as well as the ones in the Occupied 
Territories. The raison d'etre of the movement is founded on the ainl of the 
P 1 ..,.. '''''''' 1 1 ,. 1 • mestlman remgees: to retmn nome. 1 ne movement may nave cnangea ItS oase - It 
is now on its own soil - but it is nevertheless a movement that includes the diaspora 
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Palesti.nians. I argue this on the basis of the refugee issue still needing to be 
resolved, as well as the political groups WitPl11 the movement still existing in other 
countries where PalestiPian refhgees reside. Tris br' ..... 'lgs us back to the pro- and anti-
Oslo process groups that are in disagreement about how the cO!lflict and the refugee 
issue will be resolved. Although boLl} the pro- and anti-Oslo groups disagree on how 
to work out a solution, they both clah'Il to represent all Palestirians, both inside a..'ld 
outside of Palestine. The raison d'etre of the movement is also apparent within 
chapters Five, Six and Seven. They exist because the PalestiPian predic3.T!lent - lack 
of adequate statehood and continued dispersion a..'ld refugee status of PalestiPians -
still exists. A consequence of these issues not being solved is the lack of adequate 
human rights and protection, a lack of huma.rl needs, and t:bis makes the political 
groups and the movement as a whole try to alleviate t}-lis il1'JIlediate problem as far 
as they can. The last part of Wilkinson's third POi.llt refers to 'active participation on 
the part of the followers or members.' Simila.rly to above, I would argue that 
alt.~ough the Palestinian Resistance and its members in Lebanon may not be 
militarily active, this does not necessarily imply they are not participating in the 
aims of the movement. Indeed, if they could do more than they are doing at the 
moment, they would. They, both the members a..'ld the political groups in Lebanon, 
are acting within their constraints however tllis does not mean that the political 
groups in Lebanon do not constitute a part of the Palestipian Resistance. 
In the introduction, Tilly's VIew of social movements was also discussed. His 
,.. W1 JNe / , . fi ' d· ').. ,.. , concept or Ul ~wortny, um_~lea, n~T!lerous, an comnlltiea IS Important ror tne 
survival of a social movement. As far as possible, all four of these components of 
WUNC are present witllin the camps i.ll Lebanon. 'Worthiness' varies, depending on 
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ser-ting, but includes a certain standi..ng of the movement in the cOl1L1nunity. The 
Palestinian Resistance certainly has a standing as was seen through the themes of 
'soiida...rity" 'reputation" and 'social work'. 'Urity' refers to speaking together and 
collaborating th..rough the same actions. Regarding this point, questions are raised, as 
this was one of the main concerns of many of the youths that were not joining the 
• >t- -t ~ -t ro t ll 11 • t'" T""'\- ... TT"'"'II • pOll lcal groups. 1 ne example or .ne pnarmacls. ITom .t,m el ttelwen ca...1JlP m 
Chapter Seven who was dismayed at the political groups' inability, and indeed 
unwillingness, in having one single u.TJion for pha..rmacists, nurses and doctors stands 
out as an example. Nevertheless, t.~e example from t.~e siege of Shatila ca...1JlP shows 
that the groups act together when they must. Another uniti..ng factor shown in 
Chapter Six was that the identity and vision witbin each of the political groups was 
more or less the same regarding each other, but also regarding t.~e refhgee 
inllabitants of t.he canlp. Tilly's third point of mnnbers is equally important. It is 
important to show that the Social Movement has support. Nevertheless, each of 
these concepts can compensate for the other to a certain extent, as was said in the 
introduction: a high level of worthiness can compensate for a low level of munbers. 
Finally, 'cmmnilted' refers to participants' willingness to bear the costs of 
pa...rticipation h'l the movement. Again, the concerns raised by the youths not wining 
to joi..n the political groups point to the problem of people not being willing to take 
the risk and bear the potential costs> Again, though, it should be reiterated that most 
people do join groups and these youths were in a minority. Similarly, the youth who 
were not involved in the political groups, were just as politicised as the refugees 
who were. Nevertheless, taking into account the context of the Palestinian 
Resistance in Lebanon, I would argu.e that tris specific context changes the concept 
of 'committed' in that it should not only be limited to understanding the members' 
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willingness to analyse the costs, but also that of the group. It is t.h.e groups that are 
deciding their tactics in Lebanon and they have seen that some actions are too 
costly. In other words, the groups have the experience and the knowledge of mass 
political a.lld military activity, but have now decided that these may not be the best 
tools to be used at this POLllt Lll tL1lle: considering the legal status and the refugees' 
lack of protection, it seems they believe that it is v,lise to be prudent in their actions. 
The lack of adequate funding, the lack of intemational support, Lebanon's 
governmental constraints and their recent history seem to dictate that they should 
not take too many risks in t..1Jeir struggle to retu..rn home. A . I1.other important point is 
that just because some lisks are judged to be too big, does not necessarily mean that 
the refugees and the groups are any less cOIIlIPitted tha..TJ. the Palesl1Pians living in 
the West Bar~1( and Gaza. Tney - the refugees, the political groups, as well as the 
youths who are not willing to join the groups - are all committed to the goals of the 
Palestipian Resista..llce Movement. 
The fInal definition of the Palestinian groups as belonging to the many different 
types of social movement given to us by Wilkinson is not as problematic as it may 
seem at ftrst gla..'lce. In the introduction, the Palestinian Resistance was seen to 
include many categories because of the wide variety of groups within it: nationalist, 
pan-movement, class, revolutionary-resistance, women's movement as well as 
religious. Tne main problem stems from the na..'lle of the social movement itself: the 
Palestinian Resistance Movement. With regard to the part of the movement in 
Lebanon, the question a..rises as to what it is resisting, and how. The answer to this 
question would have been rather straightforward had it been asked d~ring the 
Lebanese civil war, but today it may seem to raise some eyebrows. Yet I argue that 
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it IS still a resistance movement, even In Lebanon, The Palesti..nian Resista.nce 
movement m Lebanon may not be involved m physical resista..Tlce; however 
evidence gIVen In Chapter Seven in the discussion on Palestinian identity IS 
important, and challenges the assumption that it is not a resistance movement, even 
in the diaspora, rne Palestinians, inside or outside their country, are resisting their 
Sinuation Again to Qllote SChllltz a "PaleSfinU'ar lOS sompr.ne WhO TPSl'StS" i3 it l'S a ~" ~ .&..L.. ,.L.J..... ~......... .1..1.\,.4. "', ~.1- "'~.1. .1. .l.VV.l. ..&..1...L"-"......L\,. 
part of their identity, The Palestinian Resistance Movement thus tmlls into a 
movement that is about resisting t.l}e cu..rrent situation through the concepts that are 
key to P"lestinian identity, these concppfs inclurle f'ne notions Of' 'solic'arTin" anc' ..&.-(..i..i. ...L,.L.LI. ..I. .L.a. .. ..&. .... ..&..1. .1. _" -LL.l..I.u. "'.1. .1...L\..1..I..1. ...L ..&..1. .l. ... .J .1. 
'suffering,' not necessmily physical resistance as we know it. In other words, 
although the Palestipian Resistance Movement in Lebanon does not physically resist 
their situation, they are still a resistance movement by the mere fact that their plight 
continues to exist and this rein.iorces their identity, 
Two indirect issues 
There m'e tV\"-O further issues that have been brought up indirectly throughout the 
thesis, particularly regarding the field work, 1) The difference in Raspidiyeh camp 
in comparison to the ca..'1lpS where I did my research and 2) Schultz's work in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Ship, Regarding the fOlmer, I feel Khashan is worlh 
mentioP1Tlg again because pis results seem so different from wine, Khashan 
proposes that Islamic Militancy, poverty, youth and personality patterns contribute 
13Schultz, Helena Lindholm op, cit" p, 124 
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+ Pl" '11' • 11 f "d b b' 14 LO a estullfu"l Wl.uJ.ngness to engage In, as weu as support 0 , SUlCI e om mgs. 
His sail1ple was conducted in both Rashidiyeh camp and Ein e] He1weh camp. The 
survey is based more on refugee mentality rather than actual behaviour, as the 
Leba.nese government has sealed off the border as far as they can to prevent attacks 
from Lebanon, thereby also preventing the large-scale retaliation that Israel would 
retu..rn. I therefore frnd the a"iicle somewhat problematic as it is tryi..'1g to explain 
why Palestinians in Lebanon engage and support suicide bombings within an 
environment where it does not ta.1(e place. In other words, he is perhaps trying to 
explaL.'1 what is happening i..'1 the West Ba..'1..1c, and pa..'iicularly the Gaza strip, with 
research from Lebanon. Neveliheless, his results may not be as different from mine 
as they would seem at first glance. First, the conditions, particularly in Rasbidiyeh 
ca..'1lP, are very different to other ca..'1lpS in Lebanon. The camp is heavily guarded by 
the Lebanese a.rmy and the inhabitants are restricted in many more ways than 
residents living in the other ca.lJ1pS in Lebanon. As was explained in Chapter Five, 
within this ca..'1lP, the Lebanese army is so strict that the inhabitants are not even 
allowed to bring tools into the camps with which to carry out maintenance. Ein el 
He1weh camp is also different from t.1-:1e Beirut camps. I did carry out research in tbis 
camp, and the major difference witpJn this camp is its size. It is the largest of all the 
camps, and as explained previously in Chapter Five it has tensions between the 
political groups, as it has multiple popular committees. Tpis explains the setting. His 
work was survey-based whereas my work was more qualitative~ therefore, I will 
now focus on his propositions. For Khashall prui of the reason for the support of, 
and willingness to participate Lll, suicide bombings, is Islamic militancy. My 
research only focused on secular groups, nevertheless when conducting the 
i4 Kt'1ashan, Hilal "Collective Palesftnian Frustration and Suicide Bombings" Third World Quarterlv 
(Vol. 24, No.6, 2003) 
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etlmograpmc research I was able to observe Islamic groups as well. In relation to all 
of the previous literature on t.l}e Palestipia.ll revolution and the rise of the PLO and 
the opposition groups, the i..'Ilpression one might be left with, pa..rticularly reiati..'1g to 
refugees ill Lebanon, is that the Resistance is mainly secular in orientation. Events 
in the West Bank and Gaza lead one to assume that PalestiPians in other Arab 
countries too, are supporting Islamic militancy. Indeed tlus is the case. The Islamic 
groups, Palestinia.ll Islamic Jihad and F . Ai\1AS are all considered to be part of the 
Palestinia..'1 Resistance, and therefore representatives of the Palestir..ian people as 
well: for people living witlun and outside tlle Occupied TenitOlies. Most refugees 
are religious; there were even people who are or were members of Marxist-Lepinist 
groups who were religious. But I a..'Il not certain that it is only political Isla..'Il or the 
Islamic groups that foster support for suicide bombings in tl1is case. Suicide 
bombings are considered to be a form of resistance to harsh Israeli policies towards 
Palestinians, and for that si..'Ilple reason, I believe, they are supported. I say t}l..is 
because dun.-ng my etl1l10grapmc research many refugees who were not particularly 
influenced by Islamic groups and political Isla.Til supported suicide bombings. Being 
willi..'1g to become a suicide bomber is something different, and here Khasha..'1 
proposes tllat it is again related to political Islam. No doubt political Islanl can 
motivate people to become suicide bombers; nevertheless, it is not the opJy 
motivating factor. I would argue that the 'PalestiP..ian situation' - appalling socio-
econonuc conditions for many witlun and outside the Occupied T enitories, lack of 
statehood, continual dispersal of refugees, a.lld inadequate refugee status - is 
enough to motivate a..'1yone to potentially become a suicide bomber. The problem 
Witll K..hashan's conclusions is tllat they seem to be misleading - I11jsleading in the 
sense t.1}at it gives rise to assli.Tilptions that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are 
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potential, and perhaps even actual, suicide bombers. In my research, there was 
• 1 1 CO· • 1 1 1 • 1 1 1 -11 
maeea support lOr sUlClae oomomg; nevertneless, tnere was no express Wll to 
become a suicide bomber as tl>js was not an option for them. From Lebanon, most 
political activity is paralysed. 
Schultz's work, on the other hand, was rather similar to my research with regard to 
themes of identity. She mentions similar notions such as 'to struggle' and 'to suffer'. 
However, she also has an interesti.'1g section regarding the inside-outside dichotomy. 
TIns is related to the perception by West BalLk. and Gaza PalestiDiallS of 'other' 
Palestipians Eving outside Palestine, as well as the retli..rnee Palestinians mostly from 
the PLO who retu .. rned to sta..rt rebuilding their state in the Occupied Territories. She 
explains how tins dichotomy represents tensions for the PalestunallS living ulside 
the Occupied Territories: 
'Inside-outside' represents a tension on two levels: (1) regarding identity, L'1at 
is, who is the better Palestinian, who has struggled and suffered more: and (2) 
on position and itlfiuence. 'Insiders' feel that returnees came and took positions 
without deserving them; returnees feel it was the other way round. For 
retw-nees, societal transformations in the West Bank and Gaza can be as 
disturbing an experience as for the 'insiders' watchhlg the 'outsiders' coming 
back. IS 
In tIns fmding Schulz sees t..he problems that an-ive with exiled movements that 
retum to their original territory. It is also rather a sad finding - that there should be 
such a difference between people who are all Palestipja..'1 and who all want the same 
end goal: a PalestiInall state. TIns notion does make sense, however, as the 
Palestipia..TJ. Resistance that grew up in exile was always outside the land - Palestine. 
Whereas, the insiders were always present. 
15 Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 142-143 
With regard to who is the 'better' Palestinian a...nd who has 'suffered' the most, 
Schuitz explains that Palestinians inside Palestine feel that, because they suffered 
and struggled w..rough the first Intifada, many of the 'outsiders' were able to retu ... rn. 
On the other ha...nd, as was shown in Chapters Six and Seven, the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon did not seem to be expreSSLllg whom they thought were the 
'better Palestinians', by who had suffered the most. The Palestinians in Leba..'1on, 
who have suffered so much in the past and are still suffering, interpreted the 
suffering of the Paiestinians inside Palestine at the moment, as worse and harder 
than their own. There was i.'lh'TIense solida..rity "lith, a..'1d support for, the Palesti.'1ians 
inside Palestine. The concept of 'suffering' also relates to the suffering by the 
PalestiPians inside Lebanon due to their inability to help their situation. In other 
words, feeling that one is unable to help the situation both with regard to Palestine, 
as well as the situation inside Leba...non, is also 'suffering'. 
Apart from the issue of who has struggled more, tllis dichotomy of insider-outsider 
is important if and when there is to be a Palestinian state. As we saw in Chapter 
Seven, t.~e relationsrip to Palestine of the refhgees in Lebanon is one of longing for 
Palestine and its actual soil, whereas tlle Palestillia...ns who stayed ill the Occupied 
Territories have a direct connection with the land of Palestine. The 'insiders' and the 
'outsiders' also have widely different experiences with regard to authority and 
power structures. The 'outsiders' have the experience oft."he Arab regimes (differing 
obviously from COlL.'1try to country) whereas the 'insiders' have the experience of 
Israeli rule. Witll regard to the PLO leadership who have already retumed to 
Palestine, Schultz asks the following LlJlportant questions: 
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How much does struggle of exile count among 'iilsiders' and vice versa? Has 
there been a process of accommodating different experiences dw";wg the years 
of division?lG 
She is referring here to the PLO leadership that returned to Palestine; nevertheless, 
these are important questions and issues that could have consequences for 
Palestinian society, if and when the refugees retlL1TI. 
Conclusion 
The Palestinians in Lebanon: From Peasants to Revolutionaries to a State of 
Paralysis? 
Have we turned full circle? Has the Palestinian refugee expenence m Lebanon 
1 f1 ,. • R S . " t ' t tT' It· n . ,17 t movea :.rom oemg, m ~ osemary aylgn s .erms, peasan.s.o re, om lO~~anes 0 
now being in a situation of paralysis? Rosemary Sayigh's i.>nportant work 
Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries focuses on issues related to the life 
led by the refugees in the former Palestine, the uprooting, the reality of living in the 
refhgee ca..'1lpS in Lebanon prior to the Revolution, as well as having a focus on the 
effect on the refugees of the creation of the PLO during t.~e Palestinifu"l Revolution. I8 
She points to some major themes L'1at, prior to the Palestinian Revolution, had 
16 Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 143 
17 Sayigh's terminology of 'peasants' is based purely on their experience in Lebanon, post-nakba. 
Indeed, Palestinians residing in Palestine had been actively resisting for quite some time prior to t.he 
nakba, for instance - 1917 Balfour Declaration; 1919 resisting the British and the t.hird Aliyah (until 
1923); 1929 Zionist claim to Wailing Wall; 1936 Stri.ke and .t.\rab Revolt. 
18 Sayigh, Rosema.ry Palesti .. l1ians: From Peasants to Revolutiona.ries (Zed Books, London, 1979) 
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effects on Palestinian refugee life: 'social isolation', 'loss of respect', 'family 
disruption', and 'political repression'. All of these problems still exist in the camps 
today, although the intervention of the Palesti.'1ian Revolution and the Lebanese 
Civil War made other issues more urgent. However, the difference is that today the 
refugees have lived tP.rough a time in Lebanon where they managed to acpieve 
many of their rights and satisfy at least some more of their human needs. After 
having had this, the current situation is seen and interpreted as very hard and very 
humiliating. There is an atmosphere of paralysis in the ca.T!lpS in relation to life in 
general but also rpgara"ng the pol,t'cal grollps TIt,s m· th'S context t'nat l'YlarV of" the ..l..L .&..1..," .1."".1. .1..1. 1....l...l. _ .1..1. \..1. .I. .I. \.4.._ • ".I. ..l. L.i..l...I.. .I. " ~ " "..L ".1..1..1. ..l.,J .J.. \.L.l. 
youths of today look at their situation and look at the much-diminished political 
groups with disillusioned eyes. TIlis thesis has shown that although the usual 
char.nels of mobilisation still exist and do manage to keep their adult members, as 
well as recmit new members among the youth and children, there exist a growing 
nu.T!lber of youth who are not WillLllg to join the political groups. However, their 
hopes a..'1d drea..'Ils remain the sa..'Ile as those of the political groups: returJ:'ling to 
Palestine and improving their living conditions. Nevertheless, they lmderstand the 
political group's inability to facilitate their retmn to PalestLlle from Lebanon. 
All in all, this thesis has show11 that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer from 
a lack of human and civil rights and are unable to satisfy most of their hu.l!1an needs. 
There is a sense of hopelessness and helplessness because of the lack of control over 
their situation. This resignation comes about as the refugees a.nd the political groups 
feel that they are unable to change their situation or contribute to the struggle to 
retu .. rn home. A young man from Shatila ca..'IlP wrote me a poem describing these 
feelings of helplessness, as well as t.h.e longing to rehml home: 
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The Pearl 
My homela.id is like a pearl which is far away in the sea 
We have to fight t~e sharks, the crazy waves and the whales to try and get to it 
It is in our lives but untouchable - in the distance 
It is in our hea.-ts but we still Ca.i not touch it 
The feelitig is there but we still can not get to it 
(Ayman Dahar, Shatila Camp, December 2002 - 21 years old) 
Despite their inability to change their situation, at least at tbjs moment in time, there 
still remained hope and faith that one day they would retu..rn: what I called 
'fatalistic' L.'l Chapter Seven. Fatalistic in t..1Us sense refers more to optimism than 
pessimism, in that there would be a retUl1.1 to Palestine one day - whether it be in ten 
or another fifty years. 
However, tins thesis has also Inghlig.hted that, despite tile sense of helplessness on 
the pa..rt of the refugees as well as the political groups, the political groups do still 
manage to keep and recruit members and there is a pjgh degree of political 
awareness among the refugee population. Nevertheless, many of the youth are 
suffering from disillusionment with the political groups a..l1d their situation in 
general. h'l exa.'T'jpjng mobilisation a.'ld identity within the refhgee ca.'IlPS, the 
appalling socio-economic situation was revealed. SL111jlarly the Palestilnan refugees' 
lack of protection by international, regional and local laws ma..1(e their situation 
extremely precarious, especially considering their pjstorical context in Lebanon. The 
refugees have been, and are still, waiting to be granted their rights in a hostile 
enviromnent. Tl1eir lack of a..l1Y adequate legal status and their failure to achieve 
most of their hllllall rights has been thus for over fifty yeal"s. Although the 
Palestipia..l1 refugees are not engaged in any IPilita..l1t activity a..l1d thereby are not 
considered a direct threat, tpjs situation is not sustainable. The refugee issue is at the 
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heart of the conllict between Israel and the Palestinians and should therefore be at 
the core of any future peace process. The Palestinian refugee issue involves people 
who are pa.rticularly vtl1nerable and insecure as they lack any rights of protection, 
and it is therefore of particular impOliance that Lheir needs be made a priority. 
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Interviews and Fieldwork 
Formal Interviews 
William Lee, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Jordan Field Office, Amman (21103/02) 
Age Arild Tiltnes, Regional Representative for F APO. Ll1terview held at his home In 
Amman, Jordan (22/03/02) 
Gro Hasselknippe, Researcher for F AFO. Interview held in her home in Amman, Jordan, 
(22/03/02) 
Haj Salem, leader for Fatah 1,tifada in Shatila Camp. 1,terview held in his home, Shatila 
Camp (07110/02) 
Mo'taz Ma'rouf, leader of1i~e DFLP for Lebanon. L,terview held in his home, Shatila Camp 
(07/10/02) 
Hisham Najem, leader of the Palesti.'1ia.'1 Communist Party in Shatila Camp. Interview held 
in his office, Shatila Camp (09/10/02) 
Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila Camp. Interview held in his office, Shatila Camp 
(09110/02) 
Abu Akram, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon. Interview held in his office, Mar Elias 
Camp (10110/02) 
Leader of t.he PPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed's office, Shatila Camp 
(10/10102) 
Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in his office, Mar Elias Camp 
(12110102) 
Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila Camp. Interview held at his home, Shatila 
Camp (15/10/02) 
Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon. Interview held at the PLF office in 
Shatila Camp (16/10/02) 
Abu Moujahed, former head of all popular committees in Lebanon, now head of the 
Children and Youth Centre (CYC) in Shatila Camp (1811 0/02) 
Sobheye, Palestinian resident in Sabra. Young woman (late 20' s), unmarried and has a job 
with lJNRW A Interview held in her home, Sabra (23/1 0/02) 
Tarek, Palestinian Resident of Shatila Camp. Young man, unmarried, works in his aunt's 
pha..rmacy shop in Shatila. Interview held in his shop, Shatila Ca..rnp (11112/02) 
Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut (17111/03) 
Ayman, Palestinian Resident of Shatiia camp. Attended the Chiidren and Youth Centre in 
his youth, has now finished school and has no work. Mid-twenties, unmarried, still visits 
youth centre to 'hang out' and meet friends. L,terview held in his home, Shatila Camp 
(18111/03) 
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Hussein, Lebanese Resident of Shatila Camp. Early twenties, but still visits youth centre. 
Interview held at the CYC, Shatila Camp (19/11103) 
Rabieh, Palestinian Resident of Shatila Camp. 17 years old. Still at school, dreatus about a 
beuer life with ajob abroad. Interview held at the CYC, Shatila Camp, (20/11/03) 
Abdullah Farhat, Mi.'1ister for the Displaced in Lebanon. Interview held in his Office, 
Beirut, (24111103) 
Abeer, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp. Mid-twenties, unmarried, helps to org~mise 
events for children in the youth centre. Ii1terview held itl her home, Shatila Camp (27111/03) 
Abu Samer, Palestinian living h'1 Shatila Camp. Head of a family, previously politically 
active but seems to have retired from politics now. Interview held in his home, Shatila 
Camp (28/11103) 
Informal Interviews 
Abu Mo~iahed, former head of aH popular cOITunittees for Lebanon, Leader for the Children 
and Youth Centre in Shatila Camp, Shatila camp, multiple times (2001, 2002, 2003) 
01fat Khalil Mah.tnoud, Director for the Women's Humanitarian Orga.rlisation (that also 
runs a youth centre). Interview held in her office, Bomj Barajneh Ca..'1lP, both on (28/07/0 I ) 
and (30110/02) 
Salah Salah, Director of AnAL Centre (Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisation -
Statistics and Documentation Office - based in Beirut). Interview held at his office in the 
Cola District, Beimt, (31/1 0102) 
Sara, Palestinian living in Cola district, member of the AJY AL Centre. Late twenties, 
unmarried, spends time in the ATY A.L centre. No job. Interview held at the AJIAL Centre, 
Beirut (04111102) 
Walid, Resident of Ein el Helweh camp, living at the time in Beirut. Late twenties, 
unmarried, spends his time at the AN AL centre. Interview held at AJ'iAL Centre, Beimt 
(07/11102) 
Haj Salem, (see above - Leader for Fatah Intifada) Multiple occasions in Shatila Camp and 
Sabra in the autumn of 2002 
Atlunad, Resident of Ein el Helweh Camp. Early thirties, married, has an illegal job driving 
lorries. Interview held in a friend's home, Ein el Helweh Camp (11/11/02) 
Mohmnmad, Resident of Ein el Helweh Ca..up. Mid-thirties, unmarried, no job. Interview 
held in a friend's home, Ein el Helweh Camp (12111102) 
Ayman, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp.(see above) Numerous almost daily 
conversations and informal interviews during autUIThI 2002 ~md 2003, as well as MSN 
interviewLT1g on particular issues and opinions. 
Salah, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp. Used to attend the youth centre, now he helps 
Abu Moujahed when he can. Accompanied me to many of my interviews with poiitical 
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leaders. Numerous almost daily conversations and one informal interview during autumn 
2002 and 2003, as well as MSN question and answers on particuiar issues and opinions). 
Abeer, Palestinia.. Living in Shatila Camp. (see above) Numerous ittiormal interviews and 
conversations during 2002 and 2003. 
Conversations and Topics Recorded in Diary 
Included here are people who wished to be completely anonymous (no tape recorder or 
names) as well as people who wanted the topics that we spoke about, if referred to at all, be 
refeiTed to in a general way but with no reference to their identity. 
Also included are my personal observations, impressions and thoughts on my visits to the 
camps as well as post-interviews. 
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